Managing the Oil Revenue Boom : The Role of Fiscal Institutions
eBook - ePub

Managing the Oil Revenue Boom : The Role of Fiscal Institutions

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eBook - ePub

Managing the Oil Revenue Boom : The Role of Fiscal Institutions

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Information

eBook ISBN
9781589067189
Year
2008

Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms
Preface
Executive Summary
I. Introduction
II. The Recent Oil Boom
Fiscal Policy Responses to the Recent Oil Boom Through 2005
Government Effectiveness, Sustainability, and Vulnerability Issues
III. Special Fiscal Institutions and the Management of Oil Revenue—Recent International Experience
Oil Funds
Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Guidelines, and Fiscal Responsibility Legislation
Budgetary Oil Price
IV. Quantitative Assessment of the Impact of Fiscal Institutions on Fiscal Outcomes
Non-Oil Primary Balance
Public Spending
V. A Framework for Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Oil-Producing Countries
Institutions, PFM Systems, and Medium-Term Frameworks
The Role for SFIs Within Broader Institutional Reforms
Appendices
I. Expenditure Patterns in Oil-Producing Countries, 1999–2005
II. Sustainable Fiscal Benchmarks—Key Assumptions and Further Considerations
III. Objectives and Design Features of Fiscal Institutions in the Sample of Oil-Producing Countries
IV. Econometric Analysis of the Impact of Fiscal Institutions on Fiscal Outcomes
References
Boxes
1. The Recent Oil Boom and Previous Oil Shocks
2. Botswana and Chile: Experiences with Fiscal Rules
3. Using Multiyear Fiscal Policy and Planning Frameworks
Tables
3.1. Oil Funds: Gross Financial Assets
4.1. Dependent Variable: Non-Oil Primary Balance
4.2. Dependent Variable: Expenditures
4.3. Dependent Variable: Ratio of the Change in Expenditure to the Change in Oil Revenue
A1.1. Government Expenditures in Selected Oil-Producing Countries
A3.1. Features of Fiscal Responsibility Legislation and Fiscal Rules
A3.2. Features of Oil Funds
Figures
2.1. Cumulative Change in the Non-Oil Primary Deficit Relative to Additional Oil Revenue, 2000–05
2.2. Expenditure Growth and Sustainability Analysis
2.3. Oil Price Projections
3.1. Average Budget and Actual Oil Reference Prices for Selected Oil-Producing Countries
The following conventions are used in this publication:
  • In tables, a blank cell indicates “not applicable,” ellipsis points (…) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
  • An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2005–06 or January–June) indicates the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between years or months (for example, 2005/06) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY (for example, FY2006).
  • “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
  • “Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point).
As used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.

Appendix I Expenditure Patterns in Oil-Producing Countries, 1999–2005

Table A1.1. Government Expenditures in Selected Oil-Producing Countries
(As a share of non-oil GDP, unless otherwise noted)
images
Sources: IMF staff reports and staff estimates.
1 Excluding two large outliers (Angola and Equatorial Guinea).
2 Lower-income countries are those defined by the World Bank as low-income or lower-middle-income countries. Higher-income countries are those defined by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle-income countries (i.e., 2005 gross national income (GNI) per capita above $3,465).
3 Excludes Kazakhstan, Russia, and Timor-Leste, for which 1999 data are not available.
4 For Kazakhstan, Russia, and Timor-Leste, the base year is 2000.
5 Includes extrabudgetary funds when information is available.
6 Based on 12 countries with available data: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Indonesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of Yemen.

Appendix II Sustainable Fiscal Benchmarks—Key Assumptions and Further Considerations

Key Assumptions

The sustainable fiscal benchmark is based on a standard theoretical approach linked to the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) used to determine a sustainable fiscal policy for oil-producing countries. It is defined as the (permanent) annual non-oil primary deficit derived from government net wealth, which is the present value of projected future oil revenues plus the value of net government financial assets.1 IMF teams have increasingly applied similar analytical tools to oil-producing countries, with various intertemporal welfare criteria and country-specific assumptions. In this paper, a standardized and simple approach to estimate the sustainable benchmark has been applied to the whole sample to facilitate comparability.
Constructing a sustainability benchmark for oil-producing countries inclusive of estimated oil wealth depends on key assumptions in a similar way to the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) for other countries. In oil-producing countries, the analysis makes explicit a number of sensitive intertemporal welfare issues. Similar judgments about intertemporal welfare choices are made in the DSA for other countries, but are usually not made explicit. The following key assumptions were made:
  • Estimates of proven oil reserves were taken from British Petroleum (2005). This report inc...

Table of contents

  1. Cover Page
  2. Title Page
  3. Copyright Page
  4. Contents
  5. Abbreviations and Acronyms
  6. Preface
  7. Executive Summary
  8. I. Introduction
  9. II. The Recent Oil Boom
  10. III. Special Fiscal Institutions and the Management of Oil Revenue—Recent International Experience
  11. IV. Quantitative Assessment of the Impact of Fiscal Institutions on Fiscal Outcomes
  12. V. A Framework for Strengthening Fiscal Institutions in Oil-Producing Countries
  13. Appendices
  14. References
  15. Boxes
  16. Footnotes