Navies and Foreign Policy (Routledge Revivals)

Ken Booth

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317670025
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: National Security
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First published in 1977, this study offers a comprehensive, systematic and integrated survey of the important relationship between navies and the making and execution of foreign policy. Ken Booth explains the functions navies can perform in both war and peace, the influence they have on particular situations, and how the relevant organisations can affect the character of naval actions. Ultimately, navies are regarded as indispensable instruments of the state by a number of countries, whilst all countries with a coast find some need to threaten a degree of force at sea. This book provides students and academics with the intellectual framework with which to assess the changing character of the navy.

Part One Navies as Instruments and Influences

1 The Functions of Navies

DOI: 10.4324/9781315769646-1

‘Why do we need a navy?’ is a recurring question. By indicating the ends for which navies have been and can be used, this chapter provides the beginning of an answer. It can only be a beginning because a full answer will depend upon the national interests and circumstances of whoever asks the question. As he looks at the shop-window of foreign policy instruments, the decision-maker must pay his money (or rather his country’s money) and take his pick in the light of policy priorities, national capabilities for action, and beliefs about the utility of different instruments. This chapter is restricted to spot-lighting only the naval corner of that window.

The use of the sea

The functions of navies can be conceived as a trinity, the idea of three-in-one. The unity (the one-ness) of the trinity is provided by the idea of the use of the sea: this is the underlying consideration in the whole business of navies and foreign policy. The character of the trinity is then defined by the three characteristic modes of action by which navies carry out their purposes: namely the military, the diplomatic, and the policing functions. Within each of these roles navies can serve a large variety of subordinate functions. The trinity can be expressed diagrammatically as shown in Figure 1.

Fig. 1 The functions of navies

In order to carry out these functions, naval planners have to translate policy objectives into forces of a particular size and composition; they have to decide upon the character and timing of deployment and employment; they have to choose appropriate tactics and so on. The range of operational tasks by which foreign policy objectives are translated into naval happenings is extremely wide.

The theme of navies and foreign policy is the use of the sea. Broadly, states are interested in the use of the sea for three purposes: (1) for the passage of goods and people; (2) for the passage of military force for diplomatic purposes, or for use against targets on land or at sea; and (3) for the exploitation of resources in or under the sea. Navies exist as a means to further such ends. As it has been understood from earliest times, they exist as part of a state’s general maritime policy, whose objective is to attempt to use the sea for one’s own purposes, while being in a position to attempt to prevent others from using it in ways which are to one’s disadvantage.

It is appropriate that the military role forms the base of the trinity, for the essence of navies is their military character. Actual or latent violence is their currency. It is a navy’s ability to threaten and use force which gives meaning to its other modes of action. It derives its diplomatic impact from perceptions of its military character. Obviously it derives its utility in conflicts from its ability to exert brute force successfully. The diplomatic role of navies is concerned with the management of foreign policy short of the actual employment of force. Diplomatic applications support state policy in particular bargaining situations or in general international intercourse. The policing role is internally as much as externally oriented. These functions are rarely concerned with the armed forces of other states: they are mainly concerned with extending sovereignty over the state’s own maritime frontiers.

In considering this trinity several points should be kept in mind. (1) A clear picture of warship functions should afford a basis for comparing and contrasting the naval efforts of different countries, and structure any discussion of the utility of navies. (2) Some of the terms of analysis have various nuances, but for the moment it is well to avoid confusion by semantic exegesis. (3) Like all classifications, a degree of artificiality is unavoidable. This is chronically so in the case of naval operations in peacetime, for the same operation can serve one or more objectives: this mixture of objectives can be separated for analytical purposes, but in practice, in a policy-maker’s head, they will probably be present in various degrees of jumble. (4) This presentation of naval functions as a trinity should not be taken to mean that each part is of equal importance. Different states will weigh the importance of each function in the light of their individual maritime problems and interests. (5) The classification is not based upon abstract ideas, but in all cases (except nuclear war) it is based upon an array of empirical evidence.¹

Policing role

The main aims and subsidiary policy of objectives of this role are as follows:

1. Coastguard responsibilities
   1. Sovereignty
   2. Resource enjoyment
   3. Maintenance of good order
2. Nation-building
   1. Contribute to internal stability
   2. Contribute to internal development

Policing takes place mainly in territorial waters, and is concerned with the maintenance of public order in a broad sense. It is a maritime version of the work of the police, border guards, and the idea of ‘military aid to the civil authority’. While this role is rarely seen as a part of foreign policy as such, the character and effectiveness with which it is carried out (or not) may have external implications.

Coastguard responsibilities. These tasks are by far the most important within the policing role. They are responsibilities familiar to all coastal states, and may be performed by a separately organised maritime service, a navy, or jointly. These forces attempt to further the basic interests of all coastal states, namely the extension of sovereignty, resource enjoyment in contiguous areas, and the maintenance of good order.²

Nation-building. This role involves contributing to internal stability, especially during natural or political turmoil, and contributing to internal development in more settled times. These limited functions are a naval equivalent of the role performed by many armies, going under such names as PUMF (Peaceful Uses of Military Forces) and MACC (Military Assistance to the Civil Community). For obvious geographical reasons, these functions cannot be performed on an extensive scale by navies; however, they can sometimes make a worthwhile contribution, after natural disasters or civil commotions, or in playing a limited modernisation role in some Third World countries.

The coastal policing role is not likely to appeal as an important mission to those navies which the jargon describes as ‘blue-water’. However, for over one-third of the world’s navies, coastguard and nation-building responsibilities represent the extent of their functions (and ambitions). The governments of countries where this is so either do not perceive an external naval threat, or they have no capability to match one. The defence of their maritime frontiers is therefore largely dependent on general international stability. However, even the smallest warships can have external effects which are disproportionate to their military punch. This is particularly the case in the deterrence of small-scale maritime intrusion (especially of the economically motivated type). The willingness to resist can sometimes have political effects bearing no relation to the intrinsic military effort. Iceland’s gunboats, one of the most miniscule of forces, have given evidence of this. At the other end of the spectrum of coastguard forces is the US Coast Guard (USCG); this is bigger than the navies of most countries with its destroyer-size ‘cutters’ and hundreds of aircraft.³ Essentially the USCG is a para-naval organisation and has been used as such.

Diplomatic role

The main aims and subsidiary policy objectives of this role are as follows:

1. Negotiation from strength
   1. Reassure and strengthen allies and associates.
   2. Reassure and strengthen friendly governments threatened by serious internal challenge.
   3. Reassure and strengthen friendly governments fearing external attack.
   4. Change the behaviour of friendly governments when the latter are facing the threat of external attack.
   5. Signal ‘business as usual’ during a crisis.
   6. Support or threaten force from the sea to support friendly governments contemplating acquisitive military action.
   7. Improve bargaining strength.
   8. Threaten force from the sea to support policy.
   9. Improve one’s ability to affect the course of specific diplomatic negotiations.
2. Manipulation
   1. Manipulate bargaining positions within an alliance.
   2. Demonstrate support to different countries.
   3. Gain or increase access to new countries.
   4. Build up foreign navies and create proxy threats.
   5. Create a degree of naval dependency.
   6. Provide standing demonstrations of naval power in distant waters to establish the right to be interested.
3. Prestige
   1. Provide psychological reassurances for the home country.
   2. Project a favourable general image of one’s country.
   3. Project an image of impressive naval force.

The diplomatic role has always been an important one for major navies, and has involved a wide variety of operational tasks. Diplomatic effects are induced by both latent and active means, as will be discussed in the following chapter. The range of functions within this role encompasses actions with a degree of implicit or explicit coercion (negotiation from strength) to actions promising reward (naval aid) to actions seeking to oil the wheels of relationships by improving an image (influence and prestige).

Negotiating from strength. So-called ‘political demonstrations of naval force’ are a traditional function of navies. It is one which has again risen to prominence because of recent manoeuvrings by superpower warships in different parts of the world. By such actions the superpowers have sought to persuade target states to behave in a favourable manner without the need to use force. In the diplomatic use of warships, the intention is invariably to avoid violence, but this possibility will nevertheless be present in such tasks as assisting associates when they are involved in a conflict. Where there is a possibility of violence, a prudent naval presence must include an ability to be able to fight for control of the air, as well as the sea, and possibly also the ability to project military forces ashore.

Manipulation. The influence tactics of naval diplomacy are designed to have their effects by changing (however incrementally) the political calculations of the relevant observers. Because of this, much thinking has to go into the size, shape and tactics of the force involved if the desired messages are to be effectively communicated. Effects may be induced by negative as well as positive actions. Although the range of influence-building tactics is wide, because their effectiveness depends upon the perceptions of others, this is a rather unpredictable activity.

Prestige. The promotion of a country’s prestige and influence is not an operational naval mission in the usual meaning of the tern. It is a function of considerable importance nevertheless, and is recognised as such by major navies. This role has relatively few specific operational tasks. With the exception of naval aid, port visits and ceremonial activities, the success of this role is invariably the by-product of overall naval behaviour. Encouraging others to think in desired ways and to listen to one’s case with sympathy requires diplomatic as well as naval subtlety.

Military role

The main aims and subsidiary policy objectives within this category can be divided between those pertaining to what we understand as peace, and those pertaining to what we understand as war. The peacetime or balance of power functions are as follows:

1. Strategic nuclear deterrence
   1. Deter attack on the homeland, and the homelands of the allies.
   2. Provide secure situation in which to promote foreign policy interests.
   3. Contribute to the nation’s ability to negotiate from a position of recognised strength.
   4. Counter the deterrent forces of adversaries.
2. Conventional deterrence and defence
   1. Prepare for wartime tasks.
   2. Deter hostile intrusion into maritime frontiers.
   3. Contribute to local maritime stability.
   4. Protect national claims in contiguous seas.
   5. Extend national claims in contiguous seas.
3. Extended deterrence and defence
   1. Protect state activities on the high seas.
   2. Protect the lives, interests and property of nationals (and others) operating in distant waters.
   3. Protect the lives, interests and property of nationals (and others) threatened by local disturbance or natural disaster.
   4. Provide the local maritime defence of distant national territories.
   5. Develop operating techniques for the essential wartime tasks in distant waters.
   6. Build up an infrastructure (including bases and other shore facilities) for the performance of wartime missions,
   7. Demonstrate commitment to allies.
4. International order
   1. Support an internationally recognised law of the sea.
   2. Do not support an internationally recognised law of the sea: support and extend national claims.

Strategic deterrence. Four navies presently have the capability of projecting nuclear weapons against their enemies from the sea, and so also of withholding them to affect post-exchange bargaining. China may have such a capability in the near future. A sea-based deterrent force is a very particular and very specialised branch of a navy. The maintenance of ‘invulnerability’ is a major feature of the operations of a missile-firing submarine (SSBN). Consequently, when they slip under the water and ‘get lost’ their activities are removed from the daily round of surface and other submarine forces. Nuclear strike-carriers, on the other hand, have always had a more integrated role in naval deployment and planning. Because of improvements in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) techniques, there has been some talk about the problems of protecting seaborne retaliatory forces. If SSBNs become vulnerable to any marked extent, they will require some form of defensive screening (and thus integration with other fleet activities) or further geographical invulnerability.

The sea is used to deploy counters for deterrent forces. This involves the tra...