Patriarcha and Other Political Works

Robert Filmer

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351500494
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica

Robert Filmer's prime assumption is that the Bible contains the entire truth about the nature of the world and the nature of society. Along with details of recorded history from the beginning to the death of the Apostles, the Bible also includes the laws that would govern history from that time to the end of the world. This central assumption was shared by nearly every member of Tory Christendom in England in the seventeenth century. In the same way, Filmer holds that it is impossible for a people to escape political anarchy once it is assumed that all individuals are independent and equal. It is also impossible for people to escape from collectivism, if it is granted that everyone has a moral right to an equal share of the gifts of nature. In explaining why Filmer remains both important and influential, Laslett argues that his reputation owes a great deal to the fortuitous circumstances of the time at which his works were resuscitated. His work passed almost unnoticed when it was first issued. Only the position of the Tory party gave his views prominence. The value of Patriarcha as a historical document consists primarily in its revelation of the strength and persistence in European culture of the patriarchal attitude to political problems. The opening essay by Laslett offers a brilliant analysis of late seventeenth-century English politics and philosophy. Long unavailable, this is a masterpiece of religious conservatism that still registers in debates at present.

Patriarcha

1. I The Natural Freedom of Mankind, a New, Plausible and Dangerous Opinion
2. II The Question Stated out of Bellarmine: and some Contradictions of his Noted
3. III The Argument of Bellarmine Answered out of Bellarmine himself: and of the Regal Authority of the Patriarchs before the Flood
4. IV The Dispersion of Nations after the Flood was by Entire Families over which the Fathers were Kings, and from those Kings, all Kings are Descended
5. V Kings are either Fathers of their People, or Heirs of such Fathers, or the Usurpers of the Rights of such Fathers
6. VI Of the Escheating of Kingdoms
7. VII Of the Agreement of Paternal and Regal Power
8. VIII The Opinions of Hugo Grotius, and Mr. Seiden, about Natural Community and Voluntary Propriety Examined
9. IX Dangerous Conclusions of Grotius against Monarchy Censured
10. X Two Passages in the Civil Law Cleared²
11. XI Suarez’ Dispute against the Regality of Adam. Families diversely Defined, Suarez Contradicting Bellarmine
12. XII Aristotle Agrees with the Scripture, Deducing Royal Authority from the Fatherhood²
13. XIII Of Election of Kings by the Major Part of the People, by Proxy, by Silent Acceptation
14. XIV No Example in Scripture of the People’s Choosing their King. Mr. Hooker’s Judgment therein
15. XV God Governed always by Monarchy. Bellarmine’s and Aristotle’s Judgment of Monarchy
16. XVI Imperfections of Democracies. Rome Began her Empire under Kings and Perfected it under Emperors. The People of Rome in Danger oft Fled to Monarchy
17. XVII Democracies not Invented to Bridle Tyrants, but Came in by Stealth
18. XVIII Democracies Vilified by their own Historians
19. XIX Popular Government more Bloody than a Tyranny
20. XX Of a Mixed Government of King and People: the People May not Judge or Correct their King
21. XXI No Tyrants in England since the Conquest
22. XXII Regal Authority not Subject to Human Laws. Kings Before Laws. The Kings of Judah and Israel not Tied to Laws
23. XXIII Samuel’s Description of a King. The Power Ascribed to Kings in the New Testament
24. XXIV Laws not First Found out to Bridle Tyrants but the People. The Benefit of Laws. Kings Keep the Laws, though not Bound by Them.
25. XXV Of the Oaths of Kings
26. XXVI Of the King’s Prerogative over Laws
27. XXVII The King is Author, Interpreter and Corrector of the Common Law
28. XXVIII The King is Judge in all Causes. The King and his Council Anciently Determined Causes
29. XXIX Of Parliaments
30. XXX The People, when first Called to Parliament. The Liberties of Parliaments not from Nature, but from the Grace of Princes
31. XXXI The King alone Makes Laws in Parliament
32. XXXII The King Hath Governed Both Houses, either by Himself or by His Council, or by His Judges

A Defence Of The Natural Power of Kings Against The Unnatural Liberty Of The People

I The Natural Freedom of Mankind, a New, Plausible and Dangerous Opinion

WITHIN the last hundred years many of the Schoolmen and other Divines have published and maintained an opinion that:¹

‘Mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from all subjection, and at liberty to choose what form of government it please, and that the power which any one man hath over others was at the first by human right bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude.’

This tenet was first hatched in the Schools for good Divinity, and hath been fostered by succeeding Papists. The Divines of the Reformed Churches have entertained it, and the common people everywhere tenderly embrace it as being most plausible to flesh and blood, for that it prodigally distributes a portion of liberty to the meanest of the multitude, who magnify liberty as if the height of human felicity were only to be found in it, never remembering that the desire of liberty was the cause of the fall of Adam.

But howsoever this opinion hath of late obtained great reputation, yet it is not to be found in the ancient fathers and doctors of the primitive Church. It contradicts the doctrine and history of the Holy Scriptures, the constant practice of all ancient monarchies, and the very principles of the law of nature. It is hard to say whether it be more erroneous in Divinity or dangerous in policy.

Upon the grounds of this doctrine, both Jesuits and some zealous favourers of the Geneva discipline have built a perilous conclusion, which is, ‘that the people or multitude have power to punish or deprive the Prince if he transgress the laws of the kingdom’. Witness Parsons and Buchanan. The first, under the name of Dolman, in the third chapter of his first book,² labours to prove that Kings have been lawfully chastised by their commonwealths. The latter, in his book De Jure Regni apud Scotos,³ maintained a liberty of the people to depose their Prince. Cardinal Bellarmine and Mr. Calvin both look asquint this way.*

This desperate assertion whereby Kings are made subject to the censures and deprivations of their subjects follows (as the authors of it conceive) as a necessary consequence of that former position of the supposed natural equality and freedom of mankind, and liberty to choose what form of government it please.†

And though Sir John Heywood,¹ Adam Blackwood,² John Barclay³ and some others have learnedly confuted both Buchanan and Parsons, and vindicated the right of Kings in most points, yet all of them, when they come to the argument drawn from the natural liberty and equality of mankind, they do with one consent admit it for a principle unquestionable, not so much as once denying or opposing it. Whereas if they did but confute this first erroneous principle, the main foundation of popular sedition would be taken away.

The rebellious consequence which follows this prime article of the natural freedom of mankind may be my sufficient warrant for a modest examination of the original truth of it; much hath been said, and by many, for the affirmative; equity requires that an ear be reserved a little for the negative.

In this discourse I shall give myself these cautions:

First, I have nothing to do to meddle with mysteries of the present state. Such arcana imperii, or cabinet councils, the vulgar may not pry into. An implicit faith is given to the meanest artificer in his own craft; how much more is it, then, due to a Prince in the profound secrets of government: the causes and ends of the greatest politic actions and motions of state dazzle the eyes and exceed the capacities of all men, save only those that are hourly versed in managing public affairs: yet since the rule for each man to know in what to obey his Prince cannot be learnt without a relative knowledge of those points wherein a sovereign may command, it is necessary when the commands and pleasures of superiors come abroad and call for an obedience that every man inform himself how to regulate his actions or his sufferings, for according to the quality of the thing commanded an active or passive obedience is to be yielded, and this is not to limit the Prince’s power, but the extent of the subject’s obedience, by giving to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, etc.

Secondly, I am not to question or quarrel at the rights or liberties of this or any other nation; my task is chiefly to inquire from whom these came, not to dispute what or how many they are, but whether they are derived from the laws of natural liberty or from the grace and bounty of Princes. My desire and hope is that the people of England may and do enjoy as ample privileges as any nation under heaven; the greatest liberty in the world (if it be duly considered) is for a people to live under a monarch. It is the Magna Charta of this kingdom; all other shows or pretexts of liberty are but several degrees of slavery, and a liberty only to destroy liberty.

If such as maintain the natural liberty of mankind take offence at the liberty I take to examine it, they must take heed that they do not deny by retail that liberty which they affirm by wholesale; for if their thesis be true, the hypothesis will follow, that all men may examine their own charters, deeds, or evidences by which they claim and hold the inheritance or freehold of their liberties.

Thirdly, I detract not from the worth of all those learned men who are of a contrary opinion in the point of natural liberty. The pro-foundest scholar that ever was known hath not been able to search out every truth that is discoverable; neither Aristotle in natural philosophy, nor Mr. Hooker in Divinity. They were but men, yet I reverence their judgments in most points, and confess myself beholding even to their errors in this; something that I found amiss in their opinions guided me in the discovery of that truth which (I persuade myself) they missed. A dwarf sometimes may see that which a giant looks over: for whilst one truth is curiously searched after, another must necessarily be neglected. Late writers have taken up too much upon trust from the subtle Schoolmen, who to be sure to thrust down the King below the Pope, thought it the safest course to advance the people above the King; that so the papal power may more easily take place of the regal. Many an ignorant subject hath been fooled into this faith, that a man may become a martyr for his country by being a traitor to his Prince; whereas the new coined distinction into Royalists and Patriots is most unnatural, since the relation between King and people is so great that their well-being is reciprocal.

II The Question Stated out of Bellarmine: and some Contradictions of his Noted

To make evident the grounds of this question about the natural liberty of mankind, I will lay down some passages of Cardinal Bellarmine, that may best unfold the state of this controversy. ‘Secular .or civil power’ (saith he) ‘is instituted by men; it is in the people unless they bestow it on a Prince. This power is immediately in the whole multitude, as in the subject of it; for this power is by the Divine law, but the Divine law hath given this power to no particular man. If the positive law be taken away, there is left no reason why amongst a multitude (who are equal) one rather than another should bear rule over the rest. Power is given by the multitude to one man, or to more by the same law of nature; for the commonwealth of itself cannot exercise this power, therefore it is bound to bestow it upon some one man, or some few. It depends upon the consent of the multitude to ordain over themselves a King, or consul, or other magistrate; and if there be a lawful cause, the multitude may change the kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy.’* Thus far Bellarmine, in which passages are comprised the strength of all that ever I have read or heard produced for the natural liberty of the subject.

Before I examine or refute these doctrines, I must make an observation upon his words.

First, he saith, that by the law of God, power is immediately in the people; hereby he makes God the author of a democratical estate; for a democracy is nothing else but the power of the multitude. If this be true, not only aristocracies but all monarchies are altogether unlawful, as being ordained (as he thinks) by men, when as God himself hath chosen a democracy.

Secondly, he holds, that although a democracy be the ordinance of God, yet the people have no power to use the power which God hath given them, but only power to make away their power; whereby it follows, that there can be no democratical government, because the people (he saith) ‘must give their power to one man, or to some few’; which maketh either a regal or aristocratical estate, which the multitude is tied to do, even by the same law of nature which originally gave them the power. And why then doth he say, the multitude may change the kingdom into a democracy?

Thirdly, he concludes, that ‘if there be a lawful cause the multitude may change the kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy’. Here I would fain know who shall judge of this cause? If the multitude (for I see nobody else can) then this is a pestilent and dangerous conclusion.

III The Argument of Bellarmine Answered out of Bellarmine himself: and of the Regal Authority of the Patriarchs before the Flood

I come now to examine that argument which is used by Bellarmine, and is the one and only argument I can find produced by any author for the proof of the natural liberty of the people. It is thus framed: That God hath given or ordained power, is evident by Scripture; bu...