The Middle East in World Politics (Routledge Revivals)

Mohammed Ayoob

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317811275
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Social Sciences

The Middle East is, and has always been, of major global economic and political importance. First published in 1981, this edited collection analyses many of the crucial issues that have had international repercussions during the second half of the twentieth century, with each paper considering the particular regional problems within the widest possible political framework. Internationally renowned authors consider such areas as the relationship between Israel and the Middle East, the influence of oil on global decision-making, Afghanistan and its neighbours, and the economic issues that the region has faced. A timely and relevant reissue, dealing with problems of continued importance, this volume will be of particular interest to students researching the history of the Middle Eastern conflict and the region's variety of relationships with the West.

1 The Middle East in World Affairs: An Australian Perspective

The Honourable Andrew S. Peacock

The subject of this volume is one of fundamental current importance, one which is both complex and diverse, as the list of chapters indicates. The subject matter is not one that I propose to traverse in detail, but it may be of some help if I were to give a broad Australian perspective on the place of the Middle East in world politics.

The Middle East has always been of major importance to the West. It has been an area central to world order and stability. In the postSecond World War period, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been one of the most acute and — given the patron-client relationships existing between the antagonists and great powers — one of the most dangerous in world politics.

In the last decade the changing relationship between oil supply and world energy requirements has greatly enhanced the strategic and economic importance of the region. The importance of these requirements was brought home by the oil embargo of 1973, and ever since then the West has watched the economic barometer of oil supplies and oil prices with concern. Events during 1979-80 have done nothing to ease that concern.

There have also been other developments which affect Western interests in the Middle East — all of which have the potential in the months and years ahead to put the security of Western energy supplies, and indeed world peace, at risk. These developments include disagreement by most Arab states with the Camp David approach to Middle East peace, the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Although Afghanistan perhaps falls outside the broadly accepted definition of the Middle East, the Soviet invasion of that country clearly affects the whole region and potentially threatens vital Western strategic and energy interests. This act of aggression therefore has ramifications for the entire Western world and is an event which will have a close bearing on super-power politics for some time to come. It will have an ongoing destabilising effect on East-West relations, although ironically one beneficial side effect might be to bring a greater degree of cohesion to the States of the Gulf region as a result of a common perception of a threat.

Whatever the motives of the Soviet Union in invading Afghanistan there can be no doubt that any long-term Soviet presence there must have a potentially serious destabilising effect on Iran and Pakistan, the two neighbouring countries, and, through Iran, on the oil-rich Gulf area and the Middle East as a whole.

The responses of countries to particular foreign policy problems are influenced by their own foreign policy preoccupations, whether or not these are strictly linked to the issue at hand. This is illustrated by the reactions of Middle East countries to the Soviet invasion which, incidentally, with only few exceptions, provided interesting evidence of the limited degree of Soviet influence over the Middle East.

There was no ambiguity at all in the initial response of most Middle East countries to the invasion. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Iraq all publicly expressed opposition to the invasion. The General Assembly vote and the resolutions of the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers left little doubt of the feelings of most countries. But important foreign policy considerations have meant that their responses have not developed much beyond that stage.

In terms of some Western perceptions, the invasion, and the consequent threat which the Middle East countries perceived to their own security, might have been expected to turn them towards the United States and the West. Quite clearly this has not happened — instead there seems to be developing a kind of negative neutrality towards both the super powers. One of the major reasons for this is that the Arab countries of the Middle East have one foreign policy preoccupation which overrides all others what is loosely termed the Arab-Israeli dispute.

From the point of view of the Arab countries, this dispute is no longer so much about the continued existence of Israel. It is rather about how to solve the Palestinian problem and to involve the Palestinians in a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.

The Middle East states require a solution to the Palestinian problem for a variety of reasons: because of a sense of Pan-Arab and Islamic loyalty; because of the potential threat to their internal stability that large numbers of Palestinian refugees in their countries may pose (Lebanon in the past few years provides for them a disturbing illustration of the danger, as did Jordan in 1970); and because of a clear realisation that without a solution to the Palestinian problem there will be no end to the conflict.

The position taken by the West, and in particular by the United States, on the Palestinian problem is of paramount importance in determining the strength of Arab support for the West in its efforts to respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to prevent further destabilisation of the Middle East/Gulf area and to improve the security of its oil supplies.

Most Arab states have indicated that the United States' position on the Palestinian question is unacceptable. Most of them have rejected the Camp David Agreement largely because they feel that the only substantive result it achieved was a bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel, which has allegedly weakened the Arabs' power to force an acceptable solution of the Palestinian problem. They do not accept the United States' argument that a step-by-step process will lead to greater mutual confidence and trust and thus bring about a comprehensive peace. They believe Israel only wanted peace with Egypt and that now she has it, feels she has no need to make real concessions elsewhere.

Australia recognises the motivations behind all these arguments. Our own position remains however that peace should be based on the proposals contained in UN Resolutions 242 and 338; upon Israel's rights to exist within secure and recognised boundaries; and upon recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to a homeland alongside Israel and the corresponding responsibility that they live peacefully with all their neighbours.

We also believe that President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Prime Minister Begin's swift recognition of the opportunities for peace presented by that visit, and subsequently the Camp David Agreements and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty all provided momentum towards a settlement.

But it may be that further initiative is now needed. The need for the West, in particular the United States, to pay even closer attention to its relations with the Middle East has been dramatically underlined in the past year by events in Iran and Afghanistan. This need has also been emphasised by the degree of alienation from the West of the Arab states — including those regarded as moderates — as a result of Western support for the Camp David process.

While efforts to find solutions to the Middle East question and the Palestinian problem must be at the centre of the West's efforts to improve stability in the Middle East, there are other 'inbuilt' factors which make for inherent instability in many countries of the region which must inform our policies towards the area.

Foremost among these factors is the continuing impact on Arab societies of Western political and social ideologies, and of unprecedentedly rapid technological and economic change. We are used to describing this impact as a process of 'development' or 'modernisation', and there is no doubt that many of its manifestations improve conditions in the region. But in other ways it is also profoundly disturbing and dislocating, contributing to a sense of insecurity and resentment among many social groups.

There is a growing awareness, in some countries at least, of the dangers of extremely rapid Westernisation - and steps are being taken to try to reduce these. The Saudi Arabian government for example, has adopted social and religious policies which appear, to Western eyes, anachronistic, but which are intended to maintain the stability and cohesion of the kingdom in the face of the massive social strains caused by economic development through oil wealth.

It would be unwise also to underestimate the traditionally volatile nature of Arab politics. This volatility underlies much of the tension, both internal and between states, which is endemic to the region. It is manifested in relations between Syria and Iraq; between the Yemens; between Tunisia and Libya. Nowhere perhaps has it had more tragic consequences than in the Lebanon.

In recent years the Lebanon has been ravaged by sectarian strife. The Lebanese people suffered deeply during the civil war. Since that time, despite the presence of the Syrian peace-keeping force, the situation has remained tense, punctuated by further outbursts of violence. And despite President Sarkis's attempts to achieve national unity it has not been possible to heal the rifts which exist between the many diverse factions in that country.

We appreciate that an ultimate solution to the situation in the Lebanon depends in great part on resolution of the plight of 350,000 Palestinian refugees in that country, and that such a resolution depends largely upon developments outside the Lebanon. But progress also requires factions both on the left and on the right in the Lebanon to heed President Sarkis's calls for national reconciliation. Australia, whose community has been enriched by immigrants from all the diverse groups in the Lebanon, feels for her suffering people and strongly supports efforts to achieve unity and peace in that country.

Islam is also increasingly cited as a factor for instability in the region. It is certainly true that the current resurgence of Islam is in part a reaction to the impact of the West over the last 150 years, and thus contains the potential for revolutionary change in those Arab societies which have embraced Western values and political systems. It is well to remember, however, that Islam is traditionally a conservative force which has been used successfully to help maintain the stability of governments and peoples passing through times of stress and change.

Today in Saudi Arabia and in some Gulf states, the strict application of Islamic social and religious principles is being used as a way to minimise the social convulsions of people passing from a simple nomadic existence into the complexities of a centrally organised and technological urban life-style. It is therefore, I think, simplistic to regard the present resurgence of Islam as necessarily a threat to the stability of governments in the Middle East, or for that matter governments in predominantly Islamic countries elsewhere.

Apart from its role within the different states of the region, Islam is today assuming a more prominent role as a force in international forums. The Organisation of the Islamic Conferences, representing all the predominantly Muslim countries in the world, has been in existence for more than ten years, but it is only recently that its presence has been felt in international affairs. The Conferences' rejection of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in May 1979 and, even more important, its condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in January 1980, have shown that the Islamic ties between otherwise diverse countries are now a significant factor in the affairs of the region.

The revolution in Iran is closely connected with the Islamic resurgence, but its success was quite clearly due to pre-revolutionary political, social and economic conditions and to the historical role of the Shia clergy in Iran, which is significantly different to the essentially apolitical role of Sunni clerics. The revolution is still being played out, and in this context the development of constitutional political institutions is encouraging. Nevertheless, Iran still faces enormous political, ethnic and economic problems, and the current steps can only be regarded as tentative ones about which we still have to reserve judgement.

What we cannot reserve judgement on, and what in the long run cannot be in the interests of Iran itself, are the deviations from international norms which have accompanied the revolution. In particular, the serious and continuing breach of international law constituted by the taking of the hostages at the United States Embassy in Tehran, is to be strongly condemned.

We still hear from time to time arguments in mitigation of this action. As far as the Australian government is concerned, the continued detention of hostages is provocative, cruel, anarchic and indefensible.

The revolution in Iran, and the continuing disputes and tensions within the region as a whole, have implications far beyond the region itself - especially as they relate to energy.

The rapid economic growth rates achieved by most industrialised and industrialising countries between the 1950s and the mid-1970s were in large part sustained by adequate, low-cost supplies of energy, in particular oil. The rate of increase of global oil consumption - it increased more than ten-fold between 1945 and 1975 - has exceeded that of other primary energy sources, reflecting inter alia oil's price competitiveness, transportability and high calorific value. As the demand for oil has increased, so has the dependence of the industrialised countries on imported oil. For example, the United States, once the world's leading producer and exporter, now imports 40 per cent of its needs; the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Japan are of course very much more dependent. In this context it is also important to note that the Soviet Union's oil production is expected to decline, perhaps seriously, in the 1980s and that it is likely to become an oil importer.

The growing demand has been met largely by a relatively small number of countries, the most important being situated in the Middle East. OPEC possesses about 60 per cent of proven global reserves and accounts for over 50 per cent of internationally traded oil. In recent years there has been growing recognition of the crucial nature of oil as a commodity and its increasing scarcity. Correspondingly, the political and strategic importance of the Middle East has been enhanced.

The imbalance of resource distribution has been a primary cause of international tensions throughout history. Oil today has the characteristics necessary to influence significantly relations between, and the behaviour of, nations — particularly the more vulnerable oil-importing countries.

Tensions and conflict in the Middle East have highlighted the fragility of the existing energy supply lines and their significance for global economic progress and security.

The events of 19734 and 1978-9 are well known. They were flash points in a longer-term problem. The latter crisis fundamentally altered the existing demand/supply situation. The crucial issue is the pace at which the economy of the Western world can adjust to the increasing scarcity and price of oil. An essential part of this adjustment will be to set a realistic price for oil. The rate of transition away from oil-based economies will determine the potential for energy-induced instability in international relations in the years ahead.

All these interlocking and complex factors — the Arab-Israeli dispute; oil; instability; and regional and sectarian rivalries — interweave to make up the pattern of Middle East politics which in turn radically affects the future of the West. The West of course recognises the increased importance of the Middle East. And indeed this recognition is reciprocated by Middle East states where there is growing realisation that only the West can provide the necessary strategic balance to give adequate protection against potential expansionism by the Soviet Union; that technologically the West has much to offer that the Middle East needs; and that in commercial and financial terms there is a potential interdependence.

But the development of what could prove to be a crucial relationship between the West and the Middle East cannot seriously begin until a comprehensive Middle East settlement is achieved. The need for such a settlement is increasingly urgent.

The nineteenth-century Italian statesman, Cavour, once said that in politics too much memory is a dangerous thing. Contemplating the current situation in the Middle East, one can appreciate the force of his point. It will be tragic if the past, with its territorial claims, accumulated hatreds, suspicions and fears, is allowed to frustrate the needs of the present.

2 A View from Cairo

Mohamed Riad

In order to approach the topic of our discussion, we need, first of all, to delimit the area of our concern, namely, the Middle East. I believe that the reason why there has never been a universally agreed upon definition of the Middle East is that it has generally been defined strategically by outside parties within the context of international power politics. The difficulty, it seems to me, would disappear if we try to define the area from within; that is, by identifying the region whose inhabitants share main cultural traits and historical experience, and are furthermore concerned with common problems which emanate from, or are related to, the area itself.

Arab-Islamic culture characterises the region which extends from Morocco to Afghanistan and gives it its homogeneous basis. The predominant religion of the area is Islam, and the predominant language is Arabic which has enriched the widely spoken Persian and Turkish languages. Naturally, the area shades off into other cultures at the peripheries, as we move away from the Arab world which is the core of the Middle East. But, throughout the area, there is a feeling of belonging together which makes an injustice perpetrated in one country immediately the target of protest in others.

Recent experience of foreign domination further emphasised the unity of the area and coloured the attitudes of its people towards the outside world. The rising tide of nationalism in the Middle East between the two world wars and after; the common struggle for independence; oil; and the problems of modernisation have all contributed to this feeling of belonging together. Last, but not least, the reaction to the creation of Israel, when virtually the whole Arab homeland was under foreign control, has been an added unifying factor, particularly after the occupation of Jerusalem, the third sanctuary of Islam.

II

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Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Preface
• 1. The Middle East in World Affairs: An Australian Perspective
• 2. A View from Cairo
• 3. Israel and the Middle East
• 4. The PLO and the Prospects for Peace in the Middle East
• 5. Oil, Arabism and Islam: The Persian Gulf in World Politics
• 6. Afghanistan and its Neighbours
• 7. The Middle East Role in World Energy
• 8. Economic Issues in the Middle East
• 9. A Region of Constant Surprise
• Notes on Contributors
• Index