Back To Europe

Central And Eastern Europe And The European Union

Henderson, Karen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2005
• ISBN:
  9781135358341
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

As The European Union Opens Negotiations On Membership With Five Of The Ten post-communist states who have applied, this book looks at some of the challenges presented by Eastern enlargement - not only to existing member states and European institutions, but also to the Central and Eastern European countries themselves.; The approach is interdisciplinary, and brings together contributions from academic specialists on security and international relations; European institutions; the economics of european integration; and the domestic politics of Central and Eastern Europe.; The book has been structured to provide a clear and comprehensive introduction to the topic for students taking a range of courses, including European integration, the politics of post-communist democracies, and Europe's post-Cold war order.; At the same time. it will be accessible to more general readers with an interest in European Union affairs, while presenting research to specialists in the area.

1
EU policy to central and eastern Europe

Jackie Gower

The dramatic events at the end of the 1980s that resulted in the collapse of the communist regimes in central and eastern Europe (CEE) took the European Community (Ec)¹ (like practically everyone else) by surprise and revealed a considerable policy void. Throughout the previous 30 years, the EC had only a very limited relationship with those countries that belonged to the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)² and there appears to have been no serious thought given to the possibility that they might one day join with their western neighbours in the grand “European project” of political and economic integration. However, as the new governments in central and eastern Europe embarked on radical reforms to create liberal democratic political systems and market economies, they made it clear that they saw rapid and full accession to the EC as an essential milestone on their journey “back to Europe”.

The initial reaction by the EC was cautious: it offered practical technical and financial assistance to support the reforms and went some way towards normalizing trade relations with the countries of central and eastern Europe. However, it was extremely reluctant to make any specific commitment to even the principle of central and east European enlargement, let alone set a date and identify future candidate members. Gradually, however, a broad policy strategy has evolved, albeit more in response to external demands and events than any clear vision of the kind of European Union that would meet the needs of the next century. By the end of 1997 it was possible to identify which states are considered future EU members, the criteria by which they will be judged to be ready for accession and the general strategy for the conduct of the negotiations. There remain, however, a number of crucial questions that are as yet unanswered and make it impossible to predict with any degree of certainty which states will actually join and when, and how the EU itself will be changed by the accession of the central and east European states.

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development of EU policy to central and eastern Europe and to identify the key principles of what is now officially designated the “pre-accession strategy”. It will also highlight the outstanding issues and questions that have yet to be resolved and which will be considered in more detail in the chapters that follow.

The initial response to CEE reforms

One of the main obstacles to the development of closer relations between the EC and its eastern neighbours had been the absence of any official contact between the CMEA and Brussels and the generally negative attitude of the Soviet Union towards the EC. Gorbachev, however, saw the normalization of economic relations with western Europe as an important part of his economic reform strategy. On his initiative a Joint EC-CMEA Declaration was agreed in June 1988,³ which established mutual recognition and opened the way for the negotiation of Trade and Co-operation Agreements (TCAS) with Hungary in 1988 and Poland and the USSR in 1989.⁴ Although not really going beyond affording the standard most favoured nation treatment permitted under GATT rules, the TCAS were an important symbolic encouragement to the reform process. Similar agreements were extended to all the former communist states in 1990 when it was clear that they too were embarking on fundamental reforms.

The Trade and Co-operation Agreements were part of the standard repertoire of economic instruments used by the EC in relation to third parties. The PHARE⁵ programme introduced in 1989 to provide financial and technical support for the economic restructuring of Poland and Hungary was a more innovative response intended to meet the specific needs of the central and east European countries (CEECs). It involves the Commission in a close partnership with the governments and other institutions and agencies in the CEECs engaged in projects designed to consolidate the market reforms and restructure the economies. On the initiative of the European Parliament, the scope of the programme was widened in July 1992 with the introduction of the PHARE Democracy Programme to strengthen the social and political foundations of a democratic system. Particular importance is attached to the development of a vibrant civil society, so many of the projects involve working directly with a wide range of non-governmental organizations in order to encourage a more participatory political culture.

The PHARE programme was extended to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1990 and, significantly, also to the three Baltic states in September 1991—the only former Soviet states to be included in the PHARE programme. A different aid programme, TACIS, was developed for Russia and the other newly independent states, so it would appear that even as early as 1991 the Baltic states were regarded as part of the central and east European family of nations for the purposes of EC policy.

In addition to administering the PHARE programme, the Commission was also given the responsibility in July 1989 for co-ordinating aid from the G24 states and various international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This was welcomed as an important acknowledgement of the EC’S status as an international actor⁶ and further strengthened the Commission’s pivotal role in providing external encouragement and support for the domestic reform process in central and eastern Europe.

Although it was officially maintained that the TCAS and the PHARE programme represented a “considerable upgrading of relations between the Community and the CEECs”,⁷ they failed to satisfy the expectations of the new CEE governments. There was considerable frustration and resentment at the continuing restrictions on trade despite the movement towards market economies, and disappointment that the level of financial assistance fell far short of the Marshall Aid received by western states in the post-war period to support their reconstruction. Furthermore, in the early years at least, there was a widespread perception that much of the financial assistance actually went to western consultants and experts rather than the CEECs themselves. Above all, there was no commitment forthcoming from Brussels in respect of CEE membership, although some national leaders, notably Germany’s Chancellor Kohl, made reference to what were clearly extremely optimistic dates for their accession that only served to raise popular expectations to an unrealistic level.

The Europe Agreements

In response, therefore, to both the scale and pace of the reforms taking place in the CEECs and the pressure from their governments for a more substantial political response, the Commission was asked to draw up proposals for association agreements that would have a significant political as well as an economic dimension. The intention was to create “a special type of relationship reflecting geographic proximity, shared values and increased interdependence”.⁸ The preambles contained a rather anodyne statement that the agreement would “allow (the associated state) to take part in the process of European integration”⁹ but despite strong pressure from the CEEC governments during the negotiations, there was no commitment to their future accession. The only concession was the inclusion of a statement “recognizing the fact that the final objective of (e.g. Poland) is to become a member of the Community and that this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to achieve this objective”.¹⁰ Although criticized at the time as falling short of the expectations of the CEECs, it is perhaps worth remembering that the first three Europe Agreements were signed in December 1991, barely two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and when the stability of the new democracies was still far from certain. While there may have been a certain lack of vision, there was also an understandable degree of caution. The Europe Agreements themselves were explicitly conditional on the continuation of both the political and the economic reforms, including respect for the rule of law and human rights, and future relations clearly depended on the success of the of the transition.

Although the political characteristics of the Europe Agreements were seen at the time as potentially the most important in shaping future relations between the EC and the CEECs, it was the trade liberalization measures that had the most immediate impact. In part, this was because they came into force within a few months as “Interim Agreements”, while the protracted ratification process required for the more overtly political Europe Agreements themselves led to delays of two to three years.¹¹ The economic provisions of the Europe Agreements represent a significant advance on the earlier Trade and Co-operation Agreements, providing for the progressive movement towards free trade in industrial goods over a ten-year period, with the EC removing tariffs, quotas and other restrictions much more quickly than the CEECs. Most agricultural trade, however, is excluded and there are significant exceptions made for so-called “sensitive” goods such as steel, chemicals and textiles. This overt protectionism on the EC side was widely condemned both in the CEECs and by many western economists,¹² who argued that what the nascent market economies most needed was the stimulation of free access to the market, not financial aid. The sectors where EC protectionism prevailed were invariably those where the CEECs enjoyed a comparative advantage and, therefore, in which export-led growth would have been expected.¹³ Further concessions have been made over the years, but the difficulty in persuading Member States to risk alienating powerful domestic lobbies is a warning of the potential problems that lie ahead during the accession negotiations themselves.

Despite the limitations of the Europe Agreements, there has been a significant growth in the volume of trade between the EC/EU and CEE and a dramatic reorientation of CEE exports from the former CMEA countries to EU Member States.¹⁴ However, some force is given to the criticisms of the EU’S continuing protectionism by the evidence of a large trade surplus in its favour, particularly with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.¹⁵

The Europe Agreements also contain modest proposals for the gradual realization of free movement of services, capital and labour, but both sides were reluctant to go as far as the European Economic Area model in the short term at least. However, the commitment by the associated states to approximate the majority of their economic laws to EC law is of major significance and will considerably facilitate their integration into the single market and their adoption of the acquis on accession.

The political provisions were intended to complement the gradual economic integration of the CEECs into the European economy with the development of a “European political area”. An institutional framework of Association Councils and Committees at ministerial, parliamentary and official levels has been created to encourage political dialogue on a wide range of issues of mutual concern, including foreign policy, security, international crime and the environment (see Chapter 6). After a rather slow start, regular meetings were established but both sides seem to have found them rather frustrating. Certainly, from the perspective of the CEECs, political dialogue is regarded as a poor substitute for actual EU membership and direct representation at the decision-making table. The political provisions, therefore, proved disappointing and in no way diminished the CEECs’ determination to attain full EU membership. The opening of negotiations with the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) applicants in February 1993 increased the pressure on the EU to spell out precisely what the CEECs needed to do before they too would be considered ready for membership.

The Copenhagen criteria

The Commission’s Report “The Challenge of Enlargement”, presented to the Lisbon European Council in June 1992, had put the issue of CEE enlargement firmly on the agenda by declaring that “the integration of these new democracies into the European family represents a historic opportunity”.¹⁶ The following year, the Copenhagen European Council proved a watershed in the development of EU policy to the CEECs by deciding that

the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required.¹⁷

Although no indication of the timescale envisaged was given, the statement marked a major shift in EU policy. Henceforth, the debate would be concentrated on when rather than if the CEECs would become EU members. In particular, attention shifted to the necessity for them to meet the economic and political conditions spelt out at Copenhagen:

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, th...