The Federalist Papers (Including Declaration of Independence & United States Constitution)

Written by the Founding Fathers in Favor of the Constitution – Arguments that Created the Modern America

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay

• Publisher: Madison & Adams Press
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9788026875109
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Frühe amerikanische Geschichte

The Federalist Papers, originally written and published during 1787 and 1788 in several New York State newspapers, intended to promote the ratification of the United States Constitution. They were widely read and respected for their masterly analysis and interpretation of the Constitution and constitutional principles upon which the government of the United States was established. This influential collection of 85 articles and essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay remains to this day a treasured historical document for anyone who wants to understand the U.S. Constitution.

The Federalist Papers

(1787-1788)

Table of Contents

FEDERALIST I – General Introduction

FEDERALIST II – Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence

FEDERALIST III – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence

FEDERALIST IV – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence

FEDERALIST V – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence

FEDERALIST VI – Concerning Dangers From Dissensions Between the States

FEDERALIST VII – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Dissensions Between the States

FEDERALIST VII – The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

FEDERALIST IX – The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

FEDERALIST X – The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

FEDERALIST XI – The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy

FEDERALIST XII – The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue

FEDERALIST XIII – Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

FEDERALIST XIV – Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered

FEDERALIST XV – The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XVI – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XVII – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XVIII – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XIX – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XX – The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

FEDERALIST XXI – Other Defects of the Present Confederation

FEDERALIST XXII – The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation

FEDERALIST XXIII – The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union

FEDERALIST XXIV – The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

FEDERALIST XXV – The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

FEDERALIST XXVI – The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered

FEDERALIST XXVII – The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered

FEDERALIST XXVIII – The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered

FEDERALIST XXIX – Concerning the Militia

FEDERALIST XXX – Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXI – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXII – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXIII – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXIV – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXV – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXVI – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation

FEDERALIST XXXVII – Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government

FEDERALIST XXXVIII – The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed

FEDERALIST XXXIX – The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles

FEDERALIST XL – The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained

FEDERALIST XLI – General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution

FEDERALIST XLII – The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered

FEDERALIST XLIII – The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered

FEDERALIST XLIV – Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States

FEDERALIST XLV – The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered

FEDERALIST XLVI – The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared

FEDERALIST XLVII – The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts

FEDERALIST XLVIII – These Departments Should Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other

FEDERALIST XLIX – Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government

FEDERALIST L – Periodic Appeals to the People Considered

FEDERALIST LI – The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments

FEDERALIST LII – The House of Representatives

FEDERALIST LIII – The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives

FEDERALIST LIV – The Apportionment of Members Among the States

FEDERALIST LV – The Total Number of the House of Representatives

FEDERALIST LVI – The Same Subject Continued: The Total Number of the House of Representatives

FEDERALIST LVII – The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many

FEDERALIST LVIII – Objection That the Number of Members Will Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered

FEDERALIST LIX – Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

FEDERALIST LX – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

FEDERALIST LXI – The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

FEDERALIST LXII – The Senate

FEDERALIST LXIII – The Senate Continued

FEDERALIST LXIV – The Powers of the Senate

FEDERALIST LXV – The Powers of the Senate Continued

FEDERALIST LXVI – Objections to the Power of the Senate to Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered

FEDERALIST LXVII – The Executive Department

FEDERALIST LXVIII – The Mode of Electing the President

FEDERALIST LXIX – The Real Character of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXX – The Executive Department Further Considered

FEDERALIST LXXI – The Duration in Office of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXXII – The Same Subject Continued, and Re–Eligibility of the Executive Considered

FEDERALIST LXXIII – The Provision for the Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power

FEDERALIST LXXIV – The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXXV – The Treaty Making Power of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXXVI – The Appointing Power of the Executive

FEDERALIST LXXVII – The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered

FEDERALIST LXXVIII – The Judiciary Department

FEDERALIST LXXIX – The Judiciary Continued

FEDERALIST LXXX – The Powers of the Judiciary

FEDERALIST LXXXI – The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority

FEDERALIST LXXXII – The Judiciary Continued

FEDERALIST LXXXIII – The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury

FEDERALIST LXXXIV – Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered

FEDERALIST LXXXV – Concluding Remarks

FEDERALIST I:
General Introduction

Table of Contents

To the People of the State of New York:

After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Fœderal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences, nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded as the æra in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism to heighten the solicitude, which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished, than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations, affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter, may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument and consequence of the offices they hold under the State-establishments–and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies, than from its union under one Government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views: Candor will oblige us to admit, that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted, that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable; the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes, which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions, of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those, who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right, in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection, that we are not always sure, that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives, not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support, as upon those who oppose, the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit, which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For, in politics as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications, that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude, that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations, and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized, as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power, and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretence and artifice; the stale bait for popularity at the expense of public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of violent love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten, that the vigor of Government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of Government. History will teach us, that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter; and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics the greatest number have begun their career, by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing Demagogues, and ending Tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations I have had an eye, my Fellow-Citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my Countrymen, I own to you, that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion, it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced, that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves, which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation, when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not however multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast: My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars.–The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity–The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that Union–The necessity of a Government at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object–The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of republican Government–Its analogy to your own state constitution–and lastly, The additional security, which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of Government, to liberty, and to property.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the Thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity, resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.1 This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will, therefore, be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

PUBLIUS.

FEDERALIST II:
Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence

Table of Contents

To the People of the State of New York:

When the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important, that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident.

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of Government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of consideration, therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest of the people of America, that they should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one Fœderal Government, or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each, the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national Government.

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion, that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest Citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But Politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these Gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound Policy.

It has often given me pleasure to observe, that Independent America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice, that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people; a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general Liberty and Independence.

This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made peace and war: as a nati...