The Enlargement and Integration of the European Union

Issues and Strategies

David Clark

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• ISBN:
  9781134811052
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This study addresses many of the key issues raised by the increasing expansion of the EU. Analysing the traditional 'Community method' of espansion and finding many shortcomings with its ability to handle future enlargement, Chris Preston explores:
* the past experience of enlargement and the lessons that can be drawn
* the impact that enlargement has had on EU policies, institutions and the new member themselves
* the likely future developments in the enlargement process
Focusing on the Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet countries, this book will be essential reading for students, specialists and practitioners of European Politics.

Part I

Enlargements of the EC/EU

1 Introduction

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE NEW CHALLENGES

By the mid-1990s the further enlargement of the European Union, to encompass the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has become critical for the future of European integration. Whilst other projects, in particular European and Monetary Union, may command more public attention, the possibility that the EU might expand to thirty members in the first quarter of the next millennium poses fundamental questions, concerning both the objectives and processes of the EU. So fundamental are these questions that they shape the debate on all aspects of the EU, from the CAP to institutional and decision making reform. The key question is: ‘How much diversity can the EU accommodate before it ceases to be a durable community?’

Enlargement has always been part of the EC/EU’s ‘historic mission’. In more than doubling its membership from six to fifteen over its forty-year history, such questions have been asked many times before. Though the answers have often been carefully qualified, they have reaffirmed the basic dynamics of enlargement. Despite the strains imposed on both the Union and its new members, the queue of applicants, stretching from the Southern Mediterranean, through Central and Eastern Europe, into the former Soviet Union is proof of its attractiveness. Despite its arcane rule book, opaque procedures and high membership fee, the EU is still considered to be the ‘best club in Europe’, worth making sacrifices to join.

Yet the issues raised for the Union by the possibility of nearly doubling its membership again in a shorter time-scale, are qualitatively different from those faced before. In the past, the enlargement debate was more fragmented, and focused on the problems of particular states and policy areas. Though the EC has, from time to time, engaged in a more wide-ranging debate about the effects of diversity, for instance in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the likelihood of enlargement into the Mediterranean increased, pragmatic compromises were usually found, and the more fundamental implications of recasting the whole system were left unexplored.

The collapse of the USSR, leading to the creation of new sovereign states, to the political, economic and strategic reorientation of Central and Eastern Europe, and to changes in the Mediterranean region, has transformed the environment in which further EU enlargement will take place. The assumptions of integration, based on the shared objectives and historical experience of a core group of West European states, though continually modified, are now challenged more openly.

How the EU deals with this issue depends on whether the dynamics and methods by which enlargement has been handled in the past are still valid. Hence this book seeks to explore:

• The past experience of enlargement, to assess what lessons can be drawn from it

• The impact which enlargement has had on candidates, policies and institutions and what light this throws on the problems of deepening

• The likely future development of the enlargement process in the light of the above. It also seeks to evaluate the difficulties of extending further the way the EU has handled the process.

THE MAIN THEMES OF THE BOOK

The introductory chapter sets the context for the evaluation of the enlargement process. It examines the present goals of the EU, and how these are affected by the possibility of enlargement, the dynamics of the integration process and the tensions between widening and deepening, the strengths and weaknesses of the Community’s ‘classical method’ of enlargement, an account of the formal accession procedures, and a review of the principles underlying enlargement which have shaped the process so far.

The first part of the book then traces the sequence of enlargements to date. Chapter 2 examines the EC’s first round of enlargement, from the 1961 application from the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway through to accession (for the first three) in 1973. It examines the policy debates that surrounded enlargement, the wider pressures confronting the EC, the attitudes of existing member states, the domestic debate in the applicant countries, and an analysis of the accession negotiations. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 follow a similar format for the second (Greece), third (Spain and Portugal) and fourth (Sweden, Austria and Finland) enlargement rounds.

The second part of the book goes on to assess the effects of enlargement. So, to begin with, Chapter 6 examines the impact that accession has had on the EC’s new members. It explores the political and economic adjustments necessitated by full membership, and the role played by the EC in facilitating these adjustments. It argues that the success of a new member’s integration into the EC/EU is determined more by its own willingness to make fundamental changes than by the specific terms negotiated during accession. Chapter 7 examines the impact that enlargement has had on the EC’s principal internal policies, in particular on agriculture, the structural funds, the budget, the internal market and monetary union. It argues that, whilst enlargement has encouraged the extension of the EC’s policy domain into areas previously considered to be in the exclusively national domain, EC policy priorities are still determined by member states. Chapter 8 examines the impact of enlargement on the EC’s major external policies, in particular trade, and the initiatives to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy. It comes to similar conclusions to those of Chapter 7. Chapter 9 examines the impact of enlargement on the EC/EU’s institutional structure and decision-making processes. It argues that, whilst enlargement has led to some increase in the power of Community institutions to underpin the expansion of its policy domain, it has consolidated the power of member states in the Council of Ministers, and therefore the intergovernmental nature of the EC/EU. The final part of this book seeks to apply this to future enlargement.

Chapter 10 examines the pressures for further enlargement in the Mediterranean. It argues that despite its strategic importance to the EU, Turkey is not presently a credible candidate for membership, whilst Malta and Cyprus pose institutional questions for the EU which have to be dealt with by the IGC. Chapter 11 examines the prospects for further enlargement in Eastern Europe. It examines the measures taken so far to create economic and political links through ‘Europe Agreements’. It argues that the EC needs to undertake further policy reform, particularly of agriculture and ‘cohesion’ policies before enlargement is realistic. Chapter 12 draws together the main themes of the book, reviews the development of the classical method and examines the options for reform as the EU faces a dramatically increased membership.

THE PRESENT MISSION OF THE EU

The completion of the Internal Market and the commitment to achieving EMU before the year 2000, raise the accession threshold for a group of states undertaking the transition process from a different economic base than in the past. Both these internal and external developments have also led to changes in the Franco–German axis which has, to date, been the motor of integration. The Federal Republic footed the bill for the adjustment costs of integration, whilst France set the agenda and policy priorities of the EC/EU. This implicit bargain allowed both parties to claim that there was a net gain to the whole EC to have West Germany anchored into the Western European political and economic system, and to have France shape the grand design of European integration. The unification of Germany and the geopolitical changes in Eastern Europe have modified many of these assumptions. The increased need for Germany to pursue a new form of ‘Ostpolitik’ within an EU framework is straining the Franco–German alliance at a time when moves towards EMU are themselves creating difficulties. The new challenge is to accommodate a wider range of new interests into the EU system during a period of uncertainty amongst the EU’s key actors about what are, and in the future should be, the EU core competencies and commitments.

WIDENING AND DEEPENING

Despite the new context of the enlargement debate, there has been a striking degree of continuity about the way in which the enlargement process has been managed to date. Many of the dynamics of the process have deep roots in the origins of the EC and the basic objectives of the integration process. Since the Rome Treaty was signed, the Community has been driven by the need to balance the demands of widening and deepening. At different points in the EC’s development, the emphasis has been either on widening or deepening. The initial configuration of the EC was shaped by the six founder members who were willing to transfer sovereignty to supranational institutions and invest in common policies within a customs union. Whilst the choice of core policies, in particular, agriculture, reflected the political preferences of the key actors, France and Germany, rather than a rational economic calculation of optimal trade creation, the goal of economic integration, leading to political integration was clearly established. Hence Article 2 of the Treaty states that:

The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.¹

Progress towards integration has also always depended on favourable economic circumstances. During the boom years of the late 1950s and 1960s, the Community focused on deepening, concentrating on completion of the customs union, the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy and the establishment of its own budgetary resources. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the EC’s commitment to further integration faltered. The post-1973 oil crisis recession led to a long period of stagnation and ‘eurosclerosis’, which did not lift until the economic growth of the mid-1980s smoothed the way to the completion of the Internal Market in 1992. In the mid- and late 1990s, the plans to achieve EMU before the year 2000 have been affected by the prolonged recession of the early 1990s.

Although the will to deepen has always been fundamental to the dynamics of integration, the expectation of widening has always existed. The EC was founded at a time of wide-ranging debate about the value of different economic and political frameworks to the peace and prosperity of Europe. The Six who signed the Rome Treaty opted for the intensive model of integration. Yet it was always recognised that this integration process should not be isolated from the wider European context and, if successful, was likely to generate pressures for enlargement. Hence Article 237 of the original Rome Treaty opened with the statement that ‘any European State may apply to become a Member of the Community’.² Whilst the criteria for acceptance into the EC have often proved complex and contentious, this basic commitment to widening has opened the door to a continuous process of expansion. Within four years of signing the Rome Treaty, the Six were faced with applications from the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. Although the de Gaulle veto postponed enlargement, it was never far from the integration debate. Following de Gaulle’s death, the first enlargement was pushed vigorously, though it was made conditional on the applicants accepting the commitment, made at the 1969 Hague Summit, to monetary union.

Within several years the enlarged Community of nine was again called upon to substantiate its Article 237 commitment, following the collapse of dictatorships and the restoration of democracy in Greece, Spain and Portugal. The possibility of a twelve-member, more economically and geographically diverse Community led to an active debate about the impact of widening on deepening. However, following the decision to pursue Greek accession urgently, and the prolonged difficulties in finding an internal consensus on the conditions of Iberian, in particular Spanish, accession, the debate proved inconclusive. The Community therefore faced the late 1980s with the same mindset when new pressures for enlargement were generated by both the commitment to complete the internal market, and the more fluid political environment in Central Europe and Scandinavia.

The search for balance between widening and deepening is therefore a fundamental dynamic of the EC. Although widening has been recognised as unavoidable at particular critical moments, the key EU actors, France and Germany, have always favoured deepening as vital to maintaining the momentum of the original integration project. Enlargement has, therefore, only proceeded when the risks of dilution have been minimised, by linking enlargement to new, deepening, projects, and by demanding further reassurances from prospective members.

THE COMMUNITY METHOD OF INTEGRATION

The difficulties in resolving the tension between deepening and widening are integral to the ‘Community method’ of integration. This ‘method’, developed by the early pioneers of integration, in particular Jean Monnet in his plans for the European Coal and Steel Community, founded in 1952, sought to identify sectoral policy areas where member states’ interdependence gave them strong incentives to co-operate. The expectation that successful co-operation would lead to further incremental pressures for joint decision making in related policy areas would, over time, create a regime with durable institutions and an expanding policy domain. During the 1960s, this process generated the theory of ‘spillover’³. As member states ‘pool’ their sovereignty, so the structures and processes of the EC acquire greater legitimacy, thereby generating demands for further integration. Though it has created complex and opaque procedures which have led to wide-ranging concerns about effectiveness and accountability, the Community method has endured. Once ‘locked in’ to the system, it is extremely difficult for a member state to ‘opt out’ of policy developments that may not have been its preferred choice, but which it can accept with some modification. Though the Community method may produce ‘lowest common denominator’ policies, these are still seen by enough member states as preferable to the alternatives.

THE CLASSICAL METHOD OF ENLARGEMENT

The Community’s ‘classical’ method of enlargement is an integral component of this underlying Community integration method. Over the four enlargement rounds to date, there has been a consistent pattern both to the formal accession procedures adopted, and to the implicit assumptions and principles which have shaped the expectations of the participants and the progress of negotiations.

Despite being severely tested at each enlargement round, the classical method has endured. Its major strength has been to establish at the outset of negotiations what the key outcomes should be: the integration of new members into a club with an ever-expanding rule book. The subject matter is not so much a future pact between the parties as the way in which one party will apply the rules of the other party’s club.’⁴ This alters the balance of the dynamics of negotiation. By pushing the major onus of responsibility for adjustment on to the new members, it gives them a strong incentive to conclude negotiations quickly. Any outstanding disagreements are therefore left until the new member is inside the club and has full decision-making and voting rights. The classical method also insulates accession negotiations from wider integration debates which might slow down the enlargement process even further.

However, the classical method also has serious weaknesses. The expectation that the bulk of the adjustment costs should be borne by new members, can create lingering resentments which can disrupt the whole integration process once internalised by the EC. The failure to address the predictable budgetary problems arising from the UK’s trade structure led to a renegotiation of entry terms in 1975, and an acrimonious budget dispute that was not settled until 1984. Similarly, the terms pressed on Spain, particularly for agriculture and fisheries, have led the Spanish to take a hard line on subsequent CFP and CAP negotiations, and to increase their demands for side payments. The narrow focus of enlargement negotiations also reinforces the perception that the EC is an exclusive organisation more concerned with maximising th...