Transforming Social Representations

A social psychology of common sense and science

S. Caroline Purkhardt

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317535263
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Common sense, by definition, is familiar to us all. Science, for some of us, is more remote, yet it is not always clear what the connections are between these two ways of seeing the world. In this title, originally published in 1993, the author explores several related themes in social psychology to elucidate the way we understand the social construction of knowledge and the means by which we change social reality.

From the perspective of a critique of social representations theory, the author argues that this necessitates a change of viewpoint from the individualistic and mechanistic assumptions of Cartesian science to the social and evolutionary perspective of a Hegelian framework. This not only emphasizes the cultural and historical dimensions of social phenomena but also illuminates the social and dynamic nature of individuals. As a consequence, the discipline of social psychology must itself be transformed, recognizing the active participation of scientists in the social construction of scientific knowledge.

This title will be of interest to those working in social psychology, history and philosophy of science, and sociology.

Part I

SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND COMMON SENSE

1

BUILDING CASTLES IN THE AIR

The nature, functions and processes of social representations

(Social representations are) ‘theories’ or ‘branches of thought’ in their own right, for the discovery and organization of reality.

(Moscovici, 1973: xiii)

(Social representations are) systems of values, ideas and practices with a two-fold function: first to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in and master their material world and second, to facilitate communication among members of a community by providing them with a code for naming and classifying the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history.

(Moscovici, 1973: xiii)

Social representations are ‘systems’ of preconceptions, images and values which have their own cultural meaning and persist independently of individual experience.

(Moscovici, 1982: 122)

Social representations (are) a set of concepts and explanations originating in daily life in the course of inter-individual communications. They are the equivalent, in our society, of the myths and belief systems in traditional societies; they might even be said to be the contemporary version of common sense.

(Moscovici, 1981: 181)

Since I commenced working with the theory of social representations, people have frequently asked me ‘What is a social representation?’ and, more specifically, ‘What is social about social representations?’ ‘What do they do?’ ‘How do they work?’ and ‘Where does one find a social representation?’ These questions have never been easy to answer. Moscovici’s writings are expansive and eloquent but they tend to give a nebulous impression of his general approach rather than a clear idea of any theoretical postulates or empirical concerns. Other writers have tended to focus on particular aspects of the theory in relation to their own theoretical preoccupations or research interests. As a consequence, the literature available to the English-speaking community lacks a structured presentation of the theory as a whole. This chapter attempts to fill this gap, explicating the fundamental principles of the theory in terms of the nature, functions and processes of social representations.

The contents of this chapter serve as an introduction to social representations theory for the uninitiated reader, going beyond the frequent quotations and all too brief synopses that might have sparked their interest. For those who are already familiar with the general approach it will serve to clarify particular aspects of concern. However, it should be borne in mind that this is not a definitive, state-of-the-art presentation of social representations theory. Rather, it provides the groundwork on which I build the arguments that are presented in subsequent chapters. I draw together the ideas expressed in a selection of Moscovici’s and Jodelet’s articles (Moscovici, 1973, 1982, 1984a, b, 1987, 1988; Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983; Jodelet, 1984a, b). This familiarizes the reader with the social representations approach; its assumptions, its theoretical propositions and its scope. At the same time, it is possible to identify contradictions and points of confusion which create substantial problems for the coherence and integrity of the theory. In this way, this chapter both introduces the ideas to be elaborated and raises the issues to be dealt with in the course of this book.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS: WHAT ARE THEY?

Social representations are the constituents of reality

Social representations describe a social reality that is constructed through our interactions with and communications about the social and physical world. At the same time, social representations form an ‘environment of thought’ that determines our perceptions or conceptions of reality and directs our actions. Social representations at once determine the way we see the world and how we act but are simultaneously determined by our interactions and communications. This notion of social reality can be difficult to grasp, not least because it breaks with conventional ways of thinking in social psychology. Firstly, we must break with the language of cause and effect which insists upon the independence of entities as opposed to the integral relatedness of phenomena. Secondly, we must understand that priority is given to the social and cultural aspects of reality, that is the relational and supra-individual nature of social life.

To elaborate further, the nature of representations obviates the distinction which is typically made between a stimulus and a response or between a person’s perception of an object and the object itself. A person sees or understands a physical or social object in a particular way only because that person has a representation of that object. The object and the person act together in the construction and expression of a representation. In other words, it is not the nature of the object that determines our construction of it but our relationship with that object. This representation, once formed, sustains these relations. Furthermore, it is not simply the relationship between an individual and an object that shapes a representation but also the individual’s relations with others and others’ relations with the object. A social representation is constructed through the processes of interaction and communication with other people, while those interactions and conversations are shaped themselves by people’s social representations. This does not occur within an objective reality, rather it is conducted within a socially constructed reality. Reality is social through and through: we live in a thinking society and construct a social reality.

While the notion of social reality and its construction in social life lies at the heart of social representations theory it is still not entirely clear what this entails. Social representations are said to constitute our reality. From this we can surmise that social reality neither exists purely in the heads of independent individuals nor in an objective reality independent from individuals. But it still remains to explicate the role of individuals’ beliefs and actions, the role of culture and the role of the physical environment in the construction of this social world.

Social representations are symbolic in nature

The symbolic nature of social representations embraces the social, cultural and historical aspects of social representations. It refers to the social significance of objects and events that is dependent upon the common meanings in verbal and non-verbal gestures by members of a community. These common meanings are, in turn, dependent upon a community’s social norms and values and their common history. Firstly, an object or event is simultaneously and immediately perceived and conceived in terms of a symbolic or meaningful reality. This is expressed in terms of the two facets of a representation: the iconic facet or image and the symbolic facet or concept. The object or event is not first seen and then interpreted. Rather the concrete image and the symbolic meaning go hand-in-hand. In this way representations embrace percepts, which reproduce the world in a meaningful way, and concepts, which abstract meaning from the world. The psychological activity of individuals is located in the social activity of a community; in the language, experience and knowledge shared within a particular culture; in the communications and interactions of social groups; and in the traditions and conventions of a collective history. Secondly, representations are always of something and of someone or some collective. Symbolic knowledge (unlike cognitive information) acknowledges the person who knows something and the perspective from which he or she knows it. Thus, there is always an interdependence between the social representations, the social groups and their expressive functions.

It is the symbolic that distinguishes purely cognitive representations from social representations. Cognitive psychology and information-processing approaches offer an individualistic and separatist account of representations. A representation is conceived as an internal construct in the mind of an individual that stands in place of something existing independently of that individual. The individual is isolated both from other people and from the world that is being represented. A ‘social’ representation would simply be an individual’s representation of a social object. The process of representation and the representation itself maintains the individual character. The mental processes or psychological mechanisms are severed from their social context and their social functions.

This stands in stark contrast to social representations which are essentially social, cultural and historical phenomena. We have seen that their symbolic nature is expressed both in the process of representing something and in the functions of representations in social life. The symbolic nature of social representations also supports the construction of social reality. The act of representing something is always constructive. A representation, once constructed, exists in some sense independently of that which is being represented. The representation becomes an object in its own right. This applies not only to representations shared in the minds of individuals and groups but also to representations in the products and cultural artifacts of a society. Representations exist in the media, in books, in films, in drawings, to mention but a few, as much as in the minds of people. Once a representation is constructed it acquires a force of its own.

In that representations are symbolic reconstructions as opposed to a simple reproduction they are also creative. This creative force gives social representations a highly significant role to play in maintaining the social order and in bringing about social change. Thus, it is in the symbolic nature of social representations that the emphasis on meaning and social significance becomes apparent. It is here that the supra-individual or social character of representations is established. And it is here that the dynamic and constructive power of social representations is founded.

Social representations are both form and content

An acknowledgement of the symbolic nature of social representations with all its concomitants – social, cultural and historical – implies that, as long as we are studying common sense and everyday thought, it is not possible to distinguish the form of representations from their content. The content will vary between social groups, cultures and historical epochs and it is not possible to separate the regularities in representations from the processes that create them.

Once again, this contrasts with cognitive psychology. The latter has focused on the processes of representations which are considered to be universal, irrespective of the specific content of the representation. But representations are always of something, they take the place of and signify aspects of the world. This content cannot be ignored. It cannot be assumed that thought processes are general and invariant, that is, universal. Rather, as the content of a representation differs across cultures or changes over time, so does its form. The form and content of thinking are closely related to the form and content of communications and interactions; to the discussion and agreements between people; and to the relations of social groups. In other words, the manner of thinking, as well as what we think, depends upon the cultural context.

Looking at our own discipline Moscovici argues that it is inappropriate and misleading to apply the positivistic, scientific rules of thought to social, consensual knowledge, as the logic or form underlying these different contents is also different. The ‘psychological laws’ are related to the contents of the social representations and, hence, to their cultural and historical context. This has far-reaching implications for social psychology which are reflected in the research approach adopted by some scholars studying social representations. However, the implications for the conduct of socio-psychological investigations and our understanding of social reality need to be made explicit.

Social representations are conventional and prescriptive

Bearing in mind the social nature of reality and the symbolic nature of representations we are now in a position to understand the conventional and prescriptive nature of social representations. Firstly, social representations conventionalize the objects, persons and events that we encounter in daily life. They act on any previously established social object, or any new object entering into our awareness, constraining them so that they ‘fit’ into the categories and systems of relationships that we already possess. Thus, any object is understood in terms of a symbolic system that is conditioned by our social representations and, hence, by our cultural conditions. Secondly, social representations are prescriptive, imposing themselves upon us with an irresistible force. We cannot escape from the conventions of representation, language and culture. We experience and understand the present only in terms of the past, in terms of tradition and culture.

Social representations are thus fundamentally historical in nature. All the systems of perception and conception, of description and understanding which circulate within a society are linked to previous systems. They are reproduced by the continuity of human cultural and social life, and by the language and actions by which they are expressed. This historical, prescriptive thesis is potentially problematic. It presents a sociological thesis in which social representations become as coercive as Durkheim’s collective representations or social facts. The past prevails over the present and the present remains powerless in the face of convention.

Social representations are dynamic

Social representations are not only conventional and prescriptive, they are also dynamic. As they circulate and diffuse throughout society their plasticity becomes apparent. Our perceptions and conceptions, our communications and actions and their meaning and relations are continually reconstructed and reconstituted. Our social reality is transformed as new social representations emerge and old ones disappear, along with the concomitant social objects and relations.

While the dynamic nature of social representations is a fundamental aspect of the theory it appears to portray an uneasy tension with the prescriptive nature of social representations. This returns us to our initial difficulty in understanding a social reality that both determines the way in which we understand, perceive and relate to the world and, simultaneously, evolves and transforms through these same relations. In other words, if the past prevails over the present how can the present transform the ever-present past?

Social representations are autonomous

Social representations are also said to be autonomous. In characterizing social representations as the constituents of social reality sui generis Moscovici emphasizes their cultural or supra-individual quality. Their autonomy is reflected in the description of their dynamic nature. Not only do they communicate between themselves, but as they circulate and diffuse through society they merge, attract and repel each other, influencing the form and content of each other, changing in harmony with the course of social life. Their autonomy is also reflected in their conventional and prescriptive nature. Priority is given to the consensual aspects of social representations, being shared and strengthened by tradition, over and above their social or collective origins.

Their autonomous nature makes it obvious that, as socio-psychological phenomena, social representations cannot be reduced to the social psychology of individuals. However, this is in danger of leaving out the individual from the analysis altogether. It is in danger of presenting a sociological, rather than a social psychological thesis. It denies the role of individuals in transforming and changing our social representations. By giving so much power to culture and tradition the individual becomes impotent.

THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS: WHAT DO THEY DO?

Social representations construct and shape reality

We have already seen that social representations are the constituents of our reality, forming a symbolic environment of thought. As such, they play an essential role in constructing and shaping reality, determining the meaning or significance of objects and events. Social representations provided an established order in which people can interpret and understand their material and social worlds and can become effective actors or participants in social life. Social representations embody and define the experience of reality, determining its boundaries, its significance and its relationships. In this way, reality is both continuous and stable. The ambiguity and diversity of life is reduced and the meanings of actions are made unequivocal. Social representations achieve this by indicating where to find the effects and how to choose the causes; by indicating what must be explained and what constitutes an explanation; and by setting an event in the context of a system of relations with other events.

Social representations enable communication and social interaction

The role of social representations in structuring and coordinating communication and social interaction also ensues from their symbolic nature and the construction of social reality. Individuals and groups communicate and interact with each other through the shared representations and conventional meanings of language and action. Language provides the medium for verbal communication which embodies the conventional meanings and contents of our social representations. Similarly, social representations imbue our actions and non-verbal gestures with meaning and significance.

We should also remember that social representations originate in communication and social interaction. They evolve in order to support the purposes and interests of individuals and groups, oriented towards communication, understanding and control. When individuals or groups share the same social representations, actions are understood in the same way. The action has the same significance or meaning for both the actor and the perceiver, giving rise to an exchange of gestures which is coordinated. The social representation both guides the social actions of an individual or group and allows these actions to be understood by others. However, where social representations are not shared, for example, between members of two different cultures or conflicting groups, the misinterpretation of actions is likely to occur.

Once again, we are confronted with the dilemma that there is a two-way influence between social representations and social action. On the one hand, the structure and content of social representations determine our social actions. On the other hand, communication and social interaction determine our social representations. We need to develop an understanding of social representations, not only as phenomena but also as an ongoing and dynamic process. In turn, we must also develop an understanding of communications and social interactions that goes beyond conversations and interpersonal relations.

Social representations demarcate and consolidate groups

The relationship between social representations and social actions has implications for our understanding of groups. Social representations form an environment of thought for communication and interaction within and between groups. They provide a stock of images and ideas that are taken for granted and mutually accepted by associated individuals. The shared meanings of objects and events serve to consolidate the group, providing a shared reality within which binding relations are formed with other people. They also serve to demarcate groups from each other through divergences in meaning incorporated in the social representations. In other word...