In an era in which the future of both Koreas, and North-East Asia, hung in the balance, US policy on the Korean Peninsula at the outset of the presidency of Donald Trump seemed confused, uncertain, and dangerously ambivalent. Some of Americaâs most knowledgeable, influential, and powerful officials were at odds with Trump over his unpredictable decisions. They also battled one another over what policies to pursue and feared for the future of US relations with North and South Korea as well as with other countries in the region, the rest of Asia, and the world.
Americaâs shifting policy on Korea during the Trump administration ranged from threats and counter-threats to summits and deal making, inspiring moods and responses from roseate optimism to deep scepticism relating to the near, mid-, and distant future of the Korean Peninsula. From hovering on what seemed to be the brink of war in 2017, the year in which Trump threatened to unleash âfire and furyâ on North Korea and referred to North Koreaâs Leader Kim Jong-un as ârocket manâ, the two Koreas in 2018 veered towards rapprochement and dialogue on a scale never witnessed since the division of the Peninsula between the Soviet-backed North and the Americanised South on either side of the 38th parallel after the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945.1
To superficial appearances, the process reached what was widely described as âa historic milestoneâ on June 30, 2019, when Trump and Kim staged their third meeting â this time in the dramatic setting of the heavily fortified Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. In an atmosphere of mounting excitement, Trump clapped Kim on the shoulder as they shook hands on the North-South line. The greetings between them seemed portentous, laden with hope that this time, perhaps, the yearning for reconciliation would survive recriminations and intimidation.
âNobody had expected this momentâ, said Trump. âItâs significantâ, said Kim, talking in Korean, an interpreter at his side. âWe want to bring an end to this unpleasant past and create a new futureâ. It was not just that Trump met Kim in the truce village of Panmunjom, or for a few seconds stepped across the line into North Korea, then made his way with Kim through besieging cameramen and security people on the southern side to Freedom House. There was no denying the whole occasion was âa very historic momentâ, as Trump proclaimed before he and Kim settled down behind closed doors for 50 minutes of serious talking.2
Trump emerged from that conversation, away from the pervasive cameras and microphones of the media, saying that he and Kim had âagreed to have teams set upâ to return to talks that had simply not been happening since their disastrous second summit in Hanoi on February 28, 2019. However, if the two said a word about âdenuclearisationâ, as promised during their first summit in Singapore the previous June, neither talked about it publicly. There was no mention of US demands for shutting down the Northâs main nuclear complex at Yongbyon 60 miles north of Pyongyang or for a full accounting of where the North was hiding other facilities for making nuclear weapons and missiles. Nor, apparently, was anything said about lesser issues, including return of more remains of those missing in action from the Korean War.
Nonetheless, by his own account of what he called âa very productive meetingâ, Trump âoutlined the tremendous prosperityâ that would befall North Korea âwhen this whole thing gets settledâ. In other words, if Kim would just get rid of his warheads and missiles, he could be sure of massive rewards for an economy hobbled by sanctions imposed after missile-and-nuclear tests last staged in 2017. The hope was that the economic bait would outweigh Kimâs perceived need for a nuclear programme for defence against enemies, notably the United States.
A day after the president had tweeted the idea of seeing Kim while in South Korea meeting Moon, the burst of publicity surrounding the occasion at the DMZ enabled him yet again to lay claim to have come up with the solution to North Korea. âWhen I came into office, it was a fiery messâ, he said. âNothing was happening. In two and a half years we have had peaceâ. In fact, he declared, standing beside South Koreaâs president Moon Jae-in before they flew up to the DMZ between the two Koreas for the meeting with Kim, that if Barack Obama had remained as president, âwe would have been at war with North Koreaâ.3
Trump was at pains, before and after seeing Kim at the DMZ, to defend the record of his previous two summits with Kim, in Singapore on June 12, 2018, and in Hanoi on February 28, 2019, even though the North Koreans had done nothing to get rid of their nuclear programme â and were assumed to have added several warheads to the 60 or so they were believed to have fabricated up to the Singapore summit. Standing with an American army officer at Observation Post Ouellette below the North-South line, he said, âYou have 35 million people within range of their weaponsâ. He did not say, of course, that hundreds of North Korean artillery pieces remained in place above the DMZ â not a topic of consideration in demands for the North to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical, and nuclear.
The meeting at the DMZ, if nothing else, offered respite from the mood generated on the last day of February 2019 when Trump, in Hanoi, announced the failure of his second summit with Kim. âWeâll end up being very good friendsâ, he said after breaking off the conversation, but the fact was that the talks had come to a halt after it had become obvious that both sides were getting nowhere with their basic demands.4 The Hanoi meltdown came as a shock after predictions that the two would surely issue a statement, however meaningless, pledging cooperation beyond the vague commitment to âdenuclearisationâ that each of them had signed after their first summit in Singapore the previous June. The most that Trump could take away before walking out of the meeting in Hanoiâs historic Metropole Hotel was an impression â not a guarantee â that Kim would not test nuclear warheads and long-range missiles as previously conducted in 2017.
The Hanoi summit failed over the basic issue of sanctions versus denuclearisation. Kim demanded an end to most of the sanctions imposed by the United States and United Nations (UN) after those tests, while Trump refused to budge without a firm agreement that North Korea would actually close down its nuclear programme. Trump put on the table the US call for closure of the Northâs central nuclear site at Yongbyon, 100 kilometres north of Pyongyang, and surrender of the Northâs nuclear weapons, probably a few dozen. He also wanted a list of other sites in North Korea where engineers and technicians had been fabricating or testing warheads and missiles.
âTo me itâs pretty obvious, they have to denucleariseâ, Trump said at a press conference.5 Maybe so, but Kimâs father, Kim Jong-il, who died in December 2011, had rejected the South Korean offer of massive aid in return for denuclearisation.
Unlike his father, however, Kim Jong-un had indeed given the impression that he had given up his nuclear ambitions and was ready to talk. In his New Yearâs speech in early 2018, he announced he was basically done with testing nuclear warheads and missiles and would henceforth focus on the economy. Next, he agreed that North Korea would send athletes to the Winter Olympic Games to be held in Pyeongchang, nestled in the mountains in the South Korean portion of Kangwon Province, divided at the 38th parallel in 1945 and then again in the Korean War that ended with American and South Korean forces wresting still more of the province from the North. Finally, Kim m...