Press Freedom in Contemporary Japan

Jeff Kingston

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781138647039
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317234357
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Public Law
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In twenty-first century Japan there are numerous instances of media harassment, intimidation, censorship and self-censorship that undermine the freedom of the press and influence how the news is reported. Since Abe returned to power in 2012, the recrudescence of nationalism under his leadership has emboldened right-wing activists and organizations targeting liberal media outlets, journalists, peace museums and ethnic Korean residents in Japan. This ongoing culture war involves the media, school textbooks, constitutional revision, pacifism and security doctrine.

This text is divided into five sections that cover:

• Politics of press freedom;
• The legal landscape;
• History and culture;
• Marginalization;
• PR, public diplomacy and manipulating opinion.

Press Freedom in Contemporary Japan brings together contributions from an international and interdisciplinary line-up of academics and journalists intimately familiar with the current climate, in order to discuss and evaluate these issues and explore potential future outcomes. It is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand contemporary Japan and the politics of freedom of expression and transparency in the Abe era. It will appeal to students, academics, Japan specialists, journalists, legal scholars, historians, political scientists, sociologists, and those engaged in human rights, media studies and Asian Studies.

Part I

The politics of press freedom

1

Media muzzling under the Abe administration

Aurelia George Mulgan

Dislike of media criticism has led to a crackdown on freedom of the media in both electronic and paper formats under the Abe administration (2012–). This is a worrying development that has even been picked up by the international press¹ and by international organizations such as Reporters Without Borders, which moved Japan down its global “freedom of press” rankings in both 2015 and 2016 (Asahi Japan Watch 2015a; Adelstein 2016).²

This chapter examines the Abe administration’s range of media-muzzling behaviors, its primary targets, political objectives and impact, as well as its political causes and consequences. While the strongest attacks have been reserved for the more “liberal” or left-wing media, particularly the Asahi newspaper (Asahi Shimbun) and TVAsahi, not even foreign journalists and the public broadcaster NHK are immune. In various ways the Abe administration, including Prime Minister Abe Shinzō himself, his office (Kantei) and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are pressuring media organizations across the board with a view to muting criticism of the government and engendering a distinct pro-government bias in media coverage. Their actions risk violating Japan’s Broadcast Law and even the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech, press and all other forms of expression. The prime minister and his government find media criticism galling because they face so little from within the ruling party and from opposition parties in the Diet. A system of strong prime ministerial leadership has taken hold, which brooks little resistance from countervailing forces, including media critics.

Types of media muzzling

The list is long of the media-muzzling behaviors to which the Abe administration has increasingly been prone. It includes: interpreting media criticism as “unfair” coverage, calling for “fair and neutral [namely uncritical] reporting,”³ labelling criticism of the government and its policies as media “bias,” complaining directly to television broadcasters about the content of their programs, intimidating media organizations by threatening to put pressure on their sponsors, summoning and then grilling media executives about their broadcasts, making angry protests to political reporters about critical coverage of the prime minister’s handling of particular issues, objecting to curb-side interviews and refusing to grant media interviews⁴ or to appear on TV programs until broadcasters apologize, threatening media organizations with action under the Broadcast Law,⁵ and calling for restrictions on newspapers that oppose the government’s policy.⁶ In addition to these “sticks,” the government has used “carrots” to win over media companies and representatives, granting exclusive interviews and scoops to certain favored newspapers⁷ and inviting executives and journalists to enjoy the prime minister’s hospitality, including meals and golf outings.⁸ Another less obvious but potentially effective form of media muzzling has involved the exercise of influence over staff appointments to commercial and public broadcasting companies.⁹

Such behaviors are not unique to the Abe administration in Japan nor internationally (Kingston 2015a) but are now setting the tone of government-media relations in Japan. In comparison with previous administrations, not only have cases of government guidance to broadcasters increased, but the Abe administration also stands out for its aggressive interference in media coverage, for its paranoid response to criticism (Iinuma 2015) and for its attempts to intimidate media critics. These developments have prompted a slew of criticism from a range of expert and academic observers. For example, Sugita Atsushi, professor of Political Science at Hosei University, observes, “The current administration is making too many interventions in the media. These could curtail even the public’s expressions of political opinions” (Asahi Japan Watch 2014). In a similar vein, professor of Media Studies at Hosei University, Mizushima Hiroaki, comments, “The Abe administration has shown a pronounced stance of monitoring the media and complaining about ‘slanted’ reporting when it does not suit their intentions” (Asahi Japan Watch, 2015c). Former editor in chief at Newsweek Japan, Takeda Keigo, went further, saying, “The Abe government is showing an obsession with the media that verges on paranoia … I have never seen this level of efforts to micromanage specific newspapers and TV programs” (Fackler 2015). Even the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun has called on the government to “refrain from heedlessly interfering in the content of programs” (2016).

Moreover, it is a partisan organization – the ruling party – that is frequently in the front line of actions calling the media to account. Tahara Sōichirō, a well-known MC for news programs for many years, describes this behavior as “interference in the press by political power” (Tahara, Ōtani and Kamematsu 2015). In fact, as Ōishi notes, “intimidating TV shows on the grounds of fairness and justness is something of a ‘forte’ for the LDP – the LDP has developed ‘wiles’ in a long history of using this tactic” (2015), which he describes as “repetitive interference” and “groundless tyranny” (2015).

One egregious example was the letter sent in late November 2014 by the director-general of LDP’s Information Bureau, Fukui Teru, to TV Asahi complaining about “unfair” coverage of Abenomics after its calls for newspapers and TV stations to “show fairness” in their coverage during the run-up to the 2014 Lower House election. As Mizushima points out, it was unprecedented for the ruling party to act in this way by making specific complaints about a particular program, which he characterized as “a sort of threat” (Asahi Japan Watch 2015c).

Subsequently in April 2015, the LDP’s Research Commission on Information and Communications Strategy summoned executives from both NHK and TV Asahi to question them at LDP Headquarters about the contents of their respective Close-Up Today (Kurōzuappu Gendai) and Hodo Station (Hōdō Sutēshon) programs respectively. NHK was accused of “staging” the program on Close-Up Today, while the issue for TV Asahi involved perhaps the most celebrated case of apparent political interference, forcing the Abe administration to deal with accusations that it pressured TV Asahi to drop outspoken guest commentator, Koga Shigeaki, from Hodo Station (Firstpost 2015). In this particular episode Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide appeared to be in the frontline of both applying and then denying any pressure on the media (Asahi Japan Watch 2015c). Koga had mentioned Suga by name and said that there was pressure from the Kantei regarding his leaving the program, which Suga completely dismissed (Mainichi Shimbun 2015a). The interference was condemned as “excessive political intervention” (Mainichi Shimbun 2015b) for the purpose of “[giving] the impression that the government and ruling party were monitoring the TV stations and would issue complaints for the purpose of ‘intimidating’ all broadcasters” (Tanaka 2015). In reality, both programs involved issues in which the ruling party should not have interfered and where it should have been left to the broadcasters to investigate for themselves (Tahara, Ōtani and Kamematsu 2015). The news anchor for Close-Up Today, Kuniya Hiroko, was subsequently removed from her position because, it is speculated, she conducted a probing interview of Suga on the subject of the new security legislation (Australian Financial Review 2016; Kingston 2016).¹⁰

Such pressure is likely exerted with the full knowledge, if not the tacit encouragement, of LDP President Abe Shinzō whose “glass jaw” is fully on display in his personal relations with journalists and media organizations (George Mulgan 2015). As assistant professor of Political Science at Bunka Gakuen University, Shirai Satoshi, observes, “[Abe] is refusing to accept criticism from citizens and the media. Such an attitude is not suitable for a prime minister” (Asahi Japan Watch 2014). Even in the Diet, Abe’s glass jaw is evident in the face of embarrassing statements and questions from opposition party members; he retaliated with verbal barbs and heckled his opponents while condemning their similar behavior. Abe’s acute sensitivity to anything that smacks of criticism reflects a disrespect for the role of an independent media in the democratic process in enforcing government accountability and an unenviable predisposition to retaliate with complaints, counter-attacks and other kinds of defensive action (Brasor 2014). His conduct displays ignorance of the difference between state power and the media whose job it is to check that power. In fact, in this and other respects, such as its rejection of the constitutionalist view that state power should be scrutinized and checked by citizens, the Abe administration displays a fundamental misunderstanding of democratic politics, press freedom and of human rights as natural and universal (Iinuma 2015).¹¹

Primary targets

While no newspaper or broadcaster is necessarily immune, there is no doubt that the prime minister, his government and the ruling LDP have reserved their strongest attacks for the left-wing media, particularly the Asahi newspaper and TV Asahi, which are known to be critical of Abe and the LDP (Iinuma 2015).¹²Asahi-bashing has even progressed to the point where a university came under threat for appointing to an academic position a former Asahi journalist who had reported on the Japanese “sex slave” issue. (See Yamaguchi in Chapter 10)

The attacks have also extended to the foreign media in a way that is pointed and personal, and puts the Foreign Ministry in the position of chief instrument of the Abe administration’s “denial diplomacy” on war history issues. A journalist from the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) who left Japan in April 2015 described “the suffocating atmosphere for reporters under the Abe administration” (Asahi Japan Watch 2015d) after coming under attack from the Foreign Ministry for having published a critical story about the Abe administration’s “revisionist view of history” (Asahi Japan Watch 2015a). In a similar episode, the Tokyo correspondent of an American newspaper received an email from an official at the Japanese Embassy in Washington criticizing the journalist’s source of comments on wartime sex slaves (Takeda 2015).

Political objectives and impact

Given these developments, it is difficult not to conclude that the Abe administration and LDP are trying to “control the message,” cow the media into submission and silence criticism of the prime minister and his government. (See Nakano Chapter 2) In particular, it seeks to intimidate those sections of the media whose basic political stance is one of fundamental opposition to the government’s conservative policy agenda, especially on issues involving the constitution, Japanese defense, nuclear power, human rights and so on. As Fackler (2015) argues, the aim is to ease the path for policies that have not garnered broad popular support such as rewriting the constitution, expanding the scope of military action by the country’s armed forces and restarting nuclear power plants.

While the Abe government’s media-muzzling attempts have been counterproductive internationally (See Kingston Chapter 21; Kingston 2015a), self-censorship by domestic media critics is becoming more apparent amongst those now more inclined to “play it safe” by yielding to pressure from the administration and ruling party and by confining coverage to reporting that is either bland or broadly supportive of the government, while omitting material that could be construed as critical.¹³ As an editorial in the Mainichi Shimbun opines, “the media now tends to surmise [what the administration wants] and cower” (2015a). Tahara describes the process as “the mass media today … [becoming] extremely ‘weak-kneed’ … cowering even before the political powers actually exert any pressure. Their cowering is allowing the administration to take advantage of them” (Tahara, Ōtani and Kamematsu 2015). Even the formerly outspoken Hodo Station is avoiding the risk of official ire by censoring its coverage of events and moderating its criticism of the government (Fackler 2015).¹⁴ Its popular frontman for a decade, Furutachi Ichirō, has also left the show.

Such a response from the media runs the risk of their crossing the line from “watchdog” and guardian of the public interest to “lap-dog” or even “pet dog,” where broadcasters and newspapers become mere publicity agents for or protectors of government interests.¹⁵ (See Fackler Chapter 3) In the latter role, the Japanese media fails to undertake one of the primary duties it has under the Broadcast Law to disseminate accurate information to the public at large, another key function in a democracy.¹⁶

These days, the public broadcaster NHK, particularly under its Abe-appointed chairman, Momii Katsuto, tends to act as more of a PR organ for the government despite being required by law to operate independently of pressure from political authorities (Morris-Suzuki 2005; also see Krauss Chapter 5).¹⁷Although NHK is scrupulous in obtaining cross-party commentary on key political issues and policies,¹⁸ it has been known to omit from the news, items that might be considered embarrassing to the Abe government (Hopkins 2014). Abe and NHK have a history, given NHK’s submission to Abe’s previous interference in the program it ran on the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal in 2001. As chief cabinet secretary at the time, Abe met with senior NHK staff to discuss the content of the documentary due to be aired on the tribunal. In the wake of Abe’s visit, crucial alterations were made to the content of the program, which a media whistle-blower revealed resulted directly from pressure from Abe and the Minister of Economy and Industry at the time, Nakagawa Shōichi (Morris-Suzuki 2005). The episode revealed a system of “reverse accountability” in which the public broadcaster behaved as if it were accountable to key politicians and the government of the day, instead of holding them to account. (See Krauss Chapter 5) At the time, Abe very successfully shifted the focus of debate from the issue of political intervention in NHK to the need for “fairness and balance” in journalism, a principle to be selectively applied only to programs, articles or media organizations adopting politically critical positions. (See Seaton Chapter 13) The upshot was a media pushed by the government further to the right, with critical voices subdued or self-censored out of fear of political retribution (Morris-Suzuki 2005).

Abe made a similar accusation about the NHK Close-Up Today program, saying it was at fault for falsifying its news report and thus violating the provisions of the Broadcasting Law, particularly Article 4, which states that “reporting shall not distort the facts” (Asahi Japan Watch 2015e). The Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Sanae Takaichi, had also issued an admonition to NHK on the matter (Asahi Japan Watch 2015e). For...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: press freedom in contemporary Japan
• Part I The politics of press freedom
• Part II Legal landscape
• Part III History and culture wars
• Part IV Marginalization
• Part V PR, public diplomacy and manipulating opinion
• Index