Finland's War of Choice

The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II

Henrik O. Lunde

• Publisher: Casemate
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781612000374
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de l'Europe

A selection of the Military Book Club: "A solid operational analysis" from "an established scholar of the Scandinavian theater" ( Publishers Weekly ). This book describes the odd coalition between Germany and Finland in World War II and their joint military operations from 1941 to 1945. In stark contrast to the numerous books on the shorter and less bloody Winter War, which represented a gallant fight of a democratic "David" against a totalitarian "Goliath" and caught the imagination of the world, the story of Finland fighting alongside a Goliath of its own has not brought pride to that nation and was a period many Finns would rather forget. A prologue brings the reader up to speed by briefly examining the difficult history of Finland, from its separation from the Soviet Union in 1917 to its isolation after being bludgeoned in 1939–40. It then examines both Finnish and German motives for forming a coalition against the USSR, and how—as logical as a common enemy would seem—the lack of true planning and preparation would doom the alliance. In this book, Henrik Lunde, a former US Special Operations colonel and author of Hitler's Pre-emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940, once again fills a profound gap in our understanding of World War II.

ONE

FROM FLIRTATION TO COALITION

Careful Approaches

Leonard Lundin writes that the period between the Winter War and Finland’s involvement on the side of Germany in its war against the Soviet Union in 1941 presents difficult questions for historians.¹ The most important of these for our purposes was the responsibility of the Finnish political and military leaders for Finland’s unfortunate involvement in World War II.

Despite the lack of support from Germany in the Winter War, there was a rapid shift in both Finnish governmental policy and public opinion in favor of Germany soon afterward.² The primary reason was Finland’s isolation from the world following Germany’s victories in Scandinavia and the West. To the Finns Germany looked like a rising star and the only country that could offer Finland some protection against the Soviet Union.³

In June 1940, as Germany was preoccupied in the west, the Soviet Union moved to occupy the Baltic states. Simultaneously, the Soviets began to exert renewed pressure on the Finns. The pressure took the form of several demands:

1. Return all properties removed from Hanko.
2. Soviet or joint operation of the nickel mines at Kolosjoki (Nikel).
3. Demilitarization of the Åland Islands.
4. Right to send trains across Finnish territory to Hanko.

The Finns agreed to demands 1 and 3 while the others were made subjects for negotiation. At the end of July the Soviets charged that the Finns were trying to suppress the activities of Soviet supporters in the country. To the Finns these Soviet activities were ominous and could signal that military moves against the country were in the making. German intelligence shared this view and concluded that the Soviet Union could begin military operations against Finland in mid-August.⁴

Conservative circles in Finland had argued for closer cooperation with Germany, and urged the government in that direction, as the Western Allies were going down to defeat in France and as the Soviets occupying the Baltic states had begun to exert pressure on Finland.⁵ The Finnish government needed little persuasion and its foreign minister, Rolf Witting, told the German ambassador in Helsinki, Wipert von Blücher, on July 4, 1940 that all efforts were directed at having a government oriented towards Germany. He also told Blücher that Finnish public opinion believed that the country would be able to reconquer its lost territories in the near future with the help of Germany. A month later Witting told Blücher that he wished to travel to Germany and meet with Hitler.⁶

Blücher told the Finnish foreign minister that it would be objectionable to have a Finnish government which overtly favored Germany. He suggested that a government that continued a neutral posture but cooperated secretly with Germany would be more acceptable. This statement was too strong for the German government. Blücher was admonished by his superiors and told to refrain from expressions that could raise false hopes among the Finns.⁷

However, the Germans soon began to show signs of reciprocity to the friendship expressed by the Finns. While this was no doubt tied to Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union, it began before the July 31, 1940 conference at which Hitler announced his decision.⁸

Another factor that influenced the change in German attitude involved the nickel mine concessions that were part of the Soviet demands on Finland. I. G. Farben, the German industrial concern, had contracted for delivery of 60 percent of the nickel ore production in July 1940. Finish nickel was of considerable importance to the German war industry, as was the supply of Swedish iron ore. The availability of these raw materials was an important factor in Hitler’s decision-making.

German belief that the Soviet Union might attack Finland in August 1940 caused Hitler to reinforce north Norway with units from all three services. Mountain Corps Norway, formed in June 1940, consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions under General der Gebirgstruppe Eduard Dietl. The 2nd Mountain Division, located in the Trondheim area in August 1940, was sent to the Kirkenes area in the far north. Dietl was directed to prepare plans for a speedy occupation of Pechenga and the nickel mines at Kolosjoki in case of a Soviet attack on Finland. The planned operation was code-named Renntier (Reindeer).

The Soviets were well aware of the turn in Finnish foreign policy toward Germany. The Soviet ambassador to Finland, Ivan Zotov, warned Moscow of this new trend and opined that the Finns, feverishly engaged in building fortifications, might invite the Germans into their country.⁹

The Transit Agreements

A German lieutenant colonel, Joseph Veltjens, appeared in Helsinki on August 18. He came ostensibly as a personal representative from Hermann Göring to Marshal Mannerheim.¹⁰ Veltjens’ task was to seek Mannerheim’s approval of a German proposal for the transit of supplies to German forces in north Norway and for the transit of German soldiers who were sick or on home leave. Göring was the director of Germany’s Four Year Economic Plan and one of Veltjens’ tasks was to firm up the option on the nickel mine concessions in Pechenga.¹¹ For their part, the Germans proposed to provide Finland with military equipment and supplies. According to Mannerheim, he told Veltjens that he was not authorized to enter into any agreements of this nature and suggested that the proper person was the Finnish foreign minister. Veltjens replied that he was only authorized to deal with the marshal and that he was expressly forbidden to discuss the questions with the government or politicians.¹²

Mannerheim raised the issue with President Ryti.¹³ We don’t know what recommendation Mannerheim made but he had expressed an interest to Veltjens in obtaining matériel for the armed forces. Mannerheim was told to give an affirmative reply to Veltjens and it therefore appears that the ultimate responsibility for this action lies with Ryti. Finnish civilian leaders who later claimed ignorance of this exceedingly important issue for Finland’s future are less than sincere.

The German ambassador to Finland was very surprised when Veltjens told him that Hitler had made this decisive policy change¹⁴ and “that he [Veltjens] had come to explain to the Finns that all their weapon needs would be met.”¹⁵ Blücher sent his military attaché, Colonel (later Major General) Horst Rössing, to Berlin to verify the information given by Veltjens. Colonel Rössing called the ambassador from Germany and stated “The things that were reported on the day of my departure are confirmed with minor deviation.”¹⁶

General Rudolf Walden, the Finnish minister of defense, also sent officers to Berlin to clarify the German position. Further negotiations continued in Helsinki and a secret informal military agreement was reached in early September 1940. It provided for the transit of Luftwaffe personnel and equipment through Finland to Kirkenes in Norway. Notes on the subject were exchanged between the two governments two months later.

The stated purpose of these agreements sounded innocent enough but we are entitled to ask why Germany felt it necessary to make this arrangement with Finland. Sweden had allowed transit of German supplies and personnel since April 1940 and continuation of that transit would not have aroused the ire of the Soviets. The unstated purposes become obvious in Blücher’s writings about what the transit agreements actually involved:

During these weeks [April and first half of May 1941], the German military in Finland were very active. German military transports arrived in increasing numbers. Lines of communications were built throughout the country, food and ammunition depots established, and west–east roads and bridges improved. It was not possible to conceal these actions and they became the subject of discussion among the Finnish people. It was generally viewed within the framework of a German-Russian war.¹⁷

While Hjalmar J. Procopé observes that it remains a mystery which military officials supported the decision to let the Germans into the country, I believe we can draw some rather logical conclusions after we review the various known contacts between the military in the two countries. Procope’s observation that the democratic institutions in Finland were not functioning as they should is not accurate.¹⁸ The president/prime minister and probably other cabinet members were involved. Based on the fact that he immediately sent a team to Germany, we know that the minister of defense was informed. It would have been inconceivable to keep Foreign Minister Witting in the dark.

The implementation of some parts of the agreement not pertaining to the movement of military personnel had already begun as negotiations were taking place and this indicates that Veltjens’ visit may not have been much of a surprise. We have already noted that I. G. Farben obtained a concession for the nickel ore in late July and shipments of military equipment and supplies for the Finnish armed forces began in August.¹⁹

All this must be viewed in relation to the position in which Finland found itself after the Winter War and particularly after the German victories in Norway and the west. The country was isolated and threatened by its powerful neighbor and no help could be expected from the Western democracies. For the Finns, the transit agreements and the delivery of weapons and supplies for their armed forces essentially broke the isolation in which they had found themselves. These agreements may have put a brake on Soviet plans. Marshal Mannerheim writes that Finland would have fallen victim to the Soviet Union in late 1940 had it not been for the agreements reached with Germany.²⁰ Nevertheless, it was a high-stakes gamble for the Finns to invite German forces into their country, irrevocably tying their future to that of Germany. Closer relations with Germany also damaged their relations with Great Britain and the US. The improvement in relations from the German side must also be viewed in relation to the events of the summer of 1940. These included the Soviet moves into the Baltic States and their demands on Finland, particularly as related to raw materials in the far north. Finally, Hitler’s decision in late July 1940 to mount an attack on the Soviet Union gave the final impetus and urgency to improving relations with Finland. Reports from the German military attaché in Helsinki gave the Finnish armed forces high praise.²¹

Soviet Reactions to the Transit Agreements

There were many spies in Finland, and the Germans realized that they needed to inform the Soviets about some of the arrangements they had made with the Finns. Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, was told to bring the matter up with the Soviets in a casual manner, but not before the afternoon of September 21.²² The Finns were also informed about German explanations to the Soviets through Ambassador Blücher in a separate message.²³ The explanation the Soviets were given focused on antiaircraft reinforcements (one battalion) for north Norway to counter British air attacks. Schulenburg was instructed to tell the Soviets the following:

Investigation of the transport facilities revealed that for this purpose the route by way of Finland would present the least difficulty. This antiaircraft battery will presumably be landed near Haparanda on September 22 and transported to Norway, part way by rail, and the rest by road. The Finnish Government appreciating the special circumstances has granted the German request to permit this transport to take place.

It appears that Schulenburg left for Berlin on September 21 without carrying out his instructions. In Schulenburg’s absence the Soviet foreign minister queried the German chargé Werner von Tippelskirch about reports, including in the Finnish press, of German troops landing in a number of Finnish ports. Molotov requested a copy of the German–Finnish agreement, including any secret protocols. The chargé, who may not have been privy to Schulenburg’s instructions, answered that he would communicate Molotov’s request to the German government.²⁴

Ribbentrop delayed his answer until October 2.²⁵ He instructed the Embassy in Moscow to inform the Soviets that the German–Finnish agreement involved a purely technical matter without political implications, similar to that reached with Sweden about transport through Swedish territory to Oslo, Trondheim, and Narvik. ...