Manthan

Multifaceted Reflections on the Indian Armed Forces

VK Shrivastava

• Publisher: VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9789390439201
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book establishes the relevance of war as an instrument of state policy, and the necessity of armed forces to protect and promote national interests. It then traces India's warring traditions and the enviable professionalism of the Indian armed forces. Reflecting on their post-independence military ventures it analyses why, despite five wars, India's vexed territorial and border disputes have remained unresolved.Later chapters critically dilate on a range of weighty issues related to the armed forces such as their apolitical nature, India's strategic culture, state of the civil-military relations, absence of a defence policy, ad hoc defence planning et al, and how these have acted as set back forces for the Services. One of the chapters debates the pros and cons of a coup in India and yet another one exhorts the armed forces to introspect. The book closes with a set of assertions that would keep the armed forces ready and relevant to match the national aspirations of rising India.

CHAPTER – 1

“POLITICAL VIOLENCE”: AN INTERPRETIVE COMMENTARY ON WAR

“Ultima ratio regum” – Last argument of kings.

– Inscription on the cannons of Louis XIV of France

The Age Old Wisdom

War is an extremely complex social phenomenon and is arguably the most deliberated activity of the human beings. It takes many forms and spans many fields. Not surprisingly, therefore, it has been defined differently with fine distinctions. For the purpose of this commentary, however, it signifies a conflict of considerable duration and magnitude between two or more countries involving military organisations and soldiers using weapons. The following text aims to convey that the wars have been, and continue to be, a violent instrument of policy, perpetrated by the erstwhile rulers and the present-day governments, in pursuit of their political goals. Woven around this central theme, the sweep of this narration records reflections of the noted political thinkers and scholarly generals from the ancient to the modern times, on war and its relevance as part of the statecraft.

The beginning is being made from the ancient Indian scriptures – Vedas, Upanishadas, Samhitas et al. – that have well documented India’s warring traditions both in theory and in practice. Some of the wisdom of that era may have been lost in the prevailing oral tradition of the yore. In large parts, both Ramayan and Mahabharat provide the earliest references to the war. Dialogues between the nobles and the notables in both these epics reflect sharply on the rights and obligations of the kings and the warriors, as indeed also on the warring concepts of the era. They both justify war only for a righteous cause and symbolise the victory of good over the evil. Not surprisingly, therefore, wars in the era gone by were called Dharma Yudha. Therein, the word Dharma did not imply a war in the name of the religion, but signified a war for a just cause and prosecuted with fair rules of engagement.

As an aside, it must be mentioned here that the tenets of war in ancient India were way ahead of their times. Ethics of war for a good cause had been propounded in Vedic times over a millennium before the theories of ‘Just War’, largely rooted in the Christian philosophy, even came into being.

Since monarchial system was the usual form of governance in the olden days, treatises on Rajdharma – meaning duties of the king – dealt with the facets of the statecraft and the politico-military thoughts of those times. Arthashastra, possibly the most exhaustive and well-preserved work on the subject in India, is estimated to have been written around fourth century BC. It is attributed to Kautilya – also known as Chanakya – who, as mentor of Emperor Chandragupta Maurya, laid the foundation of the mighty Mauryan Empire. Besides a learned Brahmin¹ he was also a practical politician and a shrewd statesman. While compiling Arthashastra he has drawn heavily from earlier writings and has acknowledged the fact by stating “This Arthashastra is made as a compendium of almost all the Arthashastras, which, in view of acquisition and maintenance of the earth, have been composed by ancient teachers”. ² The treatise retains a streak of practical originality. It is “less of a theoretical work on polity - - - - is more of a manual for the king and the administrator - - - - it describes the machinery and functions in peace and war”. ³

Writings in Arthashastra assert that the states are in a perpetual conflict and that it becomes necessary for a king with growing power to subdue his rivals. The text then dwells on the warring techniques and also addresses the intricacies of diplomacy. Therein, Kautilya has wisely advocated use of Sama (persuasion), Dama (inducements), Danda (Coercion) and Bhed (exploiting weakness) in dealing with an adversary and has then gone on to emphasise that, “- - - - only when the attempts of these diplomatic agents at reconciliation and compromise, and the use of the expedients of policy, severally and conjointly, failed that retaliation was to be resorted to”.⁴ Thus, Arthashastra, a practical exposé on political realism, establishes a well-defined relationship between statecraft and warfare – the fact that the later is an integral part of the former. Further, in the context of the war waging, Kautilya had also referred to the “Seven Strengths of the State” much in the same vein as “Comprehensive National Power” is being spoken of now.⁵ It was a few centuries later that the writings on Nitishastra dilated on the principles of use of force in furtherance of external duress and internal politics.

The Art of War by the scholarly Chinese general Sun Tzu predates Kautilya by about a century. His masterly work, laid out in thirteen chapters, starts with the basic premise that “Warfare is the greatest affair of the state.” In the text that follows he describes war as “The province of life and death; road to survival or ruin” and goes on to recommend that it be thoroughly studied. He then proceeds to articulate that the option of war should be exercised as the last resort after all other efforts and diplomatic initiatives have failed.

As an interesting aside it must be mentioned here that more than two thousand years later Adolf Hitler made a similar statement – “When diplomacy ends, war begins.”

Aforesaid aside apart, what is more important is Sun Tzu’s pronouncement that “The supreme art of war is to subdue enemy without fighting”.⁶ Thus, Sun Tzu is in favour of retaining a strong army as a ‘threat in being’ while employing deception and other stratagem to overpower the enemy. In short, The Art of War must be acclaimed for incisive clarity on matters military and for commenting on the political relevance of war.

Both Sun Tzu and Kautilya were votaries of military power. Yet, stylistic differences of expressions apart, both of them were convinced that the path of a conqueror lay between war and diplomacy. It is interesting to note that, by sheer coincidence, it was only in the first decade of the twentieth century that the authoritative translations of both Sun Tzu and Kautilya’s works came to light.

Apparently, the times of Sun Tzu and Kautilya were also of great intellectual vigour in the civilisations flourishing elsewhere. For, about the same time, there were other learned ones in the Greco-Roman world expounding their views on the state and the statesmanship. Aristotle’s Politics soon followed Plato’s Republic. They did not directly address the subject of war yet their writings were way ahead of their times – addressing the norms for democracy, social justices, freedom of speech and so on. More importantly, and in the context of this write up, they both had placed the relevance of military power within the over-arching import of affairs of the state. Later historians were to record that “Rome’s empire was built by arms and diplomacy and sustained by Rome’s intelligent rule - - - -”.⁷ In the similar vein, Julius Caesar, the famous Roman politician and General (Gen) who set in motion the rise of the Roman Empire, was surprised to note that all conquering Alexander the Great did not regard it as a greater task to set in order the empire which he had won, than to win it.

As a follow up of the foregoing sweep of the ancient politico-military thoughts, it would be appropriate to pause for a while on the medieval era. Therein the works of Niccolo Machiavelli, the Italian thinker of the renaissance period, merit a mention. He was a diplomat and a political theorist of repute. Two of his books, Discourses and The Prince, were published in the early sixteenth century. Whereas the first one was essentially a sally of political thoughts, the second one was more in the nature of a comprehensive guide for a King. Machiavelli comes across to decidedly view all affairs of the state through the military lens, and also of the firm opinion that only through military means can a ruler preserve his kingdom and ensure stability within. Not surprisingly, therefore, in Chapter 15 of the book, which essentially deals with the war-craft, he states that “A prince must have no other objective, nor other thought, nor take up any profession other than war - - - - for that is the only art expected of a ruler”. Because of the many similarities of his ideas, he has often been compared to Kautilya.

In the more recent past, Carl Von Clausewitz (1770 -1831) has vastly contributed to the art and science of war. He was a Prussian general and a strategist who first saw action against the French revolutionaries. During his long and illustrious career, he did a short stint with the Russian Army and was also the Chief of Staff of a Prussian Corps that fought the battle of Waterloo. Later, as a Major General (Maj Gen), he headed the War Academy in Berlin for twelve long years where he found time for his scholarly pursuits. His well-deliberated formulations, albeit partly unfinished, titled On War, were published soon after his death in 1831.

He maintained that a war could be fought successfully only by the ‘remarkable trinity’ of the people, the political masters and the army. In contrast to the long held view of measured restraint as an essential aspect of war waging, he advocated the concept of total war – application of full combat potential, and all instruments of state power – for a complete victory. As events showed, his ideas greatly influenced the war waging techniques of the coming generations. His basic premise that “War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means”⁸ is of course well known. What is not oft quoted is “Consequently, the main lines of every strategic plan are largely political in nature and their political character increases more the plan applies to the entire campaign - - - -”.⁹

The centrality of the political leadership in war, was aptly summed up by Georges Benjamin Clemenceau – he was the wartime Prime Minister (PM) of France during World War I (WW-I) – by saying that “La guerre! C’est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaries” – War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men. ¹⁰ In the same vein, in an interview to the prominent British journalist James Cameron, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had said “Wars are fought to gain a certain objective. War itself is not the objective; victory is not the objective; you fight to remove the obstruction that comes in the way of your objective.” ¹¹ Nehru also believed that “A theory must be tempered with reality.”

The writings of the noted British military historian and theorist, Captain (Capt) B H Liddell Hart are also explicit on the subject of the primacy of the political aims of the war. For, according to him, grand strategy is “Practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war” and its role is “To co-ordinate and direct all of the resources of a nation - - - - toward the attainment of the political object of the war.” ¹² Mao Zedong was even more forthright in his belief that “Politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed.”

Coming to the more recent writings, the opening sentence of “The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations” edited by Robert J Art and Kenneth N Waltz, long considered a classic in its own right, reiterates that “Military power plays a crucial role in the international politics because states co-exist in a state of anarchy”. ¹³ The quote clearly establishes the primacy of political impulses in the application of military power.

Aforesaid references to the noted works of the learned ones are by no means complete. There have been others of repute who have discussed and debated these issues with all the seriousness and have left behind their insightful politico-military thoughts on war, statecraft and their place in the overarching influence of the political compulsions. Their weighty discourses and writings were definitive enough to guide while remaining flexible enough to accommodate situational constraints and also to exploit opportunities of the settings.

All these studied outpourings of the learned ones have some common strains. They all were convinced that absolute non-violence in politics was not possible and that recourse of a war may at times be necessary in furtherance of the political aim(s). Therefore, while remaining firm in their belief of having a strong sword arm of the state, they all advocated war only as the last resort. Also that, since ...