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Napoleon's Military Maxims
Napoleon Bonaparte, William E. Cairnes, George C. D'Aguilar
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eBook - ePub
Napoleon's Military Maxims
Napoleon Bonaparte, William E. Cairnes, George C. D'Aguilar
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This classic brings together a rich sampling of the knowledge and wisdom of one of history's greatest military commanders. The concise text not only provides a fascinating glimpse of the French leader's intellectual ability for conducting military operations but also reveals his thoughts, theories, and commentaries on waging war and the art of conducting statecraft. Equally relevant to today's entrepreneur, the book is packed with maneuvers that can be applied just as easily to increasing revenues on the battlefield of commerce.
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Storia militare e marittimaNapoleonâs Military Maxims
I
THE FRONTIERS OF states are either large rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and large rivers occupy the third place.
Napoleon in his military career appears to have been called upon to surmount every species of difficulty peculiar to aggressive warfare.
In Egypt he traversed deserts and vanquished and destroyed the Mamelukes, so celebrated for their address and courage. His genius knew how to accommodate itself to all the dangers of this distant enterprise in a country ill adapted to supply the wants of his troops.
In the conquest of Italy he twice crossed the Alps by the most difficult passes, and at a season which rendered this undertaking still more formidable. In three months he passed the Pyrenees, beat and dispersed four Spanish armies. In short, from the Rhine to the Borysthenes no natural obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid march of his victorious army.
II
IN FORMING THE plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it.
Plans of campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country.
Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which is directly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this success depends generally on the caprice of fortune, or upon faults committed by the enemyâtwo things upon which a general must never count. Sometimes the plan of a campaign runs the risk of failing at the outset, if opposed by an adversary who acts at first on the defensive, and then suddenly seizing the initiative, surprises by the skilfulness of his manĆuvres. Such was the fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic Council for the campaign of 1796, under the command of Marshal Wurmser. From his great numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated on the entire destruction of the French army by cutting off its retreat. He founded his operations on the defensive attitude of his adversary, who was posted on the line of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of Mantua, as well as central and lower Italy.
Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed in the neighbourhood of Mantua, divided his force into three corps which marched separately, intending to unite at that place. Napoleon, having penetrated the design of the Austrian general, felt all the advantage to be derived from striking the first blow against an army divided into three corps without any relative communications. He hastened, therefore, to raise the siege of Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, and by this means became superior to the Imperialists, whose divisions he attacked and beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied he had only to march to certain victory, saw himself compelled after a ten daysâ campaign to retire with the remains of his army into the Tyrol, after a loss of twenty-five thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen thousand prisoners, nine stand of colours, and seventy pieces of cannon. This proves that nothing is so difficult as to prescribe beforehand to a general the line of conduct he shall pursue during the course of a campaign. Success must often depend on circumstances that cannot be foreseen; and it should be remembered, likewise, that nothing cramps so much the efforts of genius as compelling the head of an army to be governed by any will but his own.
III
AN ARMY WHICH undertakes the conquest of a country has its two wings either resting upon neutral territories, or upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some cases that only one wing is so supported, and in others that both are exposed.
In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected, a general has only to guard against being penetrated in front. In the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon the supported wing. In the third, where both wings are exposed, he should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different corps under his command to depart from this; for if it be difficult to contend with the disadvantage of having two flanks exposed, the inconvenience is doubled by having four, tripled if there be six; that is to say, if the army is divided into two or three different corps. In the first instance then, as above quoted, the line of operation may tend indifferently to the right or to the left. In the second, it should be directed towards the wing in support. In the third, it should be perpendicular to the centre of the armyâs line of march. But in all these cases it is necessary every five or six days to have a strong post, or an entrenched position, upon the line of march, in order to collect stores and provisions, to organise convoys, to form a centre of movement, and establish a point of defence, to shorten the line of operations.
These general principles in the art of war were entirely unknown or lost sight of in the Middle Ages. The Crusaders, in their incursions into Palestine, appear to have had no object but to fight and to conquer, so little pains did they take to profit by their victories. Hence innumerable armies perished in Syria, without any other advantage than that derived from the momentary success obtained by superior numbers.
It was by neglect of these principles also, that Charles the Twelfth, abandoning his line of operation and all communication with Sweden, threw himself into the Ukraine, and lost the greater part of his army by the fatigues of a winter campaign in a barren country destitute of resources.
Defeated at Pultawa, he was reduced to seek refuge in Turkey, after crossing the Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished to little more than one thousand men.
Gustavus Adolphus was the first who brought back the art of war to its true principles. His operations in Germany were bold, rapid, and well executed. He made success at all times conducive to future security, and established his line of operation so as to prevent the possibility of any interruption in his communications with Sweden. His campaigns form a new era in the art of war.
IV
WHEN THE CONQUEST of a country is undertaken by two or three armies, which have each their separate line of operation, until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a principle, that the junction should never take place near the enemy, because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not only prevent it, but beat the armies in detail.
In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, marching to the conquest of Bohemia with two armies, which had each their separate line of operation, succeeded, notwithstanding, in uniting them in sight of the Duke of Loraine, who covered Prague with the Imperial army. The success of this march, however, depended entirely on the inaction of the duke, who at the head of seventy thousand men did nothing to prevent the junction of the two Prussian armies.
V
ALL WARS SHOULD be governed by certain principles, for every war should have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of art. War should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome.
It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that when war is decided on, it is necessary to have exact information of the number of the troops the enemy can bring into the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid plan of offensive or defensive operation without an accurate knowledge of what you have to expect and fear. When the first shot is fired, no one can calculate what will be the issue of the war. It is therefore of vast importance to reflect maturely before we begin it. When once, however, this is decided, the marshal observes that the boldest and most extended plans are generally the wisest and the most successful. When we are determined upon war, he adds, we should carry it on vigorously and without trifling.
VI
AT THE COMMENCEMENT of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a matter for grave consideration, but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skilful the manĆuvers, a retreat will always weaken the moral of an army, because in losing the chances of success these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats cost always more men and matĂ©riel than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that in a battle the enemyâs loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side only.
Marshal Saxe remarks that no retreats are so favourable as those which are made before a languid and unenterprising enemy, for when he pursues with vigour, the retreat soon degenerates into a rout. Upon this principle it is a great error, says the Marshal, to adhere to the proverb which recommends us to build a bridge of gold for a retreating enemy. Noâfollow him up with spirit, and he is destroyed.
VII
AN ARMY SHOULD be ready every day, every night, and at all times of the day and night, to oppose all the resistance of which it is capable. With this view, the soldier should be invariably complete in arms and ammunition; the infantry should never be without its artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; and the different divisions of the army should be constantly in a state to support and to be supported.
The troops, whether halted, or encamped, or on the march, should always be in favourable positions, possessing the essentials required for a field of battle; for example, the flanks should be well covered, and all the artillery so placed as to have free range and to play with the greatest advantage. When an army is in column of march, it should have advanced guards and flanking parties, to examine well the country in front, to the right, and to the left, and always at such distance as to enable the main body to deploy into position.
The following maxims, taken from the memoirs of Montecuculli, appear to me well suited to this place, and calculated to form a useful commentary on the general principles laid down in the preceding observations:â
1
When war has been once decided on, the moment is past for doubts and scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that all the evil which may ensue, will not; that Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert it, or that the want of talent on the part of the enemy may prevent him from benefiting by it. The first security for success is to confer the command on one individual. When the authority is divided, opinions are divided likewise, and the operations are deprived of that ensemble which is the first essential to victory. Besides, when an enterprise is common to many, and not confined to a single person, it is conducted without vigour, and less interest is attached to the result.
After having strictly conformed to all the rules of war, and satisfied ourselves that nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual success, we must then leave the issue in the hands of Providence, and repose ourselves tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.
Let what will arrive, it is the part of a general-in-chief to remain firm and constant in his purposes: he must be equally superior to elation in prosperity and depression in adversity, for in war good and bad fortune succeed each other by turns, and form the ebb and flow of military operations.
2
When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of the enemy weak and consisting of new levies, or of troops enervated by long inaction, then you should exert every means to bring him to battle.
If, on the other hand, the adversary has the advantage in troops, a decisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede his progress, by encamping advantageously and fortifying favourable passes. When armies are nearly equal, it is desirable not to avoid a battle, but only to fight one to advantage. For this purpose care should be taken to encamp always in front of the enemy, to move when he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous grounds that lie upon his line of march; to seize upon all the buildings and roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself advantageously in the places by which he must pass. It is always something gained to make him lose time, to thwart his designs, or to retard their progress and execution. If, however, an army is altogether inferior to that of the enemy, and there is no possibility of manĆuvring against him with success, then the campaign must be abandoned, and the troops must retire into the fortresses.
3
The first object of a general-in-chief in the moment of battle should be to secure the flanks of his army. It is true that natural positions may be found to effect this object, but these positions being fixed and immovable in themselves, they are only advantageous to a general who is prepared to wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one who marches to the attack.
A general can therefore rely only on the just disposition of his troops to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon the front, or flanks, or rear of his army.
If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine, the whole of the cavalry should be posted with the other wing, in order to envelop the enemy more easily by its superiority in numbers.
If the enemy has his flanks supported by woods, light cavalry or infantry should be despatched to attack him in flank, or in rear, during the heat of the battle. If practicable, also, an attack should be made upon the baggage, to add to his confusion.
If you desire to beat the enemyâs left with your right wing, or his right with your left wing, the wing with which you attack should be reinforced by the Ă©lite of your army. At the same moment the other wing should be refused, and the attacking wing brought rapidly forward, so as to overwhelm the enemy. If the nature of the ground admits, he should be approached by stealth, and attacked before he is on his guard. If any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy, and which are always to be detected by confusion or disorder in his movements, he should be pursued immediately, without allowing him time to recover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into action, and manĆuvre so as to cut off his artillery and baggage.
4
The order of march should always be suservient to the order of battle, which last should be arranged beforehand. The march of an army is always well regulated when it is governed by the distance to be accomplished, and by t...