Hitler's Armada

The Royal Navy & the Defence of Great Britain April–October 1940

Geoff Hewitt

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Maritime
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781844157853
• eBook ISBN: 9781844689590
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History

"Any historian or general lover of history in Hitler, or the importance of the Germany Navy in WWII, will find this book immensely informative." — Nautical Research Journal
 
Hitler's Armada examines the aborted German invasion of 1940 in a fresh and original manner by looking past the myths and legends which have subsequently surrounded it, in order to arrive at significant new conclusions. Presenting fascinating detail of Hitler's Operation SEALION, author and historian Geoff Hewitt analyzes the German campaign's weaknesses, demonstrating that control of the sea, not the air, was the critical factor in the operation's failure. Hewitt questions the traditional British view that the Battle of Britain was the key factor in the prevention of Nazi invasion. Presenting the often overlooked importance of the Royal Navy during this period, Hewitt brings into sharp focus, possibly for the first time, the strategic dispositions of the Royal Navy anti-invasion forces. By focusing on the conflict between air and sea power in the months leading up to the summer of 1940, Hewitt challenges the supremacy of air power during this stage of the war. Thought-provoking and controversial, Hitler's Armada presents a compelling investigation of this historic turning point in the Second World War.

Chapter 1

The German Surface Fleet

The surface forces are so inferior in numbers and strength that they can do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly.

Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, 3 September 1939

The starting point for any serious evaluation of Operation Sealion must be consideration of the strength of the German surface feet. Whatever the anti-shipping capabilities of the Luftwaffe may have been in 1940, the fact was that the invasion force would need to be both transported and protected by surface vessels. In order to understand how the German Navy had reached the position in which it found itself in the summer of 1940, it is necessary to go back some twenty years, to the end of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles.

The navy of Kaiser Wilhelm II no longer existed, and the victorious Allies, although they had not gone so far as to impose complete demilitarization, had imposed severe restrictions on the German armed forces in general, and the Navy in particular. Article 181 of the Treaty of Versailles restricted the surface fleet to six armoured ships, six cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats. Construction of submarines was forbidden, as was the possession of military aircraft. Furthermore, Article 190, which regulated the replacement of obsolete ships, decreed that battleships and cruisers should only be replaced after twenty years service, and destroyers and torpedo boats after fifteen. Additional restrictions were placed on the displacements of any replacement vessels, so that new armoured ships could not exceed 10,000 tons, cruisers 6,000 tons, destroyers 800 tons and torpedo boats 200 tons.

To give some idea of how severe these restrictions were, the final design for the Royal Navy G3 battlecruisers of late 1921 envisaged a displacement of 48,400 tons, and the N3 battleships of the same time 48,500 tons, although the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921-2 (involving Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy) eventually restricted the displacements of future battleships to 35,000 tons, and of cruisers to 10,000 tons. As part of this Treaty, it was agreed that there would be no new battleship construction for ten years, except for two new British battleships, Nelson and Rodney, which were completed in 1927 and displaced around 33,500 tons. As the major naval powers also produced cruisers displacing 10,000 tons, and the first new Royal Navy destroyer, Ambuscade, constructed in 1926, displaced 1,200 tons, the severity of the restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty on future German naval construction is clear.

In the event, Germany retained six elderly pre-dreadnought battleships, and a number of equally antiquated Gazelle class light cruisers. The first new warship, the cruiser Emden, was launched early in 1925, and was basically a development of the last light cruisers built during the First World War, with eight 15cm (5.9-inch) guns in single mountings. Twelve new torpedo boats, six each of the Möwe and Wolf Classes, were also constructed between 1926 and 1929. Again, these were developments of the wartime torpedo boats of the Imperial Navy, although they were officially classed as destroyers in order to conform to the Versailles Treaty restrictions. In fact, their actual displacements exceeded the 800 tons limit by around 125 tons.

The first new designs (as opposed to developments of First World War types) were the three cruisers of the ‘K’ Class, Konigsberg, Karlsruhe and Köln, which were constructed between 1926 and 1930, and with nine 15cm guns in three triple turrets, director fire control and cruising diesels as well as turbines, compared well with the Leander Class light cruisers being introduced into service with the Royal Navy in 1931–3. Subsequently, two more light cruisers developed from the ‘K’ design were to appear: Leipzig, launched in 1929, and Nurnberg, launched in 1934.

The replacement of the six antiquated pre-dreadnought battleships which Germany was allowed to retain after the First World War was a difficult challenge. The intention of the 10,000 tons restriction for armoured ships imposed by the Treaty of Versailles was clear enough. New vessels could be either well armoured but slow and short range, effectively coastal-defence ships (the type actually favoured by Raeder himself, when in command of the Baltic station), or faster but more lightly armed and armoured, more akin to a cruiser. The head of the German Navy between 1924 and 1928, Admiral Zenker, eventually recommended the latter, resulting in a vessel capable of 26 knots, armour capable of resisting 8-inch shellfire and armed with six 28cm (11-inch) guns in two turrets. Such a vessel should be able to outfight the typical ‘Washington cruiser’ of 10,000 tons displacement and a main armament of eight 8-inch guns, which would be some five knots faster and outrun any battleship which it encountered.

At the time, German military thinking believed that any future war would be against Russia or France and the ‘armour-clads’, as they were called by the German Navy, would be particularly suitable for deployment against French trade routes in the eastern Atlantic – with the added benefit of drawing French naval strength into this area and away from the north Atlantic routes used by German shipping. In addition, of course, if Great Britain was not involved, then the three Royal Navy battlecruisers which could catch and sink an armour-clad – Hood, Renown and Repulse – would be out of the picture.

Admiral Raeder, as previously stated, had himself preferred the coastal-defence ship which would have been more suited for operations in the Baltic, but when he became head of the German Navy on 1 October 1928, he made no attempt to change the design, and construction of the first three armour-clads (or ‘pocket battleships’ as they came to be called) – Deutschland, Admiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee – began in February 1929, June 1931 and October 1932 respectively.

Thus, when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933, the German Navy consisted of four light cruisers with a fifth under construction, one old light cruiser suitable for training purposes only, twelve small destroyer/torpedo boats, and one pocket battleship about to commission with two more under construction. Initially, Hitler held to the ‘Conversion Plan’ of November 1932, which envisaged a total of six pocket battleships, and in 1934 two were authorized for construction. Hitler had already said in 1933 that it was his wish never to go to war with Britain, Italy or Japan, and he was eager to conclude a naval agreement with Britain.

The imminent appearance, however, of the French battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg, the first of which was already under construction, had already demonstrated to Raeder that something more powerful than the pocket-battleship design was essential. In June 1934, therefore, he urged that the new ships be more heavily armoured and be fitted with a third triple 28cm turret. Hitler authorized an increase in size to 19,000 tons displacement, but instructed Raeder to refer only to ‘improved 10,000 tons ships’. Construction work on both vessels began in 1935 and they eventually emerged as the 32,000-ton battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

By the time work on these vessels commenced, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which Hitler described to Raeder on 18 June 1935 as ‘the happiest day of my life’, had been signed. This permitted Germany to build naval forces up to 35 per cent of the Royal Navy in each category of ship, other than submarines where 45 per cent was allowed, with the opportunity to increase submarine strength to parity at a later date. The significance of this agreement to the German Navy was that it seemed to rule Great Britain out as a future naval adversary. Even in Britain, Earl Beatty (commander of the Battlecruiser Fleet at Jutland and subsequently commander of the Grand Fleet) claimed in the House of Lords that there was at least one country in the world with which Britain need not fear an arms race.

The signing of this agreement and the earlier repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles now made it possible for Germany to commence naval expansion. The battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz, each displacing some 42,000 tons, were laid down in 1936, work on the first of five heavy cruisers of the Hipper class began, and between 1937 and 1939 twenty-two large destroyers of the Leberecht Maass and the Von Roeder Classes were constructed.

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was eventually repudiated by Hitler in April 1939, but during the almost four years it existed it exercised significant influence over German naval planning. In an order of the day of 15 July 1935, the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Guse, stated that the agreement made a repeat of the former naval rivalry between Britain and Germany impossible, and Admiral Raeder himself did not permit even theoretical studies into naval operations against Great Britain. Provisional battle orders given to the German Navy on 27 May 1936 (ironically five years to the day before the sinking of the Bismarck) omitted any contingency for war with Britain. Despite what must surely have been clear evidence to the contrary, Raeder seems to have remained convinced that war with Britain would not take place, at least in the immediate future.

It must therefore have been a dramatic development for him when in late May 1938 he was summoned to a meeting with Hitler, who told him that Britain must be reckoned as a probable enemy and a major expansion of the Navy was required. In order to ascertain what form this expansion should take, the strategic role of the new fleet needed to be determined and Raeder took two immediate steps. Firstly, one of his youngest staff officers, Commander Heye, was given the task of devising a plan of action against Britain, and secondly, a planning committee of senior admirals under the chairmanship of Guse (by now promoted to Vice Admiral) was to draw up proposals on the strategy the Navy should follow, and consequently what types and numbers of ships would be required.

The first meeting of the committee took place on 23 September 1938 and the plan of action put forward by Heye must have caused a considerable stir. His argument was that even a powerful battle fleet operating out of the German Bight could not make significant inroads into the overall strategic position at sea. In other words, a second Jutland, even if favourable to Germany, would serve no purpose. The proper course, he argued, would be to provide a striking force to wage war against the shipping lanes upon which Britain depended, rather than to seek a confrontation with the British battle fleet. However, in order to carry out this attack, Germany needed both the right kind of ships and the ability to break out of the North Sea into the North Atlantic, and it was in the breakout element of the argument that Heye was vulnerable. When asked how he envisaged that the breakout would be achieved, his response was that high speeds and a great deal of luck would be needed, which would require light forces rather than heavily armoured capital ships. In common with most naval opinion at the time, Heye placed little reliance in submarines, believing that improved anti-submarine techniques and the use of sonar (known by the British as asdic) had significantly reduced their effectiveness.

The admirals on the planning committee immediately identified the flaws in the case put forward by Heye. A breakout could only be achieved, they argued, by utilizing powerful capital ships, and Guse summed up by expressing the view that whether these heavy ships themselves should be the striking force, or whether they should be used to effect the breakout of the striking force, did not need to be decided ...

Table of contents

• Fronr Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Maps
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1. German Surface Fleet
• 2. Meetings and Memoranda
• 3. Compromise and Criticism
• 4. The German ‘Overlord’?
• 5. Mines, Coastal Batteries and U-Boats
• 6. Month of Decision – September 1940
• 7. Plans, Planes and Personnel
• 8. The German Perspective
• 9. Air and Sea Power
• 10. The Royal Navy of 1939–1940
• 11. Early Encounters and the Compaign in Norway
• 12. Evaculations Prior to Dunkirk
• 13. Operation Dynamo, The Dunkirk Evalution
• 14. Operations Cycle and Aerial, the Post-Dunkirk Evaculations
• 15. ‘Gunfire and Plenty of It’
• 16. The Battle of Britain – the Legend and the Reality
• 17. ‘Be Calm, Be Calm, He is Coming’
• 18. Conclusion
• Bibliography