Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650

Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe

Jan Glete

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• ISBN:
  9781134610785
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650 is the first truly international study of warfare at sea in this period. Commencing in the late fifteenth century with the introduction of gunpowder in naval warfare and the rapid transformation of maritime trade, Warfare at Sea focuses on the scope and limitations of war before the advent of the big battle fleets from the middle of the seventeenth century.
The book also compares the social history of seamen and the early officer corps in several European countries and includes discussion on Spain, Portugal, France, Venice, the Ottoman Empire and the Baltic states.

1
WARFARE AT SEA IN EUROPEAN HISTORY

The transformation of warfare at sea

This book focuses on maritime conflicts as a part of the transformation of Europe from the end of the fifteenth century to the mid–seventeenth century. The main lines of this transformation are well known. From a maritime perspective some parts of the process are especially important. Long–distance trade increased and the role of capitalist entrepreneurs in society became more important in large parts of Europe. In the Mediterranean, the Spanish and the Ottoman empires became dominant during the first half of the sixteenth century. In the last decades of that century and the early decades of the seventeenth century the economic and political power of north–western Europe rapidly rose while the Mediterranean stagnated. The importance of the territorially integrated states in Europe rose and they began to develop permanent organisations for enforcing a state monopoly of violence on land as well as at sea. Finally, Europe developed an ability to influence economy and politics on a world–wide scale by its superior competence in warfare at sea. Warfare itself was also transformed. At sea, the institutional, organisational and technical frameworks for war and violence changed decisively between 1500 and 1650.

This book will emphasise change but some basic features of conflicts at sea remained unchanged. Warfare at sea is essentially a contest about the maritime lines of communication. These lines are used for trade, for power projection into territories close to the sea and as a source of wealth extracted by violence or through protection from violence. Consequently, wars at sea are fought in the interest of those who use the sea for trade, for the projection of military power and for resource extraction: plunder and taxes. Wars are also fought by those who feel threatened if competing groups are given free access to the sea for such activities. For the defender against seaborne invasion the sea is a forward area for naval operations which aim at delaying and preventing threats against his territory. Wars may have their immediate cause in accidental diplomatic breakdowns, domestic power politics or the vanity of rulers but once started they are shaped by the practical possibilities of inflicting damage on the enemy and giving protection to friends.

Up to the late fifteenth century European warfare at sea had a stable character within an institutional framework which was typical for the high and late medieval period (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries).Wars were usually regional and the radius of power projection was limited to Europe and the Mediterranean. Violence was used both by temporarily organised naval forces and by private groups. Permanent navies controlled by states were rare. Territorial powers had only a limited role in warfare at sea which was dominated by independent city states and mercantile interests in loosely integrated territorial states. Warfare at sea was often financed and organised by groups with a direct economic interest in protection or coercion at sea, not by states.

This was natural in a period when violence was not the monopoly of sovereigns and when sovereignty over a territory was often divided between central, regional and local power–holders. Wars were waged through social institutions rather than with organisations created by states. Many regions and cities were connected by dynastic bonds or commercial networks which crossed national boundaries. Groups with a strong interest in maritime trade normally had access to concentrated capital, the necessary hardware for war (ships), and a superior know–how in maritime matters. This often gave them a decisive advantage in conflicts over maritime lines of communication.

Medieval Europe was divided into two spheres with different types of maritime war. In the Mediterranean, oared galleys and chains of fortified coastal bases constituted a well–established system of warfare where the control of trade routes and territories close to the sea was well co–ordinated. Oared ships were the only specialised warships in Europe. In the Atlantic and Baltic sailing ships dominated in war, but they were primarily used as means of transportation for troops. Only occasionally did sailing fleets fight at sea. Sailing ship technology had not reached a stage where ships could be easily manoeuvred in combat or safely used close to a lee shore, essential requirements for a warship. Sailing ships used in warfare at sea were seldom owned by states and there were few permanent navies. Tactically, fighting at sea was carried out with infantry weapons and the crews of a fleet could easily be used in amphibious warfare. There were differences between combats at sea and on land but a general training for war might qualify a man for both types of combat. Finally, and most important, the European way of war at sea did not fundamentally differ from that of the civilisations in the Indian Ocean area and the eastern seaboard of Asia.¹

A century and half later the institutions for warfare at sea had radically changed. From the mid–seventeenth century the European naval scene was dominated by the development of large sailing battle fleets, bureaucratically organised officer corps and warfare supported by taxes and customs duties raised by territorial states. The navies had become permanent and complex organisations: they were the policy instruments of centralised states and the ships, guns and dockyards represented huge investments in capital and specialised know–how. Sailing warships with heavy guns were now the dominant weapon system at sea and oared warships had their main use as specialised forces for amphibious and coastal warfare. Amphibious warfare was still strategically important, but, to be successful, it now required careful planning and co–operation between two separate, specialised and hierarchical organisations: an army and a navy. Private use of force at sea became strictly regulated by the states. European battle fleets could increasingly be deployed overseas, a unique capacity which enabled the Europeans to control the sea lines of communication around the world. This control was the power base of the economic and military penetration which later, and for a long time, made Europe the centre of the world.²

The extension of the sea lines of communication was also a dynamic factor in the global economic development which contributed to the creation of the modern industrial world. Growing seaborne trade and European expansion around the world created a network of contacts and an international economy where the flow of merchandise became essential for the dynamic development of production and consumption. This network was created by new combinations of commercial skill and the ability to wage war and protect long–distance trade at sea. By 1650 the centre of this dynamic maritime network was situated in northwestern Europe. This region also became the centre for the new large sailing battle fleets. Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, which up to the sixteenth century had been the economically most sophisticated part of Europe and the pioneering area for overseas expansion, had rapidly declined in importance.³

The main purpose of this book is to give the reader a broad survey of the role of various types of armed conflict at sea in the transformation of Europe. Trade, state formation and the rise and decline of various centres of economic and political power are related to technical, strategical, tactical and organisational changes of warfare at sea. Naval operations, battles and seaborne trade based on armed force are therefore placed in their political and economic contexts. Conversely, the changing abilities of states to sail and fight at sea were important for the political and economic transformation of Europe and these developments are highlighted. No attempt has been made to formulate any macro–level thesis about the role and importance of sea power in this age. On the other hand, micro–level details such as the names of many admirals and the–often unknown–exact strength of the contending fleets are usually avoided. Essentially, it is a study of a number of historical meso–levels, where certain important historical questions are related to events on the maritime scene, including major naval operations and battles.

Primarily the book is based on existing studies of warfare, economy, political power and socio–economic structures. As will soon be obvious to the reader, many essential studies of warfare at sea in this period remain to be done. The sources are uneven and fragmentary but if the proper questions are asked they may give the historian much information about the growing endurance and sailing capabilities of warships, the development of gunnery, the transformation of naval tactics, the changing skills and social status of seamen and sea officers, the importance of logistics and the connections between political and economic power and warfare at sea. The purpose of this book is partly to introduce readers to questions and methods of research which may be useful for future studies about warfare at sea and its connection with state formation, economy, social structures and technology. Such studies, which have been rare for this period, will without doubt modify some conclusions in this book or make them entirely obsolete.

The changes in technology, tactics and strategy in warfare at sea were connected with a similar transformation of warfare on land and with the general transformation of the relations between state and society in Europe. Much of what has been written about war, military organisations and state formation in this period is almost exclusively based on studies about warfare on land, usually also only about parts of Europe. This study not only attempts to take the reader to sea. It also attempts to cover all parts of the world where Europeans fought at sea.

A disjointed historiography

A survey of warfare at sea must be based on studies of the subject which already exist.⁴ For the post–1650 period most navies and the wars they fought are treated in a substantial literature specially devoted to these subjects. Much of it is old; some navies and wars have been studied in greater details than others, and administration, economy and the development of naval capabilities are often inadequately treated. However, the basic facts about combats at sea are usually available and naval history from different countries has a striking thematic similarity–naval policy and administration, battles and wars, warships and dockyards, officers and men. Recent scholarship has also asked new analytical questions which have made it possible to reassess old problems and formulate some new ones.⁵

The historiography of warfare at sea from 1500 to 1650 is different. Scholarly studies centred around the critical problems in naval warfare in this period are rare. The sources are fewer and often unfamiliar to naval historians who are used to the archives of the bureaucratic navies of the post–1650 period. Historians who are familiar with the period and its sources are seldom interested in warfare at sea except major events like the battle of Lepanto and the Armada campaign. Other wars, such as those in the Baltic and the worldwide Dutch–Iberian contest during the first half of the seventeenth century are relatively anonymous. On the other hand historians have done much research on questions related to warfare at sea in this period but it is thematically centred on maritime trade and global expansion, war and foreign policy or state formation and the governance of states.⁶

Somewhat paradoxically it might be argued that the structure and change of maritime violence in our period have been obscured by the fact that they are parts of important processes which have attracted the attention of historians who often have had little special interest in the details of events at sea, naval technology and naval administration. The importance of the maritime dimension in history is often underlined by historians, but the historiography of warfare at sea from 1500 to 1650 is more disjointed than in later periods. As an historical phenomenon, it can be related to at least five major changes in this period, changes that all are well–known from textbooks on early modern history. Each of them raises at least one question of importance for a study of warfare at sea:

1 The formation and integration of territorial states

The development of states with extensive bureaucracies, permanent armies and navies and centralised political control over territories fundamentally changed the relations between state and society. Compact and integrated territorial states grew in strength and claimed an increasingly effective monopoly on the use of violence on land and at sea. At the same time the transnational power of composite empires and the church as well as the localised power of feudal and mercantile groups was reduced. Their ability to use violence independently of the centralised territorial state declined decisively.⁷

This raises the question why some of the new strong territorial rulers were interested in creating permanent navies. Did they use them for power projection, empire building and defence against invasions, or were they primarily interested in protecting and attacking trade? Did they develop an organisation with the necessary skills to handle modern naval technology in order to motivate increased taxes and a royal monopoly on violence, that is, was the navy primarily a part of their ambition to create a strong domestic power base? And why were not all territorial rulers with a coast equally interested in creating a permanent navy?

State formation may be described as the result of political interest aggregation behind increased resource extraction from the society and the creation of permanent organisations, among them navies. Which of the groups taking part in this process were especially interested in navies and in what ways were navies developed and adjusted to the national base of political interest aggregation? Were there mechanisms of governance in navies which reflected the fact that various interest groups wished to keep control over at least part of the naval efforts?⁸

2 The rise and decline of maritime political and economic empires

The early modern period saw the rise and decline of several maritime empires within Europe, that is political and commercial spheres of influence connected by sea lines of communication. Some of these, like the Spanish, Ottoman, Danish and Swedish empires, were primarily political, while others, like the Hanseatic network of trade in Northern Europe and the Dutch control of large parts of seventeenth–century Europe’s maritime trade, were economic or informal empires. The Venetian empire was a mix of both. In what way were the changing fortunes of these empires connected with early modern changes in naval technology and naval organisation? Were the nations which were successful in developing trade empires only economically successful or was their rise a result of an efficient naval and maritime policy also?

3 The expansion and restructuring of interregional seaborne trade

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, inter–European seaborne trade increased in volume and complexity. Larger volumes of more diversified types of products were traded over longer distances. This opened new areas for more sophisticated production and consumption and formed a pre–requisite for later economic development. An important change was the decline of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean area and the dynamic rise of Western and Northern Europe which became the economic centre of Europe. Were these changes connected with maritime warfare and new conditions for protection and coercion of long–distance trade? Was the efficient use of modern types of violence at sea a necessary skill for the rise of new entrepreneurs in long–distance trade?

4 The European expansion overseas

The most dramatic and well–known development in the maritime sphere is the expansion of European activities from the coastal waters around Europe to most parts of the world. Africa, Asia and America were connected with Europe and with each other through a maritime network of trade controlled by the Europeans and the European powers began to compete and wage war with each other far from Europe. In what way was this European expansion connected swith new forms of and ambitions for warfare at sea?

5 Technical transformation of warfare at sea

The development of efficient guns and the versatile sailing gun–carrying ship are normally regarded as outstanding examples of European innovative capability in this period. It has been given a prominent place in the history of technology and often also in text–books on general history. Should these developments be regarded as more or less autonomous changes which triggered off the political and economic developments or should the political and economic changes be regarded as factors of demand which moulded technology? Was technology for war at sea primarily developed within the private sphere of the societies or as an integrated part of the skills of the new centralised states?

Are these questions asked and answered in the existing literature? To a large extent the answer must be no. The division of existing historical scholarship into various subjects and traditions is inadequate for this period of change. It may be better suited to the medieval period when the institutions for warfare were more integrated with the society and to the period when permanent navies controlled by states dominated the scene. Historians who write about medieval knights and seafarers are usually aware that they are studying men who were both economic actors and warriors. The modern period with its fully established specialisation between organised navies and non–belligerent merchants may be studied by specialised historians. Specialisation is less suited to a period of transition. Political history, economic history, the history of technology and even archaeology must be interconnected and these scholarly traditions must be developed to ask questions related to the use of violence, questions which usually have been asked by military and naval historians as well as historians of international relations.

Some early modern European navies have been studied as organisations, but little has been done to integrate naval history with the development of state formation and with the role of war as a driving force in that process. War and conflicts at sea have been studied very unevenly and comparative studies of different navies and different regions are scarce. Privateers and pirates have been extensively studied, but the role of private entrepreneurs in naval warfare and the supply of naval stores have been neglected. The possible interaction between state formation, warfare at sea and the changing pattern of maritime empires has received scant attention beyond general remarks. Historical sociology has had considerable difficulties in understanding the maritime sphere and its role in European state formation. Economic history based on main–stream economic theory does not regard the use of violence for protection and coercion of competitors as an economic activity to be analysed in terms of efficiency and profitability. Consequently its role in the creation of new markets and new networks of trade has not been studied as an economic phenomenon.

European maritime activities overseas have been better covered by historians, but much remains to be done in a comparative perspective. Naval technology have been intensely studied in a few countries–primarily English sailing warships and sixteenth–century Venetian galleys–but many archives are unexplored and questions about the interaction between technical, economic and political development are often not asked. Nautical archaeology has in the last decades of the twentieth century become an important part of the history of maritime technology in this period, but co–operation between archaeologists and historians excavating archives could be improved. Early modern warfare at sea is both a challenging and exciting field for new questions, new empirical research and new interpretations. There is a wide scope for historical debate: historians with different scholarly and national backgrounds m...