The Invasion of Afghanistan and UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-1982

Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume VIII

Richard Smith, Patrick Salmon, Stephen Robert Twigge, Richard Smith, Patrick Salmon, Stephen Robert Twigge

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781136325489
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia de Asia Central

This volume examines British policy towards the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

The documents in this volume, many released into the public realm for the first time, describe the development of British policy towards the Soviet Union during the eventful years 1979-1982. The new Conservative government, under Margaret Thatcher, was determined to strengthen British defences against the perceived Soviet threat and advocated a strong response to the Soviet intervention. East-West relations further deteriorated following the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. The dilemma facing the British government was how to express strong disapproval of Soviet actions while still attempting to maintain a constructive bilateral relationship, and at the same time keep British policy in line with the Western Alliance. The death of President Brezhnev in November 1982, after 18 years in office, brought uncertainty but also new opportunities for relations with the Soviets.

This book will be of much interest to students of British politics and foreign policy, Russian history, US foreign policy, Central Asian politics, and IR in general.

CHAPTER I

7 December 1979 – 1 December 1981

CHAPTER I

7 December 1979 – 1 December 1981

No. 1

Lord Carrington (FCO) to Sir C. Keeble (Moscow), 7 December 1979¹

Confidential (FCO 28/3683, EN 021/2)

British Policy in East-West Relations

Sir,

1. The security of Britain and the democratic world requires the successful management of East-West relations. The Government need a carefully considered policy in this field. The Heads of Mission Conference in London on 19 October discussed this and the present despatch sets out my conclusions. They should guide the work of our Missions which are concerned with East-West matters and will help posts to counter deliberate misrepresentation by communist countries of speeches by British Ministers.

2. On its own admission, the Soviet Union seeks to defeat the West in a struggle waged by all means short of war. The Russians hope, with their military strength, one day to become the dominant factor in Europe. ‘Détente’ for them is a tactic to lessen the risk of nuclear confrontation and secure technology, credits and grain. In their view it does not require them to slow down their military build-up, relax their internal dictatorship, loosen their grip on Eastern Europe or renounce their freedom to intervene in developing countries.

3. Some of our Allies have specific interests in East-West relations. The US needs to manage its relationship with the other super-power in the new situation of nuclear parity. The Federal Republic of Germany seeks a reduction in East-West tensions in order to keep Berlin quiet, to promote the emigration of ethnic Germans from the East and to facilitate the development of its own links with the German Democratic Republic. France has had particular reasons for developing a special relationship with the Soviet Union, both to assert its independent role in international affairs and to blur the apparent contradiction between the existence of a large Communist Party and the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent and an expensive defence budget. The United Kingdom, by contrast, has no exclusively national interests in East-West relations. Our interest is the general but highly important one of trying to ensure that the West maintains the balance of power and minimises the risk of Soviet acts which could significantly upset it. We are thus better placed than some of our Allies to take a consistently objective view of Soviet intentions and to be an active influence for realism in the Alliance’s policies towards the East.

Elements for British Policy

I Western Defences

4. This is the key requirement. Western defences must cover the full spectrum from conventional to strategic deterrence. Indeed it is in the interest of progress in arms control that this should be so. The Soviet Union has no compelling reason to engage in negotiations in areas where the West is weak. Soviet military preponderance could undermine political self-confidence in the West, and the USSR could exploit the situation for political ends, seeking to isolate and demoralise the weaker Alliance countries and spread its influence towards the Atlantic. To withstand this we also need political unity in the Western Alliance and it will be a major British objective to promote it. The Long Term Defence Programme² and the undertakings to increase expenditure by 3 per cent a year in real terms are a demonstration of renewed resolve. The UK will play its part in implementing these decisions and will encourage others to do the same. We are also doing all we can to persuade our Allies to carry through the plans for modernisation of NATO’s longer-range Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF), without which the continuum of capabilities which NATO needs to deter political and military aggression would be broken.

II The Struggle of Ideas

5. The Soviet Union, as part of its duel with the West, has challenged the latter to a contest of ideas. We can win such a contest and our answer should be ‘take you on’. We should not copy Soviet tactics, but should make the most of our own strengths. Our democracy, ensuring that policies rest on public consent, starts with a powerful advantage over a system which cannot tolerate dissent. Soviet fears of Western contamination are an admission of weakness. Our Alliance, based on common interests, is politically stronger than the artificial and unwelcome Warsaw Pact. We in the West must manage our own affairs successfully, particularly our economies, if our ideas and the kind of societies which derive from them are to prevail, not only in East-West terms, but in the struggle for influence in the Third World. Here too I believe we are the stronger, for the USSR despite its long-term economic potential faces chronic problems of inefficient allocation and use of resources and cannot satisfy its consumers. We should work to bring home to developing countries the real nature of the Soviet system, its economic and other failures and its inability or unwillingness to provide economic aid in anything like the sums offered by the West.

III East-West Contacts

6. The Prime Minister has called for contacts with the European communist countries at all levels. There are many purposes in this. One is simply to learn more about those countries, so that our assessments shall be as good as possible and our credentials for advocating policies to our Allies shall be strong. Another purpose is to explain our policies to the East, so that the Soviet Union may better understand the limits of what the West will tolerate. Contacts also enable us to explore shared interests, such as the prevention of the wider proliferation of nuclear weapons.

7. Another purpose of contacts is to promote trade. Although economic and energy problems may depress Eastern Europe’s imports from the West for a time, there are still likely to be major capital projects on offer which will be important for some of our key industries. If the East Europeans overcome their immediate problems, the number of such projects should increase. The decision whether to go after projects and the outcome of commercial negotiations are the responsibility of industry, but, since the Governments of these countries are directly responsible for their foreign trade, political relations play a key role. We shall therefore continue to provide substantial Government support for the efforts of British firms to secure business. I accept that Ministerial contacts can play an important part and we shall develop them as much as possible. Political activity will not win us contracts when we are uncompetitive, but its absence may help us to lose them. There is one important limit to the extent to which Government should support the efforts of British firms. Export credit should be kept to the OECD’s ‘consensus’ rates of interest. We are trying to persuade France and other countries which hitherto have offered over-generous rates to join us in applying consensus rates after the expiry of various bilateral credit agreements with the Soviet Union this winter.

8. East-West contacts are also part of our armoury in the contest of ideas. A major purpose is to do what we can to undermine Soviet power by encouraging the existing tendencies towards diversity within the Warsaw Pact, tendencies exemplified by Romania’s foreign policy, Hungary’s new economic mechanism and Poland’s particular brand of pluralism which was eloquently demonstrated by the Pope’s visit. We have no interest in provoking a crisis in the area, which would again be ended by invasion if the Russians thought it necessary. But the East European countries are generally the best judges of what contacts with the West are safe for them to undertake.

9. Many types of contact have a role. We should also exploit to the limit the licence provided by the Helsinki Final Act.³ We should develop cultural exchanges as far as we can within the financial constraints, using the GB-USSR Association and the GB-East Europe Centre to promote non-governmental exchanges. Tourism is offering increasing numbers of people a glimpse of reality on the other side, a process which in both directions is likely to be to our advantage. ‘Round Table’ discussions between academics, journalists and others can be enlightening, as I know from personal experience. One of the fruits of the Helsinki process was that the Soviet Union felt constrained six years ago to stop jamming the BBC and some other Western radio services. The more alternative opinions are available and listened to, the greater the potential resistance to the official view. In the long run that must be an influence for evolution. That is why the BBC’s services to Eastern Europe are being maintained.

IV The Prevention of Soviet Expansion and the Management of Crises

10. We need to be able to deter and prevent Soviet expansion and to manage East-West crises. Provided we maintain our defences sufficiently in Europe, the major risk is likely to be in the Third World. We need an effective diplomacy and presentation of our policies to help us deal with this. Here too the BBC External Services and the British Council will provide important support.

11. We cannot allow Soviet successes like that in Angola to go on happening, or the impression will gain ground that history is after all on the side of Marxism-Leninism and developing countries’ resistance to intervention will be weakened. The catalogue of Soviet ruptures with Egypt and others will not prevent this. Indeed, after Ethiopia, South Yemen and Vietnam, and the rather different case of Cambodia, the need for a Western stand has become pressing. However the current case of Afghanistan is assessed, the Soviet Union and its proxies sooner or later will contemplate another intervention in an area of importance. It is essential that the West, and the US in particular, should contrive to leave as little room as possible for Soviet miscalculation.

12. High level contacts are the best means for this. The most effective signals will be those which register the danger of provoking East-West military confrontation. We must try to persuade the Americans to make the risks clear in important cases. But the Russians would not believe threats of confrontation if they were made on lesser matters. Here other actions, such as cancellation of major planned events, may have some limited impact.

13. The West should also be fully aware of the leverage at its disposal. When East-West relations are going well the Russians may be more reluctant to upset them. The growing Western relationship with China is a strong constraint on the USSR which much dislikes the idea of a crisis on two fronts, although any deliberate attempt to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute would be risky and its effects unpredictable. Economic levers exist; but technology transfers (outside the COCOM⁴ field) and credits cannot be denied effectively unless a number of Western countries act together, and some seem unlikely to agree to do so; this is a field which requires further study. Grain sales to the USSR offer the Americans a potentially powerful unilateral lever, but commercial interests and other factors have prevented its use.

13. [sic] The other aspect of crisis prevention is to identify the countries where the Soviet Union might be tempted to intervene, and to do what we can to prevent a vacuum emerging. Negotiations like Camp David and our own efforts on Rhodesia are needed to settle regional problems. Western economic aid, and training facilities for the military and security forces of friendly states, have important roles. So have well-timed political gestures, like Ministerial contacts with potentially vulnerable states. The United Kingdom may propose a co-ordinated Western study of how we can try together to prevent more Angolas by leverage and other means.

V Negotiations

14. Balanced arms control can contribute to Britain’s security. With our NATO Allies we have suggested an arms control approach to long-range TNF in parallel with modernisation. I believe that SALT III would be the right forum for this, provided that SALT II is ratified. The negotiation should be a strictly bilateral US/Soviet affair, but with the closest consultation among the Allies. I should like to see some result in the MBFR talks in Vienna. We are currently preparing in the Alliance new proposals for a simplified agreement on US-Soviet ground force reductions and for a package of associated measures. Our aim is that these proposals—together with those on TNF—should be ready for approval at the NATO Ministerial meetings in mid-December. This would enable the Alliance to make a convincing and balanced response to Brezhnev’s speech of 6 October.⁵

15. The Helsinki Final Act was important, principally because it established humanitarian questions on the agenda of East-West relations. It will be our policy to support the CSCE process as a forum for East-West dialogue and in order to keep up the long-term pressure on the Warsaw Pact countries to improve their performance on human rights. We shall therefore work for a successful but realistic outcome of the Madrid review meeting starting in November 1980. We shall press for a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act. We shall seek to exploit the Eastern interest in confidence building measures in order to call for their application throughout the European USSR and also to secure progress over Basket III.⁶ Thus our final agreement to a follow-up meeting on security issues, on the lines of Phase I of the European Disarmament Conference proposed by France, will depend on there also being a satisfactory package of other measures. In the coming months we shall explore the possibilities with the Warsaw Pact countries and stress the need for them to improve their implementation of the Final Act before Madrid and to avoid actions, such as the recent sentences of Charter 77 supporters in Czechoslovakia and restrictions on foreign journalists in East Germany, which are totally inconsistent with the Final Act.

16. The Final Act also strengthens our standing for raising individual human rights cases with the Warsaw Pact countries. We shall continue to press for resolution of all cases where there is a direct family connection wi...