Iraqi Federalism and the Kurds

Learning to Live Together

Alex Danilovich

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317112921
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Nationalism & Patriotism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Iraq today faces a whole gamut of problems associated with post-war recovery and state-rebuilding compounded by age old mistrust and suspicion. The situation in Iraq resembles a huge experiment in which social scientists can observe the consequences of actions taken across an entire country. Can Western ideas take route and flourish in non-western societies? Can constitutionalism take hold and work in a traditional religious and deeply divided society? Is Iraqi federalism a solution to the country's severe disunity or a temporary fix? Iraqi Federalism and the Kurds: Learning to Live Together addresses these important questions and focuses on the role of federalism as a viable solution to Iraq's many problems and the efforts the Kurdish government has deployed to adjust to new federal relations that entail not only gains, but also concessions and compromises. The author's direct experience of living and working within this embattled country allows a unique reflection on the successes and failures of federalism and the positive developments the introduction of federal relationships have brought.

Chapter 1
Federalism as a Tool to Manage Conflicts and Associated Risks

Alex Danilovich and Francis Owtram

With the intensification of ethnic conflicts in multi-cultural societies over the last two decades that has accompanied transition from authoritarianism to democracy, increased scholarly attention has moved to the ways of managing these conflicts. New theories, approaches, and policy recommendations have been profusely advanced as a result. Federalism occupies a place of choice in this booming literature as one of the most effective means to deal with divided societies and maintain the territorial integrity of deeply fragmented polities.

This chapter attempts to draw out a review of the abundant literature on federalism in order to build an explanatory framework that will help us to gain a better understanding of the current state of federalism in Iraq. We try to review common patterns and obtain helpful insights from various federal experiences and efforts deployed in many countries in attempts to quell ethnic conflicts through federalism. Federalism is believed to have become a sort of “technological” solution for deep-rooted human problems, such as nationalism and associated conflicts.

This theoretical chapter is meant to enlighten our empirical case studies that investigate various challenges to Iraqi federalism, to name, regional security arrangements and the role of the Kurdish armed forces, the Kurdistan Region’s activism in the international arena, federalization of revenues and natural resources, and finally, the peculiarities of Iraqi constitutionalism that combines the principles of Islam and liberal democracy in one constitutional system and possible implications for federal relations.

In developing this research project we believe in what Jan Erk and Wilfried Swenden say:

‥‥ empirical evidence from single cases follows a theoretical reasoning that endorses the premise of generalizability. That is, every case is seen to be part of a bigger whole and the quest is to unearth patterns to understand and explain federalism. (Erk and Swenden 2010: 1)

This study of Iraq’s new federal system will contribute, we hope, to the burgeoning literature of comparative federalism by exploring certain theoretical perspectives in relation to Iraq, which underlie the selected empirical focus of the chapters on regional security, regional foreign policy, federalization of natural resources, and the nature of the constitutional system. The three key inter-related theoretical issues addressed by this study are (1) accommodation versus assimilation; (2) asymmetrical ethno-federalism; and (3) the “paradox of federalism,” with emphasis placed on the latter. The paradox consists in federalism’s potential to both prevent and induce secession.

A success of federal relations in Iraq would have a significant impact on the concept of federalism and its application not only as a possible “technological” solution to deep-rooted human problems, but also to achieving quality democracy. As Dawn Brancati put it in 2004, “Whether Iraq is able to establish a stable democracy ultimately depends on the design of its system of federalism” (Brancati 2004: 11). Now almost a decade later, we would like to see how the Iraqi federal system has been faring since and how its experience can enrich our broader theoretical understanding of federalism.

Defining Federalism

“Confederation,” “federation” and most of the other key components of the contemporary version of the language of federalism are derived from the Latin foedus, which means an alliance among individuals or collectivities aiming at the promotion of both specific and common interests (Karmis and Norman 2005: 5).

Although contemporary federalism may not be amenable to simple definition (Filippov et al 2004: 5), it is important to touch base with the reader over the concept itself before we proceed to further discussion. The classic definition by Riker (1964: 11) remains valid today and underlines the essential key characteristics of federalism:

1. Two levels of government that rule the same land and people,

2. Each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and

3. There is some guarantee … of the autonomy of each government in its sphere

Furthermore, “in a federal state, political authority at the regional level is often exercised through a regional legislature, a regional executive, and a regional judicial system” (Anderson 2010: 129). In other words, a federated unit possesses all attributes of a polity as organized society, one step short of sovereignty.

While useful by presenting the most basic common features of federalism, this definition fails to take into account the diversity within federal institutional structures, institutional origins and various uncodified social and economic factors. “These diverse origins, institutions and meanings bring about various incentives in dealing with growing dissatisfaction with the status quo. In some cases, the institutions of federalism point in the direction of secessionism. In others, they do not” (Anderson 2010: 129).

Whilst there are as many federalisms as there are federations, scholars identify some key differences between federations. A federation can be: (1) strongly centralized or decentralized, (2) symmetrical or asymmetrical, (3) “coming together” or “holding together.” This latter dichotomy means, in effect, that a polity either is born federal from a bargain among previously independent political units (a coming-together federation) or becomes federal through a process of bargaining among regions within a pre-existing unitary state (a holding together federation). For example, the United States was born federal, Belgium has become federal, and Great Britain, Anderson contends, is in the process of becoming federal (Anderson 2010: 130).

Habisso argues that federalism is a reasonable design for political systems with a lot of potential to pursue the goal of stability and security. This design allows the securing of social unity and political stability in deeply divided societies by facilitating both unity and diversity and maintaining “dual identities” within a single country (Habisso 2010).

Federalism is considered particularly appropriate in transitional societies, as it not only palliates ethnic conflicts, but also strengthens and enhances the quality of democracy. According to Brancati, if federalism in ethnically diverse countries functions properly, democracy becomes more stable. On the contrary, if federalism does not function well, based on the common criteria i.e. autonomy and jurisdictions are not given to the regions for self-rule, the federal system will not succeed. Brancati illustrates this point by giving examples of several failed federal experiments: “Federalism has failed in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Nigeria precisely because it did not go far enough in granting regional autonomy. If regional governments are granted certain powers in principle, but are denied these powers in practice or given only modest powers in the first place, federalism is guaranteed to fail” (Brancati 2004: 11, 13).

From Assimilative Integration to Federal Accommodation

There is a fundamental difference between federal accommodation on one hand, and assimilative integration, on the other (McGurry et al 2008; Choudry 2008; Elazar 1984). Accommodation of ethno-cultural differences or ethno-federalism is not eagerly accepted by Western mainstream policy, which is oriented towards assisting “minorities in adapting to the dominant society” (McGarry 2008: 57). “This type of self-styled ‘multiculturalism’ does not advocate public support for cultural communities to remain viable and separate for the long term …” (McGarry 2008: 57). “Many Western multiculturalists display a rather shallow tolerance of the cultures of non-Western immigrants, while typically juxtaposing their liberal nationalism with ethnic nationalism … Such multiculturalism is, in our view, “pseudo multiculturalism. It is liberal integration in disguise” (McGarry 2008: 57).

Obviously, we use the dichotomy of assimilative integration/accommodation only for analytical purposes, as in real life successful federations use both at a time. The process of federation-building is meant to produce a reasonable degree of common identity; otherwise there is no sense in creating or keeping a common state, which is taken to mean that integrationist steps are necessary to certain degree in order to preserve the unity of a country.

Through Iraqi state-building since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds have experienced integration and assimilation the hard way. In Turkey, Iran and Syria both approaches have been extensively tested to prove only that assimilating the Kurds seems a mission impossible.

The Iraqi Kurds, as many other large ethnic groups in the Third World, have been striving to establish a nation-state following the classical logic described by William Safran independence–state building—nation building—democracy, “which was accepted almost as a political law of nature” (Safran 2000: 1). Unfortunately, this seemingly logical sequence of political developments has not proved viable in many places, as there are too many nations and too few states in the world. Therefore the question arises under what circumstances ethnic minorities are entitled to have a state or at least cultural autonomy and under what circumstances not? Safran (2000: 14) has identified a set of preconditions meeting which would allow an ethnic group to have federal autonomy:

• Cultural benefits are more important than economic

• Legitimate grievances over past discriminatory relationships

• Serious threat to cultural identity under the current arrangement

• The grant of autonomy will preserve the freedoms and respect of other ethnic minorities

Most large ethnic minorities easily meet all these criteria, except for the last one. Typically, when former minorities become local provincial majorities there is a serious danger that they won’t be very sensitive to the concerns of other minorities. That, for example, is what happened in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the USSR when the nationalizing elite of the Kazakh ethnic minority in what was known as Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, exalted over independence and proclaimed Kazakhstan the land of all Kazakhs and … a unitary state. The Uyghurs, another national minority in the same territory, did not like that idea and wanted independence too or at least federal autonomy as the right to preserve and foster their own distinct identity. However, the Kazakhs, the newly established majority, did not let it happen, which generated fresh ethno-cultural tensions in the newly established country. Eric Nordlinger foresaw such developments and feared that accommodation of one minority (Kazakhs in our example) would lead to power abuse by ethnocentric minorities that became majorities (Nordlinger 1972). As there are many more nations than states, it would be impossible for each nation to have its own state; therefore we need to find ways of coexistence of national groups within one state (Taylor 1993: 155).

The most characteristic feature of divided society is when “political claims are refracted through the lens of ethnic identity, and political conflict is synonymous with conflict among ethno-cultural groups” (Choudry 2008: 1). “The extreme consequences of the failure to address these challenges adequately are well known: discrimination and exclusion, forced assimilation, civil war, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide” (Ibid.). Constitutional design plays a particular role in fixing the problems of divided societies. “So constitutions matter, and matter centrally in the response to the challenges of divided societies” (Choudry 2008: 5).

Martin Dent also suggests federalism as a way to manage conflicts fueled by nationalism and to reconcile the growing separatism of national minorities within large multi-ethnic countries; under federal arrangements national minorities establish an agreement over internal affairs, national security and foreign policy (Dent 2004). Alfred Stepan calls this type of federalism “keeping together” federalism, as opposed to the US-style “coming together” federalism (Stepan 1999). For obvious reason, the US-style coming-together federalism has a rather limited value for managing ethnic conflicts (Stepan 1999).

Federalism cannot be considered as a panacea for all ills in multinational countries. If we look what happened in the former communist federations that broke up along the ethnic lines, we will see that federalism may have been used as a springboard for secession (Leff 1999, Watts 2008). Not being free associations, communist federal units developed their institutional power for national minorities and ultimately constituted “states in embryo” ready to be caught in electoral politics and ultimately break away. In other words, at the end of the day, communist federations did little more than to facilitate minority mobilization and secession (Leff 1999).

A Canadian scholar, Will Kymlicka, in his much celebrated volumes Multicultural Citizenship and Finding our Way claims that federalism has spread all over the world through a process of emulation of Canada’s successful federal experience. Canada is a mixed federation that combines “a nationality-based subunit with territory-based subunits whose members share the same language, and who do not see themselves as members of different nations” (Choudry 2008 166). The Canadian federal order and the Canadian experience of managing divided societies are also hailed by many scholars and politicians (Ignatieff 2006). Will Kymlicka exalts the virtues of the Canadian model,

[F]ederalism seems the ideal mechanism for accommodating territorially defined national minorities within a multinational state. Where such a minority is regionally concentrated, the boundaries of federal subunits can be drawn so that it forms a majority in one of the subunits. (Kymlicka 1998: 135)

Kymlicka presents Canada as a paradigmatic example of how a minority has control over issues that are crucial for not only the survival, but also flourishing of its society, education, language and culture.

The undeniable success of Canadian federalism rests on constitutional techniques combining accommodation and integration in pursuit of the maintenance of territorial integrity and political unity of the large state (See Choudry for his elaborate taxonomy of techniques used in Canada to manage minority nationalism). Many scholars who praise Canada’s success forget that it has become such only recently after the end of a major constitutional crisis in the 1990s when Quebec sought independence and failed. As the Canadian constitution does not have a provision allowing secession, the attempt by Quebec to break away shows a major crisis of Canadian federalism and constitutionalism. The history of Canadian federalism has not seemed to be a success story if we look at a longer period of time, say, since the creation of the United Province of Canada in the 1880s. Canadian federalism stemmed from consociation, with English as the only official language of the country. Quebec was created to protect the francophone identity, and originally was granted jurisdiction over language and cultural matters only. The recent electoral victory of Parti Quebecois (2012) is likely to pose new challenges to Canadian federalism.

In the case of Iraq, federalism was meant from the outset to accommodate Kurdish nationalism, identity, language and culture. All attempts to do that within a unitary state by domestic actors failed. The crucial role has been played by the international community. Scholars have noticed that minority rights have been increasingly internationalized, one of the features of the post-Cold War developments. “The international community plays an increasingly important role in shaping these debates, endorsing some models of integration and accommodation while discouraging others” (Kymlicka 2008: 111). The international community gives more than just moral support. “Countries that follow the recommendations of the international community may gain access to vital financial, technical, and even military assistances in addressing their ethnic conflicts” (Kymlicka 2008: 111). In the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, the current federal arrangements came into being entirely due to the intervention of international actors the hardest way. By its origins, Iraqi federalism resembles the German brand of federalism, as the selection of a federal system was strongly influenced by the geo-political context in which it originated, and the federal system of America was of particular note in the development of the German federation in the context of defeat and occupation (Ahmad and Brosio 2006: 4).

Elazar focuses on the politico-ethnic aspects of federalism and credits federalism as the most just resolution of these problems and legitimation of ethnic identities in order to attain “local and world peace” (Elazar 1984: 3–5). He further claims that federalism is likely to be the future of societal organization by asserting that the current nation-state model becomes obsolete and must yield to federal arrangements (Elazar 1982). Only federal solutions can fix seemingly intransigent political problems arising from conflicting national, ethnic, linguistic, and racial claims (Moots 2009: 408). The use of federalism to Michael Filippov has two sets of rationales: economic—governments use coercive action to resolve market failures, and political. Political justifications are more diverse and range from granting autonomy to ethnic, linguistic and other minorities and ther...