The Second Treatise of Civil Government

John Locke, Andrew Bailey

• Publisher: Broadview Press
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781460405086
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political History & Theory
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In this, the second of his Two Treatises of Government, John Locke examines humankind's transition from its original state of nature to a civil society. One can see the lasting influence of Locke's ideas through their familiarity to the modern reader—the roots of classical liberalism are here, and many of Locke's arguments foreshadow contemporary debates concerning government, liberty, and property rights. The introduction and annotations included in this edition are intended to contextualize the work and prevent misunderstanding, without advancing any particular scholarly interpretation or merely summarizing Locke's reasoning. This edition has its origin in the acclaimed Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought and adheres to the anthology's format and high standards of accuracy and accessibility.

The Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought is edited by Andrew Bailey (University of Guelph), Samantha Brennan (University of Western Ontario), Will Kymlicka (Queen's University), Jacob Levy (McGill University), Alex Sager (Portland State University), and Clark Wolf (Iowa State University).

The Second Treatise of Civil Government

The Second Treatise of Civil Government

Preface¹

Reader, you have here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while to tell you.² These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William;³ to make good his title, in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince⁴ in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers have that evidence, I flatter myself is to be found in them, there will be no great miss of those which are lost, and my reader may be satisfied without them: for I imagine, I shall have neither the time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the wanting⁵ part of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert again, through all the windings and obscurities, which are to be met with in the several branches of his wonderful system. The king, and body of the nation, have since so thoroughly confuted⁶ his hypothesis, that I suppose nobody hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against⁷ our common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular style, and well-turned periods:⁸ for if anyone will be at the pains, himself, in those parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert’s discourses of the flourish of doubtful⁹ expressions, and endeavor to reduce his words to direct, positive,¹⁰ intelligible propositions, and then compare them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib nonsense put together in wellsounding English. If he think it not worth while to examine his works all through, let him make an experiment in that part, where he treats of usurpation;¹¹ and let him try, whether he can, with all his skill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and consistent with himself, or common sense. I should not speak so plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the pulpit, of late years, publicly owned¹² his doctrine, and made it the current divinity¹³ of the times. It is necessary those men, who taking on them to be teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly showed of what authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed, that so they may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have vented, and cannot be maintained; or else justify those principles which they preached up for gospel; though they had no better an author than an English courtier: for I should not have writ against Sir Robert, or taken the pains to show his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of (what he so much boasts of, and pretends wholly to build on) scripture-proofs, were there not men among us, who, by crying up¹⁴ his books, and espousing his doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary. They have been so zealous in this point, that, if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope they should spare me. I wish, where they have done the truth and the public wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its just weight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done a greater mischief¹⁵ to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions concerning government; that so at last all times might not have reason to complain of the Drum Ecclesiastic.¹⁶ If anyone, concerned really for truth, undertake the confutation¹⁷ of my Hypothesis, I promise him either to recant¹⁸ my mistake, upon fair conviction; or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember two things.

First, That caviling¹⁹ here and there, at some expression, or little incident of my discourse, is not an answer to my book.

Secondly, That I shall not take railing²⁰ for arguments, nor think either of these worth my notice, though I shall always look on myself as bound to give satisfaction to anyone, who shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous in the point, and shall show any just grounds for his scruples.

I have nothing more, but to advertise²¹ the reader, that Observations stands for Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation of pages always means pages of his Patriarcha,²² Edition 1680.

[…]

1 Preface This is the preface to the whole work (consisting of the First and Second Treatises). Only the Second is included here.

2 what fate … tell you Some pages that were to go into the Second Treatise were simply lost. They contained an extended attack on the arguments of Sir Robert Filmer, an advocate of the divine right of kings, and of their absolute power to rule. Locke’s First Treatise consists largely of an attack on Filmer, and, as you will see, the Second contains a good deal of this also. It is suspected that the lost pages overlapped this attack considerably.

3 King William William of Orange, who took over as king from James II in the Revolution of 1688 (the “Bloodless” or “Glorious” Revolution). William’s coming to power is often seen as the beginning of modern English parliamentary government, with limited power for the monarchy.

4 prince Ruler.

5 wanting Lacking.

6 confuted Refuted.

7 appear against Argue against.

8 well-turned periods Beautifully constructed sentences.

9 doubtful Ambiguous.

10 positive Here this word means “clear,” but see the note above, in the section “Some Useful Background Information” for other meanings encountered in the text below.

11 usurpation Seizing an office, replacing previous holder, by force.

12 the pulpit, of late years, publicly owned The Church, recently, publicly adopted.

13 divinity Object of adoration.

14 crying up Praising.

15 mischief Injury.

16 Drum Ecclesiastic Noisy rumblings from the Church.

17 confutation Refutation.

18 recant Withdraw, renounce.

19 caviling Making trivial objections.

20 railing Scolding.

21 advertise Announce to.

22 Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c.; Patriarcha Two works by Filmer.

Book 2

[The Second Treatise]

Chapter 1. Of Political Power

§ 1. It having been shown in the foregoing discourse,¹

1. That Adam² had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by positive donation³ from God, any such authority over his children, or dominion⁴ over the world, as is pretended:⁵

2. That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:

3. That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined:

4. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam’s posterity,⁶ being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house,⁷ and to have the right of inheritance:

All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain⁸ of all power, Adam’s private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise⁹ of government, another original¹⁰ of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer has taught us.

§ 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I take to be political power; that the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from another, and show the difference betwixt¹¹ a ruler of a commonwealth,¹² a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.

§ 3. Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.

Chapter 2. Of the State of Nature

§ 4. To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect¹³ freedom to order their actions, and dispose of¹⁴ their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave,¹⁵ or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal,¹⁶ no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously¹⁷ born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one among another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all¹⁸ should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

§ 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker¹⁹ looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love among men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,

The like natural inducement has brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must needs²⁰ all have one measure;²¹ if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man’s hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should show greater measure of love to me, than they have by me showed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposes upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward²² fully the like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason has drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant. Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.

§ 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license: though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where²³ some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure:²⁴ and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Everyone, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

§ 7. And that²⁵ all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which wills the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world be in vain, if there were nobody that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if anyone in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, everyone may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, everyone must needs have a right to do.

§ 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power ov...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• The Second Treatise of Civil Government