Journal of African History, 31, (1990), pp. 217–244
REVOLUTIONARY MAHDISM AND RESISTANCE TO COLONIAL RULE IN THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE, 1905–61
BY PAUL E. LOVEJOY
York University, Ontario
AND J. S. HOGENDORN
Colby College, Maine
A WAVE of revolutionary Mahdism swept through the western emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate during the years of the colonial conquest (1897–1903).2 It culminated in an insurrection that began at Kobkitanda in French Niger late in the year 1905 and spread to Satiru, about 220 kilometres away in British Northern Nigeria, early in 1906. The revolutionary Mahdists sought the overthrow of all established authority, including the colonial regimes and local officials who collaborated with the Europeans.
The uprising of 1905–6 revealed strong divisions on the basis of class, an insight first made by A. S. Mohammad in his study of Satiru.3 This movement received virtually no support from the Fulbe aristocracy of the Caliphate. Instead it attracted radical clerics, disgruntled peasants and fugitive slaves. The absence of aristocratic involvement distinguishes revolutionary Mahdism from all other forms of contemporary Mahdism.
Mahdism has usually challenged established authority, and consequently its revolutionary potential in the context of the colonial conquest has been widely recognized. A suggestive study by Thomas Hodgkin first compared Mahdism, messianism and Marxism as expressions of anti-colonialism.4 Hodgkin contended that Mahdism was one type of revolutionary ideology, but he did not distinguish among the various strands of Mahdism. He did accurately note, however, that Mahdism could be revolutionary to the degree that it provided a universal ideology that transcended kinship, locality, ethnicity and pre-colonial state structures. Mahdism could appeal to Islamic tradition to justify the transformation of society, and it could provide a structure of ideas and institutions that drew the masses into a more active political role. We advance a new interpretation here because the evidence of class divisions among Mahdists shows that it is confusing, indeed inaccurate, to refer to Mahdism in and of itself as ‘revolutionary’.5
Fig. 1. Sokoto Caliphate: French, British and German spheres (1906).
Mahdism has not always been revolutionary. Adherents have advocated a range of political positions from (1) tolerance of established authority, despite a belief that the Mahdi would eventually appear, through (2) severe criticism of existing Islamic regimes which was often expressed through emigration (hijra) in expectation of meeting the Mahdi, to (3) the replacement of incumbent Muslim officials by Mahdist critics, often through violent means, and finally to (4) revolutionary action with the intention of destroying the Muslim state and the class structure on which it was based.6
All these forms of Mahdism were in evidence in the years immediately before and after the conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate. Our purpose is to identify carefully ‘revolutionary Mahdism’ within the larger context of the colonial conquest and to show how the ‘ revolutionary ‘ character of the uprising of 1905–6 differed from other forms of Mahdism.7
The uprising of 1905–6 was a turning point in the consolidation of colonial rule in Niger and Northern Nigeria. Until then, the French and British presence was fragile. As many scholars have shown, the British were successful in obtaining the collaboration of the Sokoto aristocracy in defeating the rebels at Satiru,8 while the French secured similar aristocratic support in overcoming the Mahdists at Kobkitanda and Karma.9 Most scholars agree that the suppression of the revolt re-enforced the alliance between the colonial authorities and the Muslim aristocracy. Kimba Idrissa and A. S. Mohammed have recognized that the revolt crossed the colonial frontier between Niger and Northern Nigeria, but most scholars only mention this fact in passing. J.-P. Rothiot even disputes Idrissa’s claim of a coordinated uprising within Niger.10 It is our contention that the pan-colonial dimension of the 1905–6 uprising provides essential evidence for establishing the revolutionary significance of this movement.
THE 1905–6 UPRISING
The revolt was supposed to begin on the Id al-Kabir, which fell on 5 February 1906, but in fact it began on 8 December 1905 at Kobkitanda, 150 kilometres south of Niamey in French Niger, when local villagers killed two gardes-cercles from Dosso. The leader of the revolt was a blind Zarma cleric, Saybu dan Makafo. The attempt to arrest Saybu and his supporters spread the revolt through much of the region between Dallol Mawri and Dallol Bosso.11
The first sizeable action in the French zone occurred at Kobkitanda on 4 January 1906. The Mahdists lost an estimated 30 men, the French 12, including one French officer. Saybu’s followers retreated to Sambera, 15 kilometres to the south. In subsequent battles, another twenty Mahdists died. Saybu and many of the survivors then fled east across the nearby colonial boundary and made their way to Satiru, which they reached sometime after mid-January.12
Fig. 2. The Mahdist revolt, 1905–6.
A second centre of revolt erupted at Karma, a Songhay town and sub-emirate of Say that was located on the Niger north of Niamey. Emir Umaru, a loyal supporter of Saybu Dan Makafo, had resisted the imposition of French colonialism in 1904, only to suffer the inevitable subjugation. In December 1905, Saybu sent an emissary to inform Umaru of the skirmish with the gardes-cercle. Umaru decided to join the Mahdists in an attempt to reverse the defeat of 1904; he was the only accredited ruler within the Caliphate who would do so.13
The revolt extended along the left bank of the Niger 400 kilometres from Sorbo Haoussa in the north to the border with Nigeria in the south. Boubon, a mere ten kilometres from Niamey, was lost. The revolt spread westward across the river to Say, Torodi and Tera and northward among the Tuareg. The French posts at Sandire and Filingue had to be abandoned, and troops from Dori had to fight their way to Niamey. On 17 January the French attacked Boubon, which was taken despite two vigorous Mahdist counterattacks. Karma, 25 kilometres from Niamey, was taken the next day, and Umaru retreated 65 kilometres north-eastward to Delitondi Zimba, in the semi-desert region of Zarma Ganda.
Elsewhere conditions were volatile. In some cases there was open rebellion; in others there was danger that there would be. Trouble spread southward to Bariba and Dendi country and westward to Fadan Gurma. French reports also suspected that the emirates of Say and Birnin Gaoure would rise, but in fact they did not. While some Tuareg joined Umaru, many others waited to see what would happen.14
The end of the revolt in French territory came quickly in early March. A combined force of French troops and cavalry from Dosso, Filingue and other places loyal to the French attacked Umaru at Delitondi Zimba on 3 March.15 The battle lasted all day, but in the end the revolt was crushed. The next two days were spent destroying villages that had supported the revolt. Umaru and many of his troops were killed, and the survivors were taken to Niamey.16 Thereafter the French re-established an uneasy presence throughout the rebellious zone.
Across the frontier in British territory, the centre of resistance was Satiru, where Saybu Dan Makafo found refuge late in January. Satiru’s location southwest of Sokoto in the direction of Gwandu placed it between the twin capitals of the Caliphate, a position dangerously close to the centres of political power.17 The revolt in French territory had engulfed the whole region surrounding French headquarters at Niamey; now the revolt in the British zone threatened the capitals of the Caliphate itself, with a potential to undermine British authority elsewhere.18
The revolt at Satiru was also scheduled to begin on the Id al-Kabir, 5 February, but it was postponed, apparently because of a dispute in the Mahdist community.19 The dispute centred on the necessity of a revolt and the recognition of Isa, the village head of Satiru, as a messianic leader who would accompany the Mahdi.20 The Satiru Mahdists (Satirawa) decided the issue on 13 February, eight days after the Id, when they attacked the neighbouring village of Tsomau. A number of people were killed.21
On the next day, 14 February, a unit of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), Company C of Mounted Infantry under Acting Resident H. R. Preston-Hillary, moved quickly to deal with this rural unrest. The reasons for the violence were not known to Hillary and were clearly misinterpreted. The British were apparently unaware of the rising in French territory. Though Hillary was not exactly walking into a trap, his misjudgement of the situation was monumental. The Mahdists attacked the WAFF column; Hillary and his escort were killed, and in the ensuing battle the WAFF suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat in disarray.22 In the words of High Commissioner Frederick Lugard, this defeat was the ‘first serious reverse suffered by the West African Frontier Force since it was raised [in 1898]’.23
The Satiru Mahdists also suffered heavy losses in the initial encounter: 30–40 were dead and wounded. Their leader, Malam Isa, was severely wounded.24 According to later reports, Isa had planned to announce a jihād at the Friday prayer, 16 February, two days after the defeat of Hillary’s expedition, and raise a green flag. Isa’s wound proved mortal, and he died on the day he was supposed to unfurl the standard of revolt. But the revolt was now firmly established in British territory, despite the death of one of its leaders.25
The British feared that a tremendous upheaval would ensue from this ‘ Sokoto Rising’, as the London Times headlined it.26 The regime was thinly spread over Northern Nigeria, and a major detachment of the WAFF was far to the southeast, engaged in a protracted campaign to subdue the Tiv. The situation appeared grave.
The Satiru Mahdists quickly regrouped, and in the aftermath of their initial victory they wreaked havoc on neighbouring towns and villages. Danchadi was burned on 6 March and Dange on 8 March 1906. Resident Alder Burdon reported that ‘ all the thickly populated country between these two was devastated’.27 The Satirawa attempted to intimidate reluctant Mahdist sympathizers into joining the revolt, and they specifically attacked slave plantations, apparently to liberate slaves.28 What worried the British were expressions of support for the uprising. Officials reported sign...