Victoria Crosses on the Western Front, April 1915–June 1916

Paul Oldfield

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781473872080
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War I
• Index: History

During visits to the First World War battlefields the author often wondered where various Victoria Cross actions took place; he resolved to find out. Research commenced in 1988 and numerous sources have been consulted in the meantime. The book is designed for the battlefield visitor as much as the armchair reader. A detailed account of each VC action is set within the wider strategic and tactical context. Detailed sketch maps show the area today, together with the battle-lines and movements of the combatants. It allows visitors to stand upon the spot, or very close, where the VC actions took place and understand what happened and where. Photographs of the battle sites illustrate the accounts. There is also a comprehensive biography for each recipient covering every aspect of their lives 'warts and all' - parents and siblings, education, civilian employment, military career, wife and children, death and burial/commemoration. There is also a host of other information, much of it published for the first time. Some fascinating characters emerge, with numerous links to many famous people and events.

Chapter One

Second Battle of Ypres 1915

Battle of Gravenstafel Ridge, 22nd–23rd April 1915

60 LCpl Frederick Fisher, 13th Battalion (Royal Highlanders), CEF (3rd Canadian Brigade, 1st Canadian Division), Keerselaere, Belgium

By early 1915, the Germans realised that they could not force a decision on the Western Front that year. As a result, they decided to concentrate on knocking Russia out of the war. If they were successful, the western allies would then have to face the entire German might in the west, so they had to relieve pressure on the Russians. Plans were hatched for operations in other theatres and for offensive action on the Western Front. Although the Germans were going to concentrate their main efforts in the east, small attacks would be launched in the west in order to retain some initiative and to pin down Allied forces.

The BEF had suffered crippling casualties in 1914 (60,000 at Ypres alone), and as a result was short of men and materiel. Despite these problems, the BEF took over more of the front from the French. Ypres was the only significant town in Belgium still held by the Allies. Fighting around it in the First Battle of Ypres in late 1914 had resulted in a dangerous salient to the east, stretching for 27 kms from Steenstraat in the north to St Eloi in the south. V Corps was formed under Lieutenant General Plumer to take over the eastern part of the Salient from the French.

The German 4th Army (General-Oberst Duke Albrecht von Württemberg) held the front from the Belgian coast to the Lys, southeast of Ypres. Duke Albrecht planned to reduce the Ypres Salient and shorten the line. He intended holding the south of the Salient with two corps, while the main attack by XXVI and XXIII Corps from the north swept over Pilckem Ridge towards Ypres. General Erich von Falkenhayn, German Chief of the General Staff, added other aims; to test the effectiveness of poisonous gas and divert attention from an offensive in the East.

The point of attack gave the Germans a number of advantages. It was at the junction of the French and British sectors, a natural weak point, and there was no unified command over the Belgian, French and British forces (and wouldn’t be until spring 1918). In addition, two of the three Allied divisions (45th Algerian and 1st Canadian) were new to the area.

German research into chemical munitions began in 1887, but negative results and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, forbidding the use of poisonous gas, halted the work. Von Falkenhayn directed it to resume in September 1914. He envisaged using gas to force the enemy to leave the protection of their trenches, thereby breaking the trench stalemate and recreating a war of movement.

The front lines before and after the Second Battle of Ypres. 22nd April–25th May 1915. The line held by late May remained largely unchanged until the opening of the Third Battle of Ypres on 31st July 1917. The shrunken Salient proved more arduous and costly to hold, but hold it did. Also shown are the sixteen VCs in this book in the Ypres area from late April 1915 to March 1916.

Chemical weapons had been used before. An irritant powder added to shrapnel shells fired at British troops at Neuve Chapelle on 27th October 1914 appeared to have had no ill effects. Explosive shells containing a liquid irritant were tried unsuccessfully against the Russians at Bolimov on 30th January 1915. Fritz Haber, Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry at Berlin-Dahlem, proposed using chlorine gas released from pressurised cylinders dug into the front line and blown along by a favourable wind. Attacking troops could follow closely behind the gas cloud with little risk. Chlorine gas was available commercially and could be manufactured without the need for secrecy.

Some German commanders were disgusted by the concept and were dubious about its reliability, but they realised it might lead to a decisive breakthrough. Oberst Peterson trained a special unit, Pioneer-Regiment 35, to operate the gas cylinders and by 11th April 5,730 gas cylinders in groups of twenty were in position.

The use of gas should not have come as a surprise to the Allies. In early February, German soldiers captured by the French spoke of gas cylinders in bombproof shelters. On 28th March, a British raid at Zillebeke found cylinders in front of the German trenches. On 9th April, ‘The Times’ reported the Germans, “… propose to asphyxiate our men … by means of poisonous gas …” On 13th April, Private August Jaeger (51st Reserve Division) deserted to the French 11th Division (General Ferry), near Langemarck. Jaeger told of an impending attack involving asphyxiating gas carried by the wind and even provided the attack frontage – Langemarck to the Poelcapelle-Wieltje road. Ferry informed the British 28th Division and 2nd Canadian Brigade and passed the report up his chain of command, but it was received with scepticism. The French also learned from a Belgian agent that the Germans had placed an urgent order for 20,000 mouth-protectors at a factory in Ghent. Allied HQs paid little attention to the warnings; it was assumed that if gas was used it would cause minor irritation and have only a localised effect.

Fritz Haber (1868–1934), of Jewish origin, was a brilliant chemist, whose involvement in the development of chemical weapons has overshadowed his other work. While at the University of Karlsruhe 1894–1911, he and Carl Bosch developed the Haber-Bosch process; the catalytic formation of ammonia from hydrogen and atmospheric nitrogen. He received the 1918 Nobel Prize for Chemistry for this work. Half the world’s food production still depends upon this process to produce fertilisers. He carried out much of his work from 1911 at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, which in 1953 was named after him.

Duke Albrecht ordered the attack to take place on 16th April. A Belgian agent reported the move forward of German reserves and the intention to use gas when the wind was favourable. HQ V Corps was warned and instructed medical units to expect 1,000 casualties, but no arrangements were made to deal with gas. On the morning of 16th April, 6 Squadron RFC saw no gas cylinders and the roads behind the enemy lines were clear. Because there was no wind, the German assault troops had returned to the rear areas before daylight.

On 17th April, V Corps completed taking over the front from the Menin Road northwards to the Ypres-Poelcapelle road. 27th Division was on the right, 28th Division in the centre and 1st Canadian Division (Lieutenant General Edwin Alderson) continued the line for four kilometres to just beyond the Ypres-Poelcapelle road and the junction with the French 45th Algerian Division.

The Canadians found the trenches filthy, with numerous dead in shallow graves. Most trenches were breastworks, some only waist high, and were not continuous. They set to work to strengthen the front line, putting out wire, setting up strong points and joining sections into a continuous line. Two to five kilometres behind the front line, there already existed a wellwired GHQ Line consisting of a series of redoubts 350–450m apart.

The Krupps L/12, 42 cms Type M-Gerät 14 Kurze Marine-Kanone, otherwise known as ‘Dicke (Big) Bertha’. The Allies tended to refer to any large German gun as Big Bertha, but the Germans restricted the name to this 42 cms howitzer. Although commonly held that it was named after Bertha Krupp, heiress and owner of the Krupps industrial empire, this may not be so. If it was named after her, one wonders what she thought of the honour!

When the British attacked at Hill 60 on 17th April, German commanders feared the gas cylinders would be discovered and furious counterattacks took place. German reconnaissance flights increased and shelling of Ypres and Poperinghe intensified to distract Allied attention.

A second attempt to launch the attack on 19th April was cancelled due to unfavourable wind and the troops withdrew covered by thick mist. That day, a 42cm howitzer (Big Bertha) sited near Houthulst Forest, joined the bombardment of Ypres. It fired up to ten 816 kgs shells per hour and heralded the start of the systematic destruction of the town. Refugees left the city, heading west for Poperinghe.

The weather improved a few days later and Duke Albrecht ordered the attack for 22nd April. During the night German troops packed into the front line and gas pipes were laid over the parapet. However, as dawn broke the wind was not favourable and the attack was postponed until 4 p.m. The left of 1st Canadian Division reported pipes projecting through the German parapet. At 4 p.m. the wind was blowing from the north at seven kilometres per hour. The commanders of XXIII Reserve and XXVI Reserve Corps were unhappy about attacking in broad daylight, but 4th Army issued the order.

Bertha Krupp 1886–1957.

An enormous shell hole at Ypres, possibly caused by Big Bertha (Australian official photograph).

1st Canadian Division’s front was held by 2nd and 3rd Canadian Brigades. 2nd Canadian Brigade (Brigadier General Currie) on the right had 8th Canadian Battalion on its left, 5th Canadian Battalion on its right and 7th Canadian Battalion in reserve on the St Julien-Fortuin road, at Bombarded Cross Roads and in Wieltje. 3rd Canadian Brigade (Brigadier General Turner VC) on the left, in contact with the French, had 13th Canadian Battalion on the left, 15th Canadian Battalion on the right and 14th Canadian Battalion in reserve at St Jean. A battalion from each brigade (10th and 16th) formed the Divisional reserve, while 1st Canadian Brigade was the Second Army Reserve at Vlamertinghe, five kilometres west of Ypres.

German pioneers in Poland attending to gas cylinders in a sandbagged emplacement. The pipes that will discharge the gas into no man’s land disappear over the parapet in front.

The area of the gas attack on 22nd April 1915. The front lines before and after are shown. The Germans punched an enormous hole in the Allied line, threatening Ypres and the whole of the BEF. A number of locations are shown by letters – T = Turco Farm, H = Hampshire Farm, MT = Mouse (Shell) Trap Farm, KW = Kitcheners’ Wood and C = Locality C. From Ypres drive northeast on the N313 towards Poelcapelle. Go through St Juliaan and park somewhere convenient and safe on the right where the buildings run out. The fields on the right are where 10th Battery CFA was located on 22nd April 1915.

This is a French gas attack on the Somme in 1917, but it illustrates what would have happened on 22nd April 1915 near Langemarck (Canadian Military History Vol 8).

The afternoon of 22nd April was sunny and the sound of fighting at Hill 60 could be heard in the north of the Salient. A furious bombardment of Ypres by Big Bertha and other heavy howitzers opened, but the German field artillery was silent. At 5 p.m. the gas cylinder valves were opened and 168 tons of chlorine gas were discharged in ten minutes along the front held by the French between Steenstraat and Langemarck.

It took ten minutes for the thick yellow-green cloud to reach the French trenches. The French assumed that the Germans were advancing behind a smoke screen but when the cloud arrived soldiers developed severe chest pains and a burning sensation in the throat. Many died within minutes, primarily from asphyxiation. Others were blinded by hydrochloric acid forming in the eyes when the chlorine combined with water. The gas was denser than air and filled the trenches, forcing the defenders to climb out into heavy enemy fire. Captain Hugh Pollard was a witness, “… in a moment death had them by the throat. One cannot blame them that they broke and fled … Hundreds of them fell and died; others lay helpless, froth upon their agonized lips …”.

The cloud rolled through the French 87th Territorial and 45th Algerian Divisions. Only a few men remained to fight, leaving a gap of six kilometres in the front. The main effect was in a rectangular area bounded by Steenstraat, Boesinghe, Keerselare and Langemarck, but it was noticed further behind the lines. French troops passed through V Corps’ rear area, but it was impossible to understand what they were saying. However, it was clear that something serious had happened.

German assault troops advanced behind the cloud, wearing gauze and cotton masks. In XXIII Reserve Corps, 46th Reserve Division with some troops of 45th Reserve Division advanced towards the Yser Canal and Steenstraat, where the gas did not have such a significant effect; the advance here made slow progress against the French and Belgians. XXVI Reserve Corps headed for Langemarck and Pilckem Ridge. In this area the gas devastated 87th Territorial Division and the German 51st and 52nd Reserve Divisions pushed through almost unhindered towards Pilckem Ridge.

German troops with early cotton and gauze gas masks.

The Colt-Browning M1895/14 machine-gun in service with Canadian forces early in WW1 fired 450 rounds per minute. It was the first successful gas operated machine-gun to enter service, but had a strange external cocking lever that was apt to dig into the ground if fired from a low position, hence its nickname, ‘Potato Digger’. As it was air-cooled, it was lighter than the water-cooled machine-guns in use with other armies, but if fired for prolonged periods tended to overheat. It also operated from a closed-bolt, making it prone to cook-offs. The Canadians adopted the Vickers soon after.

By 5.30 p.m., the Germans had broken through, creating a gap between Steenstraat and the left of 3rd Canadian Brigade; the way to Ypres appeared to be open. The French right, held by 1st Tirailleurs, had not been badly affected by the gas and remained in position, supported by 2nd bis Zouaves (half battalion) to the north of Kitcheners’ Wood.

1 Company (Major DR McCuaig – DSO for this action) was on the left of 13th Canadian Battalion. There was a 100m gap on its right, through which flowed a stream, before 2 Company in the centre and on the right flank was 4 Company. 3 Company (Major EC Norsworthy) was in support, with two platoons 350m behind 1 Company and the other two platoons were with Battalion HQ in St Julien. A mile of road to the north of St Julien was left unguarded except for 10th Battery CFA south of Keerse...