From Nationalism to Internationalism

Akira Iriye

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781134555543
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Literature
• Subtopic: Literary Criticism
• Index: Literature

First published in 2001. This is Volume X of the Foreign Policies of the Great Powers eleven part series and focuses on the policies of the United States. From 1776 to 1914. It includes sections demonstrating the U.S. journey from Internationalistic Nationalism to Nationalistic Internationalism.

Chapter 1

Introduction

What were the characteristics of United States foreign relations before World War I? Too often American foreign policy in the nineteenth century has been described in simplistic terms, such as geographical isolation, withdrawal from European politics, continental expansion, and the like. According to such interpretations, American foreign relations were unique because the United States was different from other countries in size, population and history. By the same token, every country’s foreign policy would be distinct. But to stress these intrinsic differences does not help much when one explores the interaction between nations and tries to examine their responses in some comparative perspective. The study of international relations, after all, is a study in comparative history; one analyzes why a nation acts in a particular manner by contrasting it with the ways other countries behave. It is not enough, or even meaningful, to say that American foreign affairs were determined by the country’s existential conditions and domestic forces, for the same would be true of all countries.

One must, then, begin by establishing an analytical scheme in terms of which United States foreign policy may be studied in a comparative framework. Several conceptualizations have been proposed for studying the period under consideration, of which two stand out. One stresses a ‘realistic’ nature of American foreign policy in much of the nineteenth century. The history of United States foreign relations was on the whole a success story; the nation acquired territories and amassed wealth at little cost, and managed to avoid foreign complications of serious magnitude. Such achievements, according to this interpretation, were due to a great extent to the adroit handling of foreign policy by the country’s leaders who had a clear idea of what they wanted and a pragmatic sense of the available means to obtain it. As George F. Kennan has written in his ‘Memoirs: 1950-1963’ (1972):

In such casual reading on American diplomatic history as I had had occasion to do while in government, I had been struck by the contrast between the lucid and realistic thinking of early American statesmen of the Federalist period and the cloudy bombast of their successors of later decades . . . I was surprised to discover how much of our stock equipment, in the way of the rationale and rhetoric of foreign policy, was what we had inherited from the statesmen of the period from the Civil War to World War II, and how much of this equipment was utopian in its expectations, legalistic in its concept of methodology, moralistic in the demands it seemed to place on others, and self-righteous in the degree of high-mindedness and rectitude it imputed to ourselves. (1)

American foreign policy, in this instance, can be examined in terms of the interaction between realism and idealism, or pragmatism and moralism. Such a dichotomizing scheme has had an enormous impact on the study of the subject.

The second popular interpretation sees continuity and unity, rather than discontinuity and diversity, in the way the United States has related itself to the world. The nineteenth century saw the country expand territorially and commercially, according to this view, and expansion was to be a key theme of twentieth-century American foreign relations. Expansion was not only territorial or economic but also political and ideological; Americans wanted to Americanize the world by disseminating knowledge and reshaping other societies in accordance with democratic principles. Such an interpretation stresses a monolithic thematic unity in the history of the United States foreign policy and is critical of the dichotomizing scheme of Kennan and others. As Bruce Kuklick has noted, in his ‘American Policy and the Division of Germany’ (1972),

there is a serious conceptual confusion in the analysis. One must believe that diplomats are a breed of schizophrenic robots who have two alternative centers of motivation, one quasi-Machiavellian . . . the other starry-eyed and impractical . . . These forms of analysis neglect an elementary psychological and philosophical insight - that human beings normally see the world as a coherent whole and that ideology and interest are inseparable. (2)

Instead of the interplay between two opposite behavior and thought patterns, then, the second interpretation would emphasize an underlying world-view which was remarkably unchanging throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. Disparate episodes and events of American diplomacy would become intelligible as aspects of the ethos of economic, political and cultural expansionism. Thus, according to Walter LaFeber’s ‘America, Russia, and the Cold War’ (1972).

In the middle of the nineteenth century, two events began to reshape American views toward revolutions: the continental conquest was completed, and Americans began emphasizing the commercial aspects of their foreign policy instead of landed expansion. These overseas commercial interests became especially important, for stability, peace, and confidence in the sanctity of contract were essential to any great trading venture. By 1900, the United States had burgeoned into a power which combined the interesting characteristics of being conservative ideologically and expansive economically. (3)

Regardless of the merit or demerit of the dualistic or the monolithic interpretation of American diplomacy, these conceptual schemes do not seem totally adequate as analytical tools when one studies United States foreign relations in a comparative framework and in an international context, which is the aim of this book. Both of the above approaches emphasize the uniqueness of American responses to foreign affairs, and they come close to viewing United States foreign relations as a function of the national character - whether one stresses its proclivity to moralism or systematic urge to expand. But we will never know in what ways the United States may differ in this respect from other countries. After all, neither moralism nor expansionism is a monopoly of the American people, and the question is whether the latter can be said to be more, or in a distinctive way, moralistic and expansionist than others. But then, it may be asked if these categories are really useful in comparing the foreign policies of the United States, Britain, Germany and others. Moreover, the emphasis on certain thematic unity does not help much when one tries to account for shifts and turns in American foreign relations. These do not exist in a vacuum but must be viewed in the context of the overall international system at a given moment. The international system itself keeps changing at all times, and one must relate American attitudes, ideas and policies to the changing framework and environment. The relationship here is neither undirectional nor automatic. The American ethos, even if such a thing existed, would take different shapes and expressions as it interacted with the environment. Conversely, the latter would also be affected by the way the United States perceived the external world.

These interactions and interrelationships are so complex that a monolithic or a dualistic interpretation of United States foreign policy is likely to be of limited usefulness. Still, some conceptual scheme is essential if one is not merely to intone a myriad of diplomatic negotiations, decisions and opinions without much structure but to develop a coherent synthesis. In order to facilitate our understanding and analysis of United States foreign relations before 1914, then, it will be helpful first to consider the period before 1865 and note the sources of American thinking and behavior in the international arena.

Americans related themselves to the outside world in a number of ways. But by the mid-nineteenth century, at least five levels or modes of this interaction had become visible: geopolitical factors, internationalist ideas, national interest considerations, special interests and mass culture. These are not mutually exclusive categories, and the same individual may respond to foreign issues at any one or more of these levels, depending on circumstances. By the same token, a single foreign policy decision may be characterized as a manifestation of several of these factors. But by identifying at least these five components or levels of American attitudes, assumptions, ideas and policies - in short, five dimensions of the American perceptions of the world - we may be able to appreciate the complexity and diversity of American foreign affairs and to trace their changing characteristics over time.

1 GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS

‘Our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs.’ So wrote Alexander Hamilton for the ‘Federalist’ in 1788. By ‘the system of American affairs’ he meant international affairs in the Western Hemisphere. For the United States to aim at an ascendant position in the hemisphere implied a geopolitical view of foreign relations. According to Hamilton, ‘The world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests.’ These four were: Europe, Africa, Asia and America. As he saw the world situation, he was persuaded that ‘Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination.’ Such a situation was not conducive to the peace, welfare, or security of the United States. In order to ensure these goals, then, it was incumbent upon the latter to strengthen itself through unity and to extend its influence to other parts of the American continent so as to balance the growing power of the European nations.

Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! [he exclaimed,] Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influences, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world! (4)

Here was the essence of ‘realpolitik’ or globalistic thinking which provided one component of American foreign policy. As Hamilton saw it, the crucial thing was to view the United States in the context of world politics as a whole and to ask in what kind of international system the nation’s security and interests could best be safeguarded. And he had no doubt that given the superiority of the European powers, the best strategy for the United States was to promote a regional system in the Americas. This could conceivably take the form of American hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. But the key factor was the willingness of the American people to play a role in international politics so as to ‘dictate the terms of the connection’ between Europe and America - in other words, to establish a balance between the Old world and the New. Hamilton had nothing to say about the role of the United States in Asia and Africa, presumably because these were already under European domination and the United States was too weak to do much about it. But at least in the Western Hemisphere the country had, or should have, the power and will to limit the extension of European power. This continent should be marked as America’s sphere of influence.

Geopolitical globalism had, of course, characterized one facet of European diplomacy since the seventeenth century. As they pondered the question of the ‘reason of state,’ European statesmen invariably thought of the balance of power not only in their part of the world but also elsewhere. Colonial wars of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries were in part caused by power-political thinking; capturing another country’s colony would automatically lessen its power, and since this was considered a relative thing, it followed that a state must do what it could to reduce the relative power of the others. (5) Such considerations had been particularly pertinent to European diplomacy vis-à-vis the American continent in the eighteenth century, as exemplified by William Pitt’s foreign policy which regarded imperial interests as even more important than purely European interests. From his point of view French power could be reduced by attacking Canada and reducing French influence in North America. Thus the policy of seeking to sustain a balance of power necessitated a geopolitical perspective. American leaders were heirs to this tradition, and it was not surprising that Hamilton, whose views of politics and foreign affairs approximated those of the British, should have been the first to enunciate a doctrine of American power politics.

As will be seen, power politics was by no means the only framework in which Hamilton perceived international affairs; nor was it the sole basis on which the Americans viewed the New World as distinct from the Old. But it should be noted that from its earliest inception the United States exhibited a power-oriented, geopolitical tendency in its foreign policy. This theme was not the major thread in American foreign relations before the Civil War, but it was present in several key episodes and decisions of the first decades of the nineteenth century.

Geopolitical thinking was a factor behind the assertive and highly successful American policy toward the Spanish empire in the Western Hemisphere, as the latter began to break up during the Napoleonic Wars. The Spanish-French alliance of 1795, reversing Spain’s alliance with Britain, involved the country in Napoleon’s wars and made its overseas colonies vulnerable to British attack. Spain relaxed its mercantilistic policies and opened up the colonial ports to neutral shipping in order to provide the colonies with foodstuffs and other materials. This gave an impetus to American commercial expansion in the Caribbean region. Havana and New Orleans flourished with American merchants. Equally important, some of the Spanish colonies in America took advantage of the European wars to set themselves adrift from the imperial bondage. Moreover, the identification of Spanish and French colonial interests induced the Spanish government to retrocede Louisiana to France; this territory had been ceded to Spain by France in 1762, but the former had never made much use of it and was willing to part with it for a substantial sum of money. Napoleon, however, was more interested in challenging the British empire in the East - the Red Sea, India, and beyond. Although Louisiana was formally given back to France in 1801, Napoleon’s global strategy had no specific scheme for the New World.

Here was an opportunity to try to implement the Hamiltonian concept of geopolitical regionalism - the United States would be the key power in the Western Hemisphere. President Thomas Jefferson, a bitter enemy of Hamilton in domestic politics, was in full agreement with such a view. He was convinced that the United States must try to reject European interference in American affairs and to prevent the rise of a strong European power in the New World. Louisiana and New Orleans, in particular, worried him, the former because of its huge size astride the North American continent and the latter because it provided an entrepot for American commerce with the Caribbean. In his famous letter to Robert R. Livingston, Jefferson declared, ‘The day that France takes New Orleans . . . we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.’ Contrary to his fears, New Orleans remained in Spanish hands, but he was determined to obtain it along with lands in the lower Mississippi. When Napoleon instead offered to sell the entire territory of Louisiana, Jefferson eagerly grasped the opportunity. While territorial expansionism was certainly a factor, considerations of power politics - as Gouveneur Morris said, ‘No nation has a right to give to another a dangerous neighbor without her consent’ (6) - played a decisive role in the decision to obtain Louisiana.

The Louisiana purchase (1803) and the simultaneous decline of French and Spanish power in the Western Hemisphere meant a relative increase of American power, and by the second decade of the nineteenth century it was not uncommon to conceive of the United States as the predominant member in the American system of international affairs. The independence of the Spanish American colonies, whose new governments the United States recognized one after another, served to enhance America’s relative position vis-à-vis that of the European powers. Certainly after the War of 1812 (to be discussed below), it could be said that no European power would try to alter drastically the developing equilibrium in the international system in the Americas, where the European nations still retained some of their colonies and played the most important economic roles, but where the predominant position of the United States would be acknowledged. Great Britain, the strongest European and world power, admitted as much when, after the War of 1812, its government expressed its readiness to see the United States develop as the strongest power in the New World. Without British support or acquiescence, no European power would be able or willing to challenge America’s position. Thus, for instance, while France was interested in helping Spain crush the independence movement in Latin America, they would not move for fear of British retaliation. By 1823 the French government was formally denying that it had designs on the former Spanish America. Well might John Quincy Adams boast of ‘our natural dominion in North America.’ (7)

Such dominion fitted well with Britain’s global strategy in the post-Napoleonic world, when the Vienna Conference system of international affairs had brought about the new status quo. A balance of power was maintained among the great nations which shared the same proclivity towards stability, conservatism, and order. The United States was not a member of the system, but the new international order necessarily involved a definition of regional stability in the Western Hemisphere, and after the independence of the Spanish colonies it was generally perceived in terms of the central position of the United States. The British government was particularly anxious to recognize this fact and incorporated it into its vision of global power structure; by acknowledging the emerging status quo in the New World, Britain could ensure peace and order in that part of the world, which in turn would serve to perpetuate the Vienna system. As Lord Castlereagh said in 1820, ‘there are no two States whose friendly relations are of more practical value to each other, or whose hostility so inevitably and so immediately entails upon both the most serious mischiefs.’ (8) Such thinking induced London to approach Washington for formalizing the new status quo in the Western Hemisphere as part of the global order. That the United States government rejected the overtures and instead proclaimed unilaterally the so-called Monroe Doctrine (1823) does not detract from the fact that a regional system of international affairs in the New World was being visualized as a separate entity from the Old World. Actually, by refusing to join Britain in enunciating the principles of hemispheric autonomy and opposition to European interference, the United States failed to have the Monroe Doctrine recognized as international law. It was merely a unilateral assertion which bound no other country. Moreover, there was no danger of European intervention in the New World, and American predominance there was more an ideal than accomplished fact. All the same, the Monroe Doctrine was an example of geopolitical thinking and, whether or not the United States intended it, became an integral part of the Vienna system.

For over twenty years after 1823 the Monroe Doctrine remained dormant, and the successive administrations in Washington did not base its foreign policy explicitly on that doctrine. Nevertheless, the idea of the hemispheric system of international affairs in which the United States played the leading role was always there, and whenever this principle appeared threatened, the government in Washington was quick to act. The most serious challenge seemed to come after Texas declared its independence of Mexico in 1836 and sought incorporation into the United States immediately thereafter. Britain and France recognized the Republic of Texas, and they preferred that the latter remain independent not only of Mexico but of the United States. The British government under Lord Aberdeen expressed the hope that slavery would be abolished in Texas, while France under Premier François Guizot made speeches stressing the desirability of maintaining an equilibrium among independent states in North America. In the meantime, the Mexican government was reported to be giving land grants in California to British subjects and attempting to draw Britain into intervening in the Mexico-United States dispute over the region. Historians disagree whether the United States government took these alleged moves by the European powers seriously, or whether they merely provided a pretext for pursuing a belligerent foreign policy which culminated in the Mexican War (1846-8). (9) ...