Mise en jeu and Mise en geste
[The mise en geste of a character]
Back in the day Freud created quite a stir, proclaiming (demonstrating and substantiating) that a slip of the tongue and âfalse actionâ [Fehlhandlung] are in reality neither a slip of the tongue nor false action, but oneâs true intentions breaking through âmasking actionâ [Deckhandlung], by whichâowing to outward conditions, demands and circumstancesâthey are obscured, disguised, ârepressedâ.
Along the same lines Konstantin Sergeevich [Stanislavsky] preached âsubtextâ as the current of true meaning running parallel to the superficially conventional course of dialogue: true agenda under the cover of absolute appearances.
(Hemingway with his dialogues practically hits you over the head with it, whereas Chekhov gets there with impeccable understatement.)
With Konstantin Sergeevich said phenomenon is not tinged with the aggressive hues of ârepressionâ, as in Freud, but the two are doubtless related.
Konstantin Sergeevich is, moreover, lacking the idea of these repressed motives âbreaking throughâ the surface.
Still, the palm of primacy is bestowed squarely upon âsubtextâ, peeking through the layers (the vestments) of visible text.
Subtext, as far as the Art Theatre is concerned, determines much of âwhat gets actedââand thatâs that.
And to a certain extent âwhat gets stagedâ, but only within the limits of âwhat gets actedâ.
The fact that this same phenomenon must extendâbeyond the actorâs psychological content and hence that of his actionsâto the totality of plastic, spatial and aural expression (realisation), of action as well as all the other elements of a production as a whole, is essentially ignored by these schools of thought.
Generally speaking, this is what happens in real lifeâwhen we act. The difficulty arises when spontaneous action or intention must be furnished with motivationâjustification.
This may be readily observed in an experimental setting.
There is a very simple hypnotistâs trick.
Under hypnosis the subject is ordered to perform a certain task at a specific time after he is revived.
Upon waking he will do just that, precisely at the appointed time.
I remember one such experiment in Minsk.
A young lady was put to sleep. She was ordered to open the window precisely seventeen minutes after she came to.
She did.
Nothing âmagicalâ about it.
Merely a difference in degree. For through hypnosis one is able to âneutraliseâ those strata of consciousness, those nodes or areas of the brain that regulate (stimulate, retard, mobilise to counteraction, etc.) the automatic response, i.e., everything that resists unconditional, automatic execution of external âcommandsâ.
Likewise, the basic goal of military âdrillingâ is to remove any rational intermediate between a command and its direct (reflex) fulfilment.
This must be so automatised as to be more powerful and more effective than any other external stimulus, which might ânormallyâ dictate very different behaviour (basicallyâthe efficacy of a command despite the instinct of self-preservationâas in an attackâto rush under a âhail of bulletsâ or âcharge the bayonetsâ).
There is very little room for reflection here; and the same is true of ideological âintoxicationâ (similarly effecting automatisation of physical behaviourâby way of . . . self-hypnosis) or common physical intoxication, which impairs the analytical and rational faculties.
Roughly speaking, hypnosis paralyses the rationalising, self-determining faculty.
It achieves âabsolute obedienceâ.
Nor is there any mystery in its âperfect timingâ: this is an innate quality, suppressed by higher-order functions, but easily trained to operate with utmost precision (just as the eye may be trained to judge distances with precision to rival measuring instruments; just as there is âperfect pitchâ, etc.âhere we have âperfect timingâ).
It is thought that the âsense of timeâ is to be found in the organism not in the mechanisms responsible for âhigher nervous activityâ nor in its more primitive branches [succursales] but in the most basic strataâin the tissues.
The most curious aspect of this whole process, however, is the work of motivation performed by the patient as the appointed time draws nearâparticularly if the assigned task is counterintuitive in given circumstances (which is typically the case!).
Our young lady did not simply open the window; rather, a few minutes beforehand she became quite agitated.
At last she blurted out: âIsnât it stuffy in here!?â (though it was nothing of the sort!)âat which point she made a beeline for the window.
The more âabsurdâ the task, the more preposterous and more conspicuous the process of motivation will be.
So it is in real life, only somewhat more complex, so that the work of subtext and its dressing-up in âmotivesâ may range from the unconscious act to the calculated and deliberate masking of a true motive with a sham pretext.
Someone looking to finagle a dinner invitation will deliberately, âcasuallyâ turn the conversation to the subject of food.
Also, a man suffering from alimentary dystrophy,1 to give another example, will âunwittinglyâ, âin spite of himselfâ, steer the conversation back to food again and again.
The same is true of action.
The eyes of a hungry man, who has come on some unrelated business, will invariably be drawn to whatever food happens to be laid out on the table.
Put a man in front of a mirror andâno matter what he might be doingâyou will witness his gaze returning obsessively to his own reflection.
Now.
Every motive has the habit of expressing itself directly in action (later we shall see how actionâby way of pars pro totoâmay be reduced to . . . a line of action, its âschematic representationââat which point we will be dealing with . . . the line of mise en scène!).
A young man has married a girl, and for the first time he brings her to his room.
Closing the door after her, he explains to her that the door is fitted with a âFrenchâ lock.
âLocks by itselfâ.
This is âempty informationâ and âthere is nothing to actâ here, until we find a psychological key to this . . . lockâto this talk of the lock.
This âkeyâ is two-fold.
We find it first in the young manâs character.
And second, in the storyline.
The young man (I mean the young man and the scene from Vinogradskayaâs screenplay2)âMakogonâturns out to be a selfish, possessive type.
And soon the clash of character will drive the young woman (the heroine in this story) to leave him. (Personal drama behind the events of the plot.)
The âcloisteringâ mentality, directed at the young woman, whom he has âtakenâ as wifeâis entirely characteristic of the young man.
The lock, âlocking awayâââsurfacesâ in the very first conversation. (Makogon exhibits traces of the same mentality that keeps womenââmasterâs propertyââlocked up in harems.)
But the immediate motiveâto lock away personal property (acquired by way of marriage)âis displaced, its tawdry aspect neutralised by this explanation of the locking properties of this specialâto a simple girl from the countryside outright exoticâlock.
(A detail such as this safety lock in the door is ârevealingâ of Makogonâs character.)
How to act this episode? How to stage the action?
The secret to effective mise en scèneâas opposed to life, which is largely a matter of abridgment and elisionâis to unfold on stage the entire process (see our discussion of negating gesture, which explains the whole method in a nutshellâreclaiming the process from the binomial of logic and restoring it to the trinomial of dialectic: from intentionâexecution to the negation of negation3).
What will this look like in our case?
The whole of the interior process taking place inside Makogon must be transposed into action.
What âgets actedâ is not the scripted piece of âinformationâ about the lock, but the whole process that leads up to it.
The Art Theatre is aware of this on the level of âactionââusing an internal process to arrive at correct delivery.
We must do the same more broadly, on the level of mise en scène.
We say: it is in Makogonâs nature to lock up the girl in a terem4 (to use a more familiar term than harem).
Corresponding act: lock the door (shut her in).
Action: closing the door, turn the lock.
There are two possible interpretations: a deliberate locking of the door and the involuntary (automatic) kind.
Which interpretation shall we follow?
How are they different?
They correspond to different nuances of character. Our choice then will be determined by the nuance that we wish to impute to Makogon.
The first option is somewhat crass. Entirely crass, rather. Primitive and prurient, if you will. It will effectively read as: ânow that weâre married, letâs jump into bedâ.
The second one is better. Flicking the lock automatically. Shutting himself in is probably in Makogonâs nature generally. Let us follow the second option.
We have also said that the remark about the lockâs special properties is a sort of âcamouflageâ, masking the true motive of the action around the lock.
For this âcamouflageâ to appear, it must be made necessary. Necessary to mask the true motive. To hide the true motive behind seemingly innocuous âinformationâ.
Where shall we look for this necessity? To be sure, in her action.
She is overwhelmed by the âopulenceâ of his privateâfrom now on their sharedâroom.
The lock clicks.
It snaps her out of her daze.
Naturally, her attention turns towards the lock.
To be sure, there is no âsuspicionâ on her part.
This lack of suspicion will serve all the more elegantly to cue his âmaskingâ comment, intended not so much to neutralise her actual suspicion as to disguise his assumption that she must suspect him.
(The way a guilty man always imagines that he is being watched.) Hence a certain hastiness to âcover upâ the whole business with an explanation.
A moment to steady his nerves, then a pointedly calm and didactic account of the locking mechanism.
To emphasise this even further, she will, of course, ignore his explanations, absorbed once more in her enraptured survey of the room.
Incidentally, to stress the lyrical rather than materialistic nature of her delight, the actual âopulenceâ of the room must be made if not exactly squalid, then at least as mindlessly conventional, uncomfortable and cramped as possible.
Thus the impulse to project internal conflict into sensible form, sensible fact, can generate a concrete situationâa unit of action, embodying and revealing the internal emotional mechanisms of particular characters in particular circumstanc...