Power-Sharing in Conflict-Ridden Societies

Challenges for Building Peace and Democratic Stability

Nils A. Butenschøn, Øyvind Stiansen, Kåre Vollan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781472467867
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317076742
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Based on a unique comparative study of Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Fiji this book analyses the formal and informal arrangements defining the post-conflict political order in these countries and evaluates whether these systems strengthened or weakened the chances of establishing sustainable peace and lasting democracy. What can be learned from these cases? Each country has it unique history but they are faced with comparable challenges and dilemmas in building a democratic future. Which solutions seem to contribute to democratic stability and which do not? These questions are discussed in light of theoretical literature, case studies, and field interviews with the authors concluding that systems based on proportional representation offered the best prospects for including diverse and conflicting identities and building unified political systems. The book is of particular interest to students of democracy and peace-building; academics as well as decision-makers and practitioners in the field.

Chapter 1
Introduction

Most conflicts since the Second World War have been intra-state, and the predominance of internal conflict has increased since the end of the Cold War.¹ The scale of intra-state conflicts varies greatly from all-out civil wars and genocide to low-intensity conflicts with few casualties. The effects on human security and development are disastrous.

It is a well-established principle among states that intra-state conflicts are a legitimate concern for the international community to the extent that such conflicts involve massive violations of human rights or a threat to international peace and stability. In this way, intra-state conflicts become foreign policy concerns of some or all states, even if these states are not themselves party to the conflict.²

Increasingly also, civil wars are terminated by negotiated solutions rather than by victory for one side, which was the dominant settlement pattern during the Cold War.³ Negotiated outcomes may take the form of peace agreements with or without external intervention, mediation and mechanisms for including the parties to the conflict in post-conflict arrangements.⁴

The purpose of the present study is firstly, to analyse the nature of the formal and informal post-conflict arrangements that define the political order and the rules of the game in a select number of conflict-ridden countries, and secondly, to evaluate the effects of these arrangements as implemented with the view to whether they seem to strengthen or weaken the stated goals of sustainable peace and lasting democracy. In this study we focus particularly on the significance of the effects of alternative institutional designs for the future sustainability of democratic politics, not on the processes related to the peace negotiations themselves and transitional justice, however important that might be for the immediate political climate.

We look particularly into cases of conflicts between socio-cultural groups mobilised along ethnic, religious and other socio-cultural cleavages. The two reports address a classical theme in political analysis: How can designing a political system contribute to overcoming deep-seated conflicts in society? Peace agreements after civil wars should seek to overcome the mistrust and enmity between the groups, possibly overcoming the conflict-producing cleavage structure itself. The assumption is that democracy and stability are strengthened if citizens see their interests in terms of socio-economic factors across cultural divides rather than in terms of socio-cultural identities. The recommendation would therefore be to encourage types of political representation that criss-cross cultural divides in society. On the other hand, a democratic system should also reflect real opinions and interests in society as the voters themselves define them. We observe that in most post-conflict societies, the political system tends to be organised along the ethnic divides that defined the previous conflict. The dilemma then is how a democratic principle of representation that tends to reflect group-based identities can contribute to overcoming group-based conflict dynamics.

We have selected cases that we believe are helpful in shedding light on the performance of power-sharing institutions in conflict-ridden societies. The case countries have either experienced conflict in their recent history or are trying to resolve current conflicts. We have not aimed at attaining a representative sample that will allow statistical generalisations to the universe of cases. Rather, the goal has been to achieve a diverse set of cases in order to explore how power-sharing institutions work when confronted with different political contexts, types of conflicts and historical legacies. Based on interviews with central actors, in each case we are able to say something about how the actors adapt to the formal arrangements and how the negotiated settlement is experienced from within the political system. Field visits to all nine case countries except for Rwanda have been conducted. In addition to interviews, we also rely on relevant documentation, including constitutions and laws, election results and other data, in combination with existing academic work.

By combining the lessons from these cases with insights from other documented cases, and drawing on the existing theoretical and empirical literature, we hope to be able to give some advice to policy-makers on what works and what does not work when designing post-conflict political institutions. A summary of findings and recommendations is included in each chapter. The concluding chapter seeks to draw more general lessons from the analysis of the individual cases without pretending that these lessons and recommendations are valid for all conflict-ridden societies.

The selected cases are:

Burundi is included because of the negotiated settlement between the pre-conflict Tutsi elites and Hutu rebel groups. The 2005 Constitution introduced a number of power-sharing institutions, which with the exception of devolution of powers include all the elements investigated in this report. Burundi also represents a case where the former rebel movement has become the dominant political party after conflict and where governance has clear authoritarian traits.

Rwanda also has a long history of conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. Unlike Burundi, post-conflict Rwanda has attempted to supress ethnic identities. While Rwanda has a List PR (proportional representation) system, ethnic parties have been banned and there are no provisions for inter-ethnic power-sharing. Although governance in Rwanda has been authoritarian, this makes the comparison with Burundi very useful. It should be noted that this case is a desk study as opposed to the other cases that include a study tour.

In Ethiopia, federalism was introduced after the rebel victory in 1991 as a solution to the country’s long history of ethnic conflict. By granting all of the more than 70 different ethnic groups the formal right to self-determination, the Ethiopian experience represents a break with the strategy of suppressing ethnic diversity in African states. As in Burundi, post-conflict politics has been dominated by a former rebel movement that has exhibited authoritarian traits.

Lebanon is a classic case of power-sharing system that has survived since independence in spite of local and regional conditions tensions, conflicts and wars that have threatened to tear the country apart many times. Intricate patterns of alliances both along and across ethnic lines, and informal negotiations often including external parties and powers have contributed to keeping the country together. Political processes in Lebanon therefore are illustrative of many of the questions discussed in this study. It is also attractive because the political system is relatively open to observers and major players are accessible to analysts.

Bosnia–Herzegovina is a prominent example of a peace agreement with all but the grand coalition power-sharing elements included, partly in an extreme form. When designing the power-balance between the combatting ethnic groups, the costs in terms of a weak central state and extensive veto powers that have hampered the functioning of the country since the war, were underestimated. The exclusive rights given to the “constituent peoples” also introduced unreasonable limitations to the rights of individuals not belonging to any of the three constituent peoples to elect and be elected. The country offers a good case for studying the long-term effects of the power-sharing in terms of lasting peace, a working national state and a functioning democracy with protection of human rights.

Nepal’s ten years of civil war ended with a peace agreement in 2006, containing all elements of power-sharing. A new constitution is about to be drafted and in particular federalism and broad representation of groups are likely to be brought forward into the constitution. With its complexity in terms of ethnic groups and castes Nepal offers fundamental challenges to the power-sharing concepts. Kåre Vollan, one of the authors of this report, has served several years in Nepal as advisor to Nepalese authorities on questions of elections and constitutional reform. The case study of Nepal therefore contains a more thorough discussion of the internal political processes in this country than in the other case countries.

Myanmar is chosen as a case of early transition from authoritarian rule towards democracy combined with attempts to negotiate solutions to the country’s long-lasting ethnic insurgencies. Reform of the country’s political institution is central to both these processes.

The Philippines is included because of the long-lasting Maoist insurgency. Attempts at negotiations to resolve the situation have been ongoing since the early 1990s. The Philippines has a majoritarian political system dominated by political dynasties. This makes it interesting to study the impact of the existing political system and whether the parties see institutional reforms as something that can contribute to a settlement.

Fiji has had a fragile state structure since independence. The two main groups, the indigenous Fijians and the Indians who immigrated to Fiji during the British rule, have very different interests and compete on the utilisation of land. The introduction of the alternative vote (AV) system in the late 1990s was meant to work in a conciliatory way but proved not to work as intended and the provisions for grand coalitions turned into tokenism. In particular the system of representation, the veto powers on land rights and the composition of government are of interest to this study.

For each of the cases we describe the background and nature of the conflict, and where relevant the negotiation process and constitutional history. We then present the different power-sharing elements and discuss how they relate to building peace and democracy. Where relevant, we also discuss the expected benefits of alternative arrangements. In the conclusion of each case, we present a summary table which for each power-sharing element, outlines the relevant preconditions, the existing system, the costs or risks of the present system and possible solutions.

Finally, a few words on the terminology used in this report. Groups of people in conflict need a common label. “Ethnicity” designates groups that have an identity across age, gender and socio-economic classes, as well as political opinions. Ethnic groups share beliefs of common ancestry, customs and other cultural features, which sometimes include language and religion.

The usage of “ethnic group” is analogous to the term “nation” used by Anderson – defined as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.⁵ As we use the term, ethnicity can be contrasted with social stratification, “which divides and unifies people along a series of horizontal axes on the basis of socioeconomic factors, ethnic identities divide and unify people along a series of vertical axes”.⁶ While some authors prefer the term “nationality”, we deem ethnicity to be a less controversial term.

We reserve the term “nation” or “nationality” for the relationship between an individual and her state. This is in line with the European Convention on Nationality, which states in Article 2 that “[f]or the purpose of this Convention: a ‘nationality’ means the legal bond between a person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin”. The term “nationalism” is used to refer to the ideology of an ethnic group’s ambition of statehood or connection to a state already in existence.

Other traditions, for example in political philosophy, would have a definition of a group defining themselves with a common identity, not much different from the definitions of ethnicity quoted above. Wayne Norman⁷ is one of those. He uses the term to represent a group with a common identity and he would see some expression of nationalism as being positive or neutral, similar to patriotism.

In some of our empirical cases the terms are used slightly differently. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the terms “nations” and “nationalities” are common for designating the three constituent ethnic groups. We therefore use these terms when discussing the particular case. This is done to avoid confusion, and we do not see the concept of “nations” in this and other cases as different from our more general term “ethnicity”.

1 Themnér and Wallensteen 2013.

2 The strongest expression of this principle is the United Nations’ General Assembly resolution, adopted by consensus, on the Responsibility to Protect (A/RES/63/308, 14 September 2009), also known as “R2P”. The possibilities of intervention are restricted by the ban on the use of force, UN Charter: Preamble, Article 2.4 and Chapters 6 and 7.

3 Kreutz 2010: 246.

4 According to Christine Bell (2008), it has become possible to talk about the development of a Lex Pacificatoria in international law which regulates the conclusion, content and implementation of peace agreements.

5 Anderson 1991: 49.

6 Peoples and Baily 2008: 383.

7 Norman 2006.

Chapter 2
Democratic Peace and Institutional Design. Some Theoretical Perspectives

Democracy is all about how “the will of the people” is aggregated from the individual citizen upwards in the political system to the levels of decision-making in the legislative and executive branches of government. Securing legitimate interests and basic rights of minorities in well-established stable democracies is challenging enough as long as we also want efficiency in decision-making and governance. In deeply divided societies emerging from violent conflict between groups (for example, the kind of cases discussed in this study), the challenges are all the more severe because basic conditions for democratic stability cannot be taken for granted. This relates especially to mutual trust between contending groups and their willingness to respect the rules of the game also when they lose.

Within the tradition of democratic theory, models of power-sharing can be considered as modifications of the classical liberal principle of “one person one vote”. For a variety of reasons, this principle of organising a political order – when strictly applied in national elections – does not always produce institutional outcomes that give every group of citizens adequate protection of their core rights and interests or a fair say in the running of their country. This is because political institutions composed on the basis of aggregate individual votes do not always meet the requirements for reconciling or managing conflicts in societies that are collective in natu...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Democratic Peace and Institutional Design. Some Theoretical Perspectives
• 3 Burundi
• 4 Rwanda
• 5 Ethiopia
• 6 Lebanon
• 7 Bosnia and Herzegovina
• 8 Nepal
• 9 Myanmar (Burma)
• 10 The Philippines
• 11 Fiji
• 12 Power-Sharing – Conclusions and Recommendations
• References
• Index