Following its post-war heyday, the statue of existentialism was very much thrown into the mud. And there, by and large, it has remained. Once, with Marxism, dominating the intellectual landscape, what became known as ‘existentialism’ is now widely viewed as obsolete. Authenticity, angst, alienation? Existentialist concerns, and the subjective pathos underscoring them, have long since been unfashionable in both philosophy departments, and wider culture.1 Certain figures are still studied of course. But this association is usually seen as a taint, or it is expunged from their identity altogether. The former is true for Sartre. The existentialist connection means his philosophy overall is often held up as simplistic or passé, even where specific insights are acknowledged or utilised.2 Meanwhile, the latter is true for Nietzsche and Heidegger. In an inversion of the problem facing Sartre, it is assumed that Heidegger and Nietzsche cannot be existentialists. This is, at least according to their supporters, because these two figures possess the sophistication and relevance which existentialism so plainly lacks. At any rate they are not typically read with existentialism in mind.
Further, where the term is still considered properly at all its’ purpose is largely curatorial. That is, ‘existentialism’ is used as a sort of historical place holder, a way of categorizing certain figures and themes for the benefit of textbooks and historians. So why is this? Why has existentialism become what Sartre himself called ‘a finished, already outdated mode of culture’?3 At its broadest level this book will argue that this is due to the common conflation of two related but distinct philosophical commitments. The first is to what I will call a ‘return to the human’. As discussed in this chapter, this is the idea that philosophy has lost touch with an essential goal of allowing human beings to comprehend their own existence. And this, with a related conception of philosophy as something lived, and a general theory of the human, I say is constitutive of a possible, radical, mode of existentialism. The second commitment is to a ‘humanist’ idea of the subject. The precise meaning of this will be unpacked in what follows. But, briefly, it involves acceptance of the independent and ‘present’ notion of subjectivity criticised by Heidegger in his Letter on Humanism.
As such this introduction makes two central points. First: that the root of existentialism’s dismissal lies in the conflation of these commitments. In other words, it is seen as outmoded because a possible ‘return to the human’, or a vulgarised sense of this, is held to be synonymous with a naïve, humanist view of the subject. The second point involves challenging this association. Consequently, I explain how it is possible to have a return to human existence which is non-humanist. This is attempted first by the development of a specific conception of the ‘return to the human’. I argue that, thought properly as a ‘return to human being’, this allows a mode of existentialism to escape humanism. I then outline the main problem arising from this escape. And I lastly intimate why the concept of perversion might provide a resolution to this. That is, I suggest why the idea that the human being exists as a perversion of something other than itself, might hold the key to defending a non-humanist existentialism. In this way I aim to recover an existentialism both radical and philosophically credible. I likewise hope to show how existentialist thought is still vital and relevant today.
1 The Meaning of Existentialism
A preliminary question though needs to be addressed. Before looking more closely at the meaning of humanism, and how a type of existentialism might avoid it, it is necessary to investigate the concept of existentialism itself. Specifically, I need to ask what has been, and can be, meant by it in the first place. This is for several reasons. First, if I cannot show that the term can signify something substantial then the project of this book does not even get off the ground. Second, I need to provide some justification, in contrast with other accounts, for my own specific description of its meaning. This will allow me to say more about what the ‘return to the human’ entails. Further, this will help explain why a type of existentialism has been mistakenly seen as humanist. And I will also begin to show how my conception of this ‘return’ might point toward an alternative to humanism.
So, I begin in this fashion by noting that the very capacity of the term to describe anything meaningful at all has often been questioned. As Cooper observes, ‘It has been denied … that there ever was a distinctive philosophical perspective or tendency shared by those thinkers who have been labelled “existentialists.”’4 And at least part of the reason for this has to be the sheer number and diversity of figures who have been identified under this banner. Kaufmann’s anthology is illustrative. Aside from Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Rilke, Kafka, Ortega and Jaspers are all included.5 And in his 2018 work, Rethinking Existentialism, Webber also makes a case for Fanon and De Beauvoir. Some have even argued for the inclusion of the early Marx.6
Nevertheless, diversity alone does not preclude the possibility of a common meaning.7 It could be that there is, as Merleau-Ponty says about phenomenology, likewise here a common ‘manner or style of thinking.’8 Or it could simply be that not all these figures should be classed as existentialist. Or some only partially so. As such, while not as straightforward as categorising, say, empiricism or Marxism9 it is imperative to at least look for such a meaning or ‘style of thinking’. Consequently, some of the most plausible candidates for this will be explored. I will then attempt to forge my own meaning from engagement with these. That said, it should also be stressed that my goal is a specific one. I am not attempting a definitive or exhaustive definition. Nor am I looking for a meaning which necessarily incorporates every putatively existentialist figure. Other accounts which do this better are certainly possible. So too are accounts which give a neater definition of the concept or which accord more closely with definitions given by existentialists themselves. The point here rather is to highlight the most sophisticated possible sense of existentialism. The main other proviso is that it should be one recoverable from engagement with at least some existentialist texts and thinkers.
1.1 Existentialism as ‘Anti-Philosophy’
Starting out then, one of the classical and most well-known possibilities can be understood in terms of a negation. And it uses the very difficulty of defining existentialism as its starting point. On this view, it would be impossible for the figures previously mentioned to be defined in terms of any common programme of what they are for. Rather they must be defined by a common agenda of what they are against. This is Kaufmann’s position when he argues that, ‘Existentialism is not a philosophy but a label for several widely different revolts against traditional philosophy.’10 In this way, one possible understanding of existentialism is that it is not so much a ‘philosophy’ in an obvious sense, but a sort of ‘anti-philosophy’.
Conventional or ‘traditional’ philosophy, in terms of what existentialists are thought to oppose on this view, can be defined by three related features. One: it is concerned principally with truth, and for its own sake. What Nietzsche calls ‘the value of truth’,11 when it comes to certain standard philosophical questions, is bracketed out. Why we should care, for instance, about the nature of causation, or whether there is a mind independent reality, is not usually asked. The relevance of such questions to the lives of individuals, or the kinds of individuals these questions help create, not considered. The second feature is stylistic. Conventional philosophy seeks to disclose certain truths or ideas in an impartial, and relatively standardised, manner. The voice, life, and individuality, of the writer is secondary. Likewise, the stylistic goal of the writing is not primarily to inspire or transform the reader, but to gain assent for certain truths or arguments. Lastly, it is systematic. While there is widespread contemporary scepticism toward systematic philosophy taken in a broader Hegelian or Marxist sense, it is systematic in a more limited way. That is, any given philosopher will systematically apply the same, usually well worn, methodologies and theoretical perspectives to arrive at conclusions and truths.12 And those truths will, in turn, be brought together in order to present a coherent and ‘systematic’ understanding of an issue.
But why was existentialism, on this view, opposed to all this? Why was it that, as Judaken says, that ‘existentialism defined itself against systems’,13 against systematic thought and conventional philosophy more broadly? Kaufmann does not go into much detail on these points.14 A more sustained and sophi...