Geopolitics in Late Antiquity

The Fate of Superpowers from China to Rome

Hyun Jin Kim

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351869263
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Ancient History
• Index: History

Geopolitics in Late Antiquity explores the geopolitical revolution which shook the foundations of the ancient world, the dawning of the millennium of Inner Asian dominance and virtual monopoly of world power (with interludes) that began with the rise of the Huns and then continued under the hegemony of various other steppe peoples. Kim examines first the geopolitical situation created by the rise of Inner Asian powers, and then the reactions of the great empires of Eurasia to this geopolitical challenge.

A unique feature of this book is its in-depth analysis of the geostrategies (some successful, others misguided) adopted by China, Rome and Persia to cope with the growing Inner Asian threat. The conclusions and insights drawn from this analysis are then used to inform modern geopolitics, mainly the contest for hegemonic power between the United States and China.

Geopolitics in Late Antiquity is a crucial resource for both academic and learned general readership, who have an interest in the fate of antiquity's superpowers and also for those engaged in current international relations policy-making, who wish to learn from historical precedents.

1 Introduction

In the past few decades it has been fashionable to speak of global hegemonic power shifts. The assumption has been that global power and hegemony were gradually shifting from the United States to East Asia, more specifically to China. Nothing generates more anxiety and fear in both the academic community and also among the general public than the prospect of another hegemonic conflict between the world’s great powers. China’s breathtaking rise in recent years has drawn the attention of the world to its ‘potential’ to upset the geopolitical status quo, to ‘overthrow’ or ‘replace’ the century-long dominance of the US in global affairs. Throughout history, it is often argued, power transition of this sort involving the transfer of hegemony or a tectonic shift in the geopolitical landscape, has usually involved apocalyptic warfare and mayhem such as the two World Wars of the previous century. More than a decade ago policy analysts, international relations experts and political theorists had already begun to sound the alarm and warned of an impending disaster on the horizons, that is if China is not contained and US hegemony protected.¹

Those alarmist voices have neither diminished nor been silenced as this book goes to press and what is not disputed in this heated debate is that the world faces a new geopolitical reality. The geopolitical landscape of the Pacific Rim has indeed experienced and witnessed a transformation. China is now significantly stronger than it was 30 years earlier (although there certainly can be disagreements on whether that accumulation of strength on the part of China is enough to challenge the hegemony of the US) and the top foreign policy dilemma of every nation state in East Asia and indeed across the globe is what to do in this changed geopolitical environment. This book seeks to illuminate our very modern geopolitical concerns by looking back to and examining in greater detail a significant geopolitical revolution in Late Antiquity which forced the contemporary superpowers of the known world (Rome, Iran and China) to react to a dangerous new geopolitical reality: the precipitous rise of steppe empires in Inner Asia that threatened the established world order and presented an existential crisis to these traditional, regional hegemons.

By observing how these great ancient powers managed or rather often mismanaged a major geopolitical revolution on their doorsteps and struggled with their rapidly evolving geostrategic² options in Late Antiquity (in the case of China earlier during the Han dynasty), this book hopes to inform the current geostrategic decision making of world powers. It also has the aim of escaping the Eurocentric models that have dominated policy debates and international relations theory by focusing more closely on wider Eurasian geopolitical developments in world history that arguably have a greater geographic relevance to the current geopolitical situation in Asia (especially for China) and the Asia-Pacific (via analogy for the US). The expansion of the Huns/Xiongnu was a very Eurasian geopolitical development that impacted the whole of the Afro-Eurasian interactive system.³ The analysis of how the three superpowers of Antiquity (Rome, Iran and China) coped with this unexpected challenge (and dealt with each other in the case of Rome and Sassanian Persia) will form the core of the discussion of this book. This and shorter analyses of historical exempla from later periods of history (dealing with the geostrategic decisions of the Mongol Yuan, Ming and Ottoman Empires) will inform tentative geostrategic recommendations for both the US and China.

Although it is the bread and butter of world leaders and policymakers engaged in diplomacy and military planning, geopolitics is rarely recognised as a legitimate academic discipline. It is often referred to as a pseudoscience, much discredited due to its association with the likes of General Karl Haushofer and his expansionist ideas that arguably influenced Hitler and the Nazis during the Third Reich. This is most unfortunate for two obvious reasons: a) Haushofer can hardly be credited with having ‘invented’ geopolitics; b) both he and Hitler were such poor practitioners of the art. Geopolitics is in essence a study of historical and geographical phenomena/situations which inform foreign policy decisions, a practical tool rather than a regular academic discipline. Its key attributes were widely understood and studied long before Haushofer so famously ‘abused’ it. Its first European academic practitioner was arguably Halford Mackinder, a British academic, who speculated on what he labelled the ‘world island’: Eurasia.⁴ Of course, I would argue that what later was termed geopolitics was always of interest to policy planners from antiquity to modernity. Who could possibly deny that Sunzi’s The Art of War is in essence a treatise on geopolitics and geostrategy? The whole question of whether geopolitics is applicable to historical periods other than what is termed the modern world is superbly answered by Grygiel (cited above in note 2) and there is no need to repeat his explanations here.

1.1 The great geopolitical dilemma, theoretical approaches

It is, however, first necessary to situate this approach within the context of current debates in international relations studies and political science concerning two key areas: firstly, the phenomenon of hegemonic power transition and secondly, the revival of geopolitical and geostrategic thinking in policy decision-making processes. Before discussing historical exempla I will here briefly discuss whether on a theoretical level existing hegemonic powers can accommodate a rising power and/or manage a power transfer (if it were to become a reality) without engaging in a major conflict and suffering a disastrous diminution of their national power.

The following section is not meant to be an exhaustive summary/analysis of all the literature concerning the topics mentioned above. Only select literature that is most relevant and/or is of particular interest to the argument being made has been cited to facilitate an easy read for the general readership. The same approach has been adopted for the rest of the volume. More in-depth discussion of the secondary literature for the learned academic readership will at times be provided and in other circumstances notices will be given to direct them to related publications by either the author or other experts.

What is hegemony?

It is first necessary to define clearly what we mean by ‘hegemony’. The term ‘hegemony’ has been used by historians and political scientists alike to describe structural conditions in the international system whereby ‘a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system’.⁵ The three powers we have mentioned, Rome, Sassanian Iran and Han China all fit that description to varying degrees and can be categorised as hegemonic powers within their respective spheres of influence. The great Mearsheimer of the realist school of thought has suggested rather bluntly and also perceptively that hegemony refers in practice to a self-serving ‘domination of the system’⁶ by the hegemonic power. Other scholars argue that hegemony as a concept implies rather a fusion of varying degrees of coercion and also at times consent.⁷ Hegemony, thus, can be either purely predatory or more cooperative and at times even benign, depending on the theoretical lenses applied. However, there is little doubt that hegemony implies a clear and undisputed power differential in the system.

Great power alone, however, does not necessarily denote hegemony. By way of example economic power does not mean much if not accompanied by a corresponding degree of influence (whether by force or consent) in the system. In the case of hegemons, this influence takes the form of the ability (and willingness) to administer unit interaction in the international system. Modelski thus defines ‘world powers’ as those states that have the capacity to maintain order in the global system.⁸ Expanding on Modelski’s notion of order maintenance, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye define hegemony as a structural form of the international system where ‘one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so’.⁹ Thus, a more encompassing definition is provided by scholars such as Goldstein who define hegemony as the ability to ‘dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements by which international relations, political and economic, are conducted’.¹⁰

Such definitions, however, if taken at face value, are likely to offend every major power involved in the international system other than the hegemon. Thus, there have been attempts to legitimise hegemonic domination by articulating the notion that hegemony is more of a responsibility or a privilege than arbitrary domination. In other words, a fine balance exists between consent and coercion in hegemony, rendering it for the most part a satisfactory arrangement for lesser units in the system. Kindleberger for instance has argued that:

the international economic and monetary system needs leadership, a country which is prepared, consciously or unconsciously, under s...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title
• Routledge Studies in Ancient History
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Geopolitical Situation: The Superpowers and the Huns
• 3 The Superpower Reaction
• 4 Conclusion: The Geostrategic Choices for the Future
• Select Bibliography
• Index