Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Revolt

Comparative Insurgencies

Nick Ridley

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000168013
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Weltgeschichte

Frederik Hendrik and the Triumph of the Dutch Revolt describes a crucial period in European history. During the early seventeenth century the Dutch, led by Frederik Hendrik, were engaged in a struggle for independence from the mighty Spanish Empire. But Spain was allied with its fellow Hapsburg power, the Holy Roman Empire, and Europe was convulsed with the Thirty Years' War.

It was a turbulent time with complex diplomacy, shifting alliances, monumental battles and more European powers entering the war. Yet thanks to Frederik Hendrik's adroit diplomacy and military skill, combined with the tenacity of the Dutch people, the Dutch Republic emerged from the conflicts and gained full independence, eventually becoming a significant European power. After tracing these developments, the book continues by examining and comparing later nationalist insurgencies in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It analyses and identifies the factors making for successful insurgencies. The key factors of finances and international relations are emphasised.

This volume is informative and compelling reading for both practitioners and students studying history, international relations, terrorism and insurgency.

Part I

The Revolt

1 William of Orange Builds a Nation

The sixteenth century saw much change in the Hapsburg Netherlands. In the late mediaeval era the Hapsburg Netherlands were part of and semi-autonomous within the Duchy of Burgundy. When they were acquired by the Hapsburgs, they were a complex patchwork quilt of lordships and jurisdictions, local privileges and customs of various nobility and landowners, a hangover from mediaeval times. Since 1516, during the reign of Emperor Charles V, governmental changes in the Hapsburg Netherlands resulted in reform and more unification. Standardised laws administered by provincial high courts, a newly created state service of highly trained bureaucrats with responsibility of unified jurisdictions—all these were creating a more unified Hapsburg Netherlands.

There were three major changes which all caused major upheavals; the changes were governmental, financial and religious. Financial changes came to the fore. Charles V’s various wars, all fought on behalf of the Holy Roman Empire, had proven extremely costly, and much of the financial burden had fallen on the Netherlands’s provinces. Imperial taxation on various parts of the Netherlands increased in order to meet and service these rising debts and to finance further wars, and the taxation increases caused bitter resentment amongst the Netherlanders.

After Philip II succeeded to the throne of Spain and to the Spanish Empire,¹ and after he had finished his tour of the Netherlands, he returned to Spain. His first fiscal decisions in Madrid were that no more revenues from Spain were to be sent to the Netherlands; governance and maintenance of order there had to be paid for by revenues raised within the Netherlands. The States-General had to be convened to raise the revenues. Philip II had left the Netherlands for Spain in 1559, leaving the government of the Netherlands in the hands of a regent. The Regent, Margaret of Parma, was the sister of Philip and illegitimate daughter of the former Emperor Charles V. She was sensible, moderate and well-meaning but had little practical experience in government. Philip had also ensured that 3,000 experienced Spanish troops were based in the Netherlands. In 1561 the States-General refused to grant any more money and cancelled an agreed grant of finances, the Nine Years Aid programme, stipulating that there must be no Spanish troops in the Netherlands. Margaret, seeing the potential collapse of government through lack of funds, acquiesced. The financial situation appeared to have been settled—for now.

The religious changes became more traumatic. The bishoprics of the Netherlands provinces were reorganised, but these were also accompanied by a more repressive policy against heresy. In 1540 the inquisitorial system in the Netherlands provinces was expanded. The inquisitors were given extra resources and granted increased powers of investigation and interrogation. Its activity increased in the 1550s, and, by the 1560s, prosecutions, fines, confiscations and executions by burning had dramatically increased. These caused resentment and discontent amongst wide sections of the populations. There were open demonstrations in favour of heresy and heretics.

Margaret and her counsellors, to King Philip’s anger in Madrid, adopted a more flexible policy in dealing with heresy, but the situation remained unstable. Indeed, Calvinist groups and other Anabaptist groups gained confidence from this policy and conducted mass open-air services and organised themselves into “consistories” whose attitude and actions were militant. A meeting of Margaret’s Council advocated more compromise measures, including full toleration of non-Catholics. However, this was overtaken by militant demonstrations, riots and rapidly spreading outbreaks of church invasions and iconoclasm and destruction, centring at first in Ypres and Antwerp and spreading out, the latter as far as ‘s Hertogenbosch. Iconoclasm and riots and destruction also hit individual towns in the north, including Groningen, Amsterdam and Utrecht. In some areas the militia, or schutters, stood idly by and refused to act against the rioters. Margaret and her councillors tried further policies of compromise and negotiations, but little progress was made.

By late 1566 Philip II and his ministers in Spain were focussed on robust action. The decision was made to send the duke of Alva and Spanish troops. In the Netherlands an uprising had begun. Dutch nobles like Egmont, Hoorn and William of Orange, loyal to the government, refused to join and retired to their states.

Margaret quickly acted, adopting a robust policy. She and her commanders raised troops and levies from the many towns still loyal and declared the rebellious towns and populaces to be guilty of treason unless they surrendered. Forces were deployed and besieged these towns. By 1567, apart from some pockets of resistance and groups of rebels who laid low, the revolt had been effectively suppressed. It had been suppressed due to prompt action by Margaret’s government at Brussels and the loyalty of most of the nobles, including William of Orange, Egmont and Hoorn.

Margaret of Parma had proven herself fully capable of decisive action, and, by a combination of quick action and restraint, had managed to restore peaceful rule. But it was too late. Philip II, fanatically sincere in his Catholicism and the Catholic mission of the Spanish Empire, was incensed at the outbreaks of Calvinism and at their iconoclasm. He was angry that the Brussels government had adopted policies of compromise and leniency, albeit that later these policies had been replaced by decisive and robust action which had quelled the disturbances. From the distance of Madrid, he was convinced of the complicity of the Netherlands nobles, especially William of Orange, Egmont and Hoorn, and he was unable to differentiate between the varying loyalties amongst the nobles. Both Philip and his councillors were always conscious of the value and strategic importance of the Netherlands within the Spanish Empire and that there could be absolutely no risk of its loyalty to Spain. Alva, implacable, was on his way with 8,000 Spanish troops which had been based in Milan to make sure that any further revolt would be impossible.

Alva set out and he and his forces made for the Netherlands from Milan via the “Spanish Road”. (This was the overland route used by Spain to deploy troops and supplies to the Netherlands, from Spanish-controlled Milan, northwards up through Spanish-held or Spanish-friendly territories in or near Switzerland and the Holy Roman Empire, eventually arriving at Brussels. Enabling Spain to avoid using the more hazardous sea route, it was a strategically vital route.) They arrived in the Netherlands on 3 August 1567 and were into Brussels on 22 August. He presented his credentials to Margaret and effectively took power. Direct rule from Madrid, through Alva, was to be the way the Spanish Netherlands were governed. And ruthless repression was to be the policy.

Alva intensified enforcing Spanish rule with the anti-heresy laws. Within days of his arrival in Brussels, he set up a tribunal to investigate, identify and punish all rebels. This tribunal, the Council of the Troubles, became infamously known as the ‘Council of Blood’.

Twelve thousand individuals were brought before the tribunal, of which just over 1,000 were executed while a further 9,000 were condemned with fines or total confiscation of their goods and assets. Two of those arrested and executed were Egmont and Hoorn. The executions shocked moderate public opinion. Subsequent trials and executions caused further resentment and anger. With Egmont and Hoorn executed, that left William of Orange at large and the only prominent focal point for any further opposition to Alva.

William of Orange had not stayed low and had moved to Heidelberg, at the court of the elector Palatine, a Calvinist ruler. William of Orange issued his Justification, a document that was widely distributed and which implied William’s rejection of Catholicism, still proclaiming his loyalty to Spain and to King Philip II but condemning and rejecting the mistaken and malicious counsellors and ministers.² It was an assertion of loyalty and propaganda for the Revolt.

William’s brother Louis of Orange, impetuous and always ready for action, organised an invasion from the north through Friesland. Alva speedily marched north to meet them and engaged them at Jemmingen on the river Ems. The Spanish forces overwhelmed the defensive positions of the insurgents and soundly defeated Louis and the rebels. Jemmingen effectively quelled this Dutch Revolt.

Alva had extinguished the Revolt. His military actions had been ruthlessly successful. Alva then inaugurated reforms in that he unified and standardised the criminal law—the non-seditious, non-treasonable offences—throughout the provinces and codified financial law and practice. This last act, that of the codifying of the financial laws, did result in a certain measure of gratitude from the merchants of Antwerp and the commercial and business communities of other towns.

But finances were to re-appear to the fore. Philip II, whilst fully praising Alva’s draconian efficiency in re-establishing order, also made it quite clear, in a direct despatch for Alva’s view only, that the troops based and operating in the Netherlands could not be paid by the Spanish central treasury. Revenues to pay for Spanish forces in the Netherlands had to be raised from and within the Netherlands. Alva in 1569 confronted representatives of the States of the different provinces of the Netherlands and requested the States to authorise three new taxes. These three new taxes were the Hundredth Penny, the Twentieth Penny, and the Tenth Penny. The Twentieth Penny was a 5% tax on all property sales. The Tenth Penny was a 10% tax on all other sales, a small amount but wide-sweeping for well-off and poor alike; the Hundredth Penny was a single occasion one-off 1% tax on all capital, with the capital of an individual being assessed on a sliding scale depending on the revenue gained from that capital.

Initially there was some room for negotiation, and a temporary compromise was reached. The States consented to the Hundredth Penny, and it was collected and raised revenue for Alva’s administration of 3,628,507 florins.³ The States were concerned about the other two taxes, the Twentieth Penny and the Tenth Penny, as these were to be permanent. The States offered to Alva, instead of these two taxes, a single grant of 4 million florins to be raised over a two-year period, with the whole sum to be collected and given over by late 1571. Alva accepted this. However, by 1571 the States had settled the Hundredth, accepted the Twentieth but refused point blank regarding the Tenth Penny tax. Alva rode roughshod over the States-General, appointed his own tax collectors, and in early 1572 troops were deployed for the purposes of intimidating the population and collecting the hated Tenth Penny. Calvinism remained strong and anti-Spanish feeling was high. Groups of rebels were discreetly arming, but there appeared to be little that they could achieve.

But one unit of the remnants of the insurgent forces remained active. There was a small naval force of sailors from a variety of backgrounds—anti-Spanish patriots, Calvinists, freebooters or outright criminal pirates—all hardened and experienced seamen. William, anxious to build and maintain a war fleet, adopted these “Gueux de Mer” or “Sea Beggars” and in his capacity as the sovereign prince of Orange issued the captains with official letters of marque.

However, in March 1572 Elizabeth closed the English ports to them, specifying that her withdrawal of support specifically applied to the fleet of William of Orange.⁴ The only real safe haven of the “Gueux de Mer” was now closed.

The Sea Beggars’ fleet cruised the English Channel, looking for coastal targets to attack. They came upon the small fishing port in Zeeland, Brielle. Taking it for plunder, they were welcomed by the small population. They occupied the port, and detachments of Sea Beggars were posted. The Dutch Revolt had gained control of its first piece of territory. Five days later the population of the fishing port of Vlissingen, to the south in Zeeland, rebelled and declared that they would only accept a garrison under William’s troops. Over the next two months Enkhuizen, Dordrecht, Bommel, Buren, Delft, Leiden, Naarden, Medemblik, Gouda, Oudewater, Alkmaar, and Hoorn all placed themselves under William and the Revolt.

The rebel Council of Dordrecht invited all the towns in Holland to send representatives to a meeting in Dordrecht. Twelve of the 18 towns in Holland responded together with most of the nobility of Holland. In the historic meeting on 19 July 1572⁵ all recognised William of Orange as the King’s Stadhouder in Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht. There was to be a common budget available to pay for troops, sailors and ships currently fighting in the Prince’s name. Broad-based religious toleration was agreed upon. Later governmental structures and institutions were in agreement. The individual provinces of the States were to retain their Accounting Offices (Rekenkamer) and High Courts, but coming directly under the States-General were the Admiralty Colleges and the Finance College. A Gecomimittererde Raad, or States Committee, was to advise and support the Prince. A de facto constitution and government of the nation had come into being.

The Spanish made a vigorous counter-insurgency advance. The towns of Mons, Ost, Mechelen, Zutphen, and Naarden were taken. In December 1572 Haarlem had been reached by the advancing Spanish forces. It too fell. The capture of Haarlem combined with the previous towns taken threatened to cut into two the territory controlled by the Dutch, dividing Zeeland and parts of southern Holland on the one hand and northern Holland on the other.

In the south in the provinces that remained loyal to Spain, there had been a change of government. Alva was ordered home, much to his surprise and bewilderment, to be replaced in 1573 by Don Luis de Requesens. Reserved by nature, Requesens was a career diplomat and a former Spanish governor of Milan. This post was normally taken by one of the great noble families of Spain, amongst whom Requesens was not. However, Requesens’s ability in diplomacy persuaded Philip to appoint him, and Philip sent him with the full authority to reach some sort of settlement, provided Requesens did not yield on the heresy edicts and Spanish sovereignty.⁶

Military operations against the Revolt continued. The fledgling Dutch army led by William’s brother Louis of Orange was entirely defeated in a pitched battle by the Spanish at Mook, near Nijmegen in April 1574. Louis was amongst those killed. The main thrust of the Spanish through the centre of Holland continued. The Spanish advance appeared inexorable, unstoppable. But Leiden brought this to a halt; it held out, and it was relieved, the relief force being facilitated by opening the dykes and flooding the area. Dutch forces on barges, led and assisted by the “Gueux de Mer”, relieved Leiden.

The failure to capture Leiden resulted in an outbreak of indiscipline in the Spanish armies. In late 1576 Spanish troops in Antwerp, whose pay was years in arrears, mutinied and ran amok for 11 days, sacking the city and killing 7,000 civilians. This focussed both the north and the south on the need for common urgent action, action which would also be an expression of rejection of Spanish rule. By an agreement, the Pacification of Ghent, delegates from the southern provinces of the States-General, delegates from the States of Holland and Zeeland, and delegates from William of Orange all agreed to full co-operation in expelling Spanish forces from the Netherlands. The Pacification of Ghent also included in its terms a form of freedom of worship whereby the practice of Calvinism in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland would be fully permitted, provided Calvinists did not interfere with the practice of Catholic worship elsewhere in the Netherlands. Calvinism was to remain the religious dynamic of the Revolt.

Requesens died suddenly. His replacement was Don Juan of Austria, who arrived in the Netherlands as the new Governor-General. Don Juan signed the Perpetual Edict with the States-General in June 1577, agreeing to have Spanish troops leave the Netherlands.

Don Juan’s remit as Governor-General was as a victorious general, to represent Spain in its grandeur, and as such to pacify the rebellious subjects but also to be magnanimous and reconcile both sides. In July 1577 he seized Namur. The States-General reacted by r...