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Prince
Niccolo Machiavelli
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Prince
Niccolo Machiavelli
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About This Book
Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to 1512 held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic missions to various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled and returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd June 1527
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Topic
LittératureSubtopic
ClassiquesCHAPTER I
HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND
BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED
All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men
have been and are either republics or principalities.
Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has
been long established; or they are new.
The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco
Sforza, or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary
state of the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of
Naples to that of the King of Spain.
Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under
a prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the
arms of the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by
ability.
CHAPTER II
CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES
I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in
another place I have written of them at length, and will address
myself only to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order
indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to be
ruled and preserved.
I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary
states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince,
than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the
customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances
as they arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself
in his state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and
excessive force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever
anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.
We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could
not have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those
of Pope Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his
dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less
necessity to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved;
and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is
reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well
disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule
the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one
change always leaves the toothing for another.
CHAPTER III
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES
But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly,
if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state
which, taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes
arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new
principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to
better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms
against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they
afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse.
This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which
always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to
him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he
must put upon his new acquisition.
In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured
in seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those
friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy
them in the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures
against them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very
strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always
need of the goodwill of the natives.
For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly
occupied Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the
first time it only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who
had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their
hopes of future benefit, would not endure the ill–treatment of the
new prince. It is very true that, after acquiring rebellious
provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards,
because the prince, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity
of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out the
suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to
cause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the
Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on
the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was
necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies
should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the
causes above mentioned.
Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the
second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed;
it remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources
he had, and what any one in his situation would have had for
maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did the
King of France.
Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added
to an ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the
same country and language, or they are not. When they are, it is
easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed
to self–government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have
destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the
two peoples, preserving in other things the old conditions, and not
being unlike in customs, will live quietly together, as one has
seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been
bound to France for so long a time: and, although there may be some
difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the
people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has
annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind
two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord
is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes
are altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely
one body with the old principality.
But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,
customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and
great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and
most real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go
and reside there. This would make his position more secure and
durable, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece, who,
notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding
that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able
to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as
they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not
at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one
can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not
pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt
recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more
cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who
would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost
caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested
from him with the greatest difficulty.
The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two
places, which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary
either to do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry
and infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with
little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and
he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands
and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he
offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure
him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at
the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to
them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I
say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful,
they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and
scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought
either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge
themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot;
therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of
such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one
spends much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income
from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many
more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through
the shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with
hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst
beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every
reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is
useful.
Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above
respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his less
powerful neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them,
taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any
accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen that such
a one will be introduced by those who are discontented, either
through excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen
already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and
in every other country where they obtained a footing they were
brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is
that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the
subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they
feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to those subject
states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself,
for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has
acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold
of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own
forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more
powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country.
And he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose
what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have
endless difficulties and troubles.
The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed
closely these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly
relations with[2] the minor powers, without
increasing their strength; they kept down the greater, and did not
allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece appears
to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Aetolians were
kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled,
Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and
Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their
power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to
be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of
Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over
the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all
prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present
troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with
every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them;
but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in
time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in
this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the
beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect,
but in the course of time, not having been either detected or
treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult
to cure. This it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils
that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man
to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not
having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way
that every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy.
Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at
once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a head,
for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to be put
off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with
Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy;
they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did
that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise
ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the benefits of the time—but rather
the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives
everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as
evil, and evil as well as good.
But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any
of the things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as the one whose conduct is the better to be
observed, he having held possession of Italy for the longest
period; and you will see that he has done the opposite to those
things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of divers
elements.
King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the
Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his
intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king,
because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy, and having no friends
there—seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the
conduct of Charles—he was forced to accept those friendships which
he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his
design if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king,
however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority
which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his
friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the
Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of
Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the
Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then
could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by
them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy,
had made the king master of two–thirds of Italy.
Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king
could have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the
rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and
protected; for although they were numerous they were both weak and
timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus
they would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by
their means he could easily have made himself secure against those
who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did
the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It
never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself,
depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown themselves
into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much
temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority.
And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it
up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander,
and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself
forced to come into Italy.
And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of
Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the
prime arbiter in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious
of that country and the malcontents of his own should have
somewhere to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom
his own pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who
was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.
The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men
always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not
blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means,
then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have
attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if
she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the
partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was
justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy,
this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of
that necessity.
Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor
powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in
Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the
country, he did not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were
not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away
their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized
the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very
reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken
these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for
they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from
designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have
consented except to become masters themselves there; also because
the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to
give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not
have had the courage.
And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to
Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war," I answer for the
reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to
avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to
your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which
the king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the
enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on
concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.
Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries
and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but
much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I
spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the
son of Pope Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna,
and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not
understand war, I replied to him that the French did not understand
statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the
Church to reach such greatness. And in fact is has been seen that
the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused
by France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a
general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is
the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that
predominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else by
force, and both are distrusted by him who has been raised to
power.
CHAPTER IV
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH
Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions.
I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection.
The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lo...