The Israeli Defence Forces and the Foundation of Israel
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The Israeli Defence Forces and the Foundation of Israel

Utopia in Uniform

Ze'ev Drory

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eBook - ePub

The Israeli Defence Forces and the Foundation of Israel

Utopia in Uniform

Ze'ev Drory

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About This Book

This book discusses the contribution of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF)to the building of the social and educational foundations of the country, and its role in the area of immigrant absorption and settlement during the first years of the Israeli State. The author examines how under the guidance of David Ben-Gurion Israel was able to utilize the values of military organization to combat severe, economic, and social difficulties, and build a civil society to underpin the new state.

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Information

Publisher
Routledge
Year
2004
ISBN
9781135753986

Chapter 1
David Ben-Gurion’s Position and Influence in Shaping the State

Since the War of Independence, the Israel Defence Forces have played a central role in the life of the State well beyond that which is most obviously and clearly signified by its designated name. The forces were established amidst the turmoil of war to defend and secure the physical survival of the State of Israel. More specifically, they were authorized to repel the invasion of the Arab armies, obtain as continuous and as large a territorial expanse as possible within the Land of Israel, and protect those borders. Clearly, these tasks are standard military requirements. Yet, from its earliest days, the IDF was involved, directly and indirectly, in the formation of the character and way of life of the society through the inclusion in its sphere of responsibility of civilian tasks in the areas of settlement, education, and immigrant absorption.
This non-military orientation of the IDF was precipitated largely by the constraints of reality. From the very beginning, the geopolitical situation made security a national priority. Not only have security and related topics always captured the attention of public opinion and the major protagonists in the political system, but for many years security concerns have also comprised a very healthy proportion of the gross national product. Even more importantly, a decisive majority of the adult population in Israel has passed through the IDF. This was the case with regard to the War of Independence, which was without doubt a most important formative experience of the young State. During the course of the war, 108,000 soldiers served in the IDF – about 15 per cent of the entire population, and this figure carries a much greater weight when measured in terms of the State’s qualitative and professional cadre. Following the war, broad-based military recruitment shaped the IDF’s composition through a combination of conscription and a reserve system that included all soldiers from the time of their completion of compulsory service until the fourth and fifth decades of their lives.
Under these conditions it was, in effect, a foregone conclusion that the IDF would be tied into various national endeavours that were not purely military in nature. Its influence would be felt in the building of a civilian elite and in the formation of concepts and outlooks in various social arenas. Moreover, there is no doubt that this development was to a great extent influenced not only by external constraints and their implications but also by ideational processes and their translation into practice. These processes were especially linked to David Ben-Gurion, ‘the founding father’ of the State, in the eyes of many, and unanimously regarded as the dominant personality in State leadership during the first 15 years of independence. Thus it is impossible to understand the extra-military involvement of the IDF during these years – and particularly during the nascent moments of the State – without examining the conceptions and actions of David Ben-Gurion in the arenas relevant to these civilian initiatives.
Anita Shapira defined Ben-Gurion as a leader whose:
place is preserved as one of the ‘monstrous figures’ of history, a dominant personality type destined to fashion the fate of peoples and states and leave a mark on history. They are people who have the strength of their convictions, who know at critical moments how to make the right decisions, to select the important tasks and determine priorities, and whose deeds are justified by the test of reality.1
Nathan Rotenstreich saw Ben-Gurion as an ‘historical personality’, a type of individual who can ‘sift out the circumstances and conditions and intentionally lead the train of events in such a manner that he invigorates its course and hollows out its contours. In relating to circumstances and directing them, he carves out an historical path.’2 Shimon Peres portrayed Ben-Gurion as a leader who combined a powerful intellect, a phenomenal memory and an obdurate and determined character, and that his diligence and perseverance blended with his decisiveness and pursuance of goals.3
For our purposes, it is important to recall Shlomo Avineri’s description of Ben-Gurion as:
a complex personality 
 who more than any other Israeli leader was a subject of sharp contention among friends and foes alike 
 But his thought contains a great deal of continuity and engagement with the same series of basic problems 
 Any attempt to find an orderly account of ‘the social and political philosophy of David Ben-Gurion’ is futile. We do not encounter a theoretical system because his teaching reveals a dynamic belonging to a complex and ever changing life 
 The theoretical foundations of Ben-Gurion’s Zionist thought can be encapsulated in two principles: in the first place, Zionism is a revolt against the Jewish tradition; secondly, to carry out this revolution, it is not enough to declare it. One has to seek out the social subject who will be able to carry it out.4
It appears that during the first years of the State Ben-Gurion thought that the IDF could function as part of the social subject of that revolutionary base, and would do so through the coining of a new concept – ‘statist pioneering’.
Looking back, it is easy to see that in each time period Ben-Gurion preferred to concentrate his activities on one subject, on the assumption that that subject would bear fruit and bring about decisive changes. It is also easy to see that during the course of his life he knew how to transfer all his energy and personal and political power from topic to topic and from area to area. He did this, according to Zeev Tzahor,5 out of faith in his mission and in his ability to realize it, as well as in his unlimited thoroughness in getting down to details without losing track of the main point.
Ben-Gurion was not willing to relinquish his standpoints easily. Even when he found no support for his direction or opinions, he would put up a fight, exercise his authority and his leadership ability, and use all available means of manipulation and democratic processes to attain his goals. He was in essence a pragmatic leader, who in advancing his objectives knew how to tread a path between ‘vision’ and practical policy, between stubbornness and readiness to compromise. His strength and originality were not in the formulation of ideas but rather in their political conversion. This found particular expression in the fact that he attributed significant value to those organizational instruments which served his purposes. ‘The important thing in my view’, he wrote, ‘is the economic, political, and social strength of the working people. On this account, I regard it as obligatory to build up the economy, the Histadrut, the State. On this account, I attribute importance to tools and instruments.’6
Among the personalities who greatly contributed to the formulation of Ben Gurion’s thinking, a central place must be given to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Revolution. Although Ben-Gurion tended to be very critical about what occurred in the Soviet Union, Lenin and the revolution provided him with a clear-cut example of the conversion of ideas into social and political facts.7 Ben-Gurion referred to this in his memoirs, and manifest signs of this appear in his desire to build a voluntary movement of sufficient strength to shape the nation’s character. It seems that one can also see here the root of his later ideas, which raised not a little criticism from his political opponents, of establishing a para-military regime (for example, organization of immigrant, public works battalions).
From the time of his arrival in Palestine in 1906 to the 22nd Zionist Congress, in Basel in December 1946, Ben-Gurion’s involvement in security matters was not especially significant. Although he was prone to recall with pride his part in the defence of Sejera and his participation in military encounters against Arab marauders in 1907 and 1908, in fact he was not accepted into the ranks of the ‘Hashomer’ (Jewish guard and self-defence organization) at its founding in 1909. Nor was he a party to all the security initiatives that were undertaken within the operative compass of this militia. Moreover, toward the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, he left the farming communities in Galilee for Jerusalem and became involved in political activities that were completely removed from security matters. Afterwards, he set out to study law in Constantinople, returned to Palestine at the outbreak of the First World War, and was expelled from the country in 1915 by an edict of the Ottoman regime. Following his expulsion he arrived in the United States, where he played an active role in organizing volunteers for the Jewish Legion. Ben-Gurion joined the American branch of the Legion and was in its ranks when he arrived in Egypt en route to Palestine; he even attained the rank of corporal, but this was later taken away from him because of a disciplinary violation connected with political party activity. Like a majority of the Jewish Legion members, Ben-Gurion did not participate in any military operations, but according to Tzahor ‘his experience as a soldier in the Jewish Legion reinforced his perspective. He was impressed with military hierarchy and the ability of the army to galvanize armed forces and function as a policy-determining instrument.’8
In 1919, Ben-Gurion became one of the leaders of the newly formed party, Achdut Ha’avodah (Union of Labour), and one of its senior representatives in the Yishuv’s institutions. It was as a representative of Achdut Ha’avodah, the largest workers’ party in the Yishuv, that he became involved, during the first two months of 1920, in what would be called the ‘Tel Hai Affair’. At a session of the Provisional Committee of the Jewish Community in Palestine on 23 February 1920, he firmly opposed withdrawal from the northern settlements, which at that time had not been included under British jurisdiction. The outlook which Ben-Gurion expressed was to become part of basic strategy almost 30 years later during the War of Independence:
It is clear to us, that all places in which a Jew labors must be defended. What should we do when they attack us? If we flee from bandits, we will have to abandon not only the Upper Galilee but the whole of the Land of Israel 
 As long as we have the capacity to defend – it is our duty to defend and not to abandon our locations.9
While the genesis of later military strategies found occasional expression in Ben-Gurion’s writings and pronouncements during these early years, he was not at the centre of critical military decisions. In the middle of June 1920, when the Achdut Ha’avodah Congress decided to accept ‘in recognition of its importance and the Congress’s historical responsibility, the initiative placed upon it by the Hashomer organization to attend to security matters, to organize the workers’ participation in defence matters, and to ensure national and social planning of national defence in Palestine.’10 Ben-Gurion was already stationed in London as the party’s representative. Within a year he returned to Palestine. Prior to his return, the Histadrut (General Federation of Jewish Workers) had been founded and received responsibility for security matters from Achdut Ha’avodah. From December 1921 until the end of 1935, Ben-Gurion was secretary-general of the Histadrut, its most senior office. By virtue of this position, he also served as the highest authority of the Hagana organization until its Command Council (HaMifkada Ha’artzit – 41 members who held responsibility for security in the Yishuv) was established under the auspices of the national institutions in 1931. However, most of his energy in this period was given over to non-military matters, principally to the ‘conquest of labour’ and to building up the power of the Histadrut. He did not refrain from decisions regarding security (including personal initiatives such as appointments) when his intervention was required, but it appears that in general he relied completely upon Eliyahu Golomb and his close associates in their role as supervisors, on behalf of the Histadrut and the party which controlled it, of the Hagana and its daily activities.
A good part of this reliance continued in the next stage of Ben-Gurion’s career, in his first years as Chairman of the Palestine Executive of the Jewish Agency and as effective leader of the Yishuv. Now he had responsibilities for a range of activities, such as immigration and settlement, which clearly had security aspects, as well as the task of formulating defence policy but he was still far from being directly involved in security affairs and daily involvement in defence matters.
Changes began to occur on the eve of the Second World War. With the publication of the 1939 White Paper, Ben-Gurion began to wage a militant struggle against the document’s obligatory regulations, which would have had the effect of relegating the Jewish population to a minority status in Palestine and of severely limiting the rights of immigration and settlement. This struggle was to be prosecuted, according to Ben-Gurion, by means of different instruments of the Hagana organization and he intended to closely orchestrate the operation of these instruments.
Thus, for example, in the first stage of the struggle against the White Paper, Ben-Gurion gave orders for the establishment of Aliya Bet (unofficial immigration) with his confidant, Shaul Meirov-Avigur, appointed its first head. This step was taken after initially he had opposed the idea of illegal immigration for fear of impairing political ties with the British. He rapidly sought a reversal of the policy of underground immigration and turned it into a policy of unconcealed entry into Palestine. This altered programme was called Aliya Gimmel. It would operate in broad daylight by bringing ma...

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