War, Violence and Social Justice

Theories for Social Work

Masoud Kamali

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317000334
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Social Work
• Index: Social Sciences

This book analyses the role of war and violence (in both its physical and symbolic forms) for social work in a time of neoliberal globalisation from a social justice perspective. It argues that the consequences of wars, in both their old and new forms, and the exercise of symbolic violence for the practices of social work at national and global levels have been ignored. This work explores the relationship between recent neoliberal and global transformations and their consequences for intensifying 'new wars' and conflicts in non-Western countries on the one hand, and the increasing symbolic violence against marginalised people with immigrant and non-Western background in many Western countries, on the other. The analytical approach of the book, based on the theories of multiple modernities and symbolic violence, is unique since no other work has applied such theoretical perspectives for analysing inequalities in relation to the condition of lives of non-Western people living in Western and non-Western countries. This is a necessary contribution for social work education and research since the discipline needs new theoretical perspectives to be able to meet the new challenges raised by recent global transformations and neoliberal globalisation.

Chapter 1
Integration, Social Justice and Social Work

Social Integration and Social Justice

The concept of ‘social justice’ has been, and continues to be, used variably, its definition highly dependent on the different social contexts, political ideologies and theoretical perspectives of the actors or groups involved (Miller, 1976). Concepts such as ‘just man’, ‘just action’, ‘just state of affairs’ are used frequently in our daily lives. Many people legitimise their daily actions as ‘just’ and try to justify their behaviours in accordance with the requirements of the social context in which they are acting. Adjustment to the norms and values of a given social context often justifies many social actions. However, many injustices are reproduced by individuals and institutional normative actions (Kamali, 2008).

Justice is typically placed, by some writers, into one of two categories, aggregative and distributive (e.g. Barry, 1965). The aggregative principle of justice refers to the total amount of ‘good’ enjoyed by a group as a whole, while the distributive principle refers to the share of that good between different members of the group. However, there is no consensus about what, for instance, the distributive principle of justice means at the level of detail. It may either simply state how the good is to be divided (i.e. based on an equal division of goods), or be dependent on individual or other external properties – such as an individual’s own endeavours or political institutions and the influence of political ideologies. Notwithstanding this distinction between aggregative and distributive justice, however, we can say that principles of justice always implicate distributive principles; as Miller (1976: 20) puts it:

Indeed, the most valuable general definition of justice is that which brings out its distributive character most plainly: justice is suum cuique, to each his due. The just state of affairs is that in which each individual has exactly those benefits and burdens which are due to him by virtue of his personal characteristics and circumstances.

Although Miller’s definition leaves open many questions about ‘individual characteristics and circumstances’, it stresses the distributive principle of justice in which both the responsibility of social institutions and the individuals are included.

Charity and justice as requirements of altruism are concepts that, long before the establishment of the great religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, were a part of everyday lives, norms and values, as well as legal frameworks, of many communities. As Day (2006: 70) puts it: ‘The word for charity means righteousness or justice, and so giving charity meant being right or righteous.’ For instance, the major monotheistic ancient religion, namely Zoroastrianism, contains many codes and recommendations for charity towards members of the community; one of its major laws and recommendations – namely, ‘righteous action’ – encourages charity.¹ However, the concept and practices of charity and religious engagements in the organisation of society, and in working with its marginalised groups, were not rooted in a deeper understanding of the mechanisms behind the reproduction of social problems, poverty and marginalisation. Care-taking practices were merely religiously and morally guided actions – even while such voluntary social work was necessary in preserving social bonds in pre-modern societies.

Industrialisation, modernisation and the transformation of societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, changes which were accompanied by the disintegration and elimination of many traditional bonds, made necessary the generation of new theoretical perspectives and organisational models for understanding society. The social sciences became engaged at a very early stage in questions of social integration. Whereas conflict-oriented theoreticians, such as Marx, argued that the very basis of all societies (both modern and pre-modern) is conflict between socioeconomic classes, others, such as Durkheim, believed that the very existence of human societies depends on cooperation and solidarity between the different individuals and groups in a society; from this latter, functionalistic perspective, modern changes were discussed in the framework of continuity, not disruption. The common belief, however, was that human societies developed from simple and primitive communities to more complex societies.

In accordance with an evolutionistic understanding of human history, many theoreticians, both conflict-oriented and functionalistic, considered modern changes as constituting moves in the ‘right direction’, towards a better society for all. Although modernisation created modern problems, it also created suitable means for solving them (Eisenstad, 1976, 1978). For example, Durkheim prioritises the division of labour in society, which is created by the capitalist system wherein individuals and groups are divided into different but – for each other – necessary working groups, as a modern change creating the very basis of modern solidary or social bonds (Durkheim, 1984).

Many scholars of modernisation theories, as Coser (1956) mentions, have discussed not only changes in the productive system but also in the general character of social living. Concerns about the place of the individual in society have been interwoven with preliminary concerns about how a coherent society is possible. Adam Smith was one of the first social scientists who discussed the complexity of the conditions of the industrial mode of production, and the possibility for individuals to live in an over-specialised society without dependency on state power. In his book, The Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) discusses the advantages that the new mode of industrial production brings about; developed within a capitalist framework, the aim was to achieve high productivity and profitability. Through increasing productivity and market processes, standards of living would be raised to a level unimaginable for the pre-industrial world. He argued that, although the new division of labour creates over-specialised workers and prevents the development of a sense of citizenship and a devotion to commonwealth, increased production would convince everybody of the correctness of the system. Smith believed in the industrial capitalist system as an integrative system, in which individuals are involved in a complex of productive relationships which make them dependent on each other. In other words, the modern capitalist system creates an integrated society in which everybody will create a relatively high standard of living without any engagement with compulsory organs, such as the national state. Thus, welfare would be an outcome of the ‘middle economic man’s’ actions in the market.

However, this optimism concerning the self-regulatory capitalistic system or market economy was not shared by many other scholars at a time when the disintegration of traditional bonds, alongside increasing displacement of many social groups, poverty and social conflicts, was also the result of modern change. Rapid socioeconomic differentiation, increasing inequality between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have-nots’, and escalating political struggles resulted in the appearance of dissenting and critical voices throughout the industrialised world. Two of the most important critical voices that came to play a decisive role in opposition to the capitalist system were those of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. In contrast to Smith, they argued that the capitalist mode of production does not generate happiness and wealth for everybody but creates an army of alienated poor; society becomes organised around two major poles: the rich and the poor (Marx and Engels, 1983). According to the theories of Marx and Engels, no reform could resolve the major problem of the capitalist system, in which one group, the capitalists, exploits the other, the workers. For Marx and Engels, the integration of capitalist societies is based on an inherent conflict between capitalists’ ownership of the means of production and workers having only their own labour power to sell. The ownership of the means of production enables the first class to exploit the second one. Society under capitalism, therefore, is based on an unequal and unjust interdependency between the two classes, and the only way to solve the problems of the capitalist mode of production is through radical and revolutionary change, which would create a socialist society (Marx and Engels, 1983).

According to Marx, the organisation of a new integrated society – in which everybody will, of their own free choice, work enough to produce the commodities and services necessary for each society’s maintenance, and also enjoy the fruits of their works – is possible only in a society where the compulsory organs of the nation state become unnecessary. Capitalists need the state to support and protect their compulsory organisation of production; therefore, the working class must overthrow the capitalist system and establish a new mode of production that is not based on the compulsory organisation of labour, but rather on the free ‘associations of free people’ (Marx and Engels, 1983). From this perspective, all pre-socialist societies are based on unjust and compulsory organised integration, which actually fosters disintegration and conflicts. A well-developed and real social justice only becomes possible in a completely different society, namely the communist society, in which social conflicts are completely eliminated.

Integration and social justice are also discussed from other classical perspectives, such as that of Max Weber, who can hardly be placed either in the functionalists’ or the conflict theorists’ camps. He sees modern capitalist society as a result of a historical development by which new industrial socioeconomic relationships replace pre-industrial ones. In modern society, a certain type of rationality replaces the old values and traditions. Weber’s action-oriented methodology considers the individual as an active agent who plays a significant role in society. An actor-oriented approach involves the differentiation of types of actions, and provides different models for understanding the complexity of social reality; the notion of social solidarity and the integration of modern society belong to such categories. Weber contends that social solidarity is not a fixed or static category, but a result of individuals’ and groups’ social behaviour in relation to each other (Weber, 1978: 1376). However, social action (Gemeinschaftshandeln) takes place in a society with its specific structural patterns of domination. Weber means that one of the most important elements in every society is the structure of dominance practiced by different parties, such as political, economic, and social actors: ‘domination in the most general sense is one of the most important elements of social action’ (Weber, 1978: 941). He sees domination as an inseparable part of the structure of each society, whether traditional or modern legal-rational. Since domination is concerned, the state becomes an important agent in promoting national integration of different groups in society. For Weber, the integration of society is about a socioeconomic and political order that is based on, at least, one particular kind of domination. A vital point in Weber’s analysis of domination is the mutuality of authority relationships between ‘the rulers’ and ‘the ruled’. He points out that: ‘every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience’ (Weber, 1978: 212). Individuals’ acceptance of authority is of great importance for the maintenance and continuity of the social order in which they have an interest; accordingly, social integration is also a matter of individual interest. The pure modern type of authority, which is based on legality, ‘rests on the acceptance of the validity of mutually inter-dependent ideas’ (Weber, 1978: 217).

Concerning integration and social solidarity, both Durkheim and Weber argue that there is a common interest in social cohesion, in which both ‘the rulers’ and ‘the ruled’ gain benefits. Marx and Engels contend, meanwhile, that if there is an acceptance of ‘rulers’ by ‘the ruled’ it depends on a ‘false consciousness’ of the workers and not on a real understanding of socioeconomic relationships, since it is through the established socioeconomic order that injustices are reproduced; these injustices are coercively reproduced by the capitalist political centre, namely the nation state. Marx and Engels do, however, share their understanding of the role of the state with Weber, who argues that the constant expansion of the market (what we shall get to know as an inherent tendency of market consociation) has favoured the monopolisation and regulation of all ‘legitimate’ coercive powers by one universalistic coercive institution – and this is through the disintegration of all particularistic, status-determined, and other coercive structures that have been resting mainly on economic monopolies (Weber, 1978: 337). This ‘universalistic coercive institution’ is the state, because ‘today legal coercion by violence is the monopoly of the state’ (Weber, 1978: 314).

Durkheim, on the other hand, considers the state to be one of the most important guarantees for the organisation of people’s welfare in a capitalist society. In a society where the old shared ‘collective consciousness’ of people – or ‘the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society’ (Durkheim, 1984: 38) – has disappeared, the state must take an active role in creating a minimum of justice in society by redistributing resources (Aron, 1970; Durkheim, 1984). In his book The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, he discusses the distortion of the old collective consciousness and argues that old religious beliefs, which were a part of individuals’ collective consciousness and provided proper means for social solidarity or for people accepting their place in society, are no longer valid. He concludes that: ‘In a word, the old gods are growing old or already dead, and others are not yet born’ (Durkheim, 1965: 475). This creates a situation that makes it impossible to rely on the ‘old gods’, ‘collective consciousness’ or religious acts of charity: ‘Just as ancient people had above all need of a common faith to live by, we have need of justice’ (Durkheim, 1984: 322). The modern ‘need of justice’ can only be realised by a universal and secular state, according to Durkheim. By criticising market-oriented theorists, such as Smith (along with evolutionary sociologist Herbert Spencer), he argues for a much wider role for the state and he claims that, without the intervention of the state in the market for compensating for its dysfunctions through redistribution of economic and social resources to everybody, integration would not be possible. Durkheim’s theory of social integration and social justice is referred to by some scholars, such as Aron (1970), as ‘soft socialism’. Thus, the state becomes a very important organ for promoting social integration. Its major role is to be a part of the moral regulation of society. It must fill the ‘moral vacuum’ (Durkheim, 1965) of modern society created by the death of ‘the old gods’, although it is not the state alone that can do it; as Bryan Turner (1994) points out, for Durkheim this ‘moral vacuum’ can only be filled by the development of a corporate system, a code of business ethics, and state intervention in the market place.

Although there are many differences in their philosophical standpoints, Durkheim and Marx seem to share some common theoretical grounds concerning social solidarity and social justice. Both criticise the merely ‘economic basis’ of wealth for everybody, and advocate the active intervention of the state in a market economy. They are both, although from different perspectives, awaiting some kind of revolutionary change on the part of individuals for creating a better society – one that is based on ‘collective goods’ or ‘altruism’, in Durkheim’s terminology. As Durkheim puts it: ‘Altruism is not destined to become, as Spencer would wish, a kind of pleasant ornament of our social life, but one that will always be its fundamental basis’ (1978: 173) To guarantee altruism and limit individual egoism, Durkheim talks about the role of different working groups, unions, and their ‘public opinion’. He means that in modern society, in which restrictive penal laws are of lesser importance for social solidarity, common morality is very extensive. He (1965: 475) advocates a change which is reminiscent of Marx and Engels understanding of the communist society:

A day will come when our societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formulae are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity; and when these hours shall have been passed through once, men will spontaneously feel the need of reliving them from time to time in thought, that is to say, of keeping alive their memory by means of celebrations which regularly reproduce their fruits.

Although the role of state and the organisation of the welfare state are important for redistribution of resources in society in order to reduce the economic gap between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have-nots’, the very moral basis of society must be also changed. ‘A guide to humanity’ should be discussed and critically explored in order to rebuild a ‘common morality’, in which all kind of injustices are subject to criticism and explicitly considered unjust by the members of society.

Social Justice, Inequalities and Social Work

In every society around the world, irrespective of the existence or organisation of the formal welfare state, there are both ideas and desires for social justice. Justice is always a desire to confront one or many unjust situations surrounding one or many individuals. Injustices have economic, social and political reasons and consequences, and any social work practice must consider and combat the current injustices in society in its various forms. As Fraser (1999: 25) puts it, increasing claims for social justice can be divided into two types: redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution of resources and goods (which also includes redistribution from the global North to the global South and from the rich to the poor); and, the ‘politics of recognition’. This division, in claims for redistribution on the one hand, and claims for recognition on the other, creates a challenge to the organisation of the nation states and to international relations based on unequal relationships between Western and non-Western countries (as supported by international organs, such as the UN and the EU).

The concept of social justice has been discussed by many sociologists and political theorists since the Enlightenment and the time of great revolutions. The scholars’ political, ideological and theoretical perspectives influence in many ways their understanding and prescription of justice in society (Miller, 1976). Classical ‘grand narratives’ – such as those of Smith, Marx and Engels, Weber and Durkheim, as was discussed earlier – were also engaged in discussions concerning social justice and the way human societies could achieve a better life for everybody in society. Matters of social justice have been discussed by many others in relation to the field of social work. Some theories revolve around the concept of ‘desert’ or ‘merit’, others are based on ‘rights’, and many stress the notion of ‘social contract’ (MacIntyre, 1988). Although many of the classical ‘grand narratives’ stressed the problems of liberal theories concerning the role of the ‘free market’ for creating the ground for individual happiness and well-being, classical liberal theories or libertarian doctrine (expounded by Friedman, 1973 and Hayek, 1976, among others) established itself as an important alternative in the field of the debate on social justice.

One of the major libertarian doctrines concerning social justice is utilitarianism, which means that society is ‘just’ when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction across all the individuals belonging to it (Solas, 2008). This does not mean that everybody gets the benefits of the ‘net balance of satisfaction’ and many will be left behind. Indeed, critics of utilitarianism point out that the principle requires some individuals should accept lower prospects in life for the gratification of others (Barry, 1989; 1995); many individuals should be discriminated against in order to achieve a better society with greater wealth, meaning that individuals can be used as a means to certain ends. However, it is argued, while it will be an ‘unjust’ action for a ‘just’ end, since the action is ‘unjust’ in the first instance, it cannot, based on a Hobbesian understanding of social action, be considered legitimised simply because of its ‘just’ consequences. Utilitarianism is also criticised for being ignorant about marginalised and deprived people, and also for putting at risk some of the opportunities which ‘may have an especially urgent importance’ for those people (Nussbaum, 2006: 73). Utilitarianism may lead to the reinforcement of majority privileges over minorities by denying them equal opportunities and rights by claiming the ‘good of all’. The utilitarian understanding of social justice through segregation between good and right makes it possible for aggregated acts, rules or preferences to arise, such as an ever popular preference for maximising the utility of racial purity and superiority (Solas, 2008). Utilitarianism is, in fact, precisely the kind of justice which professional associations of social work have tended to call social justice (ibid.).

Social justice is one of the most important values of any social work practice around the world and forms its core code of ethics. In the International Federation of Social Workers’ (IFSW) Code of Ethics (2012), which has also been adopted by the International Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW) in 2004, it is stated that ‘social workers have a responsibility to promote social justice, in relation to society generally, and in relation to the people with whom they work’ (2005: 2). The prominence of social justice is also acknowledged by the fact that the National Association of Social Workers and the Council of Social Work Education consider it to be a necessary condition of social work practice and education (Herrick and Stuart, 2005).

Neoliberal ...