Nazi Propaganda (RLE Nazi Germany & Holocaust)

The Power and the Limitations

David Welch, David Welch

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317620822
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: German History
• Index: History

Based on a detailed examination of specific aspects of Nazi propaganda, this book (originally published in 1983) enhances the understanding of National Socialism by revealing both its power and its limitations. The work tackles aspects of Nazi propaganda which had been neglected in the past, but together they demonstrate the disproportionate role assigned to propaganda in one of the most highly politicised societies in contemporary European history.

1	INTRODUCTION David Welch

Propaganda, propaganda, propaganda. All that matters is propaganda.

– Adolf Hitler¹

The rise and fall of National Socialism is understandably one of the most closely studied issues in European history. Historians have been at great pains to explain why millions of Germans voted for the NSDAP in free elections and how such a regime could eventually acquire such an extensive European Empire. This book attempts to understand such questions in the light of a detailed examination of Nazi propaganda, both in terms of its theory and practice.

Although Nazi propaganda has only recently come to receive the attention of historians commensurate with its importance, the degree of consensus about the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda is quite revealing. Historians of widely different political persuasions and approaches have testified to the crucial role it played in mobilising support for the Nazis. In his study of Nazi propaganda, Z.A.B. Zeman asserted that the growth of the NSDAP from ‘insignificant beginnings’ into a truly mass-movement ‘was largely due to the skilful exploitation of propaganda techniques … Although the theory and practice of Nazi propaganda were derivative to a certain extent … its cumulative effect has never been surpassed’.² Martin Broszat, on the other hand, has persuasively argued that ‘the originality of the Party did not consist in its intellectual equipment, but in the manner in which it propagandised and fought for ideas represented by others. It was the dynamics of the Party, its parades, the ceremonial blessing of banners, the marching columns of the SA, the uniforms, the bands, etc., which captured the imagination of the masses.’³

Similarly, East German historians, although approaching the subject from a different ideological point of view, have also stressed the importance of propaganda. In the standard East German text dealing with this period, Wolfgang Ruge noted: The fascist party developed a propaganda apparatus whose activities far eclipsed all previous heights of the demogogy of German imperialism. The insidious methods it employed to influence the masses, fastened on to the social crisis and the nationalist sentiments of the broadest strata of the population.’⁴

However, despite this general consensus, it has been rightly argued that the functions and assumed effectiveness of Nazi propaganda have not been examined sufficiently closely and critically in the past.⁵ This volume will not attempt to outline the historical development of Nazi propaganda, nor will it prescribe the secrets of propaganda success. The most rewarding method of understanding the phenomenon of propaganda is not, I feel, through the study of the rhetorical and psychological tricks employed, but rather through the analysis of the total social context, conceiving the whole as a dynamic field of stresses and strains wherein the forces of propaganda play their part. The aim of this book then, based on detailed examinations of specific aspects of Nazi propaganda, is to enhance our understanding of National Socialism by revealing both its power and limitations.

Before discussing briefly what propaganda meant to the Nazis themselves, I would first like to identify two common misconceptions connected with the study of propaganda. There is a widely held belief that propaganda implies nothing less than the art of persuasion, which serves only to change attitudes and ideas. This is undoubtedly one of its aims, but often a limited and subordinate one. More often, propaganda is concerned with reinforcing existing trends and beliefs; to sharpen and focus them. A second basic misconception is the entirely erroneous conviction that propaganda consists only of lies and falsehood. In fact it operates with many different kinds of truth – from the outright lie, the half truth, to the truth out of context. Moreover, as Terence Qualter has rightly pointed out, many writers on the subject see propaganda as essentially appeasing the irrational instincts of man, and this is true to a certain extent, but because our attitudes and behaviour are also the product of rational decisions, then propaganda must appeal to the rational elements in human nature as well.⁶ The preoccupation with the former ignores the basic fact that propaganda is ethically neutral – it may be good or bad. In all political systems policy must be explained, the public must be convinced of the efficacy of government decisions, and rational discussion is not always the most useful means of doing this, particularly in the age of ‘mass man’.⁷ Therefore, in any body politic, propaganda is not, as is often supposed, a malignant growth, but is an essential part of the whole political process.

There can surely be little doubt that one of the most crucial factors contributing to the Nazis’ rise to power was the skilful use of propaganda; certainly the Nazis themselves were convinced of its effectiveness. In Mein Kampf, Hitler devoted two chapters to the study and practice of propaganda. Hitler was not an original theorist of propaganda techniques, but while a student in Vienna he learnt the art of stimulating the hopes and fears of his audience into positive action. In his early writings he referred to the Austrian Marxists in Vienna, ‘who knew how to flatter the masses’. Profoundly influenced by British propaganda in the First World War, Hitler was firmly convinced that propaganda was a powerful weapon in the hands of experts. By appointing Joseph Goebbels Head of Party Propaganda (Reichspropagandaleiter) in November 1928, Hitler found his expert. From now on the emphasis was to be on the expert. However, one must necessarily turn back to Mein Kampf where Hitler laid down the broad lines along which Nazi propaganda was to operate. In the following extract Hitler assessed his audience as follows:

The receptive powers of the masses are very restricted, and their understanding is feeble. On the other hand, they quickly forget. Such being the case, all effective propaganda must be confined to a few bare essentials and those must be expressed as far as possible in stereotyped formulae. These slogans should be persistently repeated until the very last individual has come to grasp the idea that has been put forward.⁸

According to Hitler, propaganda for the masses had to be simple, it had to aim at the lowest level of intelligence, and it had to be reduced to easily learned slogans which then had to be repeated many times, concentrating on such emotional elements as love and hatred. Thus, unlike the Bolsheviks, the Nazis did not make a distinction in their terminology between agitation and propaganda. In Soviet Russia, agitation was concerned with influencing the masses through ideas and slogans, while propaganda served to spread the Communist ideology of Marxist-Leninism.⁹ Hitler, on the other hand, did not regard propaganda as merely an instrument for reaching the Party elite, but rather as a means for the persuasion and indoctrination of all Germans. This distinction led E.K. Bramsted to conclude that propaganda for the Nazis ‘had not a specific, but a total validity’.¹⁰ The main objective then of Nazi propaganda in both opposition and government was to unify the German people behind a single thought and purpose. In turn this belief in the invincibility of one’s own cause could be used as a weapon to undermine the power of one’s enemies.

In some ways propaganda is easier in opposition than in power, and Goebbels proved a skilful orchestrator of the Party’s propaganda resources. But propaganda alone can never change social and political conditions; it acts in conjunction with other factors, like organisation. National Socialist propaganda did not destroy Weimar democracy, although it did undermine it. What distinguished the NSDAP from other political parties was its ability, consistently maintained throughout its development, to merge the themes of traditional German patriotism with Nazi ideological motifs. This unification of German patriotism and Nazi ideology allowed Hitler, in Jay W. Baird’s words to ‘forge a compelling weapon against what he termed the ‘immorality of Weimar rationalism’, the symbol of cultural decadence, racial impurity, and Jewish putrefaction’.¹¹ In fact Hitler felt that the importance of propaganda would decline once the Party gained political power. In this respect organisation would eventually replace propaganda.¹² Not surprisingly, given Goebbels’ success in master-minding the NSDAP’s victory in 1933, he disagreed with Hitler’s distinction between propaganda and organisation. Goebbels believed that propaganda would be just as necessary in power, not only to mobilise mass support for the new Völkischer Staat but also to maintain a heightened level of enthusiasm and commitment to the new regime.

It was during the beginning of 1933 that Goebbels was making final plans for a Propaganda Ministry that would assume control over all aspects of mass-communications. However, because Goebbels was so involved in the forthcoming elections on 5 March, it was decided to delay announcing the creation of this new Ministry until after the Nazi’s success was guaranteed. Eventually Goebbels was appointed Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda – RMVP) by Presidential decree on 13 March. In June Hitler was to define the scope of the RMVP, making Goebbels responsible for ‘the spiritual direction of the nation’. Not only did this vague directive provide Goebbels with room to out-manoeuvre his critics within the Party, it also gave the mark of legality to what was soon to be the Ministry’s complete control of all that mattered most in the functioning of the mass media in the Third Reich.

From the outset Goebbels reaffirmed the importance of successful propaganda. In a revealing address to representatives of the press on 15 March 1933, he declared:

I see the establishment of this new Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda as a revolutionary act of government because the new government has no intention of abandoning the people to their own devices and locking them up in an airless room. This government is, in the truest sense of the word, a people’s government … The name of the new Ministry tells us quite clearly what we mean by this. We have founded a Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. These two titles do not convey the same thing. Popular enlightenment is essentially something passive: propaganda, on the other hand, is something active. We cannot be satisfied with just telling the people what we want and enlightening them as to how we are doing it. We must replace this enlightenment with an active government propaganda, a propaganda that aims at winning people over. It is not enough to reconcile people more or less to our regime, to move them towards a position of neutrality towards us, we want rather to work on people until they are addicted to us …¹³

Once in power Goebbels stressed the importance of co-ordinating propaganda with other activities. Propaganda in a totalitarian police state must address itself to large masses of people and attempt to move them to a uniformity of opinion and action. But the Nazis’ understood that propaganda is of little value in isolation. To some extent this explains why Goebbels impressed on all his staff the imperative necessity of constantly gauging public moods. He therefore regularly received extraordinarily detailed reports from the Secret Police about the mood of the people. To assure themselves of continued popular support was an unwavering concern of the Nazi leaders, and of Goebbels in particular.

By the outbreak of the Second World War the Propaganda Ministry had complete control of all the media of information. The population had therefore been unable for several years to relate what they saw, or heard, or read, to alternative sources. Writers in a pluralist society tend to view propaganda as a separate entity from other functions of leadership, even as something of which to be rather ashamed. Propaganda in Nazi Germany, on the other hand, was only an additional power weapon, albeit an indispensable function of the Völkischer Staat (hence the open advertisement of ‘propaganda’ in the title of Goebbels’ ministry). The criterion in regard to truth was simply whether ‘truth’ at a given time would serve the best interests of the state. Addressing his staff in the RMVP during the war, Goebbels declared: ‘There must be absolute certainty that words are followed up by corresponding events. Propaganda does not have anything to do with truth! We serve truth by serving a German victory.’¹⁴ Goebbels was expressing the view that in the Third Reich, the propaganda machinery served an ideal higher than truth, namely the National Socialist Weltanschauung. However, Goebbels was careful not to tell all lies; he was master at distorting the truth. All the same both Goebbels and Hitler appreciated the burden that a war would place on the Nazi propaganda machine. In a society where the illusion at least of a monolithic unity between leadership and people had to be preserved at all costs, the wa...