The Gestalt Theory And The Problem Of Configuration

Bruno Petermann

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9781138875012
• eBook ISBN:
  9781136308291
• Topic: Medicine
• Subtopic: Health Care Delivery

This is Volume VIII of a series of twenty-one on Cognitive Psychology. Originally published in 1932, this study looks at the problem of configuration and the Gestalt Theory, its empirical foundation and dynamics.

BOOK TWO

TOWARDS A CRITICISM OF THE GESTALT THEORY

To enquire into the tenability of the gestalt theory’s hypotheses, it is necessary to follow up more exactly the details which form the concrete support for the convictions of its adherents.

Here we need not concern ourselves further with the precursor of the gestalt theory, the derivation of gestalten from field excitations and short circuit processes, as Wertheimer represented these in 1912.²⁷ We have already shown above (here ff.) that this derivation proceeds from a wholly synthetic-atomistic angle, since it conceives a “total process” (“simultaneous ϕ”) as arising out of primarily basal elementary excitations through definite “cross processes”. Hence it is at once evident that this mode of explanation does not accomplish what must be demanded of it on the basis of the special standards since then laid down by the gestalt theoreticians themselves. According to Köhler’s disquisition of 1924, the being configured, the “intrinsic articulation” of our perceptual data, can only be admitted to be explained if, firstly, it has been deduced that in general certain inner coherences can arise physiologically within the primarily basal aggregate of single excitations; and secondly, if over and above this it is also made evident, that such coalescences appear just in this very manner, that is, directed towards intrinsic articulation. The second requirement can certainly not be coped with on the basis of Wertheimer’s theorems. For if a coalescence were at all comprehensible for the physiological elementary processes on the basis of the hypothesized field-excitations, it would have to be a coalescence “of all with all”. A selective coalescence, such as the facts demand, such that the various gestalt units delimit themselves within the field of vision over against one another, cannot be envisaged by Wertheimer. And the assertion that Wertheimer’s “simultaneous ϕ” at all events explains the fact of coalescence occurring at all, is equally unproven. Wertheimer himself can say nothing more about this ϕ process than that it presents a “kind of physiological connectedness, indeed a unitary total process resulting as a whole out of the single physiological excitations”. Thus he simply hypostasizes what has to be explained without making the attempt to show the connection directly “from the starting point of physics”, that is, from the starting point of the physiologically known properties of the excitation processes which can be presumed. If one attempts to fill in these gaps by Wertheimer’s means of thinking, one arrives back at the points Exner established (see above, here). However the genesis of the so-called “total excitations” may be conceived, physiologically nothing more is present than a multiplicity of states of excitation of single cells, in reciprocal action, it is true, in virtue of the so-called “short circuits”. The situation is by no means improved by this introduction of a “short circuit” effect as the principle of the reciprocal action—apart from the fact that the vagueness of the whole position is only increased thereby. “Just as the optic nerve excitations cannot become whole processes by reason of their antagonistic induction, so this cannot ensue for them by reason of any other sort of reciprocal action.” (G. E. Müller, 1923, here.) We must thus conclude, with G. E. Müller: “It is therefore an evasion to designate a collection of excitations a unitary total process because of the circumstance that they mutually influence one another through cross-functions.” Wertheimer gives us nothing more than a bare verbal solution of the problem.

Hence our critical discussion need no longer delay over it. We shall therefore turn immediately to the final form of the gestalt theory, as this presents itself to-day, and we shall attempt to test how well it is founded.

What is most impressive here is that Köhler seems to have been successful in extending the gestalt principle to the territory of physics, which is held to be so secure, in scientific theory, and then providing an hypothetical psychophysical substructure for the psychological gestalt theory.

These considerations of his are so impressive for the reason that, to a certain extent, they present a “transcendental” deduction of the gestalt category in general, and, at the same time, a physico-physiological deduction of the gestalt psychology, in particular. Accordingly, we shall have to come thoroughly to terms with them.

Not till our second book shall we take up the detailed investigations of the empirical research which has been instituted from the viewpoint of the gestalt theory’s position, for the purpose of verifying, or establishing and elaborating it. We shall have to put these empirical findings to the proof as to their true scope, on the basis of immanent criticism, as well as by comparison and contrast with other observations.

PART ONE

TOWARDS AN APPRAISEMENT OF THE CONSTRUCTIONAL FOUNDATION OF THE GESTALT THEORY

The possibility of building up the system of gestalt psychology in a really constructional manner is due, as we have seen, to Köhler’s grounding of the gestalt theory upon physical considerations, and the physiological elaboration of these.

It has its roots in Köhler’s fundamental thesis that even in physics there are provinces subject to the gestalt category. And it is accomplished in Köhler’s attempt so to construct the neurophysical happening (on the basis of this insight into the logical structure of certain provinces of physics, and with the concrete approach of “physics as the starting point”) that the phenomenal gestalten appear to be explained.

Criticism of the hypothetical foundation of gestalt psychology will therefore have to concern itself firstly with Köhler’s gestalt physics, and secondly with Köhler’s gestalt physiology.

CHAPTER I

KÖHLER’S EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE A GESTALT-THEORETICAL PROVINCE IN THE SYSTEM OF PHYSICS

An analysis of Köhler’s gestalt physics must extend to two, in themselves well delimited, parts of physics, the theory of electrolytic solutions, and the theory of physical “distribution systems”.

The peculiar nature of these two spheres, Köhler considers, justifies one in speaking of a gestalt-theoretical province in the system of physics. For the dominant significance of specific gestalt-theoretical categories is supposed to be discoverable in them, through the closer epistemological clarification of their conceptual structure. Let us consider the first of these spheres.

1. KÖHLER’S “DEMONSTRATION OF A FIRST PHYSICAL GESTALT FACTOR”

§ 18. Köhler’s line of argument in proof of the gestalt character of systems of electrolytic solutions

The proof Köhler adduces as warrant for his view that systems of electrolytic solutions have gestalt character, appears to be very simple. The facts to which Köhler refers can readily be reviewed. Let us, to bring a concrete example in support immediately, consider two solutions, one of HCL and one of LiBr, separated, to begin with, by an impermeable partition. Now imagine instead of this isolating partition another one introduced which allows the diffusion of the two solutions; or in fact imagine the partition removed. An extraordinary phenomenon now occurs in this whole. At the surface of contact of the two electrolytes—which of course were previously in nowise electrically charged—there arises an electrical difference of potential. That is to say, the whole made up of the two solutions reveals a characteristic electrical property. And this property, this difference of potential at the boundary surface, was certainly not present before contact of the two solutions was produced, while the solutions together did not yet constitute a whole; for the solutions were previously electrically “neutral”.

Is it therefore not true that in very fact “the characteristic properties . . . of the whole do not [allow] of being put together from properties of the parts of a like sort”? Is Köhler correct in affirming that this must indeed be looked upon as a “first physical gestalt factor”?

The question is, whether in fact a new sort of relationship, one that has hitherto escaped epistemological analysis, is revealed in the quoted example; whether in fact the relationships here under discussion “have not hitherto adequately occurred to the philosopher, as a philosophical problem, in the course of his physical enquiries”. To settle the point, we shall follow out more clearly, how the physical facts of the matter and the logical interpretation must be confronted with each other. We believe that the philosophical elucidation of the physical facts of the matter demands not only this logical orientation, but far more a correct physical interpretation. With Köhler this very physical interpretation appears at one place, but this the crucial one, to be inappropriate.

What does “part” of the whole mean in a solution system? Does the physicist actually view the relationship in a manner which makes it permissible to treat the two single solutions, as such, as “parts”? If Köhler himself speaks of the physically “real character” of the whole, and sees in this the justification for alleging physical gestalten in general, one may, conversely, with at least equal if not greater justice, insist that the concept of “part”, too, should have meaning only in so far as a “physical reality” is actually connoted by it.

Now what are the “physical realities” which, as “parts” of the solution system, constitute the system of reactions according to physical theory? In the view of physical theory, they are, as is well known, the ions of the solutions concerned.²⁸ It is well known, too, that physics explains the fact of the occurrence of a difference of potential at the surface of contact also in terms of the ions. It appears as a consequence of diffusion taking place. Before osmotic communication, the pairs of ions of the two solutions are arranged in two groups (e.g. Solution 1, H⁺ and Cl⁻; Solution 2, Li⁺ and Br⁻) so that each group appears superficially to be electrically neutral. Then diffusion takes place, the distribution of the ions within the whole alters. The ions travel at varying velocities corresponding to the ionic concentration in the two solutions. The varying velocity of the ions causes the difference in electrical potential. This, therefore, explains Köhler’s phenomenon. But the explanation—quite contrary to Köhler’s belief—is obviously directly in terms of the interaction of the parts.

The relevant property of the whole seems to be wholly derivable from “properties of the parts of a like sort”. The ions have a characteristic electrical charge in their own right. And even if something special can be demonstrated to hold superficially for the solution system of charges in the form of the potential difference, this by no means signifies the appearance of a phenomenon which was not present in the components.

Thus, in following up a line of thought which insists that the concept “part” must be applied in a narrower fashion, one adapted to the physical facts of the matter, the conclusion soon emerges that Köhler’s argument collapses at all points. The remarkable logical fact he alleges to have discovered vanishes.

Even if Köhler is not willing to grant our demand that the facts be held to in applying the concept “part” to be a just one, the position is still untenable for him, once we have penetrated somewhat more deeply into the physical facts. Our argument can be adapted to this, too.

We may safely concede to Köhler that it is possible to say that the two components can be regarded as “parts” of the electrolytical system of solutions, in the true sense. Are the properties in question then really not “present” in forms “of a like sort” in these parts? Of course, they are not apparent as potential differences, superficially distinguishable. But such properties, alike in kind to subsequently arising potential differences, are nevertheless “present”!

It is true, one does not take note of these when one thinks of what one is dealing with as a “solution”, as defined simply in its pre-scientific sense; but only when one takes into account, that the moment one speaks of the physical state of affairs, the “electrolytic solution”, everything is implied which belongs essentially to this solution, in any way, as a physical property of it; that is, above all that property which is directly characteristic of it, the state of ionization which alone makes the solution ah “electrolytic” one.

When this fact is taken into account, viz. that definite electrical properties are already specific for the physical character of those “parts” from the outset, even setting aside the consideration that they are parts of the whole osmotic system, the antithesis which seduced Köhler to his far-reaching inferences disappears. It exists, in fact, solely for a conception of the data which stands suspiciously near to a pre-physical way of thinking. In an analysis which probes the physical constructs in the totality of their properties, these difficulties, on the contrary, vanish completely.

Probably this last form of our argument, at all events, should be acknowledged as effective even by Köhler. For indeed, the same idea lies at the basis of his own exposition, in the place where he disavows the attempt to propose chemical compounds as examples of super-summative structures in the sphere of natural science. It is true that in these compounds the “whole” does actually possess properties quite different from those of the “parts”; and it is true that in the present stage of theoretical interpretation the properties of the whole cannot be deduced from those of the parts. Yet he does not in any way accept such chemical compounds as evidence in proof of the true occurrence of gestalt phenomena in nature. For “after so many marvels of discovery in natural science, it is possible, too, that the apparent new formation currently acknowledged by the as yet hardly a century old chemistry, may some day be reduced to basic physical conceptions, as physics and physical chemistry progress”.

Exactly similar is the line of argument we have carried through in opposition to Köhler’s pre-scientifically conceived concept of “solution”. For we have established that the only concept of electrolytical solution relevant to the discussion is the one authentic to, and really elaborated in detail by, natural science; and we have then observed that the singular facts fundamental for Köhler do actually vanish on this view.

§ 19. Becher’s version of Köhler’s line of argument

T...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• INTRODUCTION THE PROBLEM OF CONFIGURATION AND THE GESTALT THEORY
• BOOK ONE
• BOOK TWO
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX