World Political Systems after Polarity

Nerses Kopalyan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781315451398
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

What will the current global political order look like when American unipolarity ends? Historically, the power configurations of world political systems have been defined by four structures: multipolarity, tripolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity. These concepts inform both the formulation and the analysis of short-term policies and long-term, grand strategies of powerful actors in the world political order and may be of profound importance to the future peace and stability of the global system.

The concept of nonpolarity, however, has never been addressed as a possible or a potential structural formulation in the nomenclature of global political systems. This book provides a coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity and how diplomacy will operate in a more collective age, and fits into the ongoing discussion about the nature of the political world order as we approach the end of the "American century."

1 Engaging polarity

An introduction

Is the end near? How long will American unipolarity last? Such questions raise both anxiety and concern both at the scholarly level and the political level. More interestingly, do we know or can we predict what the world will look like after American unipolarity? Will the new world order even have superpowers after the decline of the United States? Surprisingly, very little work has been conducted to address such important and challenging questions. But why? Robert Jervis (2009) writes, “Academic analyses are influenced both by events in the world and by scholars’ political outlooks and preferences.” There are developing phenomena that will come to shape and influence the global political realm, yet because these “things are not happening,” they remain puzzles that are “ignored.” So, he poses the question: “Who until the end of the cold war would have written an article on unipolarity or encouraged a graduate student to work on this topic?” (p. 189). Similarly, this book asks, “Who until the end of American unipolarity will write a scholarly work on nonpolarity or encourage a graduate student to work on this topic?”

Such rhetorical questions concerning the choice for topics and subject matters for research within the field of international relations (IR) presuppose two important developments to the very nature of research and inquiry: (1) the extent to which the study of a subject matter must be justified in order to even consider undertaking research and (2) the meta-theoretical considerations that define and legitimate the very method and nature of inquiry. Methodology and paradigmatic legitimation, then, have become the structural basis, the scientificity, for commencing scholarly research. The extent to which IR, as a social science discipline, is itself considered a science brings about more questions than answers: Is it a continuing attempt to attain scientific credentials for its knowledge accumulation, or a stubborn march toward scientificitness that is, itself, controversial? The broad and intense debate of what science is, and whether IR should or can be a science, has consumed the discipline in gauging such questions as: what is the nature of theory and concept, what is the nature of inquiry, what is the nature of knowledge accumulation, what is the nature of explanation, and what is the nature of causation (Bull 1969; Kaplan 1969; Reynolds 1973; Waltz 1979; Ogley 1981; Ferguson and Mansbach 1988; Nicholson 1996; Wendt 1999)?

The legitimation for research and inquiry, then, has required IR to rely on philosophy of science. Since it is the scope of its scientificity that legitimates mainstream IR scholarship, adherence to the logic and method of science itself must address the concerns of what is science and scientific inquiry in relation to the social science of IR. Philosophy of science as legitimation (Wight 2002), then, has offered a robust and powerful framework in addressing the two concerns posed above: the nature of undertaking specific topical research and the meta-theoretical justification. Concomitantly, for the research project at hand, in the relationship between the normative and the empirical, the structural and the historical, the conceptual and the analytical, and more importantly, between the theoretical and the factual, the following serves an axiomatic premise: Facts are what matter, and theory is simply a better way of collecting them (Gunnell 1975).

Historically, the power configurations of world political systems have been defined by four structures: multipolarity, tripolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity. The concept of nonpolarity, however, has never been addressed as a possible or a potential structural formulation in the nomenclature of world/global political systems. The reason for this may be as follows. Since considerations of hegemony and polarity are generally undertaken by proponents of (neo)realism, or world-system(s) scholars who also rely on the traditional taxonomy of polarity, nonpolarity would create paradigmatic and conceptual-analytical complications since the absence of poles indicates the absence of hegemon(s), which either negates positional and structural considerations inherent to the above-specified paradigms or marginalizes the balance-of-power thesis. Thus, paradigms that account for system-wide hegemons and forms of polarity are not and will not be able to address and explain the structure of a nonpolar system.

The discipline’s lack of a coherent conceptualization of nonpolarity limits the development of a robust theoretical model that can contribute to the study of polar structures and world political systems. The general intent of this book is to address this puzzle of nonpolarity. The second deficiency in the discipline is the dearth of scholarly attention to a systematized consideration of structural transformations, including the structural transition of the system after unipolarity. Specifically, the field lacks any research that addresses observable and systematized patterns of transitions between modalities of polar structures (unipolarity specifically). As such, no probabilistic assumptions are available that gauge the power configurations of a system after unipolar structural transition. This work is primarily concerned with assessing the structural outcomes of systems after a unipolar period. In sum, an important puzzle remains to be addressed in the study of polarity, the structures of system-wide power configurations, and the subsequent outcome within the system after structural (unipolar) transitions. In this light, the specific research question posed in this book is as follows:

What is the polar structuration (power configurations) of a system after unipolar transitions, and should a system transition into a nonpolar structure, how can this phenomenon be explained and accounted for?

A practical question may be asked with respect to this book: Does polarity matter? The answer is threefold. First, polarity matters when attempting to formulate, analyze, and gauge the short-term policies of powerful actors. For example, after the Cold War, the policy of the United States as the single system-wide hegemon (unipole) was whether to utilize American preponderance and preserve the unipolar epoch or to engage in revisionist behavior and transition the system into a multipolar structure—for example, the US attempt during the bipolar Cold War to position China as a third pole and balance it against the USSR. The underlying arguments were based upon the nature and outcome of the different power configurations of the system: If unipolarity is unstable, then the United States should formulate policies allowing other actors to become system-wide hegemons in order to form a multipolar system, which may be more stable. If, however, unipolar structures are stable (and relatively peaceful), then US unipolarity should be preserved. This indicates several highly distinct and diverse policy stratagems: concentration of power, utilization of resources, diplomatic endeavors, international obligations, and all other modes of state behavior. Simply put, policies change in accordance to whether the system is bipolar (a primary concentration of resources against a single opposing pole), multipolar (a balance of resources against or with several poles), unipolar (selective concentration of resources contingent on outcome), or nonpolar (diffusion of power and dispersion of resources against or with numerically high actors, where balancing is untenable). Policy formulation, then, becomes heavily contingent upon the power configurations of the system.

Second, polarity matters because it shapes the policies of other states within the system that are regional/sub-system hegemons or potentially rising powers with ambitions of being system-wide hegemons. For example, European actors such as United Kingdom, France, and Germany, or Asian states such as China, South Korea, and Japan, would have to articulate policy that is either consistent with US unipolarity, or hypothetical China-US bipolarity, or a multipolar configuration with the Unites States and few other actors. So, if the system was bipolar (China-United States), would Europe continue bandwagoning (policy in unipolar structure), engage in polarization (join United States as policy in a bipolar structure), attempt to be revisionist (seeking multipolarity), or remain nonaligned? The polar structuration of the system plays a crucial role in answering such questions.

Third, polarity matters because it allows for the formulation of long-term grand strategies, which may be of profound importance to the future peace and stability of the global system. If system-wide hegemon(s) seeks to preserve or alter/revise given polar structures, what would be the consequence for the rest of the actors involved in the system? If states are able to gauge what the potential consequences are to their interests based upon the power configuration that the system might take, how does this affect their positioning and policy formulations? For example, if China is anticipating a bipolar structure, then its policy would necessitate a massive concentration of resources against the opposing pole; but if it is anticipating a multipolar structure, its policies and behavior would have to be multidimensional; but if it is preparing for a nonpolar system, then its preparations and strategic endeavors will once again have to be vastly different. Since the structure of the system is the environment within which a state functions, the conditions (modality) of this environment (polar structure) are fundamental to the security, economic health, and positional status of states. Simply put, even when considering practical, mainstream concerns—not to mention academic theory building and hypothesis testing—polarity matters.

The extant literature on polarity finds extensive concentration on four modes of polarity—unipolarity, bipolarity, tripolarity, and multipolarity—along with the analytical utilization of the balance-of-power concept. Kaplan’s (1957) formulation of equilibrium and stability within the system is a classic and comprehensive conceptualization of balance-of-power theory, based upon the works of Liska (1957) and Gulick (1955), and is consistent with the traditional realism of Morgenthau (1993) and the research of Claude (1962) and Wolfers (1962). These authors consider relations between powerful states as primarily defined by delicate power balancing in order to sustain the status quo. In his power transition theory, Organski (1958) focuses on the specific modes of wars and international conflicts between declining hegemons and rising challengers, but still relying, very much like Carr (1951), on status quo satisfaction as crucial for the stability of the system. Treatments of systems stability are also undertaken by Waltz (1964) and Rosecrance (1966), addressing the characteristics and dynamics of different polar systems and how given attributes of polarity affect the stability (gauged by war-proneness) and longevity of the system’s structure. Deutsch and Singer (1964) demonstrate that “interaction opportunities” and dispersion of resources decrease the probability of conflict as the number of poles increases in the system. As such, multipolarity is deemed more stable and peaceful than bipolarity. Wallerstein’s (1974) world-systems approach interjects an economics dynamic into gauging the global system as a three-tiered structure accounting for the interactions between states within a hierarchy of material power.

Neoliberalism partakes in the discourse by addressing the role of the world economy and how the distribution of economic power and the rules governing international economic institutions have been vital to the process of international political change.¹ Modelski (1978) suggests a cyclical explanation of power transition, a process that includes counterhegemonic coalitions, arms buildup, hegemonic war, and system renewal. Waltz’s (1979) structural realism provides a systemic treatment of polar positioning where the behavior of powerful states is constrained and shaped by the system, thus viewing the multipolar balance-of-power structure as the most volatile and recurring in history, since states constantly counterbalance against other powers and position themselves accordingly. Rapkin et al. (1979) contribute to the debate by elucidating the conceptual, definitional, and measurement problems related to the concepts of polarity and polarization, introducing empirical tests that gauge the formulation of poles as being developed in degrees (high, moderate, or low polarization). Gilpin’s (1981) work on change in the international system concentrates on revisionist rising power(s) balancing and challenging the system-wide hegemon(s) when the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Once this challenge is materialized, the equilibrium in the international system is disturbed, with the resulting change in the system reflecting the new distribution of power and a resolution to the disequilibrium. In sum, the post-WWII/Cold War era approached research on polarity either through multipolar versus bipolar models, conceptual and measurement controversies, or specific development of systems analysis to account for an international system that has two or more poles.

The end of the Cold War brought about the expansive debate over unipolarity, with the debate revolving around modes of counterbalancing (Levy 2003) against the unipole, ranging from traditional considerations² to soft-balancing,³ to scholarly disputes over durability/stability,⁴ peacefulness,⁵ and structural coherence of the new unipolar system.⁶ Layne (1993) contends that the current uni...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Engaging polarity: an introduction
• 2 Between the conceptual and the methodological
• 3 Between the conceptual and the analytical: engaging the theoretical framework
• 4 The Far Eastern World Political System
• 5 The Near East–Middle Eastern World Political System
• 6 The Indic World Political System
• 7 The Mediterranean World Political System
• 8 The Medieval World Political System
• 9 The Global Political System
• 10 After polarity: findings and aftermath
• Index