First then, it is clear that if we know the causes by which
constitutions are destroyed we also know the causes
by which they are preserved.
Aristotle1
Democracies, Karl Popper noticed, are countries, the âgovernments of which we can get rid without bloodshedâ. The philosopher went on to observe that in these, âthe social institutions provide means by which the rulers may be dismissed [peacefully], and the social traditions ensure that these institutions will not be easily destroyed by those who are in powerâ2. The question in this book is if the currently existing democracies have âsocial traditionsâ that are strong enough to withstand those who may want to destroy them. Or, are we witnessing a period of what the political scientist Larry Diamond has called, âDemocratic regressionâ?3 To answer this question the book looks at histories of earlier democratic breakdowns to answer the question: when is democracy in danger of withering away?
One of the most conspicuous facts about demagogues is that they often have followers who follow them without a hint of criticism and believe that these individuals have an almost supernatural ability to âmake their countries greatâ. This is nothing new. In fact, one of the earliest sociological analyses, written at the beginning of the 20th century, focussed on this.
In his famous book Economics and Society, the German sociologist Max Weber (1864 â 1920), wondered why people obey orders and accept that others rule over them. In traditional societies â under feudalism and in certain tribes â the reason was tradition. One group of people, say, the elders or the chiefs, had always ruled, and people living in these societies, just accepted traditions, âby virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and powersâ4.
But as societies became more modern, they also tended to become more rational, based on expert-knowledge, technology and decisions by governments were based on legal rules, which themselves were established by âthose elevated to authorityâ, but it was âfundamentally domination through knowledgeâ5. This society is characterised by âthe rule of lawâ, and by rational arguments which were ultimately based on scientific or rationalised knowledge. Weber himself was one of the experts. Trained as a lawyer, and a full professor at a distinguished university, he was not a man of the people. And, yet, he was aware that the purely rational-bureaucratic state could appear stale, and he accepted that in âbureaucratic organisations, the holders of power ⌠have a tendency to make use [of their knowledge] to increase their power still furtherâ6. It was under these circumstances that a third type of rule could emerge. Sometimes the people, or more commonly a segment of them, would place their trust in, what Weber called, âEin charismatischer FĂźhrerâ â âa charismatic leaderâ. Readers who do not speak German might misinterpret this term. The noun âFĂźhrerâ, in English (and other languages), has become synonymous with the Third Reich. That, however, is not the case. In German the word, while used by the Nazis, has no such connotations and means simply âleaderâ. Yet, Weberâs Charismatiker (to use a synonym) was an extraordinary personality; someone who for sometimes irrational reasons was able to spellbind and mesmerize his followers.
This charismatic leader was not necessarily an extraordinary individual, âWhat is alone important is how the individual is ⌠regarded by those subjects to charismatic authority, by his âfollowersâ and âdisciplesâ.â In part, people would follow this individual because he â in their eyes â had performed a miracle, but that was not, said Weber, the essential matter. Rather, for those who choose to follow a charismatic individual, the reason for the devotion stems from âthe conception that it is the duty of those subject to charismatic authority to recognize its genuineness and act accordinglyâ. And, he went on, âpsychologically this recognition is a matter of complete personal devotion, arising out of enthusiasm, or of fear and hopeâ7.
There are more than superficial similarities between this portrait of the âcharismaticâ leader and modern-day leaders like Trump. The followers of the 45th President of the United States too were â in many cases, at least, driven by âpersonal devotionâ, which as motivated out of âenthusiasmâ (like at his rallies), and âfearâ (of losing livelihood and status), and the âhopeâ that this extraordinary leader will use his magic powers to save them.
One might consider Weber as prescient when he wrote that, for the followers of the charismatic leaders,
Charismatic domination means a rejection of all ties to any external order in favor of the exclusive genuine mentality of the prophet and hero. Hence, its attitude is revolutionary and transvalues everything; it makes a sovereign break with all traditional or rational norms8.
But, in fact, he was just writing about leaders, who shared the same traits that always characterise these politicians. The followers of Lenin in Weberâs day were rather similar to those who put their trust in Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, Turkeyâs president Erdogan, and the former US President Donald Trump.
From the outside, this devotion to the charismatic leader could and would appear irrational, especially when contrasted to the rational-bureaucratic state where everything is âbound to intellectually analysable rulesâ9. For those who see it as their duty to follow the charismatic leader, the virtue of his leadership (and it tends to be a man) is that his âauthority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rulesâ10. Hence all rational arguments fall on deaf ears, and the charismatic ruler is always given the benefit of the doubt by his followers and viewed with incomprehension by his opponents. When he has not performed miracles, or just not delivered, there is always an excuse, and the reason is always conspiracies against him. Hence those who follow a charismatic leader â whether a religious prophet or in this case a politician â seek affirmation. And, hence they select information that is congruent with their previously established perceptions. In the words of a recent study, âpopulist voters self-select media content that actively articulates the divide between the âinnocentâ people and âculpritâ othersâ.11
To ignore this appeal â and to be blind to the rather uninspiring system of a rational bureaucratic state governed by experts â is something established democratic politicians (and those who endorse this system) do at our peril. To understand why countries, fall prey to demagogues, and sometimes go on to become dictatorships, we need to appreciate and empathize with followers who bring would-be tyrants to power. This does not mean that we have to agree with them, let alone concede to their demands. Empathy, it has been said, is the ability to step into someone elseâs shoes and then step out again12. If we just say that those who follow a charismatic leader are unintelligent, if you do as Hilary Clinton, who publicly stated that âyou could put half of Trump's supporters into what I call the basket of deplorablesâ, then you are likely to miss the point and suffer the consequences.
But why is it that some people feel tempted to follow a charismatic leader? Weber hinted at the answer by saying that they do so out of âenthusiasmâ or of âdespair and hopeâ. But he did not elaborate.
Others who have written about demagogues and despots have answered this question. And the recurrent theme is hurt pride. Like today, many coups and overthrows of democracy, whether the ones in Ancient Athens and Rome, or more recently, like in the past century, were often instigated by individuals who claimed to speak on behalf of the people.
The breakdown of democracies â or, as they used to be called, republics â is not a novel subject of inquiry. The great minds who have pondered the issue range from Plato to Hannah Arendt, and in between the likes of Aristotle, Alexander Hamilton and Karl Marx, to name but a few.
Many of them were not optimistic. âDemocraciesâ, wrote James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 10, âhave ever been spectacles of turbulence and contentionâ, and he later went on, âthey have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deathsâ13. Whether the process was slow or fast, was generally contentious. Some â and the Fourth President of the United States was one of them â believed that the process was swift, and that republics would soon fall prey to demagogues. Madison would have been pleasantly surprised that the American republic has lasted over 240 years.
James Madison was a keen scholar, and he was well-versed in the classic theories of earlier democracies. One of them was developed by Aristotle â the one-time tutor to Alexander the Great (356 â 327BC). Citing examples of how democracy had been brought down in Rhodes, and of how Thrasymachus had brought down the democratic government in Cyme (present-day Kimy in Greece), the ancient Macedonian philosopher concluded that breakdowns of democracies were caused by âthe insolence of the demagoguesâ, and that âthe largest number of the tyrants of early days have risen from being leaders of the peopleâ.14
One of the things that writers â philosophers as well as political scientists â focused on when writing about these populist demagogues was that they appealed to a particular segment of society, namely those who felt they were left out and somehow forgotten by the so-called âelitesâ. Hannah Arendt found, in line with contemporary social scientists, that the ones who vote for demagogues tend to be the ones who come from âapparently indifferent people whom all other parties had given up as too apathetic or too stupid for their attentionâ15. That those who supported Brexit and voted for Donald Trump in 2016 fit the bill may not go unnoticed, but it is premature to draw conclusions about this yet16.
Needless to say, one cannot equate the past with the present, but the similarity is striking. But, perhaps more importantly, Arendt went on to say, âWhat convinces the masses are not facts, not even invented factsâ17.
But the problem in dictatorships â and in societies that are governed by demagogues who may become tyrants â is that the leaders of these states wilfully distort facts, create confusion, and thrive on the uncertainty thereby created. Some scholars using quantitative methods have even found evidence that voters cherish, what they call âthe authentic appeal of the lying demagogueâ18.
Democracy cannot exist in such societies. At least not in the long run. For these systems of government are based on âthe forceless force of the better argumentâ, as the German philosopher JĂźrgen Habermas has called it19. The idea is that we all through rational debate, facts and evidence, test propositions, and then vote for parties whose ideas win approval in the court of public opinion. These partiesâ policies are then implemented by elected representatives20. Their policies, in turn, are tested in the real world. Come election time two to five years later, there is a debate about whether the governmentâs policies have worked. And, if the discussion reveals that the government has not done a good job, then it is booted out by the voters. Democracy is a system where you can change the government without violence but by voting.
It has been widely believed that the barrier to progress was knowledge. W. E. B. Du Bois, the great African American writer, believed that âthe ultimate evil was stupidityâ, and that, âthe cure for it was knowledge based on scientific investigationâ21. Yet, in many ways, it seems that the opposite is true in the cases when countries have succumbed to dictatorships. In fact, it coul...