Making a Difference

NGO's and Development in a Changing World

D. Hulme, Michael Edwards, Michael Edwards

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781134160532
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Development Economics
• Index: Economics

As Western aid budgets are slashed and government involvement with aid programmes reduced, NGOs in the voluntary sector are finding themselves taking an ever-increasing share of development work overseas. As they do so, they are forced to grow and to assume new responsibilities, taking more important and wide-ranging decisions - in many cases, without having had the chance to step back and review the options before them and the best ways of maximizing the impact they make. This collection of essays explores the strategies available to NGOs to enhance their development work, reviewing the ways that options can be understood, appropriate programmes and likely problems.

Part I

Introduction

1

Scaling-up the developmental impact of NGOs: concepts and experiences

Michael Edwards and David Hulme

Introduction

There are now some 4,000 development non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in OECD member countries alone (OECD 1989), dispersing almost three billion US dollars’ worth of assistance every year (Clark 1991, p.47). They work with around 10,000 to 20,000 ‘Southern’ NGOs who assist up to 100 million people (ibid p.51). Yet despite the increasing scale of this sector, and the growing reputation that NGOs have won for themselves and for their work over the last ten years, their contribution to development on a global level remains limited. Many small-scale successes have been secured, but the systems and structures which determine the distribution of power and resources within and between societies remain largely unchanged. As a result, the impact of NGOs on the lives of poor people is highly localised, and often transitory. In contrast to NGO programmes, which tend to be good but limited in scope, governmental development efforts are often large in scale but limited in their impact. Effective development work on a sustainable and significant scale is a goal which has eluded both governments and NGOs.

One of the most important factors underlying this situation is the failure of NGOs to make the right linkages between their work at micro-level and the wider systems and structures of which they form a small part. For example, village co-operatives are undermined by deficiencies in national agricultural extension and marketing systems; ‘social-action groups’ can be overwhelmed by more powerful political interests within the state or local economic elites; successful experiments in primary health care cannot be replicated because government structures lack the ability or willingness to adopt new ideas; effective NGO projects (and not all are) remain ‘islands of success’ in an all-too-hostile ocean. ‘If you see a baby drowning you jump in to save it; and if you see a second and a third, you do the same. Soon you are so busy saving drowning babies that you never look up to see that there is someone there throwing these babies in the river’ (Ellwood, quoted in Korten 1990a). Or, as an Indian development worker once asked us in Rajasthan, ‘Why help trees to grow if the forest is going to be consumed by fire?’ In other words, small-scale NGO projects by themselves will never be enough to secure lasting improvements in the lives of poor people. Yet what else can NGOs do, and how can they increase their developmental impact without losing their traditional flexibility, value-base and effectiveness at the local level? Resolving this dilemma is the central question facing NGOs of all kinds as they move towards a new millennium.

Of course, an emphasis on quality in NGO work is never misplaced. Good development work is not insignificant just because it is limited in scale, and some might disagree with Clark’s statement (in this volume) that ‘maximising impact is the paramount objective of NGOs.’ As Alan Fowler (1990, p.11) rightly points out, the roots of NGO comparative advantage lie in the quality of relationships they can create, not in the size of resources they can command. Some NGOs appear to have lost sight of this fact in a headlong rush for growth, influence and status, forgetting that ‘voluntarism and values are their most precious asset’ (Brown and Korten 1989) . Simple, human concern for other people as individuals and in very practical ways is one of the hallmarks of NGO work. There is a danger that these qualities will go ‘out of fashion’ because of mounting concerns for strategy and impact, but in so doing the voluntary sector will lose its most important defining characteristic.

Nevertheless, all serious NGOs want to increase their impact and effectiveness, ensure that they spend their limited resources in the best way possible, and thereby maximise their own particular contribution to the development of people around the world. The question is, how are these goals to be achieved? We believe that there are many possible answers, but none which ignore the importance of macro-level influences in determining the success of people’s development efforts at grassroots level. We find it inconceivable that NGOs will achieve their objectives in isolation from the national and international political process and its constituent parts. It is this interaction, this search for greater impact, that forms the central theme of this book. Although many contributors use the term ‘scaling-up’ to describe the goal of ‘increasing impact’, it should be noted at the outset that this does not imply expanding the size of NGO operations. There are many different ways in which impact can be achieved, and the contributions to this book have been chosen deliberately to reflect the wide diversity of approaches chosen by different NGOs at different stages in their development. There is no attempt to identify the ‘best’ strategy for achieving greater impact, still less to impose a consensus where none exists.

The term ‘NGO’ also embraces a huge diversity of institutions, though the chapters in this volume are consistent in differentiating between: international NGOs such as Save the Children and Christian Aid (commonly referred to as Northern NGOs or NNGOs); ‘intermediary’ NGOs in the South (SNGOs) who support grassroots work through funding, technical advice and advocacy; grassroots movements of various kinds (grassroots organisations or GROs, and community-based organisations or CBOs) which are controlled by their own members; and networks and federations composed of any or all of the above. Clearly, each of these ‘NGOs’ plays a distinctive role in development and faces a different range of choices and strategies when considering the question of impact. Added to this is the obvious importance of context in determining which strategies are chosen and how effective they are in practice, and the observation (made with particular force in Ireland and Klinmahorm’s paper in this volume) that ‘scaling-up’ is often a spontaneous process rather than the result of a pre-planned strategy. These complications make generalisation difficult and dangerous.

Nonetheless, a conceptual framework is needed if any sense is to be made of such a wide range of case studies. There are at least five models of scaling-up we have considered in writing this introduction. The first comes from Clark (1991), who differentiates between ‘project replication’, ‘building grassroots movements’, and ‘influencing policy reform’. These distinctions are echoed by Howes and Sattar (in this volume), who separate organisational or programme growth (the ‘additive’ strategy) from achieving impact via transfers to, or catalysing other organisations (the ‘muliplicative’ strategy). Mitlin and Satterthwaite (also in this volume) comment that successful NGOs concentrate on ‘pulling in’ resources rather than expanding the scale of their own service provision, while Robert Myers (1992:379) makes the opposing case, defining scaling-up as ‘reaching as many people as possible with services or programmes.’ This is a limiting definition, but Myers goes on to make a useful distinction between ‘expansion, explosion and association’. ‘Explosive’ strategies begin with NGO operations on a large scale and adapt programmes to local circumstances afterwards. In contrast, ‘associational’ strategies ‘achieve scale by piecing together coverage obtained in several district (and not necessarily coordinated) projects and programmes, each responding to the needs of a distinct part of the total population served’ (Myers 1992, p.380). In Myers’s model the most obvious form of scaling-up is direct programme expansion. Robert Chambers (this volume) adds a further important dimension to the debate by highlighting what he calls ‘self-spreading and self-improving strategies’ – ‘to develop, spread and improve new approaches and methods’, gradually extending good practice through NGO and government bureacuracies until their entire approach is transformed, and rejuvenating the NGO sector by stimulating the formation of new, independent NGOs.

From all this, and on the basis of the experience recounted in the chapters that follow, it seems to us that the most important distinction to be made lies between additive strategies, which imply an increase in the size of the programme or organisation; multiplicative strategies, which do not imply growth but achieve impact through deliberate influence, networking, policy and legal reform, or training; and diffusive strategies, where spread is informal and spontaneous. These distinctions are important because each group of strategies has different costs and benefits, strengths and weaknesses, and implications for the NGO concerned. Different strategies may be more, or less, effective according to circumstance, and it may not be possible to combine elements of each one in the same organisation. We make some preliminary observations about these trade-offs in the conclusion to this volume. The value of a strong conceptual framework is that it can clarify the strategic choices available to different NGOs and help them to make the decisions appropriate for the specific realities they face.

For the sake of clarity, we have divided this introduction and the rest of the book into four sections, each representing a particular approach to scaling-up. Three of these approaches fall into the ‘multiplicative’ and ‘diffusive’ categories: working with government, linking the grassroots with lobbying and advocacy, and advocacy in the North. The fourth strategy – increasing impact by organisational growth – falls under the ‘additive’ approach. These categories are not intended to be wholly self-contained, and indeed as the chapters illustrate there is a good deal of overlap between them. In particular, when this volume was edited, we found that several examples combined support for local-level initiative with lobbying at the national level (see the chapters by Constantino-David, Dawson, Hall, and Mitlin and Satterthwaite) so that Section IV covers both of these approaches and looks at their linkages. Nonetheless, a structure is needed to order the debate and to ensure a degree of clarity in the discussion.

Working with government

Traditionally, most NGOs have been suspicious of governments, their relationships varying between benign neglect and outright hostility. Governments often share a similarly suspicious view of NGOs, national and international, and their relationship, at least in Africa, has been likened to cat and mouse (Bratton 1990) . It is not hard to see why this should be the case. Government structures are often rigid, hierarchical and autocratic. Power and control rest at the topmost level where programmes are designed and resources allocated. All governments are encumbered with authoritarian relationships with their citizens, for they are collectors of taxes, enforcers of the peace, and protectors of the social order (Copestake 1990). They have a natural tendency to centralisation, bureaucracy and control. NGOs, on the other hand, are (or should be?) distinguished by their flexibility, willingness to innovate, and emphasis on the non-hierarchical values and relationships required to promote true partnership and participation.

Nonetheless, there are sound reasons for NGOs to enter into a positive and creative relationship with the institutions of both state and government. Governments remain largely responsible for providing the health, education, agricultural and other services on which people rely, though this is changing under the impact of the ‘new conditionality’ and its attempts to expand the role of the private sector at governments’ expense. The state remains the ultimate arbiter and determinant of the wider political changes on which sustainable development depends. Some would argue that only governments can do these things effectively and equitably – that any attempt, for example, to privatise services is bound to result in declining access to quality care for the poor. Whether or not this is true, it remains a fact that (in most countries) government controls the wider frameworks within which people and their organisations have to operate. While this remains true, NGOs ignore government structures at their peril. An increasing number of NGOs have acknowledged this and are working actively to foster change at various levels. International NGOs tend to restrict themselves to the institutions of government, working within ministries to promote changes in policy and practice. National NGOs, on the other hand, can take a more active role in the political process and the wider institutions of the state. Usually, this takes the form of subjecting these institutions to various forms of external pressure and protest, as in the case of social action groups in India lobbying the local Forest Department or Block Development Officer (a strategy covered under ‘linking the grassroots with lobbying and advocacy’ below).

A more direct approach is to work within the structures of government in an explicit attempt to foster more appropriate and effective policies and practices, which will eventually be of benefit to poorer and less powerful people as they filter through into action by civil servants ‘lower down’ the system. The aim here is to ensure that governments adopt policies which are genuinely developmental at national level – policies which will ultimately enable poor people to achieve greater control over their lives in health, education, production and so on. NGOs have attempted to do this via direct funding, high-level policy advice, ‘technical assistance’, the provision of ‘volunteer’ workers, or (usually) a mixture of these things. Many NGOs provide government with a ‘package’ of inputs which includes material support as well as people and ideas. It is important to remember that these strategies are not an attempt to ‘replace’ the state, but rather to influence the direction of government policy or support existing policies. ‘NGOs cannot seek to replace the state, for they have no legitimacy, authority or sovereignty, and, crucially, are self-selected and thus not accountable’ (Palmer and Rossiter 1990).

Although the case studies in this section of the book cover a wide range of approaches and contexts, their conclusions are strikingly similar. First, when the decision is taken to work within government, the constraints and difficulties of the government system have to be accepted as a starting point. Unlike in NGO programmes, good staff cannot be handpicked and supported with high salaries or generous benefits; systems and structures cannot be changed at will and resources are always in short supply. Motivation is often lacking because salaries are low and conditions poor. Public services are suspicious of change and often officers at lower levels in the hierarchy have been actively discouraged to experiment, innovate or take initiative. Inevitably, progress, if it is achieved, will be slow, and agencies must commit themselves to partnership for long periods of time. The chances of succeeding in this approach are increased if NGOs agree to work within the government system, right from the start. This increases the likelihood of sustainable reforms and enables the NGO to understand and deal with the constraints faced by the official system.

Second, personalities and relationships between individuals are a vital element in successful government–NGO partnerships. If these relationships do not exist, no amount of money or advice will make a difference. In addition, conflicting interests and agendas within government ministries may make dialogue and consensus impossible, undermining the efficacy of even the strongest NGO inputs. The whole notion of ‘counterpart training’ needs to be closely examined to ensure that NGO expatriate inputs really do have a lasting impact when faced with such a range of constraints. Even when good relationships do exist, this is no guarantee of success. This is partly because individuals are moved around the government system with alarming regularity (making influence through individual training and advice difficult to achieve), and partly because there is often a barrier between the ‘pilot project’ stage of co-operation (which is heavily dependent on a small number of likeminded officials) and the acceptance and diffusion of new approaches throughout the government hierarchy. The case of special education in Bangkok related in this volume by Ireland and Klinmahorm provides a graphic illustration of this problem. VSO has also had some success in making this transition by using what Mackie (in this volume) calls ‘the planned multiplication of micro-level inputs’ – the slow and careful evolution of different forms of support which are small in themselves but significant in the aggregate. Such approaches appear most likely to make an impact in smaller countries where NGOs have better access to key decision-makers. John Parry-Williams’s account (in this volume) of legal reform in Uganda provides just such a case.

Third, NGOs are generally ‘small players’ when it comes to influencing governments, as compared to bilateral and multilateral donors such as the World Bank. It is these much larger agencies that tend to determine the ideological context in which policies are formed, a classic case in point being the ‘new conditionality’ of good governance and free markets which NGOs have thus far largely failed to influence (Edwards 1991). In addition, in a situation where donor funds abound and government needs are acute, NGOs which insist on detailed assessment of programmes and on long-term, low-input strategies may be labelled as ‘unhelpful’ and ‘obstructive’, a case in point being SCF’s work at provincial level in Mozambique (Thomas 1992). There are many official donors (and NGOs?) who are willing to commit large-scale resources for immediate consumption or ill-thought-out interventions, with little acknowledgement of the longer-term implications of their actions. The impossible recurrent cost burdens imposed by vertical programmes in basic services are a good example of this problem.¹

Certainly, greater success may be achieved if NGOs allow governments to take credit for progress in programme and policy development, regardless of their own influence in these areas (for an example of reforms in Primary Health Care in Indonesia see Morley et al 1983, p. 13). Something similar may be happening in the much-vaunted District Development Programme supported by Britain’s Overseas Development Administration (ODA) in Zambia (Goldman et al 1988). There is also evidence that concentration at central ministry level, and coalitions of NGOs re-inforcing each-other’s influence, can help to combat the impact of the larger donors (Edwards, 1989).

The relative influence of NGOs and official agencies on Southern governments is a useful reminder that this strategy needs to be approached with care. The decision to work with (but not for) government must be based on an assessment of the ‘reformability’ of the structures under consideration, the relationship between government and its citizens, the level at which influence can be exerted most effectively, and (for international NGOs), the strength of the local voluntary sector. NGOs must also calculate the costs and benefits of this strategy in relation to others. For example, it may be difficult to operate simultaneously as a conduit for government and an agent of social mobilisation, or to work both within government and as an advocate for fundamental change in social and political structures. There are also dangers in identifying too closely with governments, which may be overthrown or voted out (as in the case of well-known health activists in Bangladesh). Nonetheless, even under the most authoritarian governments there are often opportunities for progressive change. For example, the Ministry of Health in Pinochet’s Chile developed a strong policy on breastmilk substitutes with help from NGOs. The example quoted by Clark (in this volume) of an OXFAM programme which worked alongside rigid government structures in Malawi is also instructive. There are certainly enough examples of NGO impact on government policy and practice to give hope for the future, so long as the conditions for influence are right.

The direct approach: increasing impact by organisational growth

For many NGOs the obvious strategy for increasing impact is to expand projects or programmes that are judged to be successful. Over the 1980s this approach has been pursued in the South, where it has led to the evolution of a set of big NGOs in Asia (see the chapters by Howes and Sattar and by Kiriwandeniya in this volume for discussions of two such cases), and in the North where many NGOs have dramatically expanded their operational budgets and staffing. Expansion can take several forms. It may be geographical (moving into new areas or countries); b...