Terrorism, Risk and the Global City

Towards Urban Resilience

Jon Coaffee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317045960
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Physical Sciences
• Subtopic: Geography
• Index: Geography

First published in 2003, this account of the anti-terrorist measures of London's financial district and the changes in urban security after 9/11 has been revised to take into account developments in counter-terrorist security and management, particularly after the terrorist attack in London on July 7th 2005. It makes a valuable addition to the current debate on terrorism and the new security challenges facing Western nations. Drawing on the post-9/11 academic and policy literature on how terrorism is reshaping the contemporary city, this book explores the changing nature of the terrorist threat against global cities in terms of tactics and targeting, and the challenge of developing city-wide managerial measures and strategies. Also addressed is the way in which London is leading the way in developing best practice in counter-terrorist design and management, and how such practice is being internationalized.

PART I
TRANSFORMING CITIES IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM

Chapter 1
Introduction: Terrorism, Risk and the Global City

After the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington the fortification and militarisation of globally significant cities has proceeded at an unparalleled pace, particularly given the perceived threat of further terrorist attack (Davis 2001; Light 2002; Swanstrom 2002; Graham 2004; Sternburg and Lee 2006). It was also hypothesised that this would continue with, ‘military doctrine and strategy [becoming] more and more closely geared to the tactical and strategic protection of the political and economic key sites, zones and spaces of the global capitalist systems’ (Graham 2001, 415).

It is however important to be careful when ascribing the events of September 11 2001 as the start of a new and dramatic militarised urban counter-terror response (Coaffee et al. 2008a). Rather we can perhaps see the events of 9/11 as accentuating trends in security which in many cases have a long historical trajectory and that were already taking place. In this sense, it is important to note that military technology and strategy has always played a key role in the urbanisation process. Since the beginning of urban civilisation, defence against people or the natural elements – what today we might term resilience – has always been a factor influencing the landscape of cities, becoming an ever-present preoccupation as the ruling powers sought to defend and secure their interests through creating increased feelings of safety (Forbes 1965; Postgate 1992). As early urbanisation proceeded, so the defensive systems deployed by city authorities became increasingly sophisticated to repel the improving strategies of intruders (Morris 1994), in particular, through the construction of physical barriers such as gates, walls and ditches – the most common features of urban defence (Mumford 1961; Jordan et al. 1997). Such defensive structures, especially the city wall, also became associated with class distinction and the dual processes of inclusion and exclusion as the social élite lived within the defended citadel whilst the poor often lived in relative danger outside the city wall (Sjoberg 1960; Pile et al. 1999).

But with time even the city wall became less important as a symbol of wealth, privilege and safety, as technological advances – most notably the invention of gunpowder – made such defences less effective (Keegan 1993). Cities, however, continued to be characterised by defensive features as new walled and gated spaces developed, this time within the city boundaries, as danger was increasingly seen to originate from within, rather than outside, the urban area (Luymes 1997; Atkins et al. 1998). By the mid-nineteenth century many Western cities were characterised by secure residential estates amidst vast tracts of working class housing, which were seen as terra incognita (Newman 1980; Jackson 1992).

The Contemporary Fortress City

Contemporary Western cities are no different from their predecessors. They too attempt to use defence and try to embed resilience into the urban landscape. This situation has perhaps been most pronounced in the United States where, since the 1960s, the relationship between defensive architecture and urban design has received widespread attention given rising crime rates and the declining condition of high-rise residential dwellings (Jacobs 1961; Boal 1975; Gold 1982; Newman 1995; Gold 2007). In particular, in the early 1970s the ideas of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) (Jeffery 1971) and, more notably, Defensible Space (Newman 1972) became popular. Such approaches advocated ‘designing out crime’ through the addition or removal of physical features which could control access, increase surveillance capabilities, and hence limit the opportunities for crime to occur in certain areas (Flaschsbart 1969). Although this work was situated in an American context, during the 1970s and 1980s such territorial approaches were extensively used by local authorities in the UK, and elsewhere, in existing housing schemes and in the design of new residential areas (Coleman 1984, 1985; Dawson 1984; Goodey and Gold 1987), and adapted to defend particular sites from terrorist attack, particularly in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s (Brown 1985a; Coaffee 2003) and Israel (Soffer and Minghi 1986).

In the 1990s further increases in violent crime, racial and cultural conflict, and material inequality within Western cities served further to fragment the urban landscape creating ‘radically new and complex logics of segregation and displacement’ (McLaughlin and Muncie 1999, 117). This scenario was aided by the adoption of an array of fortification and surveillance devices in the cityscape. Residential areas, commercial centres, retail spaces, entertainment districts, and public facilities were defended as the result of the actions of urban authorities, private businesses and wealthier citizens (Christopherson 1994; Dillon 1994; Flusty 1994; Fyfe 1997; Oc and Tiesdell 1997). As Mike Davis (1995, 356) argued from an American perspective, ‘we do indeed live in “fortress cities” brutally divided into “fortified cells” of affluence and “places of terror”’. The work of Davis on what he termed ‘Fortress LA’ (Davis 1990; 1992; 1995; 1998) depicted a city in which the ‘defence of luxury has given birth to an arsenal of security systems and an obsession with the policing of social boundaries through architecture. This militarisation of city life was increasingly visible everywhere in the built environment of the 1990s’ (Davis 1995, 355).

Davis’ work also showed how both occupiers and property developers are now assessing building security at the design phase with the militarisation of commercial buildings and their borders becoming ‘strongpoints of sale’ (Flusty 1994; Dear and Flusty 1999). Other work in this field has also been important in highlighting insurance reductions that might be obtained for embedding security features into buildings (for example Graham 1995), the increasing influence of the police within the planning and building design process (Herbert 1998), the increasing role played by the private security industry (Jones and Newburn 1998), and the juxtaposition within urban landscapes of controlled and regulated spaces with areas of disadvantage and poverty (Zukin 1992).

The contemporary trend towards increased urban fortification per se was strongly related to enhanced perceptions of fear amongst urban dwellers (Glassner 2000; Furedi 2002). Ellin (1997) for example, argued that ‘form follows fear’ in the contemporary city, with people in areas perceived to be at risk increasingly constructing defensive enclaves to protect themselves – to ‘pad the bunker’, to use Davis’ (1990) term. The ability to pay for such fortifications is crucial. As Christopherson (1994, 420) asserted, ‘there is no doubt that the new fortress-like environments respond to some version of consumer preferences’. As a result, many have argued that contemporary city life has been fundamentally reorganised as certain sections of society seal themselves away from the rest of the city, creating new types of ‘privatised’ public space which do not provide the same degree of access to all members of society (Sorkin 1995; Lees 1998; Gottdiener 2000; Atkinson and Helms 2007).

Within the Western city the desire for secure urban environments is now seen in many quarters as one of the defining characteristics of so-called postmodern urbanism (Ellin 1997; Dear 1999) or at least an element of the design-led approach of new urbanism (Harvey 1997; Fainstein 2000). Oscar Newman who suggested the concept of ‘defensible space’ in the 1970s as a solution to urban crime was, in the 1990s, seen as one of the most influential thinkers on urban design issues in the United States (Harvey 1996). Indeed, Newman himself (writing in 1995) reflected that defensible space ideas could be rejuvenated and used as a new physical planning tool for urban revitalisation. In the UK there is also clear evidence that ‘Newman-esque’ ideas continue to influence urban policy, promoting neighbourhood renewal, social inclusion and a design-led urban renaissance. For example in recent years local governments have been increasingly encouraged to form strategic partnerships with the police and local residents to reduce crime in their area with importance being placed on ‘policies and guidance for designing out crime’ (Urban Task Force 1999, 127).

More recently, community safety, admittedly a broad issue, has become central to recent government attempts to create sustainable communities and secure public places, and to merge criminal justice with social policy often through a neo-liberal lens (Gilling 2001, 381). In the UK, for example, the publication of Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention (ODPM/Home Office 2004) argued that safety and security are essential to successful, sustainable communities (Raco 2007; Coaffee and O’Hare 2008). Not only should such sustainable communities be well-designed, attractive environments to live and work in, but they should also be places where freedom from crime, and from the fear of crime, improves the quality of life. The ideas contained in this policy document draw significantly on ideas of CPTED and defensible space, which have been utilised by built environment professionals and law enforcement agencies since the 1970s.

Such an emphasis on countering crime through changes in urban design and management have for many years, in certain cities, also been linked to reducing vulnerability from terrorist attack. This concern has become ever more pertinent since 9/11 with many commentators drawing attention to the potential impact of ‘new’ and evolving terrorist threats in relation to the design, functioning and marketing of cities (Marcuse 2002a; Marcuse and van Kempton 2002; Mills 2002; Warren 2002; Light 2002; Coaffee 2005). Indeed, the Safer Places document mentioned above has also proved influential in assisting those charged with countering the threat of terrorism in UK urban areas. In 2009 it will be appended with a counter-terrorism supplement which highlights possible design solutions for mitigating the impact of terrorist attack (Coaffee and O’Hare 2008).

The Evolving Terrorist Threat

As noted above, in recent years it has not just been the perceived risks of crime and intrusion that have led urban authorities, in collaboration with the police and the private security industry, to construct defensive urban landscapes. Increasingly, the potential threat of urban terrorism in certain cities has necessitated attempts to ‘design out terrorism’ (or perhaps more correctly to ‘design-in’ counter-terrorism) through the addition of advanced security design features. These are constantly updated to keep pace with the ever-changing terrorist threat (Haynes 1995; Hyett 1996; Hoffman 1998; Coaffee 2008). Previous studies have highlighted that if an urban area is vulnerable, or perceived by the community to be at risk from terrorist attack, then a reduction occurs in business confidence and public unease ensues (Compton et al. 1980; Brown 1985b; Jarman 1993). This, in the worst-case scenario, leads to business relocation from the threatened area or, the reluctance of the public to visit certain parts of the city. For example Brown (1984) showed how Belfast city centre was adversely affected by the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (Provisional IRA’s) bombing campaign of the 1970s and the early 1980s, and, how business establishments were in favour of high levels of security to ease public concerns over their safety. This study starkly illustrated, that in certain contexts, terrorism could serve to exacerbate fears for safety, which is already a key concern for users of the city, and may well lead to increased fortification of the urban landscape (Rycus 1991).

Since the 1960s, fuelled by the growth of the mass media, terrorism has been sporadic but widespread. It has been varied also, with attacks against military establishments, government buildings, VIPs, or concentrations of particular racial or cultural groups (Picard 1994; Wilkinson 1997; Sageman 2004; Rees 2006). In the early 1990s the global tendency of such targeting shifted noticeably towards economic targets, with the principal aim of causing economic disruption, social unease and inflicting direct or indirect political pressure on the ruling powers (Hillier 1994; Rogers 1996; Coaffee 2000a). Such targeting commonly began to be concentrated against business districts or critical national infrastructure such as gas and electricity plants, telecommunication infrastructure, and transport networks.

Moreover, in the early 1990s important financial centres became prime targets of attack because of their vast array of new ‘designer’ office buildings, their increasingly cosmopolitan communities, the potentially devastation effects of bombing on commercial activities, and the significant media attention and publicity that could be obtained by the terrorists. Examples of commercial targeting at this time included the bombing of the financial districts of New York and Bombay in 1993, and Tokyo, Madrid, Paris, Riyadh and Colombo in 1995. In a UK context, the main terrorist threat during the early to mid-1990s came from the Provisional IRA, with their prime target being the City of London (also known as the ‘Square Mile’ or ‘the City’) due to its symbolic value as the traditional heart of British imperialism (and State power) and its economic importance at the centre of the British and global financial system. This book in large part, is concerned with the impact and reaction to two vehicle-bomb attacks the Provisional IRA carried out in the City in April 1992 and April 1993, the indirect effect on the City of two bombings in 1996 in the London Docklands and central Manchester, and the more recent worldwide attacks on or after, 9/11, most notably in London in July 2005.

During the late 1990s the threat of such economic terrorism received a great deal of attention from international leaders. For example, in June 1996 the then US President Bill Clinton called on world leaders to work together to combat international terrorism. Similarly, the British Prime Minister of the time, John Major, cited the Provisional IRA bombings in London and Manchester in 1996 and the Tokyo subway poison gas attack in 1995 as examples of how terrorism affects security and freedom and stated that ‘it is a problem from which no one can hide and on which we must all co-operate. This is the security challenge of the 21st century.’1

In short, the threat of terrorist attack over the last fifteen years has had huge material and symbolic effects upon the contemporary urban landscape in areas perceived to be at risk. Urban terrorism has created security threats to which municipal and national governments have been forced to respond in order to alleviate the fears of their citizens and business community. As a result security measures similar to those used to ‘design out crime’ have been increasingly introduced, including physical barriers to restrict access, advanced surveillance techniques in the form of security cameras, insurance regulations and blast protection, as well as innumerable indirect measures that operate through activating individual and community responses.

However, as will be highlighted in the latter sections of this book, after 9/11 both the perception of what constituted terrorism and the subsequent counter-responses changed dramatically, as a result these acts of mega-terrorism in New York and Washington, and future fears about so-called ‘postmodern terrorism’ using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As Saifer (2001, 42-3) noted in the wake of 9/11:

The attack on New York has been by far the most hideous and devastating of that class of terrorist outrages which have which have been conceived and implemented by dedicated terrorist groups and networks on a ‘demonstration’ basis, in circumstances where otherwise vigilant security systems have foiled many other attempts. Death and destruction have been visited on cities and their citizens in the same way, by terrorist attacks on individual buildings and urban spaces, in such places as … the central area of Manchester and the financial district of the City of London. The attack on the World Trade Center expanded the scale and the ‘global reach’ of such ‘demonstrations’ by a truly appalling margin.

Moreover, and with particular reference to the UK, the threat of terrorism and the methods of attack used by terrorists have evolved rapidly. New approaches to counter terrorism are needed in response. It is not just economic and military targets that are considered under attack. Crowded public places (e.g. shopping areas, transport systems, sports and conference arenas) are considered to be at high risk, but cannot be subject to traditional security approaches such as searches and checkpoints without radically changing public experience (Coaffee et al. 2008). More recently concerns about the likelihood and impact of terrorist attack against such crowded public places using a variety of novel and experimental deployment methods – as recently seen by failed attacks in central London and a partially successful Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) at Glasgow airport in June 2007 – has heightened the sense of fear in many urban locations as future attacks against ‘soft targets’ appear more likely (Coaffee 2008).

New forms of terrorist tactics have subsequently led to new levels of urban vulnerability, and hence new forms of protective security. In o...