The Spanish-American War 1895-1902

Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific

Joseph Smith

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317900283
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

Fought in both Caribbean and Pacific and turning on America's superior naval strength, this short but decisive war had momentous consequences internationally. It ended Spain's imperial power, and the US emerged for the first time as an active force in world affairs, acquiring -- amidst much domestic controversy -- an empire of her own in the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Cuba (whose struggle against Spain had sparked the war). Heavy with implications for twentieth-century America, the war is explored in its widest context in this engrossing and impressive study.

1

The Spanish-Cuban War (1895–98)

The ‘Ever-Faithful Isle’

During the latter half of the nineteenth century Spain cut a sorry figure in comparison to the expanding great powers of Europe. The monarchy, the traditional symbol of Spanish unity, was overthrown in 1868 and only restored in December 1874 by a military coup. The untimely death of King Alfonso XII in 1885 resulted in an infant successor and the regency of the Habsburg princess, María Cristina. Beset not only by Carlist pretenders to the throne but also by persistent criticism from republicans and socialists, the monarchy faced an increasingly uncertain future as the century drew to a close. Paradoxically, however, Spanish political life during ‘the Restoration’ projected an image of relative calm and stability. This was achieved by caciquismo, a system of scheming and manipulation which enabled the political bosses known as caciques in alliance with the wealthy landowners, military leaders and government officials to rule the state for their own personal advantage. At the national level, politics were dominated by the Conservative and Liberal parties who took it in turns to share periods in government office. The two foremost practitioners of caciquismo were Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, who headed the Conservatives, and Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, the leader of the Liberals. Behind the democratic veneer of elections, debates in the Cortes (national parliament), and regular changes of government, Spanish politics were controlled by a network of corrupt and selfish cliques. Political life was so barren that Spain was said to be marooned in ‘the Dead Sea of politics’.¹

The curious mood of self-deception so evident in Spanish internal politics also applied to the country’s relationship with its overseas colonies. There was no denying the fact that the once great empire of Charles V and Philip II had shrunk by the middle of the nineteenth century to include only Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, and a few small territories in the Pacific Ocean and North Africa. However meagre they were in size, the continued retention of these possessions assuaged the sense of national loss and humiliation caused by the breaking away of the Latin American colonies at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In this context, Cuba was accorded special significance in the Spanish psyche. Not only was Cuba the largest and richest island of the West Indies, but it had also remained loyal to the mother country. Cuba was affectionately described by Spaniards as the ‘ever-faithful isle’ and was perceived as living proof that God’s blessing continued to shine on Spain’s imperial status.

Long and narrow like a crocodile, Cuba stretches more than 700 miles in length from west to east and varies in width from 20 to 50 miles across, though at one point the island is more than 100 miles from north to south. Its geographical position astride the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea had historically made the island a frequent port of call for Europeans en route from the Old World to the New World of Mexico and Central America. The Spaniards first came as conquerors in search of gold and silver, but some chose to settle in Cuba and thereby established a pattern of emigration which continued right up to the end of the nineteenth century. Spanish emigrants arriving in Cuba were known as ‘peninsulares’ because they had been born in the Iberian peninsula. Their ‘white’ children who were born in Cuba and the New World were called ‘creoles’. The distinction was crucially important because peninsulares regarded themselves as ‘pure-blooded’ and therefore superior to creoles. Moreover, Spanish imperial rule was dedicated to ensuring that the peninsulares retained a privileged status and dominated the government, the Church, the military and commerce.

The steady flow of emigrants from Spain to Cuba during the nineteenth century ensured that the peninsulares remained a substantial and highly powerful element of Cuban society. In fact, the number of peninsulares was actually boosted during the 1880s as a result of the introduction of government financial assistance for unemployed Spaniards emigrating to Cuba. Of the island’s 1.6 million population listed in the census of 1887, about 150,000 were peninsulares and 950,000 were creoles. Whites therefore comprised almost 70 per cent of the population. The remainder were mostly blacks and mulattos who were descended from Africans brought as slaves to work on the plantations.² The institution of slavery was maintained for almost the whole of the nineteenth century. A sizeable free coloured population existed, but it was economically and socially consigned to the bottom of society. Life was harsh for the people of colour. Discontent showed itself in occasional slave uprisings but more commonly in a general lawlessness and banditry that was such a feature of rural areas especially during the latter half of the nineteenth century. One calming influence for peninsulares and creoles was the presence of a permanently strong garrison of 20,000 Spanish troops in Cuba. Indeed, whites – whether peninsulares or creoles – considered the maintenance of Spanish authority as the best guarantee of protecting property and social order.

If subjection to Spain brought advantages for creoles in Cuba, there were also serious disadvantages, including the perpetuation of the special privileges accorded peninsulares from the Captain General at the top to the most humble government official. Moreover, the restrictive policy of mercantilism sought to give Spanish shipping and products a virtual monopoly of colonial trade. In addition, the Spanish crown levied high taxes on profitable local industries such as sugar and tobacco. Consequently, the nineteenth century witnessed frequent complaints from the creoles in Cuba against what they considered to be shameless exploitation by a reactionary and corrupt imperial system. On occasion, discontent erupted into violence and revolt. This was particularly evident in the eastern province of Oriente which was more racially mixed and economically less developed than the wealthy western provinces of Occidente (which included the capital, Havana), Las Villas, and Camagiiey. It was the Orientales, comprising not only creoles but also even larger numbers of blacks and mulattos,³ who took the lead in declaring that Cuba should separate itself from Spain and become independent. This radical objective was publicly proclaimed in the village of Yara on 10 October 1868. Such pronouncements were known as ‘gritos’, and it was therefore the ‘grito of Yara’ which marked the beginning of the Ten Years’ War of 1868–78.

For a decade the roving bands of Orientales referred to derogatorily by the creoles as ‘mambises’⁴ fought a guerrilla war against numerically superior Spanish forces. The most celebrated rebel chiefs were Máximo Gómez y Báez, a veteran professional soldier born in Santo Domingo (the present-day Dominican Republic) who rose from sergeant to the rank of major-general, and Antonio Maceo, the mulatto leader from Santiago de Cuba, former mule-driver and hero of the peasants. Hampered by mountainous terrain, lack of roads and a rainy season which stretched from May to October, the Spanish army was unable to pursue and destroy the insurgents. However, the Spanish forces retained control of the cities and towns, and by sheer weight of numbers they successfully confined the rebels to the mountains. In so doing, they prevented the revolt from spreading beyond Oriente. The rich sugar plantations of the west therefore escaped the war and most of its destructive effects. The military stalemate was broken in 1876 by the arrival from Spain of General Arsenio Martínez Campos. Acting more like a politician than a general, Martínez Campos astutely exploited the divisions and war-weariness among the Orientales by offering amnesty and the prospect of political concessions. An agreement to end the fighting was eventually signed at Zanjón in Camagüey on 10 February 1878.

Although neither side had achieved a clear military victory during the Ten Years’ War, the Pact of Zanjón was generally interpreted in Cuba as a Spanish triumph. The amnesty for the rebels was honoured, but Spanish politicians, operating within the system of caciquismo, subsequently showed little interest in implementing political or administrative reforms. The notable exceptions to this were the abolition of slavery in 1886 and the negotiation of a commercial agreement with the United States in 1891. The likelihood of significant political change was, however, severely constrained so long as Cuban representation in the Spanish Cortes was effectively limited to 6 out of 430 members. Moreover, the right to vote for the Cuban delegates was based on the payment of a high poll tax which restricted the suffrage to 53,000 voters or 3 per cent of the island’s population.⁵ The fact that the majority of these voters were peninsulares merely reinforced and highlighted the latter’s continued monopoly of office and privilege in Cuba.

Despite their unhappiness over the slow pace of political change, most Cuban creoles were loyal to Spain. They identified themselves with the mother country rather than the nebulous idea of ‘Cuba’. Thoughts of independence were not only regarded as treason, but were also associated with the Ten Years’ War and its attendant racial disharmony and destruction of property. In fact, creoles who advocated reform were hopeful that it could be achieved by traditional political methods. For this purpose the Liberal Party was formed in August 1878. Its stated objective was ‘autonomy’, which meant in practice the granting of wide powers of local self-government, increased Cuban representation in the Cortes and the freedom to trade. The Autonomists adopted the slogan of ‘Home Rule’ and frequently cited as their model Britain’s granting of ‘dominion’ status to Canada. Indeed, the idea of autonomy for Cuba found increasing support among Spanish liberals. At the beginning of 1895, prompted by the Liberal government of Sagasta, the Cortes was on the point of enacting measures to increase Cuban membership in the national parliament, but action was deferred by the outbreak of revolt in Cuba.

Steadfast against autonomy and resolutely opposed to the separation of Cuba from Spain was the Constitutional Union Party. Founded in November 1878, this party consisted mostly of peninsulares who favoured what was popularly known as ‘Cuba española’ (‘Spanish Cuba’). Starting with the premise that God had willed Spain to discover and civilize Cuba, the Unionists were utterly convinced that the continuation of Spanish rule was essential for the island’s prosperity and survival. ‘The people of Cuba are Spaniards, like those in Madrid, and the island is just as much part of Spain as is Castile’, declared a typical Unionist view.⁶ By utilizing the voting power of the peninsulares and the support of the local militia force of volunteers, the Unionists effectively stifled the efforts of the Autonomists to secure political and administrative reforms. Similar close links with government officials and business interests in Spain gave the Unionists considerable political influence in the Cortes on any legislation relating to Cuba. A particularly prominent supporter was the Conservative Party leader, Cánovas, who characteristically affirmed in July 1891 that ‘no Spanish [political] party will ever abandon the island of Cuba’. In what would become a famous phrase he declared that, if necessary, Spain would fight to ‘the last man and the last peso’ to retain the island.⁷

Cánovas’s remark indicated the deep-seated anxiety held by many Spaniards that a renewal of armed revolt in Cuba was seemingly inevitable. This arose primarily from the actions of a small but growing number of creoles who advocated separation from Spain. However, the concept of independence, or ‘Cuba libre’ (‘Free Cuba’), was considered treason and was not tolerated within Cuba. Its adherents avoided harassment and arrest either by going into hiding or seeking exile abroad, usually in the United States. Most notably, Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo had preferred exile rather than accept the Pact of Zanjón. Those exiles who believed that the fight for Cuban independence must be continued formed numerous clubs and juntas in Latin America and Europe and especially in the United States. During the 1880s there were a number of external attempts to launch revolts in Cuba by mobilizing the existing mass economic and social discontent on the island. But these efforts failed mostly as a result of lack of organization and leadership. The defects were remedied by José Martí.

Born in Havana in 1853, Martí was a first-generation creole. His father was an artillery sergeant from Valencia and his mother came from the Canary Islands. An ardent advocate of Cuban separation from Spain, he had been imprisoned during the Ten Years’ War and exiled to Madrid at the age of eighteen in 1871. Working mainly as a writer and journalist, he travelled to various countries in Latin America and from 1881 onwards lived a life of exile in the United States. During the 1880s he rose to prominence among the Cuban exiles and gained the name of ‘the Apostle’ by his tireless preaching not only of Cuba libre but also the necessity to transform Cuban society. The idea of independence as a catalyst of economic and social revolution had great appeal to the discontented masses suffering from exploitation by the ruling political elite. Acclaimed as a poet and man of ideas, Martí was also a technician and strategist. He was convinced that the Tee Years’ War had been lost through lack of central direction and organization. His answer was to establish the Cuban Revolutionary Party in January 1892. With the moral support and financial backing of thousands of members from within the United States and especially among the large numbers of Cuban emigrants employed as cigar-workers in Florida, Martí and the new party proceeded to plan the liberation of their homeland.

The Outbreak of War

Martí’s revolutionary activities were aided by the onset of severe economic depression in 1893. High unemployment in Cuba fuelled resentment against Spanish rule. Consequently, Martí found little difficulty in recruiting supporters and establishing a network of juntas throughout Cuba. The task of these juntas was to prepare for a nationwide rebellion which would be timed to coincide with the landing in Oriente of a force led by the most prominent exiles. The revolt was scheduled for February 1895 and called for Martí and up to 1,000 exiles to embark from Fernandina, Florida. In Oriente they would link up with two smaller expeditions, one from Costa Rica containing Antonio Maceo and the other from Santo Domingo headed by Máximo Gómez who, despite being almost sixty years old, had agreed to assume military command of the ‘Liberating Army’.

The more immediate problem for the revolutionary junta in the United States was how to keep their preparations secret. Complete secrecy proved impossible to achieve because the Spanish government habitually employed a large number of agents to monitor the activities of Cuban communities resident along the eastern seaboard. Moreover, there was also the risk that the United States government might intervene under the neutrality laws which prohibited expeditions known as ‘filibusters’ from using American ports as bases to attack friendly foreign governments. Similar difficulties had defeated a number of expeditions in the recent past and did so again on 14 January 1895, when...