1 | Retributive and Restorative Just Cultures |
There are basically two ways to approach a just culture: inside your organization as well as outside of it. One is based on retribution, the other on restoration. When faced with actions that led to a (potentially) bad outcome
1. Retribution imposes a deserved and proportional punishment.
2. Restoration repairs the trust and relationships that were damaged.
Retributive and restorative processes ask very different questions in the wake of an incident. Consider this when you are trying to build a just culture of trust and accountability in your organization.
ā¢ Retribution
ā¢ Which rule has been broken?
ā¢ Who did it?
ā¢ How bad was the infraction, and so what does the person deserve?
ā¢ Which manager, department, or authority gets to decide?
ā¢ Restoration
ā¢ Who has been (potentially) hurt?
ā¢ What are their needs?
ā¢ Whose obligation is it to meet those needs?
ā¢ What role does the community play in learning from the event?
Letās first look at retributive and restorative approaches to justice separately, to see how each tries to generate accountability, trust, and learning. Then weāll compare and contrast the two. You will find that the two approaches donāt have to be mutually exclusive. In your own organization, you might well be able to create a mix of responses that imports the best of both worlds.
RETRIBUTIVE JUST CULTURE
Retributive justice is as old as humanity itself. It is easily recognizable in varieties of ancient law (e.g., the law of āmeasure for a measureā). Retribution considers punishment, if proportionate, to be a just response to a sanctionable action and to be an appropriate deterrent. Retributive justice wants the offender to pay something back, to forfeit something in return for what he or she did. Retribution is not vengeance. Retribution is not supposed to be directed at the person, but at the actions (the wrongs). It is supposed to come with inherent limits (i.e., there is only so much punishment that you can exact), it involves no pleasure at the suffering or pain of others, and it is constrained and governed by procedural standards.
SHADES OF RETRIBUTION
A popularized way to think about a just culture is based on shades of retribution. This type of just culture, introduced in hospitals, airlines, oil companies, and other organizations over the past years, understands that it is foolish to expect fallible people to be perfect. These organizations find it important to learn from mistakes, and their approach to just culture wants to hold people accountable not necessarily for the outcomes they create, but for the choices they (supposedly) make while doing their work. When things go wrong, the consequences should depend on the choices that people made in the lead-up. Such a just culture often distinguishes among a minimum of three types of actions:
ā¢ An honest mistake is an inadvertent lapse, slip, or mistake. It was unintended and can happen to anyone in those circumstances.
ā¢ At-risk behavior is a choice that increases a risk that is not recognized, or mistakenly believed to be justified.
ā¢ Negligence or recklessness is a choice to consciously disregard or take a substantial and unjustified risk.
Those who have adopted such a ājust cultureā believe that different choices deserve different consequencesādifferent shades of retribution. Honest mistakes require compassion and an investigation into the conditions that triggered them. At-risk behavior calls for coaching and warnings. Recklessness must lead to disciplinary action, including suspension, dismissal, or referral to other authorities. The idea is that employees who feel that they will be treated fairlyāthat their honest mistakes will not be punishedāare more inclined to report mishaps and failures. But will they?
āYou have nothing to fear if you have done nothing wrong.ā
What if a prosecutor would say this to respond to concerns from the community of practitioners? It might be said to assuage concerns from the sector that human errorsānormal, honest mistakesāare being converted into criminal behavior by the prosecutorās office. This is not just hypothetical, of course. Practitioners have been fined or charged for rule infractions that were part and parcel of getting the job done. They and their colleagues may feel some anxiety as a result. Can they supply incident data in good faith, or are the data going to be used against them? Are there enough protections against the prying of a prosecutorial office? Donāt worry, a prosecutor might say in reply. Trust me. There is nothing to fear if you have done nothing wrong. I can judge right from wrong. I know a willful violation, or negligence, or a destructive act when I see it.
But does he? Does anybody?
Retributive just cultures draw a line somewhere between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. A willful violation is not acceptable. An honest mistake is. Risk-taking behavior probably isnāt. Negligence and recklessness are certainly not. And if what you have done is acceptableāif you have done nothing wrongāyou have nothing to fear. A just culture definition in use in air traffic control, for example, promises and warns simultaneously that āFront-line operators or others are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but where gross negligence, willful violations, and destructive acts are not tolerated.ā18
The idea of a line makes intuitive sense. If just cultures are to protect people against being sanctioned for honest mistakes (when theyāve done nothing wrong), then some space must be reserved for mistakes that are not āhonestā (in case they have done something wrong). Consequently, all proposals for a just culture emphasize the establishment of, and consensus around, some kind of line between legitimate and illegitimate behavior: āIn a just culture, staff can differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable acts.ā19 There is not a single proposal for just culturesāindeed, not a single appeal to the need to learn from failure in aviationāthat does not build in some kind of escape clause into the realm of essentially negligent, unwanted, illegitimate behavior. An environment of impunity, the argument continues, would neither move people to act prudently nor compel them to report errors or deviations. After all, if there is no line, then āanything goes.ā So why report anything? This is not good for peopleās morale, for the credibility of management, or for learning from mistakes and near misses.
So calls for some kind of border that separates tolerable from culpable behavior make intuitive sense. And ideas on just culture often center on its embrace and clarity: āA āno-blameā culture is neither feasible nor desirable. Most people desire some level of accountability when a mishap occurs. In a Just Culture environment the culpability line is more clearly drawn.ā13 Another argument for the line is that the public must be protected against intentional misbehavior or criminal acts, and that the application of justice is a prime vehicle for such protection.
A recent directive from the European Union (2003/42/EC) governs occurrence reporting in civil aviation. This directive has a qualification: a state must not institute legal proceedings against those who send in incident reports, apart from cases of gross negligence. But who decides what counts as āgross negligenceā? The same state, of course. Via its prosecutors, investigating magistrates, and judges.
The directive, as does much guidance on just culture today, seems to assume that cases of āgross negligenceā jump out by their very nature, that āwillful violationsā represent an obvious category, distinct from violations that are somehow not āwillful.ā It assumes that a manager, a prosecutor, a judge, or any other authority can recognizeāobjectively, unarguablyāwillful violations, negligence, or destructive acts.
If we want to draw a line, we have to be clear about what falls on either side of it. Otherwise there is no point in a lineāthen the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behavior would be one big blur. Willful violations, say many people, clearly fall on the āunacceptableā side of the line. Negligence does too. But what is negligence then? To begin with, look at this definition:
Negligence is conduct that falls below the standard required as normal in the community. It applies to a person who fails to use the reasonable level of skill expected of a person engaged in that particular activity, whether by omitting to do something that a prudent and reasonable person would do in the circumstances or by doing something that no prudent or reasonable person would have done in the circumstances. To raise a question of negligence, there needs to be a duty of care on the person, and harm must be caused by the negligent action. In other words, where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which can reasonably be foreseen to be likely to cause harm to persons or property. If, as a result of a failure to act in this reasonably skillful way, harm/injury/damage is caused to a person or property, the person whose action caused the harm is negligent.13
A few concerns come to mind. First, the definition is long. Second, it is actually not really a definition. It does not capture the essential or finite properties of ānegligence.ā It does not allow you to grab ānegligent behaviorā and put it on the unacceptable side of the line. Instead, it presents an array of questions and judgments that you need to make. Rather than this solving the problem of what is ānegligenceā for you, you now have to solve a larger number of perhaps equally intractable problems instead:
ā¢ What is the ānormal standardā?
ā¢ How far is ābelowā?
ā¢ What is āreasonably skillfulā?
ā¢ What is āreasonable careā?
ā¢ What is āprudentā?
ā¢ Was harm indeed ācaused by the negligent actionā?
So instead of clarifying which operational behavior is ānegligent,ā this shows just how complex the issue is. And how much of a judgment call it is. In fact, there is an amazing array of judgment calls to be made. Just see if you, for your own work, can (objectively, unarguably) define concepts such as ānormal in the community,ā āa reasonable level of skill,ā āa prudent person,ā or that you could achieve āa foresight that harm may likely result.ā What, really, is normal (objectively, unarguably)? Or prudent, or reasonable (objectively, unarguably)? Donāt we all want to improve safety precisely because the activity we are engaged in can result in harm? And, of course, research showed us a long time ago that once we know the outcome, we overestimate the amount of foresight we, or someone else, could and should have had.20
Just responses to bad events are not a matter of matching the inherent properties of undesirable behavior with appropriate pigeonholing and a fitting punitive level. It involves the hard work of deciding what story to tell and whether to see something as reckless, as at-risk, or as erroneous. Merely supplying the categories leaves this issue unresolved. It boils down to fairly empty guidance on how to create a just culture. It also creates an ethical issue: assigning an act to a category will forever be a judgment.
It is not that making such judgments is impossible. In fact, we do this often. It is, however, important to remember that these are indeed judgments. They are not objective and not indisputable. To think that there comes a clear, uncontested point at which everybody says, āYes, now the line has been crossed, this is negligence,ā is an illusion. What is ānormalā versus ānegligenceā in a community, or āa reasonable level of skill,ā versus ārecklessnessā is infinitely negotiable. You can never really close the debate on this. As a result, there really is no line. There only are people who draw it.
What matters is not whether some acts are so essentially negligent as to warrant serious consequences. What matters is which authorities we in society (or you in your organization) rely on to decide whether acts should be seen as negligent or not. Who draws your line?
Assigning acts to categories becomes a matter of power. Who has the power to tell the story, to say that behavior is one thing and not the other? And who has the power to decide on the response? It is a power that can finesse and fudge a whole range of organizational, emotional, and personal issues. A conclusion of wrongdoing could, for instance, be underwritten by a hospitalās risk managerās greatest fears (of liability, loss of reputation or political clout) or by how a manager is held accountable in turn for evidence of trouble in the managed unit.
Suppose nurses take to scanning the barcode label that one of their colleagues pasted on the wall behind the patient because it actually reads well, and is always easy to find as opposed to others. This may have become all but normal practiceāeverybody does it because everybody always has the next patient, and the next, and the medication barcode scanners are of such poor quality that they canāt read anything except flat and high-contrast labels (indeed, labels pasted ...