Handbook of Epistemic Cognition

Jeffrey A. Greene, William A. Sandoval, Ivar Bråten, Jeffrey A. Greene, William A. Sandoval, Ivar Bråten

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317746867
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Pedagogía
• Subtopic: Psicología educativa

The Handbook of Epistemic Cognition brings together leading work from across disciplines, to provide a comprehensive overview of an increasingly important topic: how people acquire, understand, justify, change, and use knowledge in formal and informal contexts. Research into inquiry, understanding, and discovery within academic disciplines has progressed from general models of conceptual change to a focus upon the learning trajectories that lead to expert-like conceptualizations, skills, and performance. Outside of academic domains, issues of who and what to believe, and how to integrate multiple sources of information into coherent and useful knowledge, have arisen as primary challenges of the 21st century.

In six sections, scholars write within and across fields to focus and advance the role of epistemic cognition in education. With special attention to how researchers across disciplines can communicate and collaborate more effectively, this book will be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the future of knowledge and knowing.

Dr. Jeffrey A. Greene is an associate professor of Learning Sciences and Psychological

Studies in the School of Education at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Dr. William A. Sandoval is a professor in the division of Urban Schooling at

the UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies.

Dr. Ivar Bråten is a professor of Educational Psychology at the Faculty of Educational

Sciences at the University of Oslo, Norway.

1

AN INTRODUCTION TO EPISTEMIC COGNITION

Jeffrey A. Greene, William A. Sandoval, and Ivar Bråten

In the twenty-first century, it is not enough for people to know what; they must also know why. The world is becoming increasingly complex and interconnected (OECD, 2013). Information and information sources proliferate rapidly, even overwhelmingly, with the growth of technology (Leu, Kinzer, Coiro, Castek, & Henry, 2013). Ever more frequent interactions between diverse and disparate cultures demand a critical reflexivity (World Bank, 2011). These and other factors have led educators, policymakers, and the public to recognize that students must acquire the knowledge, skills, and dispositions needed to be critical consumers and creators of the world in which they live. Calls for increased focus on these knowledge, skills, and dispositions have gone by many names, including critical thinking (Bonney & Sternberg, 2011), twenty-first century learning skills (National Education Association, 2014), digital literacy (Metzger & Flanagin, 2008), and more discipline-specific language such as education about the nature of science (Duschl, 2008), historical understanding (Wineburg, 2000), and mathematical problem solving (Schoenfeld, 1992), among others. Attempts at educational reform such as the Common Core Standards (NGACBP, 2010) and the Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS Lead States, 2013) have pushed educators and students to focus more on conceptual understanding and critical evaluation than the mere acquisition and use of information. Regardless of the terminology used, the modern world, and the current zeitgeist in education policy, research, and practice, have brought to the forefront the scholarship captured in this Handbook on epistemic cognition, which concerns how people acquire, understand, justify, change, and use knowledge in formal and informal contexts.

Research into epistemic cognition has roots in psychology (Kitchener, 1983; Perry, 1968), disciplinary education (Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996), the sociology of science (Kuhn, 1962), and philosophy, reaching back as far as Plato’s work on the nature, source, limits, and justification of knowledge (Goldman, 1986). Such long and vigorous scholarly tributaries have met to form a powerful, and at times volatile, river. While we have chosen to use the term epistemic cognition to characterize this multi- and interdisciplinary research area, others might argue for a different moniker. Within education research itself, the terminology varies including personal epistemology (Barzilai & Zohar, 2014; Hofer & Pintrich, 2002), epistemological resources (Hammer & Elby, 2002), nature of science (Osborne, Ratcliffe, Collins, Millar, & Duschl, 2003), public understanding of science (PUS; Bromme & Goldman, 2014), and epistemic cognition (Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 2011; Greene, Azevedo, & Torney-Purta, 2008; Hofer & Bendixen, 2012; Kitchener, 2002). Many scholars have lamented the disparate, and sometimes contradictory, terminology in the field, claiming that it leads to conceptual confusion among researchers and practitioners alike, and that it erects walls between scholarly disciplines that otherwise share interest in the phenomenon of epistemic cognition (Hofer & Bendixen, 2012; Sinatra & Chinn, 2012).

A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES IN TERMINOLOGY IN EPISTEMIC COGNITION

Many of the debates about the best terms to describe this area of research likely come from varied interpretations of the term epistemic cognition itself, including different understandings of those two specific words, and their derivatives. Within the field, and even within the chapters in this Handbook, differences in terminology can easily lead to confusion. To assist readers of this Handbook, both those new and those experienced in this area of research, in this chapter we provide descriptions of how scholars vary in their use of the following terms: epistemic, epistemology, epistemological, knowledge, cognition, and beliefs. Our purpose in describing these differences is not to suggest that particular terms are superior to others, or that particular combinations should not be used. Rather, we offer this analysis to help readers better understand important differences in terminology in the field, and what they indicate about current and future research in epistemic cognition.

Epistemic, Epistemology, and Epistemological

Epistemic is derived from the Greek term episteme, which means knowledge, what is known, or the way of knowing. This term is typically used as an adjective, implying “of or relating to knowledge” (Kitchener, 2011, p. 92). Therefore, epistemic cognition translates to cognition of or relating to knowledge. Throughout this Handbook, authors refer to a variety of phenomena qualified by the adjective “epistemic,” including epistemic aims, beliefs, change, climate, competence, judgments, norms, practices, reasoning, and stances, among others. The decision to differentiate “epistemic” cognition, practices, and the like from standard (i.e. nonepistemic) cognition, judgments, etc., suggests that researchers posit that in some way, or to some degree, people’s thinking, actions, and goals differ when the focus is knowledge, as opposed to other foci (e.g. avoiding effort or increasing one’s self-concept; Chinn, Rinehart, & Buckland, 2014).

The term epistemology is comprised of episteme and a derivation of the Greek term logos, which means “theory of, account of, or discourse about” (Kitchener, 2011, p. 92). Therefore, epistemology literally translates as “theory of knowledge.” The term personal epistemology, suggesting the study of people’s individual theories about the nature and limits of knowledge and knowing, was prominent in the early psychological scholarship in this area (e.g. Hofer & Pintrich, 2002). The term is still used in contemporary scholarship (e.g. Barzilai & Zohar, 2014), but it is not as prominent as it once was. Some authors have referred to the “epistemology” of academic domains, or the particular warrants and means by which experts in that domain justify claims as knowledge.

Schommer (1990) used the term epistemological beliefs to characterize her work in this area of research. Kitchener (2002), among others, has argued that this term directly translates to “beliefs about the theory of knowledge,” and that while some people may in fact have such beliefs (e.g. philosophers), it is more likely that students and nonphilosophers have epistemic beliefs, which translates as “beliefs about knowledge.” Kitchener further posited that most education researchers are likely interested in the latter, not the former. Nonetheless, numerous terms using the adjective “epistemological” rather than “epistemic” continue to proliferate in this area of research (e.g. epistemological resources; Elby & Hammer, 2010), and in most cases it appears that the scholars who use this term mean it in the way that Kitchener described “epistemic.”

Knowledge

Adding to the complexity of terminology used in the field that we are calling epistemic cognition is that the term knowledge is used in myriad ways. Philosophical epistemology includes, among other foci, the study of how people can reliably and accurately differentiate knowledge from guesses, doubts, or other kinds of mental representations (i.e. thoughts within an individual) or claims (i.e. statements shared between individuals; Chinn et al., 2011). Chinn et al. (2011) have referred to the different possible perspectives on a claim or mental representation (e.g. believe a claim, knowing a claim, doubting a claim) as epistemic stances. Normatively within philosophy, believing is an epistemic stance where the person holds the claim as true, with or without necessarily having reflected upon it or having evidence for it. Knowing is a specific kind of epistemic stance, more restricted than believing, where the person has evaluated the evidence for the claim and judged it to be sufficient to treat the claim as knowledge, as opposed to opinion or conjecture (Goldman, 1986). In practice, when people claim to “know” something (e.g. “I know that cats are a kind of mammal”) it suggests greater confidence that the claim is an accurate representation of the world, compared to saying that they “think” or “guess” (e.g. “I think that a platypus is a mammal”). This distinction is important, because in their everyday lives people think with, act upon, and respond to “knowledge” differently than they do to other kinds of claims or mental representations (e.g. guesses, wishes).

Philosophical epistemology has certainly influenced how educational researchers conceptualize epistemic cognition, and knowledge, but there are differences in usage of the term knowledge across and within both disciplines. Empirical research has shown that the word knowledge and its derivatives are used in different ways, by laypeople and experts (cf. Alexander & Dochy, 1995; Alexander, Winters, Loughlin, & Grossnickle, 2012). From our reading of the educational research literature on epistemic cognition, scholars in this field have used the term knowledge in at least four different ways.

Knowledge that and knowledge how. Philosophers, psychologists, and educators distinguish between propositional and procedural knowledge. Propositional knowledge is “knowledge that” and often is called factual, declarative, or, if more extensive, conceptual knowledge. Procedural knowledge, on the other hand, is “knowledge how” to do something. Propositional knowledge includes mental representations of a bicycle itself, whereas procedural knowledge includes mental representations of how to ride that bike. While both can be made explicit, procedural knowledge is often the more tacit of the two. Some scholars have argued for a third kind of knowledge, conditional knowledge, which refers to an understanding of when, or under what conditions, it is appropriate to use declarative and/or procedural knowledge (Paris, Lipson, & Wixson, 1983).

Prior knowledge. In psychology and education, scholars often refer to “prior knowledge,” meaning all that is stored and accessible in long-term memory. Kitchener (2002) has argued that in fact “knowledge” is a narrower, more restricted subset of mental representations. Many of the mental representations stored in a person’s long-term memory are not “knowledge” in the epistemic sense. Nonetheless, education researchers often do not differentiate between knowledge mental representations versus “not-knowledge” ones (e.g. guesses, doubts). Therefore when education researchers use the term prior knowledge, they often mean for it to include mental representations or claims that have the epistemic stance of know, as well as other stances such as doubt, or do not believe.

Individual versus social knowledge. At times, scholars use the term knowledge to refer to mental representations in an individual’s mind. In other situations, scholars use the term knowledge to refer to claims that have been codified and agreed upon by groups of people. A person can “know” a secret, such as where a valuable object is hidden. This is individual “knowledge.” On the other hand, groups of people can come together to agree that particular claims are “knowledge,” or not. For example, prior to the twenty-first century, the astronomy community considered Pluto to be a planet; this was agreed-upon knowledge in that community. However, in 2006 the International Astronomical Union changed Pluto’s status from planet to dwarf planet, thus changing the “Pluto is a planet” claim from “knowledge” to “not-knowledge.” Formal (e.g. scholars in a discipline) and informal (e.g. neighbors) groups of people can come together to decide upon what they consider knowledge or not. Such groups can also agree upon practices or processes as reliable ways of establishing that particular claims are or are not knowledge, and such practices and processes are called epistemic norms (Goldman, 1999).

Knowledge in the world versus knowledge in context. As argued by Chinn and Rinehart (2016/this volume), realism is not necessarily a naïve position. There are numerous scholars, including many educational researchers, scientists, and philosophers, who argue that there is an “objectively real” world outside of the human experience (Chinn et al., 2014). These scholars believe that while it may be the case that humans will never be able to obtain a perfect mental representation of this “real” world, humans can construct increasingly productive and useful models of that world, which they call “knowledge.” For these scholars, a particular human’s understanding of reality may never be perfect, but it is nonetheless useful and therefore warrants being called “knowledge.”

On the other hand, some scholars in cultural psychology (Lave & Wenger, 1991), science studies (Longino, 1990), and philosophy (Fuller, 1988) do not conceptualize “knowledge” as a mental possession of individuals, reflecting a “reality” out in the world. Rather, they argue that particular propositions or procedures constitute knowledge only in relation to interactions between individuals and particular contexts. For example, in some contexts the concept of evolution is considered knowledge, and is useful and recognized. In other contexts, creationism is considered knowledge, and evolution is not. In the latter context, a deep understanding of evolution would not be helpful or normative, and therefore, from a contextualized point of view, it is not appropriate to refer to evolution as “knowledge” in that context. Within the epistemic cognition literature, this had led some scholars to argue that research into epistemic cognition must be situated in context, and that it is a mistake to characterize particular epistemic stances or beliefs as adaptive or sophisticated in all contexts. Rather, the knowledge status of a particular proposition or procedure, and its “sophistication,” depend upon the context in which they are being evaluated (Chinn et al., 2014; Elby & Hammer, 2001; Sandoval, 2012).

Summary. Clearly, scholars within educational research and philosophy, among other disciplines, use the term knowledge in many ways. We are intentionally withholding any arguments we might make about which view(s) of knowledge we hold as most defensible. The important point is that throughout this Handbook authors use the term knowledge differently, often in one or more of the ways previously described. Greater clarity on the various ways of conceptualizing knowledge can lead to new directions for research in epistemic cognition, for example exploring how students justify declarative versus procedural knowledge claims, or how contextualized views of knowledge might influence where epistemic cognition research occurs (cf. Sandoval, 2012).

Cognition and Beliefs

One major distinction in this area of research involves scholars who describe their work as the study of epistemic cognition (e.g. Chinn et al., 2011; Greene et al., 2008; Kitchener, 2002) versus those that describe it as the study of epistemic, or epistemological, beliefs (e.g. Schommer, 1990). While at times the term cognition is used to mean roughly the same as “mental representation” (e.g. “People have cognitions about bicycles”), more often it is used to refer to mental processes such as attending, remembering, decision-making, reasoning, and perceiving. Some scholars have argued there are particular cognitive processes, or particular manifestations of those processes, that are focused solely on epistemic issues, and therefore they refer to this subset of cognition as “epistemic cognition.” Other scholars have focused more upon “epistemic” or “epistemological beliefs,” which they conceptualize as an influence upon, and result of, cognitive processing. Schommer-Aikins (2004) argued for the term beliefs as the best descriptor for this field because she viewed the phenomena as being nonconscious or tacit in nature, having both cognitive and affective qualities, being resistant to change, and having a strong yet often unexamined effect upon thinking. Murphy (Murphy & Alexander, 2016/this volume; Murphy & Mason, 2006) has also argued for the term epistemic belief due to the affective aspects of the phenomena. Often in the literature on epistemic cognition, it is not clear whether authors view the phenomena as particular mental representations that are one of many objects acted upon in standard m...