Perspectives on Contemporary Pakistan

Governance, Development and Environment

Ghulam Ali, Ejaz Hussain, Ghulam Ali, Ejaz Hussain

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000048162
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Economía
• Subtopic: Política económica

This book analyses problems of governance, development and environment affecting contemporary Pakistan; issues that lie at the centre of federal and provincial policy deliberations, formulation and implementation.

The book offers a comprehensive assessment of the policies, or lack thereof. Authors from a variety of disciplines empirically and conceptually evaluate latest developments, events and data regarding law and order, economic under-performance, social intolerance and climate crisis. The book offers varied perspectives on state sovereignty, civil-military relations, spousal violence, rural development, CPEC, nuclear governance and transboundary climate risk. Arguing that the conclusions should be adopted by the social, political and economic stakeholders of Pakistan, as well as the region at the higher level of governability, the book demonstrates that it would both boost national morale and inspire individuals to further investigate to come up with innovative solutions.

Examining some of the most pressing and persistent problems Pakistan and South Asia is facing, the book will be of interest to academics working in the fields of Political Science, in particular South Asian Politics, Development Studies and Environmental Studies.

1 Fighting for the FATA

Military action and governance in the tribal areas of Pakistan

Shahzad Akhtar

Introduction

Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has essentially faced, and suffered from, three interrelated challenges of governance: that revolve around (1) the perennial problem of unbalanced civil–military relations; (2) lack of socio-economic development; and (3) the environment, that largely have remained neglected in the public policy domain. As the first chapter in this volume, this study thus deals with the lingering crisis of governance and development in Pakistan through studying the case of the (former) Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA),¹ which, in recent years, has witnessed various military operations, legal and institutional arrangements and, above all, (extra-)regional attention with respect to cross-border insurgency. Bearing in mind the aforesaid challenges along with the sub-regional significance of the FATA in terms of governability and federalism, this study aims to emphasise the conceptual, empirical and thematic value of the case in hand for other studies in this book, which are conducted on similar themes, though in different parts of Pakistan. Moreover, this initial chapter will also serve as a point of reference for Chapter 2 that explains the FATA’s merger with Khyber–Pakhtunkhwa.

In order to fully comprehend the said merger, it is pertinent to highlight and analyse the processes, the policy and the actors that shaped the political, demographic and institutional dynamics of the (former) FATA which comprises 27,200 sq km and has a population of approximately five million. A British-era legal framework, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), provided the basis for local governance through the collective responsibility of tribes. The tribal people were allowed to retain their semi-autonomous status in exchange for loyalty to Pakistan. The FATA lagged far behind, compared to the other parts of the country, in terms of socio-economic and political development, primarily because of this minimal state presence. In addition, as a result of the lack of a proper governmental set-up and the weak authority of the Pakistani state, the FATA emerged as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban militants who fled the US attacks in Afghanistan. Under the terms of its alliance with the US in the War on Terrorism, Pakistan attempted to exert control over the FATA, hitherto a semi-autonomous territory, around 2004 that backfired and insurgency began there.

Since then. the Pakistani military has carried out various military operations in different parts of the FATA to suppress the rising Pakistani Taliban insurgency, also known as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Pakistani government’s initial counterinsurgency campaign from 2004 to 2008, that relied on conventional forces and used force indiscriminately, did not succeed in curbing the insurgency. Instead, the insurgency in the FATA became powerful and brought significant territory under its control. However, Pakistan improved its counterinsurgency strategy around 2009 and started retaking areas under the control of the TTP.

Consistent military assaults in different agencies or areas of the FATA, including Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan area, launched in June 2014, forced the TTP to relinquish its control of the region completely in 2016–17. Hundreds of the TPP’s militants were killed and most of the leadership fled across the border to Afghanistan’s eastern provinces where the Afghan government has little or no control. Following the defeat at the hands of the Pakistani military, the TTP splintered into many small groups, operating independently. The destruction of the powerful Pakistani Taliban insurgency raises a few important empirical questions. Why did the FATA insurgency disintegrate? How important was the role of the United States, particularly of the Obama Administration, in shaping Pakistan’s changed counterinsurgency approach? What changed in the Pakistani government’s counterinsurgency approach that led to the defeat of the TTP? How much has the Pakistani government changed its governance mechanism in the region to stop the resurgence of insurgency? This chapter focuses on addressing these questions.

I argue in this chapter that a robust counterinsurgency strategy by the Pakistani government, characterised by adapting conventional forces into a counterinsurgency force, a more judicious use of force targeting insurgents and securing the civilian population, and following a clear and hold strategy, led to the defeat of the TTP insurgency. The chapter is organised as follows. The first section begins with an analysis of how the TTP insurgency escalated and posed a serious threat to Pakistan’s security. This also discusses how the initial growing strength of the insurgents created an alarming situation that forced the government officials to take the threat seriously. The chapter also discusses how the changed American approach towards the Pakistan–Afghanistan region under President Obama pushed Pakistan to adopt a hard line towards militants operating in the FATA region. The chapter then moves on to explain the elements of the Pakistani government counterinsurgency strategy that led to the defeat of the FATA insurgency.

Pakistan’s responses to the growing power of the TTP

The US invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks toppled the Afghan Taliban regime. Many Al-Qaeda militants and Afghan Taliban members sought refuge in the FATA due to the geographical proximity, shared ethnicity and Islamic brotherhood. The FATA had long enjoyed a semi-autonomous status and the Pakistani government exercised only limited authority there. The FATA comprises around 27,200 sq km of territory, roughly the size of Maryland in the United States. In addition, the FATA tribes did not follow any formal laws (i.e. the laws of a modern state to govern society) but their own tribal system based on the centuries-old code, Pashtunwali, that provided the basis to govern their daily lives. This tribal system is sometimes misunderstood as lawlessness in the absence of a formal governance system, which is not true. Johnson saw Pashtunwali ‘as an alternative form of social organisation which advances conflict resolution mechanism’.²

The US pressurised the Pakistani government in 2002–03 to take military action against the foreign militants hiding in the FATA to deny them space and to stop them from attacking American-led international forces across the border in Afghanistan. Pakistan initially resisted American pressure to undertake a military operation because of the semi-autonomous status of the FATA region and the fierce independence of the tribesmen. The Pakistani government exercised limited control of the area through a patronage network that was established during British colonial times. Local tribal leaders, also known as Maliks, were given a share of power by the government in administering the tribal areas in addition to disbursement of allowances and subsidies in return for their loyalty to the Pakistani state. This modus vivendi of maintaining the status quo helped the Pakistani state avoid rebellion from the FATA tribes for a long time before 2004.

However, in 2004, the Musharraf government finally gave in to American pressure and became willing to use military force against the tribesmen in the FATA. The US also incentivised Pakistan with economic and military assistance along with designating the country a major non-NATO ally. Pakistan finally launched military operations in the FATA against the local tribal groups who were alleged to be providing support to the foreign militants. The military’s use of force against the locals not only broke the long tradition of not interfering in the semi-autonomous region of the FATA but it also wildly disrupted the patronage network that had played a key role in keeping the tribes under control. The disruption of the long-held status quo marked the onset of insurgency in the FATA. In the following years, the FATA insurgency became very powerful.

Pakistan’s poor counterinsurgency strategy from 2004 to 2008 provided space and strength to the FATA insurgency. The Pakistani government lacked commitment to fighting the insurgency and employed an ad hoc strategy that involved excessive use of force, on the one hand, and offering peace negotiations to the insurgen...