The United Nations and Changing World Politics

Thomas G. Weiss

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000028928
• Edition: 8
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica

This completely revised and updated eighth edition serves as the definitive text for courses in which the United Nations is either the focus or a central component. Built around three critical themes in international relations (peace and security, human rights and humanitarian affairs, and sustainable human development) the eighth edition of The United Nations and Changing World Politics guides students through the seven turbulent decades of UN politics.

This new edition is fully revised to incorporate recent developments on the international stage, including new peace operations in Mali and the Central African Republic; ongoing UN efforts to manage the crises in Libya, Syria, and Iraq; the Iran Nuclear Deal; and the new Sustainable Development Goals. The authors discuss how international law frames the controversies at the UN and guides how the UN responds to violence and insecurity, gross violations of human rights, poverty, underdevelopment, and environmental degradation. Students of all levels will learn that the UN is a complex organization, comprised of three interactive entities that cooperate and also compete with each other to define and advance the UN's principles and purposes.

PART ONE

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Chapter 1

The Theory and Practice of UN Collective Security

THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF the UN is to maintain international peace and security through what is broadly referred to as collective security. Collective security is premised on the idea that security is in the interest of all states, and threats to security often require a coordinated international response. States agree to confront security threats and to share in the costs of maintaining or enforcing the peace. The primary mechanisms for collective security in the UN Charter are the commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI), peace enforcement (Chapter VII), and the respect for regional arrangements (Chapter VIII).¹ This chapter explores the theory and practice of collective security at the UN by examining the requisites for successful collective security, and the roles of the UN Security Council, General Assembly, and secretary-general in supporting the arrangements. It concludes with an examination of the role of regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in maintaining international peace and security.

Collective Security

Initially, collective security was conceived as being guaranteed by the Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the UN Charter. This conception of collective security can be traced through a long history of proposals that deal with war and peace.² The central thread is the same: all states would join forces to prevent one of their number from using coercion to gain advantage. Under such a system, no government could conquer another or otherwise disturb the peace for fear of retribution from all other governments. An attack on one would be treated as an attack on all. The notion of self-defense, universally agreed on as a right of sovereign states, was expanded to include the international community’s right to prevent war.³

The apparent simplicity of the logic of collective security contrasts with the difficulties in its application. In theory, successful collective security depends on three factors: consensus, commitment, and organization.⁴ Consensus refers to the recognition by members that a threat to international peace and security exists. Members of a collective security arrangement, especially the most powerful members, must agree that a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace has occurred, or they must at least stand aside (i.e., abstain) when others wish to act. When the UN was founded in 1945, the central concern was states invading other states and grabbing territory. After World War II, the land grab was rare and the violent conflicts that did arise instead centered on who controlled governments, decolonization, and related civil strife. States provided arms and aid to governments they liked and provided assistance to opposition groups in states they did not like. Some states funded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in other states that promoted democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, though this was seen by others as fomenting rebellion and subverting the recognized governments. Did such actions disturb the peace or threaten stability? Deciding which behaviors constitute a threat to international peace and security is one of the central challenges for the UN. Since 1945, states have not been consistently willing to characterize all uses of force, outside of self-defense, as a threat to or breach of the peace.

If and when member states agree that some use of force is unacceptable, they must then agree on what to do about it. Should states impose economic sanctions, use military force, or a combination of both? This is where commitment factors in: Once a course of action has been decided, then states must be committed to that course of action and have contingency plans if it falters. They must be willing to bear the costs and sacrifice their national interests for the collective good—or define their national interest as coterminous with general peace and stability.

Finally, if the first two conditions can be met, then there must be organization. That is, agreed-on mechanisms, rules, and procedures must exist for carrying out a course of action. If sanctions are imposed, how will member states enforce them, detect cheating, or evaluate their political and social impact? If military force is approved, which states will conduct the operations, and how will they be monitored? These kinds of policy choices are complicated and represent the kind of questions member states wrestle with at the UN. The record of the world organization in collective security is determined in large part by its ability to meet the conditions of consensus, commitment, and organization in practice.

The Security Council and Collective Security

Chapter V of the UN Charter designates the Security Council as the organ primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Unlike in the League of Nations, all UN member states are legally required to abide by Security Council resolutions that constitute decisions that relate to enforcement actions.⁵ The Charter originally specified that the Security Council would have eleven members, but in 1965 the council’s membership was increased to fifteen to better reflect the expanded UN after decolonization. In this “first UN” intergovernmental body, the most powerful states are accorded special responsibilities and privileges. The five permanent members (the P5) are the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China. Each state of the P5 has veto power. They pay more of the bills, and no decision can be made on nonprocedural questions unless they concur or at least agree to abstain. The veto power ensures that no enforcement action can take place against one of the great powers. Such an action could start a major war—the very thing that the United Nations was established to forestall. By preventing action against a permanent member, the veto saves the organization from wrecking itself in operations against its most powerful members. Enforcement actions can be undertaken only with great power consensus, the first key element for collective security.

The remaining ten members are elected to two-year terms by the General Assembly. When electing the nonpermanent members, the assembly tries to maintain a geographical balance by including representatives of the four major regions of the world: usually three from Africa, two from Asia, three from Europe, and two from Latin America. After expanding in 1965, the Security Council altered its decision- making process, reducing the mathematical weight that the permanent members hold in the voting. Nine affirmative votes are now needed to pass a resolution.

The presidency of the council revolves monthly among council member states and plays a critical role in setting the agenda and smoothing the way to a vote. Some disagreement during the formal voting process has been reduced by efforts to gain consensus before any vote, though this process may lead to soft or unclear resolutions or statements. The president meets with the secretary-general to identify the parties to a dispute, negotiates with the permanent members to try to ensure that the veto will not be used, and consults with the elected members of the Security Council and other relevant groups or actors. Accordingly, unified decision making is facilitated, and disunity in the council can be reduced.⁶ Some-times a president decides to push a particular theme for a month—for example, protection of civilians or peacebuilding.

The General Assembly and Security

The Security Council is not the only organ of the first UN with a role in maintaining international peace and security. The General Assembly, where every member state is represented, serves as a more open forum for discussion of security matters. Under the UN Charter (Articles 10 and 11), it may consider and make recommendations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly’s role in international peace and security increased for a time with the passage of the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950. This resolution, which can be initiated by either the General Assembly or the Security Council, was first enacted to allow the assembly to address North Korean aggression in South Korea. This was a reaction to the Security Council’s inaction after its initial condemnation of aggression and approval of assistance to South Korea. The absence by the boycotting Soviet Union (protesting Taiwan’s occupation of the “Chinese seat” on the council in spite of the 1949 military victory by the Chinese communists under Mao Zedong) had permitted the initial call for assistance and linked the UN to the subsequent military action against North Korea and its allies. But once Moscow ended its boycott and entered the fray, the Security Council was paralyzed by the Soviet veto. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was not used again until 1956, when permanent members were involved in two crises. The General Assembly approved UN actions in the Suez crisis because effective action in the Security Council had been blocked by France and Britain; earlier that year, the assembly had censured Moscow’s use of armed force in Hungary. Another use was in 1960, after the Security Council became deadlocked over the Congo operation primarily because the Soviet Union and the United States supported different sides in the conflict.

The Uniting for Peace Resolution has been invoked ten times, the last being against Israel in 1997 for its policies in the occupied territories. Although several NGOs from the third UN called on the General Assembly to invoke the resolution in response to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, no state on the Security Council or in the General Assembly has formally called for its consideration in recent years. Given its sporadic use, the efficacy of the Uniting for Peace Resolution for enhancing the General Assembly’s role in international security is subject to considerable skepticism.

When the Security Council is paralyzed, the General Assembly can at least be a sounding board for international views. It has overwhelmingly condemned Syria’s war on its own people in five different resolutions since 2011 and even called upon Syrian president Assad to step down. In 2014 the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea with only twelve member states voting against it. However, the assembly can only make nonbinding recommendations, including statements of condemnation, relating to international peace and security. Only the Security Council can make decisions that are binding on member states.

The Secretary-General and Security

The second UN also has an important role in the maintenance of international peace and security.⁷ The Charter spells out some of these actors: the executive head of the organization (the secretary-general) and the professional staff (the secretariat). Selected by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, the secretary-general is effectively the chief executive officer (although the Charter specifies “chief administrative officer”). Today’s professional and support staff number approximately fifty-five thousand in the UN proper and an additional twenty-five thousand in the specialized agencies. These figures represent substantial growth from the five hundred employees in the UN’s first year at Lake Success and the peak total of seven hundred staff employed by the League of Nations.⁸ In matters of peace and security, several departments are involved, including the undersecretaries-general for political affairs, humanitarian affairs, and peacekeeping operations. Depending on the number of peace operations under way at any moment, somewhere between ten thousand and one hundred thousand UN soldiers, police, and other special personnel have served under the secretary-general.

Beyond organizing and directing staff, the secretary-general plays an instrumental role in the mediation of disputes, negotiations between or among warring parties, and deployment of UN-sponsored forces. This role reaches beyond that assigned to any other international official—although many ask whether the role is more “secretary” or “general.”⁹ An important mechanism in this regard is the appointment of special and personal representatives or envoys of the secretary-general, who undertake missions in conflict areas.¹⁰ This step is approved by the Security Council and is often taken when the council is divided and unable to act.

Additionally, Article 99 of the UN Charter makes it possible for the secretary- general to “bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security,” although it has been invoked only three times. If the council is unwilling to act, as one UN staff member said, there is no point in diving into an empty swimming pool. Even without formally invoking Article 99, the secretary-general can still press his views behind the scenes with various states. His personal judgment and readiness to run risks and take initiatives are crucial to fulfilling the job description.

The secretary-general’s actions are closely scrutinized by governments. Depending on the political climate, criticism can be scathing, and it certainly affects the UN Secretariat. Secretary-General U Thant was stridently criticized by the West for pulling UN troops from the Sinai in 1967, just as Trygve Lie, the first secretary-general, and Dag Hammarskjöld had been criticized by the Soviet bloc for their respective actions in Korea and the Congo. U Thant was also criticized by Washington for his clear opposition to the U.S. presence in Vietnam. More recently, Secretaries-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and Kofi Annan have been criticized for their actions in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Somalia, and Iraq. The eighth occupant of the job, Ban Ki-moon, assumed office in January 2007 and has been critici...