The Silent Attack

The Fallschirmjäger Capture of the Bridges of Veldwezelt, Vroenhoven & Hanne 1940

Óscar González, Thomas Steinke, Ian Tannahill

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781781593851
• eBook ISBN: 9781473857865
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: German History
• Index: History

"An enthralling account of how German Special Forces fought to take and hold the key river crossings to allow the main German Army to swarm into France."— Firetrench
 
Much has been written about the capture of Fort Eben-Emael in Belgium by German paratroopers, on May 10, 1940. This operation marked the first use of gliders and shaped charges—and proved it possible to drop paratroopers behind enemy lines. Training, secrecy, accuracy and speed linked to the element of surprise made these men lethal, causing chaos among Belgian soldiers.
 
However, it should be stressed that these paratroopers were part of a larger group: The Sturmablteilung Koch (Koch Assault Group), the elite of the Luftwaffe in 1940, whose mission was not only to take Eben-Emael, but also the three bridges over the Alberto Canal near Veldwezelt, Vroenhoven, and Kanne. The success of the attack on Belgium and France would depend on the rapid conquest of those bridges.
 
The aim of this book is to show how the assault on the Albert Canal bridges was planned and carried out, based on documents, records and evidence, and also through many photos never published until now. Every detail—from the creation of the Koch Assault Group to the final attack—has been impeccably researched, as well as verified through testimonies of Belgian and German soldiers.
 
"An impressive and beautifully presented book, with a meticulously researched, clear and readable narrative which is generously supported by innumerable photographs, first-hand accounts and a complete list of all those who took part. This must be considered an important addition to the library of airborne literature."—Pegasus Archive

Chapter One

Belgium – Shortly Before The War

Despite its unequivocal neutrality, Belgium was forced into war on that fateful 10 May 1940 when the Wehrmacht invaded. The Belgian Army had been integrated into the Western Alliance for the purpose of resisting the German attack, but in the end was overwhelmed. Belgian forces were hardly able to do anything against the gigantic German war machine. Belgium was a prosperous but small country of eight million people. The Belgian High Command was obviously aware that in the course of a German attack it had few choices to make. The reality exceeded everything they had been able to imagine.

After the First World War a series of important changes had occurred in the Belgian Army. For example, it reduced the number of divisions from seventeen to eight in 1924, and from eight to six in 1926. Nevertheless the Belgians knew – and differed from the Netherlands in that respect – that the Germans were not likely to respect their neutrality should the circumstances call for it. Significant pointers hardened this conviction: the failure of the League of Nations to create a carefully considered, peaceful framework for international relations, the political developments in Germany and the reoccupation of the Rhineland. Accordingly, at the end of 1936 King Leopold III called for a massive rearmament and modernization of the Army. These measures were undoubtedly intended to fortify the independence of the nation. At the same time Belgium’s neighbours, the great European Powers of the time (France, Great Britain and Germany) were to be dissuaded from considering Belgium to be the stage for the “settlement of their differences”. A number of measures were the direct consequence of this royal intervention: a fifteen per cent increase in the defence budget, the period of conscription raised from eight to twelve months, the strengthening of the line of fortifications along the Meuse by the construction of three forts at Neufchâteau, Battice and Eben Emael; the division of the country into three military areas (with command centres at Brussels, Antwerp and Liège) and the construction of an anti-tank defensive line between Kooningshooiskt and Wavre, the K-W Line, also known as the Dyle Line. Within this modernization three divisions were motorized straight away (two regiments of cavalry, and one of Ardennes Riflemen (Chausseurs ardennais). To defend the fortifications and major cities (Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels and Liège) a Homeland Air Raid Precaution was introduced (Défence Aéronautique du Territoire).

King Leopold III of Belgium in 1940. (Fort Eben Emael)

1916 model Mauser 7.65-mm rifle. Weapon used by artillery units in the Belgian forts. (Fort Eben Emael)

All these changes meant that in May 1940, in comparison to the small land area of the country, the Belgian Army had a significant fighting force: 100,000 soldiers in peacetime and 650,000 after the mobilization: in all, eighteen infantry divisions, one corps of cavalry with two divisions and a motorized brigade: one artillery brigade and the Ardennes rifle corps formed of two partially motorized divisions and other independent units. All these units made up seven infantry divisions and one corps of cavalry. Each corps had two infantry divisions and a regiment of pioneers, as well as signals and supply. Each regiment of infantry had over 3,000 men equipped with the Mauser M-35 rifle, six anti-tank guns, nine mortars, 108 Browning M-30 light MGs, and 58 Maxim M-08 heavy MGs. The division of artillery had sixteen 155-mm Schneider M-17 field howitzers, eight 105-mm Schneider M-13s and eight 120-mm Cockerill M-32s.

The modernization extended to the immediate armament of the troops. The 105-mm field gun with which the Army had been equipped since before the First World War was replaced by one of 120-mm calibre. The programme of exchange was pushed through between 1924 and 1931 by the Koninklijke Kanonnengieterij. Mass production was authorized in 1932, but the economic crisis intervened to upset this plan. In the course of these changes the various MGs were supplanted. From 1931 a new model, the Browning M-30 was in use with new ammunition. From that year, 6,000 of them were distributed and became operational with the Maxim of the infanry and Hotchkiss of the cavalry. This allowed the phasing out of the obsolescent and not very efficient Colt MG by transferring it to rearward units. These examples illustrate outstandingly well the “law of inertia” which the Belgian Army pursued in its exchange and modernization of units and weapons after the Great War¹.

Modernization did not extend to strategy, however. As in the First World War, it continued to be founded upon a static defence. It is therefore not surprising that the Belgian Army had no radios, nor armoured personnel carriers nor anti-tank weapons worthy of mention.

Both cavalry divisions had sixteen T-15 tanks (actually Vickers-Armstrong Carden Lloyds 1934 models fitted with two Hotchkiss 13.2-mm guns). No.1 Ardennes Division had nine of these tanks. Other units had the T-13, a Belgian copy of the Vickers T-15. Of the model B-1 there were thirty examples; of the B-2, B-20 and B-3 150 examples, all fitted with a turret, 47-mm anti-tank gun and Belgian FN30 7.65-mm MGs. The Belgian Army also had some French technology in the form of twelve Renault ACC1 model 1935 tanks with 47-mm guns and co-axial MGs. These vehicles were grouped into an independent 4 The Silent Attack unit of two large sections.The military vehicle pool also had tracked vehicles for the transport of the 47-mm anti-tank gun SA-FRC model 1931, and personnel carriers Familleheureux GMC model 1938 and Ford/Marmon-Herrington.

Maxim MG of 1917 design issued to the Belgian Army. (Fort Eben Emael)

T-13 Belgian Army tank armed with a 47-mm gun it was used in the anti-tank role.

Belgian soldier photographed in 1940.

The Belgian air force was neglected and totally obsolete by 1940. Of its fleet of 234 aircraft, 180 were operational, seventy-six of the machines were fighters (twenty-two Gloster Gladiators Mk 1, twenty Hawker Hurricanes Mk 1 and thirty-four Fiat CR 42 “Falcos”). These machines offered no threat to German fighter aircraft. Belgium also had sixteen Fairey Battle Mk 1 bombers (very slow with poor defensive armament and already obsolete) in the 5th and 7th squadrons. That was everything.

Belgium was expecting the delivery of another eighty fighters under the Hawker Hurricane licence, but these were not operational in May 1940. Also too late to pose a threat were the Brewster F2 Buffalo fighters obtained from the United States and the Italian Caproni. Thirty-four Fiat CR 42 fighters of an order for forty in March had arrived at the time of the German attack.

Belgium had an observer corps armed with FRC 7-mm model 1927 and Madson 20-mm CHM model 1935 anti-aircraft guns. In 1940 this constituted the defence of the national airspace. The air force was composed of three regiments. The first specialized in aerial observation and air-to-ground cooperation, the second was the fighter force. The third regiment had aircraft for long-range reconnaissance and light bombing. Each regiment had anti-aircraft units.

It is a strange fact that a country with a relatively long coast should have disbanded its navy between the war because of budget shortages. The navy was reactivated in September 1939. By then it was far too late to start building naval vessels and disorganization ruled. The merchant marine was scoured for naval reserve officers, as too were other branches of the military for men who had seagoing experience. Eventually the navy had thirty officers, 98 NCOs and 513 other ranks. The only operational vessels were a small coastguard ship armed with a 47-mm gun and two MGs, and two wooden boats requisitioned as minesweepers. The coastal artillery had one gun at Antwerp and another at Zeebrugge.

On 1 September 1939, Belgium declared its neutrality but ordered general mobilization, fearing a German invasion in the east of the country. The mobilization met serious difficulties: a lack of officers and experience in the ranks of the reservists, and inadequate armament. As in France, the inactivity between 1939 and 1940 adversely affected morale. The men lacked fighting spirit, being more concerned for their families than the defence of the national borders. Another decisive influence for lack of motivation was the perennial Belgian problem still extant today: the racial tension between Fleming and Walloon. While the French-speaking Walloons manned the borders, the Dutch-speaking Flemings were stationed around the cities. In order to avoid any unease arising from this discrimination, the Government awarded farmers, miners, teachers and officials frequent home leave. But the esprit de corps was inevitably undermined², and while Belgium was “caught up” in its internal problems, the Germans prepared for war.

The Defence of the Albert Canal

The Albert Canal is 129.6 kms in length and was built between 1930 and 1939. It is a showpiece of Belgian engineering. It provided not only an unsurpassable link between Liège and Antwerp, but was also an excellent obstacle to an invader coming from the east. Harmonizing with the main aim of the defensive strategy of the Great War, the Belgians trusted blindly in the construction of defensive obstacles (ranging from the Albert Canal to bunkers and forts, such as Eben Emael), which in combination with the troops on the border would provide an insurmountable barrier against any attempt by the Germans to invade. This defensive plan depended on the German strategy for attack being the same as it had been at the beginning of the First World War. They did not expect it to be anything else, and for that reason, despite all the expenditure in time, effort and money, the Belgian defensive plan failed. As will be seen, the Blitzkrieg swept across the Albert Canal before the Belgians had time to react.

The impressive Fort Eben Emael was the central strongpoint of the entire Belgian defence in the Liège area. (Gonzalez)

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Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Foreword
• Introduction in 1940
• Chapter 1 Belgium – Shortly Before The War
• Chapter 2 The Training of the First Military Glider Pilots
• Chapter 3 The German Planning for the Attack
• Chapter 4 The Belgian Planning for the Attack
• Chapter 5 The Attack on Veldwezelt Bridge – Group Stahl
• Chapter 6 The Attack on Vroenhoven – Group Beton
• Chapter 7 The Attack on Kanne-Group Eisen
• Chapter 8 The Allied Air Attacks Against the Bridges, 11/12 May 1940
• Chapter 9 The Men Of SA Koch Decorated
• Chapter 10 “There Is Nothing Left For Us To Do But Give In” – An Epilogue
• Appendix I SA Koch Personnel List
• Appendix II Certificates Awarding EK I And EK II to Various Recipients
• Appendix III Maastricht and Arrival in Cologne
• Bibliography
• Notes