Turkey in the 21st Century

Quest for a New Foreign Policy

Özden Zeynep Oktav, Özden Zeynep Oktav

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317005971
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Zwischenstaatliche Organisationen

This unique book investigates the complex transformation of Turkey's foreign policy, focusing on changing threat perceptions and the reformulation of its Western identity. This transformation cannot be explained solely in terms of strategic choices or agency driven policies but encompasses power shifts and systemic transformations. Is Turkey shifting its axis? Will this affect its traditional Western-oriented foreign policy? The book begins by discussing the relationship between security and globalization, using examples of Turkey's regional positioning. It then focuses on to what extent the 'traditional' discourse on security in Turkish politics, which prevailed during the Cold War era and beyond, has undergone a change in the new era. This timely book is a much needed account of how pragmatism rather than ideology is the main determinant in Turkey's current foreign policy and should be read by all looking for a fresh and stimulating take on Turkey's response to globalization and the internationalization of security in the 21st Century.

1 A Framework for Understanding the Changing Turkish Foreign Policy of the 2000s

Özlem Tür and Ahmet K. Han

DOI: 10.4324/9781315549552-2

In an article written in 2003, the contours of Turkish foreign policy were summarized as traditionally being shaped by five factors: historical experiences, geopolitical and geostrategic location which provide a unique position for the country, a number of vulnerabilities, the political ideology of the governing elite (Kemalism) and the demands of systemic, regional and domestic changes on the country’s external relations at any time (see Aydın 2003, 307–8). From the late 1990s onwards, there have been change and re-thinking on almost all of these factors. From then on, although historical experiences did not change, they were often re-visited and re-interpreted, given new meanings and at times romanticized. The geo-strategic importance of the country was re-emphasized in such a way that it was put forward as a factor bringing new opportunities, “responsibilities” and roles. This was different from the Cold War understanding of Turkey’s geostrategic importance where a more defensive, status quo stance was legitimized rather than activism.

Turkish foreign policy remained security-oriented until the late 1990s. The systemic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War did not translate simultaneously into a decrease of threat perceptions in Turkey. With the demise of the Soviet Union Turkey’s perception of threat from the north was reduced, only to be replaced with the threat from the south, especially from Syria, Iran and Iraq. According to some scholars, during the 1990s, Turkey was facing “2½ Wars” (see Elekdağ 1996 ). However, the end of the 1990s witnessed a remarkable shift concerning the threat perceptions and the vulnerabilities that led some scholars to underline a desecuritization of Turkish foreign policy. Another factor is that the impact of the political ideology of the ruling elite (Kemalism) has declined as the central role of the traditional military-bureaucratic elite in politics and foreign policy-making was increasingly sidelined by a new ruling government and party (the Justice and Development Party – the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AKP). This situation was inevitably coupled with a deep division in the country as to foreign policy issues on what and where Turkey’s interests lay as well as the tools to realize them. This discussion brings forth the arguments about worldviews and the security culture. As the foreign policy-making elite began to change, so did elements of the dominant worldview and the security culture. This chapter will try to demonstrate this change and, building on the argument that one society can have more than one security culture, it will show how differing cultures and worldviews cohabit.

The chapter will start with an analysis of traditional foreign policy and will then look at the post-Cold War period. The changes at the systemic, regional and domestic levels will be analyzed as the key factors to understand and unlock the dynamics of the change since the end of the 1990s.

Traditional Turkish Foreign Policy

It has been widely argued that Turkish foreign policy since the early days of the Republic has shown elements of continuity which can be considered as its basic principles. One element is an unquestioned Western orientation. The Kemalist military-bureaucratic elite in Turkey, building on the late Ottoman Empire’s efforts of modernization, strove to make Turkey “a European state” – part of the Western system of states that was defined as “contemporary civilization.” As Karaosmanoğlu argues, in the eyes of Turkey’s founders, “there was only one civilization, the Western one, and they would join it in spite of the West” (see Karaosmanoğlu 2000, 208). In the following decades there were alternative domestic visions to Westernization. However, they remained rather marginal and less popular and Westernization continued to be the dominant discourse. The Cold War helped to locate Turkey as a Western state and ally due to its geostrategic position and Turkey’s Western-ness was therefore not questioned within the Cold War context. As Kirişçi argues, “During the Cold War Turkey has benefited from a rent due to her geostrategic position and Turkish foreign policy has showed outstanding success in keeping this rent as high as is possible” (see Kirişçi 2009a, 3).

A second element is the role of history. The transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic – especially the collapse of the Empire – plus wartime developments and the War of Independence left their mark on the foreign policy of Turkey. As argued elsewhere, “the sometimes over-zealous attitude towards issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity and a lingering suspicion of its Western allies despite its goal of becoming a member of their club, for instance, could have been fed by the memory of that past” (see Altunışık and Tür 2005, 91). It was interesting to see that, despite the commitment to become a part of the West, the founders “underlined the lingering European prejudice against Turkey and the unchanged Western objective of disintegrating Turkey” (see Karaosmanoğlu 2000, 208). In particular, the Sèvres Treaty and the idea that Turkey is a constant interest in great power rivalry, as well as the great powers having a “project” of dividing Turkish territory, are all important in this context, collectively referred to as the Sèvres Syndrome and still relevant today (see Altunışık and Tür 2005, and also Çandar 2004 ).

A third element can be described as a preoccupation with security and a security-oriented foreign policy. The threat perception of being surrounded by enemies – a state under continuous security risk – made Turkey security-oriented in its foreign policy. The effects of the bipolar international system, pitched Turkey, as a member of the Western bloc, against some of her neighbors, while historical and political differences contributed to create a hostile security environment with others. Such an emphasis on security dictated by a combination of history and geopolitics as well as the Cold War environment led to a predominantly realist understanding of the international system. In a realist, self-help international system, the bond between foreign policy and security becomes almost inseparable. Turkish foreign policy during the twentieth century was a good example of the inseparability of foreign and security policies. When Turkish decision-makers talked about foreign policy they were in effect talking about security policy and vice versa.

Karaosmanoğlu sees the cultural environment as central in the formulation of these three elements. According to Karaosmanoğlu, “Turkey’s cultural environment has influenced its quest for security through alliances, its circumspect foreign policy and the persistent efforts of the successive governments to embrace the West.” He argues that the impact of the country’s security culture¹ in the formulation of its foreign and security policy has often been “overlooked” in Turkey while the “role of the military” has been “overemphasized” and calls for more attention for the cultural aspect (see Karaosmanoğlu 2000, 199). Turkey’s security culture has traditionally been based on realpolitik, a quest for Westernization and the role of the military-bureaucratic elite in security and foreign policy-making. As mentioned above it is hard to draw a clear line between Turkish foreign and security policy, especially until the late 1990s. Therefore the security culture is reflected almost entirely in the foreign policy culture and behavior during this period. However, as Gray points out, national security culture is not static and it “can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded and culturally translated” (see Gray 1999, 52; Karaosmanoğlu 2000, 200). Also according to Gray, “A particular community may well contain more than one strategic culture” (see Gray 1999, 51). In line with this point, from the late 1990s onwards, Turkish foreign/security culture has gone through a change; affected by an alternative culture of security, shaped by a worldview different from the Kemalist/Republicanist one. This alternative strain would cohabit with the old elements. Accordingly today they still continue to cohabit, affecting the debate on foreign policy within Turkey.

¹ Here we treat the concepts of “strategic culture” and “security culture” interchangeably, following Karaosmanoğlu. Also we adopt Gray’s approach by not necessarily distinguishing between strategic/security culture and behavior (see Gray 1999, 49–50, 62).

The argument on security culture goes hand in hand with the worldview of the ruling elites. The interpretation of the ruling elite constitutes a worldview, a set of assumptions of “images of other actors” as well as “causal beliefs about how they interact with one another, and prescriptions about appropriate courses of action” (see Mowle 2003, 562). Traditionally, the ruling elites shared a worldview that saw Turkey’s identity as part of the West, and Turkey as “a secular state engaged in a project of westernization” (see Altunışık 2009, 173; Aydın 1999, 160). This worldview induced a particular foreign policy/security culture that was in essence “moderate and sober” as well as “realist” (see Ş. Kut 1998, 58), having its feet firmly based on realpolitik (see Barlas and Güvenç 2010, 200). The predominant aspect of this culture was its emphasis on preserving the status quo – the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country – by utilizing policy tools of “equidistance” (see Altunışık 2009, 173) and balance of power.

Wight argues for the implementation of the concept of “a tradition” in explaining different aspects of international relations and he talks about three ideal types of traditions: the Machiavellian or realist approach; the Grotian or rationalist approach; and the Kantian or revolutionist approach. Robins points out the applicability of Martin Wight’s analysis of a Western international relations landscape to non-Western contexts, including Turkey. Following up on that point and related to the above arguments, the realm of Turkish foreign policy has been dominated by the Machiavellian or realist approach (see Robins 2007, 290). In this context pursuit of power and the use of threat to use force as tools of foreign policy becomes dominant.

Another observable characteristic of traditional Turkish foreign policy was the limited outlook of the foreign policy-making elite. The foreign ministry and the military-bureaucratic elite were in charge of formulating and executing foreign policy decisions, and foreign policy was one sphere of politics where consensus among the traditional decision-making elites was strongest, to the extent that foreign policy was often regarded as “state policy.” This consensus was shared by civilian and military circles alike, as well as the mainstream political parties. This situation has started to change from the 1980s onwards, especially during the 1990s, as will be argued below.

The Post-Cold War Period, 1990–1998

The changes at the international level which followed the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the bipolar international system led to a shaking up of the aforementioned foundations of Turkish foreign policy. Although the end of the Cold War and ensuing systemic change brought about a change in Turkey’s surrounding regions, the impact of this change on Turkish foreign policy remained rather limited. The demise of the Soviet Union, unlike the rather successful transitions in Central and Eastern Europe to Western liberal systems, brought conflicts and wars to Turkey’s surrounding regions. The conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus and the failed attempt to bring peace to the Middle East led to the continuation of the old order during the 1990s in the region at large. As such Turkey has been unable to benefit from the so-called “peace dividend” that her European partners in NATO in particular were able to exploit in the Cold War’s immediate aftermath (see Han 2010, 90).

The securitization of Turkish foreign policy during the 1990s has delayed any real change in Turkey in the aftermath of the Cold War. The threat from the north, the Soviet Union, disappeared only to be replaced by an increasing threat from the south – Syria, Iraq and Iran. In 1992 the major blueprint of Turkish security strategy – the National Security Policy Document – was revised, placing Kurdish separatism at the top of the list of threats confronting Turkey, and confirming Syria, Iraq, and Iran (with their support of the PKK) as Turkey’s main sources of threat (see Mufti 2002 ). Problems with Greece also continued during this period. Hence the country had to devise and conduct a “2½ War Strategy” that forced it “to effect its defence planning on ‘two-and-a half campaigns,’ that is, conducting two full-scale operations simultaneously along the Aegean and southern fronts while at the same time being prepared for a ‘half war’ that might be instigated from within the country” (see Elekdağ 1996 ). As the PKK issue and cross-border attacks intensified from Turkey’s southern neighbors, the security orientation in foreign policy and the common use of Hobbesian methods continued. Thus, Turkey emerged as a “coercive regional power” (see Öniş 2003 ). This was against the spirit of the time, considering the worldwide developments with calls for democratization, liberalization and transition to Kantian “tradition.” However, Turkey, partly due to the continuation of its security concerns, was unable to adapt to this change.

During the 1990s, Turkish foreign/security policy came under the increasing influence of the military, especially through the National Security Council (MGK or Milli Güvenlik Kurulu), underlining the protracted security concerns (see Özcan 1998 ). The military was mainly driven by the traditional elements of the security culture, which was about the sanctity of the country’s territorial integrity and maintaining the status quo. The realist approach in foreign policy has been expressed in terms of “defensive non-involvement realpolitik” (see Karaosmanoğlu 2000, 216). However, as the decade unfolded, Turkish foreign policy increasingly assumed a fairly offensive realpolitik character. Nevertheless, even though this offensive turn involved the threat and use of coercive means, including force, it was neither aggressive nor expansionist as it built on the main element of the traditional security culture – maintaining the status quo.²

² Within this context it can be argued that Turkish foreign policy has a pattern of such a transformation from defensive to offensive posture that is not aggressive per se and that is triggered mainly by concerns regarding the status quo and/or territorial integrity. Indeed such a pattern is observable in Turkey’s behavior on Cyprus in 1964 and 1974, on the PKK–Syria conundrum in 1993 and 1998, and on Iraq in 1990 and 1992 onwards. In all of those cases Turkey transformed its behavior from...