Living in a Technological Culture

Human Tools and Human Values

Hans Oberdiek, Mary Tiles

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• ISBN:
  9781134911158
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Histoire et théorie de la philosophie

Technology is no longer confined to the laboratory but has become an established part of our daily lives. Its sophistication offers us power beyond our human capacity which can either dazzle or threaten; it depends who is in control.
Living in a Technological Culture challenges traditionally held assumptions about the relationship between `man-and-machine'. It argues that contemporary science does not shape technology but is shaped by it. Neither discipline exists in a moral vacuum, both are determined by politics rather than scientific inquiry.
By questioning our existing uses of technology, this book opens up wider debate on the shape of things to come and whether we should be trying to change them now. As an introduction to the philosophy of technology this will be valuable to students, but will be equally engaging for the general reader.

1
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF TECHNOLOGY

Throughout this century, and certainly since World War II, technological developments have solved or alleviated problems that long plagued humankind. We rejoice that scientific and technological advances have either eradicated or brought under control many childhood diseases and gratefully take advantage of vastly increased opportunities for speedy travel and long distance communication. Yet it often seems that technology creates more problems, and more intractable problems, than it solves. This is true even in medicine, where dramatic and obviously beneficial advances have been made. Both at the beginning and at the end of life physicians now have the power to keep alive indefinitely people who would have mercifully perished quickly were nature simply allowed to take its course. Even programmes of immunization against childhood diseases such as measles and chicken pox have contributed to overpopulation and hunger in developing nations. Attempts to increase crop yields to avoid starvation have required the introduction of costly fertilizers and pesticides which, in turn, have caused chemical pollution and medical disorders. Population increases and the introduction of intensive farming, or the famine resulting from an inability to increase agricultural production, have brought about traumatic changes in age-old patterns of life. It can seem that the technological ‘solution’ to one problem leads just to the creation of many, unanticipated new problems.

Out of these ambivalent feelings towards technology have grown two conflicting visions, one optimistic the other pessimistic, one of technical omnipotence the other of technical impotence, one of control of the environment and human destiny through technology the other of technological systems running out of control. The optimists see technology as fulfilling the biblical injunction to ‘fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing’ (Genesis 1:28). Although dominion can be construed either as stewardship or as domination, the aim inherited from seventeenth century movements that inaugurated ‘modern science’ has been that of domination. Thus Bacon (1561–1626), regarded by many as the father of modern science and technology, talks of subduing and dominating nature. Bacon was confident that by deploying our intellectual powers it would be possible to gain knowledge of nature’s secrets and so acquire the ability to bend the course of nature to our will. He had faith that humans would co-operate to acquire this knowledge and that they would deploy it to improve the lot of humankind. His vision of a scientifically developed and organized society, presented in New Atlantis (Bacon, 1627), reflects his optimistic view of human beings, their moral as well as intellectual perfectibility. On this optimistic view, we are firmly in control of the technologies we produce. Technology provides us with instruments which can be used and further developed by us, or not, depending on our purposes. As such, any technology is value neutral: we impose our values in deciding which technology to use and how. Our success in controlling certain aspects of nature and in harnessing its secret powers (atomic energy) has exceeded Bacon’s wildest dreams. Isn’t it therefore reasonable to suppose that the methods which have served us well thus far will enable us to continue to overcome obstacles, to solve problems and to expand our control over nature indefinitely?

On the other hand there are those who have become deeply pessimistic as a result of observing the path of so-called technological ‘progress’. As they see it, we are strangely impotent in the face of, indeed are enslaved by, a pervasive technology that, ironically, we ourselves have made. Not only is the goal of dominating nature a mere dream, but our ability to control the effects and course of development of the technology we have unleashed is also illusory; mute structures and blind forces are causally far more potent than human will and intelligence. At best, and if we are lucky, we can give technology a little nudge in this or that direction, perhaps slightly retarding its inexorable course. Technological development may have been initiated by humans, but it has become autonomous, has gone beyond the point where, individually or collectively, we can exercise control over it.

Each of these visions overdramatizes. Each is just a caricature of what any one person actually believes. Curiously most of us find ourselves captivated by first one and then the other, depending on the technology, or features of a technology, under consideration. Word processors are likely to be thought a boon by writers and students. They can now control and manipulate a text with greater ease and speed than ever before. Computers generally provide those who use them with enormous power to manipulate data. But this very power can pose a threat to those on whom data is collected, stored and transmitted. Those who have had their credit privileges removed because of a computer error often find it nearly impossible to have their credit rating restored. Computer booking for air travel, computer holding of medical records, academic records, police files all make it possible for a governmental agency to amass a file on an individual without that individual being aware of the information being collected or having the opportunity to scrutinize or correct it. Each of us is thus likely to have occasion to feel the attraction of both visions of technology, and this suggests that much can be said for each. This seems to offer the depressing prospect of interminable, inconclusive debate between optimists and pessimists. After outlining the positions and showing what can be said for and against them, however, we will suggest that the battle lines should not be drawn here. The tendency to see technology issues in one or other of these lights is itself a reflection of deeper, culturally more pervasive assumptions which are shared by optimists and pessimists. By making these presumptions explicit it will be possible to shift the terms of debate away from simply having to adopt pro- or anti-technology positions. We can move instead towards providing a framework for thinking through what is at stake in any given controversial technological decision.

OPTIMISM

Optimists hold that technology and its products are value neutral; technologies are passive tools which can be used for good or evil. If technology is sometimes used improperly and causes harm, the fault lies with its human operators and developers, not with the technology. As the proverb goes, ‘It is a poor carpenter who blames his tools.’ It has thus been labelled an instrumentalist view of technology (Feenburg, 1991). This optimistic vision is a familiar part of capitalist technological cultures and is dominant within them. It finds expression in the advertising designed to sell us the latest ‘state of the art’ dishwasher, computer, insecticide or toothpaste. For example, in an advert for Sinclair computers we find:

information technology has a long and benign history. The computer, the telephone, the telegraph, the printing press, the invention of writing itself—all of them led to increased prosperity and universal improvements in the standard of living…. The more information we have, and the more sophisticated the use we make of it, the more exciting and effective our decisions and actions become.

(Sinclair, 1983)

The same optimistic vision was used by President Reagan to sell his Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars, programme—the vision that the problem of providing an impenetrable defence against incoming nuclear missiles can be solved, providing sufficient human resources and money are devoted to it. This was coupled with the message that this would be a benign technology because it was developed purely for defensive purposes. So far from seeing human beings as helpless in the face of inexorable technological progress, optimists tend to see technology as a route to virtually unlimited power over nature as human capabilities are dramatically extended. Optimists, for instance, see the micro-chip as representing a quantum leap in the technology of humankind:

the microcomputer is rapidly assuming huge burdens of drudgery from the human brain and thereby expanding the mind’s capacity in ways that man has only begun to grasp. With the chip, amazing feats of memory and execution become possible in everything from automobile engines to universities and hospitals, from farms to banks and corporate offices, from outer space to baby’s nursery.

(Time, 20 February 1978, p. 38)

and:

By massive physical changes deliberately induced [through technology], we can literally pry new alternatives out of nature…. We have the power to create new possibilities, and the will to do so. By creating new possibilities, we give ourselves more choices. With more choices, we have more opportunities. With more opportunities, we can have more freedom, and with more freedom we can be more human.

(Mesthene, 1983, pp. 110–11)

This vision is persuasive because it has a foundation in our experience of technological development., Our society has changed dramatically since the nineteenth century and even since World War II. Electronic technologies based on the transistor and the microchip have brought within the reach of the average person both aspects of culture (music, film, information of all kinds) and complex, easy to operate, tools (computers, calculators, microwave ovens) which were once accessible only to the wealthy. New drugs, vaccines and surgical procedures mean that many medical conditions which were once life threatening or fatal can now be treated or prevented from occurring. Agricultural productivity has increased beyond what was conceivable at the beginning of the century, and consequently the level of nutrition of most in developed countries has been markedly improved. And so one could go on.

We recognize that it is the carpenter’s lack of skill which leads him or her to make a rickety chair; and that were he or she to attack someone with his or her hammer, we would blame the carpenter, not the hammer. Although modern technologies are far removed from the simple tools of a carpenter, the principle, we can be readily persuaded, is the same. Disasters involving advanced technologies—nuclear power plant accidents, plane crashes, and oil spills—result from faulty design or control, or from faulty operation, not from anything inherent in the technology itself. In cases such as the use of concealable explosive devices to destroy aircraft, where advanced technology is used maliciously, the blame for the resulting loss of life lies with those placing the explosives, not with explosive or electronic technology.

Such reasoning lends plausibility to the picture of technology as simply providing us with tools which can be used to good or bad ends. Technology simply augments human abilities so creating new possibilities. Devoid of intrinsic value and lacking both will and intelligence, it plays an entirely passive role in the human exercise of power and control.

Optimists do recognize that technological development carries a price. It inevitably destroys as it creates. Pure running water in every villager’s home undermines the communal life focused on the village well. They also recognize that since technology brings increased power over nature, it also carries the risk that this power may fall into the wrong hands, being used for destructive rather than constructive purposes.

Technology spells only possibility, and is in that respect neutral. Its massive power can lead to massive error so efficiently perpetrated as to be well-nigh irreversible.

(Mesthene, 1983, p. 111)

But to emphasize this negative possibility shows a lack of resolve, and is to go against the spirit of the age, which is ‘witnessing a widespread recovery of nerve’ (Mesthene, 1983, p. 114). For the first time since the Greeks, Mesthene argues, we are convinced again that there is nothing in the universe that cannot, in principle, be known. ‘The commitment to universal intelligibility entails moral responsibility’, and this is hard work, but (if we do not lose our nerve) ‘we have the means at hand to make the good life, right here and now’ (Mesthene, 1983, p. 115).

By referring to the Ancient Greeks Mesthene points us to the source of the vision of human fulfilment which has been crucial in forming and sustaining the optimistic, instrumentalist view of technology. Already in Plato and Aristotle we find clearly expressed the idea that it is reason which marks humans off from animals. For humans fully to realize their human potential is thus for them to rise above their mere animal nature by cultivating and employing their rational capacities allowing these, rather than animal instincts and appetites, to direct their action. This means that only those who have the time (the leisure) to cultivate their rational faculties, freed from concern with the material necessities of biological life, can live truly fulfilled human lives. Practical work, whether of the skilled worker or the agricultural labourer, is thus devalued. It is something humans need to be freed from if they are to become fulfilled. Moreover, it is activity whose function and direction should ideally be the product of knowledge, of understanding the nature of the goals to be achieved and the means to achieve them. The bridle maker (weapons manufacturer) needs to receive design specifications from those who will use it (military personnel) and these in turn are directed by generals (military strategists) who determine the role of cavalry (bombs and artillery). Generals in turn look to politicians for their military objectives. In a well-ordered state (Republic) the means—end hierarchy maps onto a social—political hierarchy, an authority structure, in which direction flows from those who are qualified, in virtue of their theoretical and practical wisdom, to deliberate about ends and the best means of achieving them, to the skilled workers and labourers who must bring them about. (See, for example, Plato’s Republic 601c and Aristotle’s Nichomechean Ethics 1094a10–15.)

For the Greeks, the freedom of some to lead fulfilled human lives was contingent upon the labour of others (slaves and females) providing for the material necessities of life (production and reproduction). Slaves are explicitly likened to tools (Aristotle’s Politics Bk.I iv 1253b23) and one might thus say that slave labour and its management formed a ‘technology’. It was even argued that slaves would be necessary unless or until technology was developed to take over the labour performed by slaves. Here the instrumental vision both of labour and of technology could not be more clear.

Marx and Engels made only a minor modification in this vision when they dreamed of overcoming the need for the division of labour, the division between those who deliberate about ends and those who carry them out and by their labour provide for the necessities of life. They dreamed that the development of industrial technology could be used to overcome this division. Technology, provided it belongs to and is managed by the whole community for the communal good, was envisioned as replacing slaves, freeing everyone from the necessity of labour and so making available to all the possibility of a fulfilled human life (Marx and Engels, 1970, p. 61). (This dream was already outlined, in somewhat different technological terms, by Bacon when writing his New Atlantis.) In other words, both the programme of modern science and Marxist revolutionary politics were founded on an instrumental view of technology and on a vision of science as that which delivers the rational tools for controlling nature, freeing humans from enslavement to it. It is an instrumental vision founded on a separation of the distinctively human from the natural and hence on the conception that humans can only realize their full potential when freed from the practical demands of the work and labour necessary to ensure their biological well-being.

The fact that this view of technology has transcended the political divide of the Cold War years has lent credibility to the view that technology is value neutral—it seems to be neutral between the very different value frameworks of democratic individualism with free-market capitalism and totalitarianism with state capitalism. On this view, the way to advance technology is to advance science. Technology is applied science. That is, the application, via rational problem solving techniques, of rationally acquired understanding to material situations to achieve freely chosen ends. The assumed independence of both science and material problem situations from social determination gives a double-edged objectivity to technology. It is a product of rationally acquired, universal knowledge of the laws of nature, laws which hold no matter where one is in the universe. This knowledge is applied to material situations and could be similarly applied, with similar results, to such situations wherever they arise. Success or failure is evident: the goal is achieved or it isn’t. Technological progress consists in making more possibilities available (being able to do more things) so that more desired ends can be achieved and can be achieved more efficiently.

This scheme is implicit in Western philosophical tradition and is reinforced by its recurrent returns to classical Greek texts, those of Plato and Aristotle in particular. It also underlies the decision making practices of many contemporary national and international institutions. Stamp (1989) illustrates this in the case of development agencies. A vision of development is founded on the belief that lack of development is a result merely of lack of financial resources to get available technology. This is to assume that a machine or process which works in one place will work when transferred to another. Development aid then takes the form of financing for technology transfer. Stamp also illustrates the fallacies of this approach. Most poignantly these are demonstrated in the failures of development policies and their consequent human suffering and social disruption.

It is precisely in the problems of technology transfer that the limitations of viewing technology in purely instrumental terms have become most evident. Technologies, by their very specification, are introduced not into purely material contexts but into social contexts. They are to be used by human beings, to perform tasks previously done in other ways by other means, possibly by other people, or to do wholly new things. Their introduction is bound to have social effects.

Optimists such as Mesthene would not deny that this is the case, but would argue that the problems that have arisen with transfer are the result of human, moral failings resulting in irresponsible use of technology. Mesthene’s appeal to moral responsibility is both an injunction to those who use technologies and an indication of what becomes a key concern for those optimistically pursuing new technologies. The concern is that the technology does not fall into the wrong (morally irresponsible or reprehensible) hands. Control over the development of technology demands control over its dissemination and this can be assured only if control is exercised over (other) people. This was clearly seen by those involved in the decision to develop peaceful uses for nuclear power. Weinberg, curator of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory from 1955 to 1973, suggested that a ‘technological priesthood’ would be necessary to ensure that nuclear power was managed properly and in perpetuity (Weinberg, 1972, p. 34). Observing that the development of nuclear weapons had already created a military priesthood whose function was to guard against the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and to prevent them or the expertise and materials for building them from falling into the wrong hands, Weinberg realized that the development of peaceful uses for nuclear energy was going to require the creation of a similar group of trusted people as both possessors and guardians of nuclear expertise.

Thus the vision of domination of nature through technology contains within it the seeds of social paranoia:

Once we have multiplied the power of our body by a machine, then we have lost the self-regulating features of nature. We want that power for our self, but we do not want it to be used on our self. Thus, as we use it we tend to distance ourselves from it. The machine is turned against the Other, whether this be the soil, a bird, a bacterium, or other people. In the process we become grandiose and abstracted from the concrete immediate flow of life.

(Kovel, 1983, p. 121)

In this way thinking that one can control technology, and so seeing it as conferring power, leads naturally to thinking also that one can, and must, control other people, namely those who do not share one’s goals and values, and who might therefore put technology to uses other than those intended or even turn it against oneself.

If this mind-set is accompanied by the tendency to see every problem of control as a technological problem, one to which a technological solution can be found, then it can lead to the development of technologies not designed to ‘better the lot of all humankind’, but to control and manage one part of humankind in the interests of another part. In Brave New Workplace Howard examines the extent to which computer technology has been perceived and used to incr...