The MENA Region: A Great Power Competition

AA.VV., Karim Mezran, Arturo Varvelli

• Publisher: Ledizioni
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9788855260725
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Tratados

The volume deals with competition among regional and external players for the redistribution of power and international status in the Middle East and North Africa, with a focus on Russia's renewed role and the implications for US interests. Over the last few years, a crisis of legitimacy has beset the liberal international order.In this context, the configuration of regional orders has come into question, as in the extreme case of the current collapse in the Middle East. The idea of a "Russian resurgence" in the Middle East set against a perceived American withdrawal has captured the attention of policymakers and scholars alike, warranting further examination. This volume, a joint publication by ISPIand the Atlantic Council, gathers analysis on Washington's and Moscow's policy choices in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers' engagament in the countries beset by major crises.

1. US Withdrawal from the Middle East:
Perceptions and Reality

William F. Wechsler

When Britain’s Minister of State in the Foreign Commonwealth Office toured its “Protected States” of the Persian Gulf in November 1967, he conveyed an important message of reassurance. Yes, they had encountered embarrassing military setbacks in the region recently. And, of course, there were voices at home arguing that the financial resources being dedicated to securing the Middle East would be better used to improve the domestic economy. But any lingering perceptions of an impending British departure reflected only rumors, and certainly not any reality.

Indeed, the Minister confirmed that “there was no thought of withdrawal in our minds” and that Britain would remain in the Gulf “so long as was necessary and desirable to ensure the peace and stability of the area”1. By all accounts the Minister was honest in his representations of British intentions and sincere in his confidence that British promises would be kept. And yet, merely two months later, on 16 January 1968, the Prime Minister publicly announced that Britain would soon begin withdrawing all its forces East of Suez, to be completed by the end of 1971.

The United States, closing in on a quarter millennium since its declaration of independence, is now an old state with a short memory. Most Americans, even including some who have helped craft US policies toward the Middle East in recent administrations, do not remember the details of what was immediately understood to be a terrible British betrayal of its longstanding local partners. The Gulf states, most of which are not yet a half century from their independence, are young but have longer memories. None of their leaders have forgotten.

Today it is the United States’ turn to be confronted with questions about its withdrawal when visiting the Gulf and the wider Middle East. For many US diplomats and military officers in the region, such questions are baffling and their repetition frustrating. How can there be any doubts about the US commitment when there are so many US resources dedicated to the region? How can there be any question of American withdrawal when the United States has such clear national security interests at stake?

Perpetual American Interests

Indeed, American policymakers’ recognition of US national security interests in the Middle East has remained remarkably consistent across administrations ever since the region’s energy resources began to be exploited, and especially since the United States took on the mantle of global leadership.

Some of these regional interests reflect the United States’ wider understanding of its global security requirements. As with any part in the world, the United States has a strong interest in ensuring that no power in this region, either state or non-state, has both the will and capacity to directly attack the United States. As such, the United States has traditionally worked to ensure that no single entity could militarily dominate the wider Eurasian landmass, of which the Middle East is part, as such a power would inherently pose a direct military threat.

Over this same time period the United States also concluded that its global interests are best protected by promoting the liberal international order. This order represents a remarkably idealist break from historic norms of oligarchical societies, authoritarian governments, mercantilist economies, and adventurist militaries. But, with some notable exceptions, the American approach to achieving these idealist aims has been largely defined by a realist reliance on incremental progress towards generational reform, and the clear willingness to compromise in the short term on matters of principle in support of longer-term improvements, notwithstanding the inevitable charges of hypocrisy.

Overall this mix of idealist and realist polices has been remarkably successful, as the post-World War II era has witnessed the greatest global advancement in the human condition ever recorded. And yet, nowhere has that realist acceptance of compromise and incrementalism been more evident than in the Middle East, where representative governments remain scarce, a near-term threat of interstate conflict persists, and many economies are still primarily organized for the benefit of those who rule.

This dynamic cannot be understood without first appreciating the region’s unique role as a global energy producer. Oil remains the most important global energy source, representing over one-third of all energy consumption, ahead of coal and natural gas, and far ahead of all renewable resources combined2. No matter the rate of the energy transition, oil is going to remain a crucial part of the energy mix for at least the lifetime of anyone reading this, and most likely through the lifetimes of their children. Furthermore, although the effect is not nearly as direct as it was decades ago, a long-term increase in the market price of oil still negatively affects both global economic growth and inflation, and a long-term decline in prices would make energy producers unstable.

US policymakers must still grapple with these realities, notwithstanding the United States’ newfound “energy independence”. While breakthroughs in fracking and directional drilling have doubled US production over the last decade3, this doesn’t mean that the United States is now in a state of energy autarky. Increasing domestic production and the growth of renewable energy have indeed gone a long way toward mitigating the strategic risk of a foreign adversary cutting off distant energy supply lines in wartime, but they do nothing to protect the United States from increases in global oil prices. US oil companies do not offer American citizens discount pricing due to their nationality, nor do American consumers choose to pay above market rates for domestically sourced gasoline.

Unfortunately, global oil prices are not the result of an entirely free market, absent from any foreign government influence. This is because roughly four-fifths of the world’s proven oil reserves are concentrated in the fourteen member states of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and about two-thirds of these are located in the Middle East4.

Saudi Arabia alone plays a particularly prominent role. It is naturally blessed with some of the cheapest oil in the world to find, develop, and produce. It possesses the second largest proven oil reserves (after Venezuela, which mainly has problematic extra heavy crude), maintains the second largest production (now to the United States due to fracking), and remains the oil market’s global swing producer with spare capacity that allows it to make the tactical shifts necessary to influence market prices. These shifts are sometimes designed for global benefit, as when Saudi Arabia acts to prevent unwelcome price volatility in moments of crisis, and at other times are made to maximize the Kingdom’s own long-term market position and revenues. As a result, Saudi Aramco is by far the world’s most profitable company.

Even more unfortunately, the Middle East is a fundamentally unstable region of the world, beset with interstate military rivalries and deeply challenged by internal tensions. Additionally, most of the region’s energy resources have to move through one of two critical geographical chokepoints. The most important is the Strait of Hormuz that connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, sandwiched between Iran, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. It is so narrow that ships moving through are restricted to one inbound or outbound lane, each only two miles wide. Through this tight passage transits about one-third of total global seaborne traded oil and, in total, over a fifth of the entire world’s global oil supply. Over one-quarter of global liquefied natural gas trade also moves through the channel. Moreover, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the similarly narrow waterway between the coasts of Yemen and the Horn of Africa at the southern end of the Red Sea, itself accounts for just under one-tenth of total seaborne traded petroleum. It is painfully easy to disrupt the movement of tankers through these chokepoints, and it doesn’t require a sizable military to shut it down entirely.

Given these energy and geographic realities, the United States has long identified four principal national security objectives that are specific to the Middle East: the region’s energy resources must continue to be extracted, they must be able to move freely to consumers, regional stability should be supported, and regional prosperity should be encouraged. Ideally, perhaps, these American objectives could be realized by freeriding on another benevolent global power eager to provide them. A...