The Weimar Republic

Stephen J. Lee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780415473231
• eBook ISBN: 9781134721092
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

The Weimar Republic provides a comprehensive introduction to Germany in the aftermath of the First World War. Exploring themes including the formation of the Republic, the impact of the Treaty of Versailles and the Republic's problems and achievements, it is an invaluable study guide.

This second edition includes two new chapters: the first looks at the Chancellors and Presidents of the Republic, the second assesses the career of Gustav Stresemann. It also contains a timeline and updated analysis to enhance readers' understanding of events and controversies. Integrating historical interpretation, exam-style questions, and evaluation of sources, this book provides students with a clear understanding and a foundation for examination success.

1

THE GERMAN REVOLUTION, 1918–19

BACKGROUND

Germany was taken into the First World War in August 1914 by a civilian government under Bethmann Hollweg, the fifth Chancellor of the Second Reich. By July 1917 his regime had been converted into a military dictatorship under Field Marshals Ludendorff and Hindenburg. This, however, made little difference to Germany’s prospects in the War. Despite defeating Russia in the East, the Reich faced imminent collapse in the West by October 1918. The decisive factors were the entry of the United States into the war and a crippling blockade imposed by the Royal Navy. Ludendorff therefore advised Kaiser Wilhelm II to appoint a civilian government to negotiate an armistice with the Allies. Prince Max of Baden was entrusted with this unenviable task on 26 October. He was supported by the Social Democrats (SPD), who since 1912 had been the largest party in the Reichstag, but opposed by the more radical Independent Socialists (USPD) and Spartacists, who had broken away from the SPD during the course of the war.

The situation then deteriorated rapidly as the armed forces began to disintegrate. The result was a series of military and naval mutinies. The Kaiser was persuaded to abdicate on 9 November. On the same day, Prince Max of Baden handed over the reins of government to Friedrich Ebert, who succeeded him as Chancellor, while the latter’s SPD colleague, Philipp Scheidemann, proclaimed Germany a Republic.

At this stage the SPD were obliged to share power with the radicals — the USPD and Spartacists — in a Council of People’s Representatives. It was no secret, however, that the groups had vastly different aims. The SPD hoped to establish a Western parliamentary system, while the USPD wanted to give pre-eminence to the councils and the Spartacist leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, intended to emulate the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. In January 1919, the Spartacists came out in open revolt in the streets of Berlin. They were, however, crushed by the Freikorps, or remnants of the Imperial army, with the full knowledge and sanction of Ebert, who had already done a deal with the commanding officer, General Groener. The next target was Bavaria, which had in the meantime proclaimed a Soviet Republic: this regime was brought down by the Freikorps in April 1919.

Meanwhile, elections had been held for the convening of the first full assembly of the Republic. This met in Weimar but, once violence in Berlin had ended, the legislature was transferred back to Berlin, which once again became the permanent capital.

ANALYSIS 1: EXPLAIN THE POLITICAL CONFLICT IN GERMANY BETWEEN 1914 AND 1919

At the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 Germany experienced major political changes. The first stage occurred in October 1918 when the military dictatorship under Ludendorff handed over power to a constitutional government under Prince Max of Baden. Then, on 9 November, the Kaiser’s regime collapsed altogether, to be replaced by a Republic. This, in turn, experienced internal upheaval as the various factions of the political left contested power against in each other in Berlin and elsewhere.

Even before 1914, the long-term political stability of the Kaiser’s Reich had been threatened by two deep faultlines. One was the potential for conflict between the authoritarian base of the Reich and the constitutional challenges of frustrated liberalism, especially apparent in the middle classes. The other was the growth of a mass working class, the result of Germany’s rapid industrialisation; this was particularly feared by the industrial and landed elites. Overall, Germany had failed to adapt economic and social change to a traditionalist power structure. Sooner, or later, major changes were likely. But the main factor in releasing the upheavals which actually occurred between 1918 and 1919 was the dislocation caused by the First World War.

At first, the war had the opposite effect. The outbreak seemed to reconcile Germany within the Burgfrieden (‘peace within the fortress’) as political parties and social classes sank their differences. The SPD, previously critical of the regime, supported the war effort, partly through an underlying patriotism and partly in the belief that war would bring with it a recognition from the rest of society of the true worth of the working class. The middle classes were similarly enthusiastic. Even the liberal historian Meinecke welcomed the conflict, believing that it would achieve the full integration of authoritarian Prussia into a more democratic Germany and create a people’s army.

The problem was that victory did not materialise. Germany was involved in a war on two fronts and it failed to break through in the west, despite success in the east. This resulted in the key decision-making passing to the military leadership. The Kaiser, so influential before 1914, ceased to function effectively as head of state, losing power to the high command, the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL). The Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, was even more affected and resigned his office in June 1917.

For a while, Ludendorff and Hindenburg prevailed; insisting on an all-out campaign for victory, they continued to carry most of Germany with them, with the significant exception of the far left. Then, in September 1918, Germany experienced its first political change as the OHL advised the Kaiser to hand political power to a broader-based government led by a new Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden.

There were three main reasons for this sudden change of direction. The first was impending military defeat. On 23 September Bulgaria requested an armistice. It was only a matter of time before Germany’s other allies — the Ottoman Empire and Austria—Hungary — followed suit. It had suddenly become clear that the war could no longer be won, which made it increasingly difficult to justify the huge losses Germany was experiencing: 2.4 million military deaths and 293,000 civilian deaths from starvation and disease in 1918 alone. A second factor in the handover was the refusal by the Allies, especially President Wilson, to negotiate with anything other than a fully representative government. And, third, Ludendorff had his own motives. He told members of his military staff of his request for an armistice:

I have advised His Majesty to bring those groups into the government whom we have in the main to thank for the fact that matters have now reached this pass. We will now therefore see these gentlemen move into the ministries. Let them now conclude the peace that has to be negotiated. Let them eat the broth they have prepared for us.¹

The October reforms were, in some ways, a major concession to parliamentary responsibility. The Chancellor now had to have the confidence of the Reichstag, which also had ultimate responsibility for the actions of Kaiser, for the military and naval command, and for the conclusion of treaties. The moderate parties in the Reichstag, which included most of the SPD, hoped that this would be enough to see an end to the war without punitive measures against Germany from outside or a collapse on the inside.

But these concessions were rapidly followed by further upheavals which affected the whole of Germany. Three major problems undermined both the reforms and the government which had introduced them. First, the Allies were unconvinced that Germany had become a genuinely democratic regime and therefore delayed moves towards an armistice. The longer this took, the greater would be the pressure on the new government. Second, this was exacerbated by growing disillusionment within Germany at lack of any economic or social reforms; there was particular popular resentment against labour regulations and housing conditions. It would not take much to make this volatility explosive. Third, this ingredient was provided by a last-minute attempt by the military and naval commands to pursue new offensives. The latter, for example, gave orders for the German navy to put to sea in a final showdown against the British.

The result was the rapid spread of naval and military mutinies. These were accompanied by the establishment of soldiers’, sailors’ and workers’ councils all over Germany. Confronted by an irresistible momentum, Prince Max stepped down on 9 November, handing power to the SPD leader, Friedrich Ebert. Meanwhile, the assault from below had also resulted in the flight of all the state rulers and of the Kaiser himself. To many, the way seemed clear for the establishment of a more democratic regime based upon a much broader social base. This might, in turn, bring the achievement of all the aims of the SPD.

But there was a major complication, which threw Germany into further chaos from November onwards. Under the pressure of the First World War, the SPD had experienced an internal split, with the formation of the Spartacus League in 1916 and the USPD in 1917; both opposed Germany’s involvement in the war, but only the Spartacists espoused revolutionary Communism. The remainder, or Majority SPD, remained highly suspicious of both the Spartacists and the USPD, wanting to make the most of the October reforms and the power inherited from Prince Max of Baden. But, for the moment at least, they were pulled along by the radicals and the exceptional circumstances in which they found themselves. Eventually, the divisions resulted in direct conflict — between the MSPD on the one hand and the USPD and Spartacists on the other — as uneasy collaborators became bitter rivals in search of different outcomes.

The origins of their collaboration — and rivalry — can be seen in the events of 9 November 1918. On that day, two great crowds assembled to witness two proclamations of a republic, one by Liebknecht and the Spartacists, the other by Scheidemann and the MSPD. At first there was an attempt to govern collectively through a Council of People’s Representatives (Rat der Volksbeauftragten), under Ebert, Scheidemann, and Landsberg (from the MSPD) and Haase, Dittmann and Barth from the USPD. Differences, however, emerged over longer-term strategies and policies: the USPD and Spartacists remained committed to the principle of council rule, while the MSPD wanted to prepare for a transition to a national constituent assembly. The latter was more in line with Western-style democratic institutions, whereas the councils were associated more with revolutionary influences from Russia. Specific differences arose in December 1918 over the maintenance of law and order, over whether the army should be radicalised and over whether the means of industrial production should be brought under socialist control. In the same month the members of the USPD ended their co-operation with the MSPD, while the Spartacists reconstituted themselves as the KPD, or Communist Party. Thus the original SPD splintered along the faultiness it had shown during the First World War — into three distinct parties (see Figure 2 on page 47).

The significance of this was considerable. The new Republic was caught between three left-wing visions, all of which collided at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919. Central government was divided between radicals, who envisaged a permanent system of councils, and moderates who preferred the restoration of a constitutional structure based on the Reichstag. The states — or Länder — were also affected. Bavaria, for example, came under Eisner’s USPD regime in November 1918, to be replaced, in turn, by a Communist Räterepublic under Leviné. The Communists also made an ill-judged bid for power in Berlin as Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg sought to replace the MSPD government from which the USPD had already withdrawn.

What gave the MSPD the advantage was an agreement made on 10 November between Ebert, the leader of the MSPD, and Groener, Commander-in-Chief of what remained of the German army. The latter offered Ebert military support to suppress any revolutionary uprisings and to maintain law and order. Ebert was able to use this in two ways. First, he resisted pressure from both the USPD and the Spartacists for immediate radical changes, whether political, social or economic. Second, he was able to fend off the challenge from the Spartacists by calling on the support of the Freikorps, which crushed the attempted rebellion and shot its leaders in cold blood. The next stage was to authorise similar action against the far left in some of the Länder, beginning with the overthrow of Leviné’s regime in Bavaria and moving on to purge threats in the industrial areas of Saxony.

The conflict within Germany’s left had the gravest implications for the future of the new Republic. By 1920 the USPD had disintegrated, leaving a huge gap between the SPD and KPD. The Communists never forgot the actions taken against them by the Social Democrats in 1919 and remained permanently opposed to the institutions and ethos of the Republic; this was to be particularly important after 1919 when the Republic entered a second period of crisis. The polarisation of the left between revolutionaries and evolutionary democrats, in turn gave an opportunity to the political right, whether nationalist or Nazi, to attack the whole basis of Weimar democracy.

Questions

1. Why was political reconciliation replaced by political conflict within Germany between 1914 and 1919?

2. Why had the SPD split into three parties on the political left by the end of 1918?

ANALYSIS 2: WAS THERE A GERMAN REVOLUTION, 1918–19?

‘Revolution’ involves the transfer of power in circumstances outside the normal constitutional process. It results in radical changes to political — and quite possibly social and economic — infrastructure. The process is often accelerated by the experience of war, and especially of military defeat. This is what happened in Russia during the course of 1917.

There has always been an argument that Germany had a similar experience a year later. The usual interpretation is that, like Russia, Germany underwent either two revolutions, or a single revolution which developed in two stages. A ‘revolution from above’ liberalised the constitution of the Second Reich in October 1918. It was followed by a ‘revolution from below’, which further subdivided into two. One successfully laid the foundations of the Republic in November, only to be threatened in turn by an attempt to establish a more radical Bolshevik-style regime in January 1919. Collectively these developments...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Questions and Analysis in History
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Outline chronology
• Series preface
• Introduction
• Acknowledgements
• 1 The German Revolution, 1918-19
• 2 Versailles and its impact, 1919-33
• 3 The constitution and party system, 1919-33
• 4 Chancellors and Presidents of the Republic, 1918-33
• 5 Crisis and recovery, 1920-23
• 6 A period of stability, 1924-29?
• 7 Foreign policy, 1919-33
• 8 Gustav Stresemann: an assessment
• 9 Social and cultural achievements, 1918-33
• 10 Crisis and collapse, 1929-33
• Notes
• Select bibliography
• Index