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1 The Chinese Moon Festival Gala 2009–2014
Political marketing using imagery and sensory laden messages
Introduction
Nationalism has been a prominent feature of modern Chinese politics and society, although its form has altered over the past decade or so as the CCP has appropriated China’s cultural nationalism through its broad use of propaganda. This move symbolizes the thoughtful manipulation that state nationalism is wielding on cultural signs and perceptions in China. Through imagery and sensitively laden political marketing that favours Party policy and rule, this form of nationalism indicates a more nuanced and ingenious mode and use of propaganda than what we have previously encountered. On 19 August 2013, the Chinese president Xi Jinping made an important speech at a national conference on propaganda where he emphasized that innovation in ideas, devices and methods are the most significant points in the development and progress of the CCP’s propaganda work (Xi Jinping: xionghuaidaju bawodashi zhaoyandashi nuli ba xuanchuan sixianggongzuo zuodegenghao 2013). Using the China Central Television (CCTV) Moon Festival / Mid-Autumn Festival Gala (zhongqiuwanhui) as a case study, this chapter scrutinises Party-state appropriations of cultural nationalism. The gala is a rich pool of moon-inspired traditional Chinese cultural attractions, and the shrewd steering of these culturally bound images and iconography shows a new propaganda tactic that mixes nostalgia, romance and abstract philosophical ideas into a patriotic and nationalist symbol. These customary cultural signifiers, illusions and fantasies attend to the Party’s political objective of bolstering its legitimacy by shaping a culturally bound national identity.
Nationalism as a lifeblood of the Party-state
In the political and social climate of modern China, nationalism and nationalist discourse have gradually taken the upper hand among other ideas or social movements, such as communism, revolution and modernization (Townsend 1988: 205). In particular, in the process of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) revolutionary march towards power on the mainland region, nationalism played a more important role than Marxism in terms of contributing to the popular anti-imperialist revolution and creation of legitimacy for the communist regime (Gries 2004: 73; Zhao 2004: 209). When China was under siege by Western countries at the end of the imperial era, nationalism, gained the greatest appeal among the Chinese compatriots, especially with young college students. They were very patriotic and enthusiastic about the possibility for change in China, and around this time there was temporary cooperation between the CCP and its political adversary – the Nationalist Party. Nationalist sentiment among the Chinese people, evoked by the invasion from the West and Japan, helped the CCP to avoid what may have been a catastrophic fate as it was encircled and being suppressed by the Nationalist Party.
Up until it took over power of the mainland region, the CCP maintained its focus on nationalism and changed it into a patriotic-only discourse that overwhelmed other national and collective campaigns and ideologies. This state-steered nationalism discourse, along with its political focus, is still active in the political, social and cultural narratives and activities of present-day China. Moreover, acting as the official rendition of patriotism, nationalism is used by the CCP government to mobilize and manoeuvre the Chinese people in order to maintain the stability of its rule (Zheng 1999; Chang 2001; Guo 2004; Zhao 2004; Zhao 2005; Brady 2008). The Chinese government officially acknowledges nationalist sentiment as aiguo, which translates as “ ‘loving the state,’ however, Chinese nation and the Communist state are forever ‘indistinguishable’ ” (Zhao 2005: 78). In contemporary China, state nationalism is simply a contracted patriotism that demands adherence and loyalty to the Communist Party–state, which is assumed to represent the will of all the Chinese people and is similar to the Three Represents1 that signify the superiority and omnipotence of the CCP.
Unfortunately, since the adoption of the Opening Up reforms and the loss of appeal of Marxism and Maoism among the Chinese people, a depoliticization process has occurred within the socio-cultural domain. Consequently, people’s attention has gradually become more focused on the economy and their own affluence and materialism. Simultaneously, a mounting political and social crisis, directly or indirectly caused by the economic makeover, broke out during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and the armed suppression of the peaceful demonstration led to a deterioration of reputation and legitimacy of the CCP government with the Chinese people.
In order to repair and rebuild its damaged image and authority during the post-1989 period, propaganda, in its diverse guises, became the very lifeblood (shengmingxian) of the Party-state, as the vital measure for ensuring the CCP’s ongoing validity and hold on power (Propaganda Cadre Training Reference Materials: 131; cited in Brady 2008: 1). In particular, since Xi Jinping took over power in 2013, “the struggle for public opinion” (yulundouzheng) has been re-called by the CCP to highlight the importance of propaganda and positive publicity of Party policies and ideology (Xi Jinping xuanchuan sixianglingyu “yulundouzheng” xintifa yinguanzhu 2013). This more serious and politically coded phrase has replaced “public opinion guidance” and points to the CCP’s determination to strengthen its power through propaganda. Different from Mao-era propaganda, the current mass education enlisted by the CCP has been revitalized and is capable of managing the content of information that is disseminated to the public (Shambaugh 2007: 27). A feature of propaganda in the post-1989 period is that the CCP has started to further strengthen patriotic admonition and nationalist appeal (Zhao 2004: 218–247; Chang 2001: 6). Nationalism has become a “political apparatus” (Guo 2004: 24) and “a new ideology” (Zheng 1999: 2) and thus underscored all attempts to reclaim the rightfulness of, and to confirm the governing of, the CCP. The use of nationalism is a versatile cure to numerous internal and external dilemmas and challenges encountered by the CCP government. For instance, to redirect concern from domestic troubles, and to feign power in the diplomatic world (Zhao 2005: 76), it has been useful in refurbishing the “state ideology of socialism” and aiding China’s progression into “a socialist nationalist phase” (Xu 2001: 126).
This novel stage of the state nationalistic discourse – as fostered by the CCP government, along with its advance into the new millennium – is correlated with components of cultural nationalism and features a culturally bound national entity. Guo (2004: 15) argues that Chinese nationalism normally refers to official or state nationalism, or unofficial nationalism (which largely reflected in areas of cultural and popular nationalism), or a combination of both. As a pioneer in analysing China’s cultural nationalism discourse, Guo (2004: 2) maps out the distinguishing characteristics of the cultural nationalists group in contemporary China. According to Guo’s findings, for cultural nationalists, being Chinese predominantly engages sharing in conventional cultural practices and recognition of “Chinese” principles and moral standards; it does not ineluctably require love of the Party or devotion to its “four cardinal principles.” Therefore, culture, rather than allegiance to the Party-state, has become the most fundamental yardstick for outlining the national community.
Different from cultural nationalism, state nationalism defines the nation to be first of all a political-territorial entity, where Party rule and a dominant centralized state are of utmost sig...
