The Refutation of the Self in Indian Buddhism

Candrakīrti on the Selflessness of Persons

James Duerlinger

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135115005
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Eastern Philosophy

Since the Buddha did not fully explain the theory of persons that underlies his teaching, in later centuries a number of different interpretations were developed. This book presents the interpretation by the celebrated Indian Buddhist philosopher, Candrak?rti (ca. 570–650 C.E.).

Candrak?rti's fullest statement of the theory is included in his Autocommentary on the Introduction to the Middle Way ( Madhyamak?vat?rabhasya ), which is, along with his Introduction to the Middle Way ( Madhyamak?vat?ra ), among the central treatises that present the Pr?savgika account of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophy. In this book, Candrak?rti's most complete statement of his theory of persons is translated and provided with an introduction and commentary that present a careful philosophical analysis of Candrak?rti's account of the selflessness of persons. This analysis is both philologically precise and analytically sophisticated. The book is of interest to scholars of Buddhism generally and especially to scholars of Indian Buddhist philosophy.

1

INTRODUCTION

Part I: On the translation and its study

The text and the character of its study

In the sixth or fifth century BCE¹ at Deer Park in Sarnath, India, Śakhyamuni Buddha introduced a profound teaching about our suffering, its cause, its cessation and the path to its cessation.² In India a number of Buddhist philosophical schools emerged in which it was assumed that his teaching was based on a theory of persons³ they developed into a theory that includes an explanation of the ontological status of persons, a presentation of arguments for the theory and against rival theories, replies to objections to the theory, and an account of the relevance of the theory to the problem of suffering.⁴ A “person” (pudgala, gang zag)⁵ or “self ” (ātman, bdag),⁶ in the Indian Buddhist tradition is that to which we refer when we use the first-person singular pronoun to refer⁷ and to which, by convention, we ascribe person-properties. ⁸ Person-properties include properties such as possessing a body and mind, being a perceiver of objects, a thinker of thoughts about the objects perceived, an agent of actions that experiences the results of its actions, and such like.⁹ Persons or selves are we ourselves as the objects to which we refer by using the first-person singular pronoun, not some entity present in us such as a soul, whose existence is posited within scripture or in a non-Buddhist philosophical school to explain why we ascribe unity and identity over time to ourselves.¹⁰

Since the Buddha did not fully explain the theory of persons that underlies his teaching, in later centuries a number of different interpretations were developed in the schools. One of these interpretations is presented by the celebrated Indian Buddhist philosopher, Candrakīrti (c.570–650 CE),¹¹ in verses 120–65 of the sixth chapter of the Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra)¹² and in his commentary on these verses, which is included in his Autocommentary on the Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya).¹³ Candrakīrti presents his interpretation of the Buddha’s theory of persons as the theory sketched by Nāgārjuna (c.150–250 CE) in the Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakaśāstra),¹⁴ which is the central treatise upon which the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) School of Indian Buddhist philosophy was developed. In what follows, the Introduction to the Middle Way I call the Introduction, Candrakīrti’s Autocommentary on the Introduction I call the Commentary, and Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way I call the Treatise.

In the second chapter of this book, I translate Candrakīrti’s commentary on verses 120–65 of the sixth chapter of the Introduction. In this first chapter I introduce the translation and in the third I add a detailed analytical commentary on the translation. Throughout, I refer to Candrakīrti’s commentary on verses 120–65 as the Commentary and to the verses in it as the Verses. I refer to the Verses by citing the numbers the editors and translators have assigned to them.

Although a few scholars are in the process of editing a Sanskrit copy of the Introduction and its Commentary,¹⁵ their editions may not be available for quite some time. But since there are Tibetan translations¹⁶ available that most scholars of Buddhism believe to be reliable guides to the meaning of the original Sanskrit, the Tibetan translation is used for this study. The edition of the Tibetan text used for the translation is that of Louis de La Vallée Poussin.¹⁷

This book on Candrakīrti’s interpretation of the Buddha’s theory of persons is similar in character to my 2003 book, entitled Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons: Vasubandhu’s “Refutation of the Theory of a Self.” In that book I translated and explained the interpretation of Vasubandhu (c.350-450) as it occurs in the treatise he calls “The Refutation of the Theory of a Self ” (Ātmavādapratiṣedha).¹⁸ Vasubandhu is generally regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the scholastic period of Buddhist thought in India. He appended the “Refutation” to his Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakośa).¹⁹ In the first eight chapters of the Treasury Vasubandhu explains the theses or tenets²⁰ of the Kaśmīrī Vaibhāṣika School (Great Exposition Follower School). In his own commentary on these verses, called the Autocommentary on the Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya), Vasubandhu criticizes the theses of the Kaśmīrī Vaibhāṣika School primarily from the point of view of the original Sautrāntika (ṣūtra Follower) School.²¹ In the “Refutation” Vasubandhu presents and defends the interpretation of the Buddha’s theory of persons accepted within both the Kaśmīrī Vaibhāṣika School and the original Sautrāntika School. Their interpretation is accepted with variations²² in most Indian Buddhist philosophical schools. His treatise is mainly concerned with (i) a presentation and critique of the very different interpretation of the Buddha’s theory that is accepted within the Indian Buddhist philosophical schools called the Pudgalavāda Schools because of the unorthodox account of the “person” (pudgala) presented in them,²³ and (ii) detailed replies to objections to his theory presented by the Pudgalavādins and a non-Buddhist school of philosophers in India called the Vaiśeṣikas (“Particularists”).

In the book on Vasubandhu’s “Refutation” I explained and assessed (i) the interpretations of the Buddha’s theory of persons presented by Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavādins, (ii) Vasubandhu’s arguments for his interpretation and against that of the Pudgalavādins, (iii) the Pudgalavādins’ arguments for their own interpretation and against the sort of interpretation presented by Vasubandhu, and (iv) the replies each gave to the objections presented by the other.²⁴ Although the interpretation of Candrakīrti was explained in relation to those of Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavādins, it was not explained in any detail as it is here. As in the first book, the interpretations of the Buddha’s theory of persons presented by Vasubandhu, the Pudgalavādins, and Candrakīrti I call their own theories of persons, meaning by this that they accept as true the theory of persons they attribute to the Buddha.

An important Mādhyamika Buddhist critique of non-Buddhist Indian theories of persons and the Pudgalavādin theory is included in the verse treatise, Compendium of the Way Things Are (Tattvasaṃgraha), which is composed by Śāntarakṣita (c.eighth century CE) and explained by Kamalaśīla (c.740–795 CE) in his Elucidation of the Compendium of the Way Things Are (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā).²⁵ The Compendium and its commentary have been translated into English,²⁶ but a careful philosophical study of their contribution to Indian Buddhist theories of persons awaits a new translation of the critique of non-Buddhist Indian theories of persons and the Pudgalavādin theory they contain, along with an introduction and a commentary of the sort I have provided here for the theories presented by Vasubandhu and Candrakīrti.²⁷

In my account of Candrakīrti’s theory of persons and its relation to the theories of Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavādins I have repeated little of what I wrote in the earlier book. What is repeated is reworked in a way that clarifies and corrects what is written there and captures the nuances of Candrakīrti’s own use of Indian Buddhist philosophical terms. Nor do I again introduce any non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools.²⁸ Vasubandhu’s account of the meanings of Buddhist philosophical terms is not again explained,²⁹ but the meanings of these terms as used by Candrakīrti are extensively explained, since their explanation is crucial to an understanding and appraisal of his theory of persons. My research into Candrakīrti’s theory of persons has led me to revise my 2003 account of the most basic philosophical questions to which a study of Vasubandhu’s “Refutation” gives rise. I have included the new account of these questions in the Appendix to the present book.

In the earlier book I attributed to Vasubandhu the sameness thesis, which is that a self is the same as the collection of aggregates (skandha-s, phung po) in dependence upon which it is conceived. The aggregates are the ever-changing momentary elements of our bodies and minds that the Buddha identifies as the phenomena in dependence upon which a self is conceived. In the Commentary Candrakīrti assumes that all proponents of the sameness thesis believe that the aggregates are substantially real in the sense that each exists by its own nature. What exists by its own nature is what exists independently or by itself. Candrakīrti interprets the sameness thesis in two different ways. In the first interpretation a self is an object of the first-person singular pronoun that does not possess person-properties, and the sameness thesis is the thesis that it is the same as a collection of substantially real aggregates. In the second interpretation a self is an object of the first-person singular pronoun that is a possessor of person-properties and the sameness thesis is the thesis that it is the same as a collection of aggregates in the sense that the conception of a self refers to a collection of substantially real aggregates.

Let us call the self in the first interpretation of the sameness thesis “a self without person-properties,” meaning by this an object of the first-person singular pronoun that does not possess person-properties. Let us call the self in the second interpretation “a person-property self,” meaning by this the object of the first-pe...