Social Deviance

Social policy, action and research

Leslie T. Wilkins

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN:
  9781136424526
• Topic: Medicine
• Subtopic: Health Care Delivery

Tavistock Press was established as a co-operative venture between the Tavistock Institute and Routledge & Kegan Paul (RKP) in the 1950s to produce a series of major contributions across the social sciences.
This volume is part of a 2001 reissue of a selection of those important works which have since gone out of print, or are difficult to locate. Published by Routledge, 112 volumes in total are being brought together under the name The International Behavioural and Social Sciences Library: Classics from the Tavistock Press.
Reproduced here in facsimile, this volume was originally published in 1964 and is available individually. The collection is also available in a number of themed mini-sets of between 5 and 13 volumes, or as a complete collection.

CHAPTER 1

Scientific Evaluation of Social Policy – Is it Needed?

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What is a scientific approach? – Human science and ethics – Uncertainty – Method: the criterion – Destruction and construction – Experience and knowledge – Instruments and feelings – Ends and means – Why do research?

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The social services in all countries are hotly debated. No matter what level of provision is or is not made for the socially vulnerable groups within a culture, some persons regard these as totally inadequate while others see them as excessive and as waste of taxpayers’ money. Neither side in this debate is at present able to produce in support of its beliefs much evidence that is sufficiently ‘scientific’ to withstand critical analysis. But the ‘scientific approach’ is now being demanded from many quarters.

What is a Scientific Approach?

What is meant by a scientific approach? What is generally defined as ‘science’? It is easier to define the ‘scientific method’ than to define ‘a science’. Perhaps ‘a science’ might be defined as a discipline which made use of the ‘scientific method’ and ‘science’ as a body of knowledge obtained by means of this method. The scientific method is completely independent of the subject-matter, in all its essentials; it is a coherent plan for investigating complex systems and states of affairs including great organizations involving men, materials, machines, and money. The method ensures that the results are reproducible, valid, and efficient, and that departures from any of these requirements can be stated and measured. Sometimes ‘science’ is defined as an organized body of knowledge (acquired by the rigorous scientific method) of the workings of the world of systems and institutions as well as of things and people. T. H. Huxley (1872) remarked, ‘… by science I understand all knowledge which rests upon evidence and reasoning of a like character to that which claims our assent to ordinary scientific propositions …’

There is something unsatisfactory about all definitions of ‘science’, and even the ‘scientific method’ is not immune from philosophical questioning. None the less, while people’s ideas of what science is differ, and not all scientists or even philosophers of science are completely agreed, it is both a term and a methodology to which people react strongly. Some people look on what they believe to be science as something remote and treat it with far too much respect or even fear. Others, dismissing what they cannot understand as, therefore, invalid, say that they are ‘not going to be blinded by science’. Both methods of rejection of the scientific method are unsatisfactory and unnecessary.

Another view is that there are some areas of human activity that are outside the scope of the scientific method. This may be true of the creative arts, but the scope of the scientific method, as well as its power, has been rapidly and relentlessly increasing. Matters which were outside the province of science a few years ago are now being studied by scientific methods, and there is little doubt that the province of science will continue rapidly to increase.

There are some who would think of themselves as scientists who would take the view that their ability to understand a phenomenon or process was a satisfactory criterion of the degree to which science had been able to explain it. But clearly there could be few advances in knowledge if every advance were tested by the ability of the majority of people, or even the majority of scientists, to understand it and to feel subjectively satisfied with the evidence. Democratic evaluation of this kind has a place, indeed an important place, in the scientific method, but its place is limited. There are, of course, rules for the acceptance of evidence other than democratic evaluation and the subjective satisfactions of the scientist.

Human Science and Ethics

It was at one time thought that ‘human’ problems were outside the scope of the proper functions of scientific inquiry, but few today would take this view in any general way, although they might select specific areas as improper for application of the scientific method. The problems of human behaviour and of social administration and management are well within the range of known scientific methods of analysis. The tools of science today can be applied to problems of evaluating social action.

In the past most social agencies claimed support for their activities from voluntary or government funds on the grounds that they were ‘right’ (i.e. ethical) and therefore it must be more effective to do what they proposed than to continue with less humane systems. For example, it was argued that treatment in ‘open’ penal institutions must be more effective in reforming criminals than punitive detention in secure prisons. It was also argued that provision of after-care for discharged prisoners was right, and therefore must be more effective than merely leaving them alone to find their own ways back into society. These and all similar arguments confound two factors: it may be right (ethical) to provide certain facilities such as after-care of prisoners and to use ‘open’ institutions, but these are matters of a different order from the assumption of effectiveness, which is a matter of fact that can be ascertained. Indeed, ethical considerations cannot be soundly based unless they are based on evidence which is itself independent of ethical considerations.

It may be believed that it is wrong to flog offenders, but it is difficult to make such a claim unless it is known whether or not those flogged tend afterwards to commit more or fewer offences than those not flogged. It could be that flogging resulted in fewer reconvictions by offenders so dealt with, and yet it may still be held that it would be wrong to flog. But suppose that all those flogged subsequently lived good lives and all those not flogged returned to a life of crime, could flogging then be considered to be unethical? It might be so argued if other aspects of flogging could be found which were relevant to the issues, but these other factors would need similar assessment. Again, some would argue that flogging is ethical – the offender, they believe, must be given a taste of his own medicine. But ifall those flogged returned to crime, and all those not flogged lived good lives, it would be difficult to sustain the view that flogging was right. The extreme views on either side of the controversy regard the out-come of flogging as irrelevant. But can such a position be regarded as reasonable or ethical?

If we have no information of the outcome, how can we make sound ethical judgements? Clearly such judgements are possible only in limiting cases. It cannot be argued that scientific considerations are independent of ethical considerations, since it is highly probable that the scientific method will be necessary to provide the basic evidence upon which sound ethical judgements can be based. The scientific method, as we shall subsequently see in more detail, is not concerned with ethics, nor is it concerned with the arts, but the arts cannot (and generally do not) ignore science. Similarly, ethical arguments cannot avoid considerations of scientific data.

Uncertainty

It is often believed that science deals with things about which we can be certain, and that areas of experience where uncertainty and the philosophy of indeterminism are relevant are not fields for scientific inquiry. This was at one time true. Uncertainty was once a topic that science knew nothing about, but modern science has made notable successes in dealing with uncertainty. The scientific method can now deal with uncertainty both within the atom and within the human brain, both in the individual and in the human and animal group.

Uncertainty is dealt with by modern probability theory. Chances can be measured, risks can be calculated and strategies assessed. Measurements in these terms relate directly to problems of social administration and individual casework and real life.

But there are areas where science is not important – even aside from ethics. There are areas where human insight and creative art are by no means out of date. Indeed, the scientific method has been used to provide information regarding situations in which human creativity may be increased.

In the complex and costly business of social action we should not leave to chance any area of decision-making or any aspect of any situation that can be properly studied. By properly, we mean rigorously and powerfully and in such ways that other people may verify any results for themselves – in fact, we mean scientifically.

The scientific method can lift issues completely out of the area of controversy. It provides a court of appeal.

Method: The Criterion

If two scientists disagree on any issue, and the issue is within the ambit of science, then it must be possible for them to agree on a procedure which they can both accept as a critical test of their points of difference. For reasons of personality they may not be able to get together to work out such a test procedure, but it must exist as a possibility. If such a critical test cannot be imagined as possible, then the issue between them is not a scientific issue. The scientific method does not vary with the subject-matter, but is the same irrespective of its results and basically the same in all the sciences.¹

Destruction and Construction

The different social agencies which operate in most societies today have many functions – some preventive, some constructive, some preservative, and some remedial. All have, perhaps, one feature in common: they aim to make groups or individuals more effective members of society, by direct or indirect means. They are concerned with social change. There seems to be no reason why agencies whose objectives are to build up society should be content with less powerful tools than those whose job is destruction. The problems are often similar but reversed. We can even refer to the ‘war on want’ and the ‘war on crime’. These phrases are more than picturesque terms, they refer to the idea of a strategy which underlies both planned actions in war and actions in social administration. The use of scientific method in war was proved of extreme value in terms of effective destruction, and it can be applied equally to social construction in peace.

What did the scientific method achieve in war? A few examples have become generally known. The effectiveness of radar was doubled by means of a scientifically planned strategy. The Royal Air Force stated that by the use of certain analytical procedures the strategy for submarine attack was improved to the extent that the number of ‘kills’ increased by 700 per cent. The mining strategy used against the Japanese was credited with the loss of 1,200,000 tons of shipping. Much was learned about flying safety, and many lives of friendly forces were saved.

It may be easier to measure the damage done in war than the productivity or constructive work achieved in peacetime by social agencies, but there is no inherent reason why this should be so. When we are fighting for our country and motivated by patriotism we may be more willing to try scientific methods and to be a little more ‘hard boiled’ about our problems, but we can find ways of evaluating our socially constructive strategies as well if we try. Indeed it is our duty to try to do so.

Any social agency supported by taxpayers’ money or voluntary funds has a duty to study and evaluate its effectiveness and to seek continuously to improve the methods it employs to achieve its objectives. It is not enough to believe, however sincerely, that we are doing good. It is not enough to invoke ‘experience’ or to collect meaningless and misleading information. It is not completely honest to spend money on giving attention to people who do not need such attention, or to those who might be better integrated with society if they were not disturbed by unsought ministrations of well-meaning people. It is not enough to rely upon the support of colleagues and those in the same professional group and to accept their endorsement of our work as proof of its effectiveness. Professional in-group support does not measure effectiveness and does not absolve us from accountability for our decisions. The effectiveness of social agencies, it is claimed, is a question to be determined empirically by methods which can be repeated and verified by others.

Experience and Knowledge

The need for evaluation of social action is not completely agreed. To some it seems an absolute and obvious necessity, but others would claim that even if it were possible, which they doubt, it is still not necessary specifically to plan evaluative routines. The money so spent, they claim, would be far better spent in doing more of the particular work which the agency has as its commitment.

Perhaps the argument most frequently put forward against the demand for rigorous evaluation of social action is that of experience. It is ‘obvious from experience’ that the system is doing good, that patients are getting better, and that clients are profiting from the work of the caseworker. The experience to which defences of this kind usually refer is the experience of colleagues or an é1ite. ‘No one can test my methods unless they have been trained in them,’ is a frequent assertion. Let us examine the nature of this kind of proposition.

Interesting personal experiences can certainly be cited to defend almost any policy or system or action. The testimonials received by various patent medicine companies are not fakes, yet in many cases it is known that the ‘cure’ could not possibly have been due to the effect of the ‘treatment’. Large proportions of patients given a placebo in medical clinical trials are convinced that the ‘medicine’ did them good – they know from their experience. In fact, in many cases they are definitely better.

There may be many cases where the most desirable action is to do nothing. But there are many ways in which nothing may be done. A placebo is a way of administering ‘nothing’ to a patient, and indeed to do ‘nothing’ in any other way would defeat the objectives of the trials. If the patient knew or believed that nothing had been done, his reactions would not be comparable with those of the experimental group. It may defeat these objectives if the patient believes that nothing is being done, even if action is taking place, and, conversely, belief that something is being done may be sufficient to be ‘effective’. But the decision to do nothing, in no matter what way it may appear, should always be recognized for what it is by those responsible. Where we know nothing, it may be preferable to do nothing, but if we do not know that we know nothing, we shall never learn any more. One word can always be said in favour of doing nothing (or perhaps in favour of the use of a suitable placebo): unlike many other things we may do, this course of inaction is likely to do no harm; it will leave room for spontaneous recovery.

Time, it has been said, in anothe...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• The International Behavioural and Social Sciences Library
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Scientific evaluation of social policy-is it needed?
• 2 The divide - action and research: 'pure' and applied
• 3 The place of theory
• 4 A general theory of deviance Deviance, opportunity, and normality
• 5 Models or muddles? Towards a strategy for social work and research
• 6 What problems? What priority? General social accounting and priority for action
• 7 Problem into model Transformation and communication
• 8 Target, criteria, ends, and means
• 9 Measurement and estimation of pay-off
• 10 Groups, loops, and hierarchies Decision-making networks
• Appendices
• I SELECTION OF TARGET AREAS
• II ARE MATCHING DESIGNS SATISFACTORY?
• III EVALUATION OF TRAINING PROGRAMMES
• IV CONFIDENCE AND COMPETENCE IN DECISION-MAKING
• Index