Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin

Hiroshi Kimura

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781315500317
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Social History
• Index: History

Why has the stalemate in Japanese-Russian relations persisted through the end of the Cold War and Moscow's weakening control over its far eastern territories? In this volume Kimura continues his comprehensive analysis of Russia and Japan's strained and unstable relations to the present day.

Part One

THE GORBACHEV PERIOD: NEW THINKING

Chapter 1

The Policy Effects of Change in Soviet Leadership

1. Political Leaders and Their Environments

Did change in leadership make a difference in Soviet policy?¹ This is a pivotal question that almost all specialists on Soviet affairs have considered, especially after Gorbachev assumed the USSR’s top leadership post on March 11, 1985. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was young, dynamic, and fast-moving—so unlike his predecessors. The new general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) raised expectations among people both within and outside the Soviet Union to such a high level that it is no overstatement to describe the general sentiment at the time as “Gorbachev fever.” Nevertheless, in the early days of Gorbachev’s rule, it was hard to imagine any radical and meaningful changes occurring in the Soviet Union as a result of his leadership. Even if Gorbachev fully intended to bring about substantial changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies, whether he could actually succeed in doing so was another question. Gorbachev, like all leaders, had to act within institutional and political settings that at different times either constrained or enhanced his ability to initiate and execute policies.² Gorbachev’s success in formulating and implementing policies depended upon the political environment and situation in which he found himself at the given time. Among the “environments” that Gorbachev had to reckon with, three in particular stand out.

The first is the human environment. There were at least three levels of people with whom Gorbachev had to deal. First, he had to play a complex power game with his colleagues in the CPSU’s Politburo and Central Committee. Although the position of CPSU general secretary in the Soviet political system was very powerful—far more so than was generally recognized—the power was not unlimited. Since the demise of Stalin, the general secretary (or the first secretary) of the CPSU had been a primus inter pares, ruling the Soviet Union largely on the principle of collective leadership. Unless Gorbachev’s intention was to become a second Stalin, he needed to obtain endorsement or support, whether positive or passive, from his colleagues. The second element in Gorbachev’s human environment was the administrative apparatus. Of particular importance was the middle hierarchy of people in the Party and Soviet bureaucracy (popularly known as apparatchiki); these intermediary executives strongly opposed any radical changes (e.g., economic “reform”) that might have deprived them of their vested interests. If Gorbachev wanted to do anything innovative, he had to be prepared to undertake a battle with the middle level of the party and the government bureaucracy as well as factory and kolkhoz managers, who were expected to reject any such attempts due to their inertia, their entrenched conservatism, and the rule of innate and instinctive fear of anything that could threaten their power and interests. The third element in the human environment that the new general secretary had to take into consideration was the Soviet populace in general. The Soviet general public appeared to have ambivalent feelings toward and expectations of the leadership under Gorbachev. On one hand, they had strong expectations that Gorbachev would do something to break the economic and political stalemate in which they found themselves, dating from the late Brezhnev era. On the other hand, most were unwilling to pay the cost of revitalizing the economy. For example, the average Soviet citizen, who would have liked to see his or her boss fired for corruption, did not want, on the other hand, to be forced to work harder. The Soviet public, accustomed after almost seven decades to living within a system that discouraged incentive and initiative, could not be awakened overnight. It was reportedly observed that Gorbachev “does not smoke and drinks sparingly,” that he “limits himself to a glass or two of wine with his meal” when traveling abroad as a guest.³ Such a leader might mistakenly assume that his fellow citizens had the same willpower and self-restraint.

The second environment that Gorbachev had to reckon with was the Soviet system. Gorbachev had to bring about changes and conduct reforms within the framework of Soviet-type Communism, a system based on principles such as state or non-private ownership of the means of production; centralized planning of production and distribution (i.e., rejection of the market economy); and the monopoly of a single political party, the Communist Party. The intricate relationship between Gorbachev and the Soviet system is discussed in greater depth later in this chapter.

The third environmental aspect that Gorbachev had to take into consideration in his conduct of both domestic and foreign affairs was international situations. It goes without saying that the domestic affairs of any given country cannot be isolated from external circumstances. It would be appropriate at this juncture to recall that the “modernization” drive of China, another “Communist” power, required peace and stability. Similarly, Gorbachev’s attempt to institute economic reform and perestroika required a reduction in tensions in the international arena. Slowing the arms race with the United States was of particular importance.

The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev seems, therefore, to necessitate discussion of the following questions: (1) Did the change in the guard at the Kremlin make a difference in the policy of the Soviet Union? (2) If so, on which levels (e.g., style, personnel, policy, system) and to what extent, in practice, did changes occur? (3) What were the priorities of the Gorbachev leadership? Do we agree with the standard view that “housecleaning” and domestic affairs (e.g., revitalizing the sluggish Soviet economy, consolidating a personal power base, and managing complaints and pressure from Eastern Europe) was a more urgent task for Gorbachev than improving the Soviet Union’s external relations with the United States and other foreign countries? Or should we view domestic and foreign affairs as being inseparably intertwined to such an extent that we cannot identify which was more important? These general questions will be addressed and partially answered in this chapter, before we proceed to the specific discussion of Gorbachev’s policy toward Japan.

2. Changes in Style, Personnel, and System

Prior to an examination of whether the Gorbachev leadership brought about changes in the Soviet Union and concomitantly in the world, it is necessary to define “change.” What do we mean by “change”? Some analysts have argued that meaningful change in the Soviet Union would only have been possible after a major transformation of the basic institutions of state and society: that is, fundamental changes in the relationship between the government and Soviet citizenry, in the selection procedures for government personnel, in decision-making processes, and in the production and disposition of economic wealth.⁴ Others seemed content to detect any signs of change in the political climate, foreign policy style, or domestic policy tactics. Between these two extremes there is a wide range of notions on what “changes” Gorbachev was expected to produce and did actually produce in the Soviet Union.

In my view, at least four significant changes can be differentiated: changes in style, personnel, system, and policy. At least in the initial phase of perestroika, Gorbachev’s leadership clearly brought about considerable changes in the first two areas, while the latter two were hardly touched.

“Very young, energetic, intelligent, prudent; yet pragmatic, soft, elegant, but prestigious”—this is the description of Mikhail Gorbachev made by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, after he met the new Soviet leader in Moscow at Chernenko’s funeral.⁵ Many other observers also noted that Gorbachev differed from his predecessors in terms of style. For instance, Gorbachev eschewed the development of a “cult of personality.” Soviet newspapers, including the party organ Pravda, began to call the new general secretary simply “Mr. Gorbachev.” In fact, Gorbachev seemed eager to cultivate the image that he was a populist type of political leader. He mixed freely with ordinary people, having a direct dialogue with the people on a “grassroots” level. He spoke directly and without notes. The new general secretary was not very secretive about his family life. On the contrary, he cultivated the image of an open, humane, and familiar political leader, and did not hesitate to subject his stylish wife, daughter, and granddaughter to public scrutiny.

The speed with which Gorbachev moved after assuming office was remarkable. When Gorbachev assumed the position of general secretary, almost all international observers expected the new leader to move slowly, biding his time as he consolidated his power. But they turned out to be wrong. Gorbachev moved very quickly—particularly in his drive to replace aging personnel with younger men in the party, government, and military.

In July 2, 1985, shortly after assuming office, Gorbachev stunned the world with his sudden nomination of Eduard Shevardnadze as the new Soviet foreign minister.⁶ Andrei Gromyko, veteran diplomat with twenty-eight years of experience in foreign affairs, was “kicked upstairs” to the ceremonial post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (president of the USSR).⁷ What motivated Gorbachev to risk such an extraordinary and quick move? The key seems to be Gromyko’s replacement, Eduard Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze was a Georgian who had been elevated to a CPSU Politburo position only a day before his appointment as foreign minister. In foreign affairs, he was “virtually a blank slate,”⁸ with very little experience.⁹ This appointment indicates, first, that the new general secretary intended to pursue the “de-Gromykoization” of Soviet foreign policy; second, that Gorbachev himself intended to take charge of conducting Soviet foreign affairs; and third, he wanted to have not merely a like-minded person who would cooperate with him but also a professional politician upon whom he could rely to successfully implement his foreign policies.¹⁰ This replacement of the foreign minister was followed shortly after, in 1986, by the replacement of Boris Ponomarev as head of the Central Committee’s International Department (CCID) by Anatolii Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States. Around the same time, Gorbachev appointed Aleksandr Yakovlev to head the Propaganda (i.e., media) Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Why did Gorbachev move so rapidly in carrying out a reshuffling of his personnel? By appointing those who were loyal to him to key positions, he was undoubtedly aiming to consolidate his power base. But this did not seem to be the only reason behind the shake-up. Gorbachev was also aiming to replace aging, inefficient, conservative officials with younger, more efficient, and reform-oriented ones. It seems that these changes were not intended simply to be cosmetic but to enable more substantial alterations in the internal balance of power and in the basic policy orientation. If this was in fact Gorbachev’s intention, then to what extent did substantive changes actually occur under Gorbachev?

Gorbachev’s domestic policies—as best illustrated by the shift in catchwords from uskorenie (acceleration) to perestroika (restructuring), glasnost’ (openness) and demokratizatsiia (democratization)—underwent a great transformation. It was not merely the catchwords but the interpretation of these concepts as well that underwent a significant change. For instance, perestroika is an ambiguous term: it may simply mean a mild tinkering with the superstructure (in Marxist terms) of the Soviet state; but it can also be interpreted more widely and boldly to mean an attempt at restructuring anew the entire Soviet system.¹¹ Glasnost’ could be interpreted to mean openness, publicity, or transparency in the workplace, whereby, with sufficient knowledge of the job and with the right to freely criticize bureaucratic distortions and corruption, Soviet workers could be encouraged to work more efficiently. But the meaning of this term easily can be broadened into the right of freedom of speech, which Andrei Sakharov and other dissidents had called for, including criticism of the legitimacy of the system. The notion of demokratizatsiia also can be radicalized so that a distinction between “socialist democracy” and “bourgeois democracy” easily can be blurred. What were Gorbachev’s own interpretations of these key concepts of his domestic policies? Related but more fundamental questions are: Did Gorbachev intend to change the Communist system or not? And did he actually attempt to do this or not? Scholars have offered three different answers to these questions.

The first school of thought considers Gorbachev to have been a great reformer or even a systemic transformer who wanted to change the Communist system, and who in fact did. Gorbachev had a radical reform intention from the beginning, but being an astute politician, he was careful not to reveal in public all that he had in mind.¹² Thus, Gorbachev sometimes may have appeared inconsistent to outside watchers. If Gorbachev had tried to be consistent, he could never have been successful in conducting his reform.¹³ Inconsistency thus became notable particularly in Gorbachev’s domestic policies. In the foreign policy field, Gorbachev was able to formulate his policy, which was executed largely by one major agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), headed by Eduard Shevardnadze, his closest ally and his appointee.¹⁴ In contrast, Gorbachev’s domestic policies, especially economic policy were not implemented in their original form, due to lack of support from various intermediary executive agencies and organs and due to a lack of financial resources.¹⁵ Nevertheless, Gorbachev ultimately went far beyond these and other limits and constraints. In short, Gorbachev intended to transform, rather than simply to revitalize, the existing system, and he in fact played the decisive role in dismantling the Communist system. When Yeltsin took office in the Kremlin, the system had already ceased to be Communist, thanks to his predecessor’s enormous work.¹⁶ Gorbachev was “a product of that very nomenklatura and at the same time its antiproduct—its ‘grave digger,’so to speak.”¹⁷

In marked contrast, the second school of thought regards Gorbachev as no revolutionary but only a reformer of the Soviet system. In the very early stage of his rule, he was not even a reformer but rather merely a nationalist. Gorbachev wanted the Soviet Union to enter the next century in a manner worthy of a great power. A revived Soviet economy was the indispensable precondition for maintaining superpower status. One of his goals in embarking upon uskorenie and perestroika was to build a strong Soviet Union again,¹⁸ powerful enough to compete with the strong America advocated by U.S. President Ronald Reagan. It is doubtful that in his attempts to successfully conduct perestroika Gorbachev considered it necessary to renounce the Communist system. There is an abundance of evidence to warrant this doubt: When Gorbachev wanted to become the first Soviet president, he hesitated to hold a general election; he did not in the end accept “the 500-Day Plan,” which called for a radical marketization of the Soviet economy; he let his closest reformist allies (such as Aleksandr Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze) leave the Kremlin; he appointed instead to important government positions those who later became coup plotters (such as Gennadii Yanaev,...