What Makes Us Think?

A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain

Jean-Pierre Changeux, Paul Ricoeur, M. B. DeBevoise

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN:
  9780691092850
  9780691009407
• eBook ISBN:
  9780691238265
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Mind & Body in Philosophy

Will understanding our brains help us to know our minds? Or is there an unbridgeable distance between the work of neuroscience and the workings of human consciousness? In a remarkable exchange between neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux and philosopher Paul Ricoeur, this book explores the vexed territory between these divergent approaches--and comes to a deeper, more complex perspective on human nature.


Ranging across diverse traditions, from phrenology to PET scans and from Spinoza to Charles Taylor, What Makes Us Think? revolves around a central issue: the relation between the facts (or "what is") of science and the prescriptions (or "what ought to be") of ethics. Changeux and Ricoeur ask: Will neuroscientific knowledge influence our moral conduct? Is a naturally based ethics possible? Pursuing these questions, they attack key topics at the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience: What are the relations between brain states and psychological experience? Between language and truth? Memory and culture? Behavior and action? What is a mental representation? How does a sign relate to what it signifies? How might subjective experience be constructed rather than discovered? And can biological or cultural evolution be considered progressive? Throughout, Changeux and Ricoeur provide unprecedented insight into what neuroscience can--and cannot--tell us about the nature of human experience.


Changeux and Ricoeur bring an unusual depth of engagement and breadth of knowledge to each other's subject. In doing so, they make two often hostile disciplines speak to one another in surprising and instructive ways--and speak with all the subtlety and passion of conversation at its very best.

1 - A Necessary Encounter

Knowledge and Wisdom

Jean-Pierre Changeux: You are a well-known and admired philosopher. I am a scientist. My professional career has been devoted to the theoretical and experimental study of the elementary mechanisms involved in the functioning of the nervous system and, particularly, the human brain. If I seek to understand the brain by approaching it through its most microscopic structures, which is to say the molecules that compose it, this hardly excludes a desire to understand its highest functions, which traditionally come within the domain of philosophy: thought, the emotions, the faculty of knowledge, and, of course, the moral sense. As a molecular biologist I find myself confronted with a formidable problem: how to discover the relationship between these elementary molecular building blocks and highly integrated functions such as the perception of beauty and scientific creativity. After Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud there remains the conquest of the mind, one of the most formidable challenges facing science in the twenty-first century.

Since the most ancient antiquity, philosophers have argued about what traditionally in France is called l’esprit—not l’Esprit with a capital E, or “Spirit,” but what Anglo-American authors mean by “mind.” Even though our respective positions may seem as far removed from each other as they could be, the encounter between philosophy and neurobiology seems to me not merely welcome but necessary. I have enormous admiration for your work. I have not found many authors in France—perhaps owing to the fault of my own ignorance—who have thought as deeply about the problems of morality and ethics as you have. Why should we not work together to try to construct a common discourse on these topics? Perhaps we shall not succeed. But our attempt will at least have the value of identifying points of agreement and, still more importantly, of exposing areas of disagreement and throwing into relief the gaps that one day or another will have to be filled.

Paul Ricoeur: I wish to respond to your words of welcome with an equally warm greeting addressed to a renowned man of science and the author of Neuronal Man,¹ a work worthy of the closest and most respectful attention.

What we are undertaking is a discussion, in the strong sense of the word. It is motivated first by a difference in our approach to the phenomenon of human life that has to do with our training, respectively, as a scientist and a philosopher. But it is motivated also by a desire, if not to resolve the differences related to this difference in our points of view, at least to raise them to a level of argumentation permitting the reasons of one to be regarded as plausible by the other, which is to say worthy of being defended in the context of an exchange governed by an ethic of debate—what the philosopher Jürgen Habermas calls Diskursethik.

I want to make my position clear at the outset. I am a partisan of a current of European philosophy that contains three distinctive approaches, typically referred to as “reflective philosophy,” “phenomenology,” and “hermeneutics.” The first approach, reflectivity, emphasizes the mind’s attempt to recover its power of acting, thinking, and feeling—a power that has, so to speak, been buried or lost—in the knowledge, practices, and feelings that exteriorize it in relation to itself. Jean Nabert is the leading representative of this first branch of the tradition to which I belong.

The second, phenomenology, refers to the ambition of going back “to things themselves,” which is to say to the manifestation of what presents itself to experience as the least encumbered of all the constructions inherited from cultural, philosophical, and theological history. This concern, by contrast with the reflective approach, lays stress on the intentional dimension of theoretical, practical, and aesthetic life and defines all consciousness as a consciousness of something. Husserl is the eponymous champion of this branch.

The third term, hermeneutics, refers to an approach that derives from the interpretive method applied first to religious texts (exegesis), classical literary texts (philology), and legal texts (jurisprudence), and stresses the plurality of interpretations associated with what may be called the reading of human experience. The masters of this third branch, which challenges the claim of any philosophy to be devoid of presuppositions, are Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer.

Henceforth I will use the generic term “phenomenology” to designate the philosophical tradition that I represent in this discussion in each of its three branches—reflective, descriptive, interpretive.

Changeux: In my case the experience of belonging to the world of scientific research, and more particularly of biological research, has profoundly influenced my thinking.

While still quite young, as a student, I took part in what might be called the molecular biology movement. Its aim, in the 1960s, was to elucidate the structure and function of the molecules that are situated at the ultimate boundaries of life. This program met with success, as is well known,² and led to further research. Certain of these molecules, called allosteric proteins, possess a crucial and dual feature: they serve, on the one hand, to determine a particular biological function, for example a chemical synthesis; on the other hand, they obey a signal that regulates this function. These proteins introduce flexibility into cellular life, acting as switches that help to coordinate the functions of the cell but also to promote the cell’s adaptation to the conditions surrounding it.³ To understand in strictly physico-chemical terms biological functions that are essential to the life of the cell has been, and continues to be, the objective of a tradition of research of considerable scope and vitality with which I enthusiastically align myself.

More unexpected was the demonstration that followed. The brain was shown to possess molecules that are very similar to these bacterial switches—receptors of chemical substances known as neurotransmitters that assist communication between nerve cells.⁴ Our cerebral functions, from the most modest to the most elevated, are also rooted in physico-chemical nature by virtue of the fact that they are mediated by these molecular switches.

The extreme complexity of cerebral organization and its development became accessible to the methods of molecular biology by the end of the 1960s, opening up a second line of research. It was no longer possible to think of the brain as a computer composed of circuits prefabricated by the genes. To the contrary, connections between nerve cells are gradually established over the course of development by a process of trial and error. The selection and elimination of such connections are regulated to a substantial degree by the newborn infant’s interaction with the environment and with itself. In short, the brain cannot be viewed as a strictly genetic machine; it incorporates, within a defined genetic envelope peculiar to the species, a series of nested “epigenetic” imprints that are established by variation and selection.⁵ Another way of stating this hypothesis is to say that evolutionary (epigenetic) competition inside the brain takes over from the biological (genetic) evolution of species and creates, as a consequence, organic links with the physical, social, and cultural environment. A very fruitful interface is produced in an entirely natural way, then, with the human sciences and society.

A third line of research, so far theoretical for the most part, relies on the new methods of modeling made possible by computer technology to try to further exploit our still quite partial knowledge of the functional organization of the brain. It consists, for instance, in devising the simplest plausible neural architectures that constitute a formal, or artificial, organism capable of carrying out a defined cognitive learning task. Two features distinguish this approach. On the one hand, it is “neurorealist” in the sense that it appeals only to known elementary components of the brain, for example the molecular receptors of neurotransmitters I have already mentioned; on the other, it tries to define the minimal degree of complexity that a network of nerve cells capable of carrying out specifically human tasks must possess.⁶ The theoretical program consists in trying to give an account, in a rigorously formal way, of a behavior defined on the basis both of the anatomical organization of a network of nerve cells and of the activity that takes place in this network. This enterprise, known as connectionism, has illustrious antecedents: the cybernetics of Norbert Wiener, the universal computing machine conceived by Alan Turing, and the first neural network model developed by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts to represent the “embodiment of mind.”⁷

As a member of the faculty of the Collège de France, I am required to present the current state of knowledge in my field, which is continually evolving, in a didactic form. Neuronal Man, to which you referred a moment ago, represented a synthesis of my first seven years of lectures. Its aim was to make the dazzling progress of the sciences of the brain more widely known. I realize today that this attempt to organize the available knowledge regarding the brain, from the molecule to mental activity, has had a powerful retroactive effect on my own conception of the brain and its functions. In this regard I share with René Thom the view that what counts in the modeling process is its ontological import, its impact on our conception of the origin of things and beings—in other words, its underlying philosophy. While writing Neuronal Man I discovered Spinoza’s Ethics and the full rigor of his thought. “I shall consider human actions and appetites,” Spinoza says, “just as if it were an investigation into lines, planes, or bodies.”⁸ Can anything more exciting be imagined than to try to reconstruct human life in a way that rejects teleology, that rejects anthropocentrism, that rejects all conceptions of the world that take shelter in religious superstition—what Spinoza called the “refuge of ignorance”? This reading came to complete and enrich my acquaintance with the pre-Socratic philosophers. I have always been and remain still very attached to Democritus, in particular, among the ancient atomists.

None of this suffices to explain the very marked interest I have in ethical questions, which led me to read your work Oneself as Another.⁹ The decisive event was a talk I gave on the neurosciences shortly after Neuronal Man appeared to a working group of the Comité Consultatif National d’Éthique dans les Sciences de la Vie et de la Santé, the committee that advises the French government on issues in bioethics. In the very lively debate that followed I found myself driven into a corner. How can neuronal man be a moral subject? I have not ceased since to reflect upon this question, to make a serious attempt to give new meaning to an ethics of the good life—a joyful, humanist ethics compatible with the free exercise of reason. It is this attempt that sparked my interest in talking with you today.

The cleavage between scientists and philosophers is relatively recent. In antiquity, philosophers such as Democritus and Aristotle were also excellent observers of nature; mathematicians such as Thales and Euclid were philosophers as well. With the Hippocratics, a rational medicine grew up alongside the shamanistic medicine (or medicine not far removed from shamanistic traditions) that was still dominant in ancient Greece. Rationality came to be introduced into the domain of traditional medicine with the rejection of all assumptions of magical or divine intervention and the search for natural causes. The physician made a diagnosis and, on the basis of this, proposed a treatment, a course of medication. Instead of hunting demons, a pharmocological agent was now employed to attack material causes of illnesses. No longer a demiurge, the physician was now a rationalistic and scientific philosopher.¹⁰

The cleavage between scientists, philosophers, and artists occurred after the Renaissance, though one still finds during this period artist-scientists such as Leonardo da Vinci and later, in the nineteenth century, a certain tradition of philosophical thought among scientists—I am thinking here, for example, of Augustin Cournot and Henri Poincaré and, more recently, Jacques Monod. On the other hand, a tradition of interest in scientific knowledge has been carried on in philosophy by William James, Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and, in our own time, by philosophers such as John Searle, Daniel Dennett, and Paul and Patricia Churchland.

Ricoeur: I think of Georges Canguilhem, also Gaston Bachelard. For me, Canguilhem’s La Connaissance de la vie¹¹ is an important point of reference. Canguilhem was both a philosopher and physician. He showed how human beings structure their environment and project “vital values” that give meaning to their behavior. They thus manage to inaugurate a normativity that is distinct from the operation of physical law. As for Bachelard, he recognized in La Formation de l’esprit scientifique¹² a distinct form of inventiveness related to the power of “epistemological rupture” but comparable to poetic creation.

Changeux: Bachelard examined the mental activity of the scientist in a particularly original way, it is true. One might also cite the dialogue between Karl Popper and John Eccles, the one a philosopher and the other a neurobiologist, as it happens. In their joint work The Self and Its Brain¹³ one finds an entire program worked out, in fact.

Ricoeur: They tried to construct a philosophical system that organized in a hierarchical way the levels at which the sciences of the brain and the philosophy of mind interact. No doubt we will encounter this problem quite often in our discussion as well.

Changeux: Yes. We have therefore at least one relatively recent example of dialogue between a philosopher and a neurobiologist. Eccles’s approach was different from mine, however. He was interested in the electrical activity of the nerve cell and of groups of neurons. The point of departure for his thinking was therefore at a level more organized than that of the molecule, which may explain some of the differences between our points of view. Eccles was also perhaps one of the last neurobiologists to believe in the dualism of mind and brain.

Knowledge of the Brain and Self-Knowledge

Changeux: The exchange of views to which we both look forward turns on a question that seems to me essential, namely to what extent the spectacular progress that has been made in our understanding of the brain over the last twenty years or so will lead us to reexamine the fundamental problem of what is usually called the relation between body and mind or, as I would prefer to characterize it, the relation between the brain and thought. The past few decades have seen the emergence of an entirely new field, cognitive science, that draws upon work in physiology, molecular biology, psychology and the human sciences. It has given rise to highly promising interdisciplinary collaboration involving not only researchers in the natural sciences but also anthropologists and other social scientists. This new alliance holds out the prospect of achieving a unified and synthetic view of what was formerly a question reserved for philosophy (when it was not reserved for religion) by building upon our present state of knowledge about the brain and its functions. It now becomes possible, I would argue, for a neurobiologist to legitimately take an interest in the foundations of morality, for example, and, conversely, for a philosopher to find material for reflection, even edification, in the results of contemporary neuroscience.

The fundamental question—a philosophical question, on which I would like our debate to focus—is whether the progress of knowledge in the sciences of the nervous system, the brain, and, more generally, cognition calls for a reexamination of the crucial distinction made in the eighteenth century by David Hume, which many philosophers and scientists seem still to endorse today, between the factual—what is—and the normative—what ought to be; that is, between knowledge, in particular scientific knowledge, and moral rules. Does this distinction need still to be upheld or can we now inquire into the relationship between moral rules and nature by using our scientific knowledge of the brain and its higher functions to enrich ethical reflection? I am aware that this question, despite its importance, is a highly sensitive one. Many of our fellow citizens continue to regard morality as belonging to the domain of religion. In fact, I should think that most people believe that morality serves to protect us against science and technology. Well-intentioned persons wonder with what right a scientist can chair a committee on bioethics, as I did for six years, rather than a jurist, for example. Others challenge the very presence of scientific experts on such a committee. As a result, it is hard to see how any cooperative relationship can be established between scientists and ethicists.

Few members of the general public realize that the idea of a science of ethics is not new. It is found in the work of Auguste Comte,¹⁴ who proposed a positive morality of altruism subordinating selfish desires to sympathetic instincts that would stand as the “seventh science,” the science par excellence, uniting the natural with the scientific and the social to produce morality. Comte even went so far as to propose “phrenological physiology” as a scientific basis for morality, relying upon Gall’s notion that the seat of each innate and irreducible faculty is localized in a particular part of the brain. Comte exploited Gall’s model in order to advance the hypothesis that the more or less complex interaction of these faculties affects the emotional states that govern moral judgments.

Comte was not the only one to posit scientific laws of morality. Spencer, and after him Darwin, did so as well, though in contrary ways: Spencer emphasized the doctrine of laissez-faire and the success of the fittest at the level of society, Darwin the enlargement of sympathies and the social instinct peculiar to the human species. After them, the Russian prince Peter Kropotkin, remembered chiefly as the theoretician of anarchism, found in nature an...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Translator’s Note
• Prelude
• Chapter 1: A Necessary Encounter
• Chapter 2: Body and Mind: In Search of a Common Discourse
• Chapter 3: The Neuronal Model and the Test of Experience
• Chapter 4: Consciousness of Oneself and of Others
• Chapter 5: The Origins of Morality
• Chapter 6: Desire and Norms
• Chapter 7: Ethical Universality and Cultural Conflict
• Fugue
• Notes
• Index